Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry

RepoRt
31 July 2013
Queensland
Health
Payroll System
Commission
of Inquiry
The Honourable Richard N Chesterman AO RFD QC
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry www.healthpayrollinquiry.qld.gov.au ©Queensland
Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry 2013
The Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry supports and encourages the dissemination and
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31 July 2013
The Honourable Campbell Newman MP
Premier of Queensland
PO Box 15185
CITY EAST QLD 4002
Dear Premier
As required by the terms of Orders-in-Council of 13 December 2012 and 18 April 2013 I have made
a full and careful inquiry into the implementation of the Queensland Health Payroll System, and
present the Report of the Commission of Inquiry.
Yours faithfully
The Hon Richard Chesterman AO RFD QC
Commissioner
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
PO Box 13674 George Street QLD 4003 Telephone 1300 887 081 Fax (07) 3846 6686 Email info @healthpayrollinquiry.qld.gov.au
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ORDER (NO. 2) 2012
TABLE OF PROVISIONS
Page
Short title ……………………………………….. 1
Commencement ………………………………. 1
Appointment of Commission …………… 1
Commission to report ……………………… 1
Application of Act …………………………… 1
Conduct of Inquiry …………………………. 1
Short title
1. This Order in Council may be cited as the Commissions Of
Inquiry Order (No. 2) 2012.
Commencement
2. This Order in Council commences on 1 February 2013.
Appointment of Commission
3. UNDER the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act
1950
the Governor in Council hereby appoints the Honourable
Richard Chesterman AO RFD QC from 1 February 2013, to make
full and careful inquiry, in an open and independent manner,
into the implementation of the Queensland Health payroll
system with respect to the following matters, and having regard
to previous reviews of the Queensland Health payroll system
implementation, including the KPMG implementation review
and the Auditor-General of Queensland’s report titled
Information
systems governance and control, including the Queensland Health
Implementation of Continuity Project (2010):
a. the adequacy and integrity of the procurement, contract management,
project management, governance and implementation process;
b. whether any laws, contractual provisions, codes of conduct
or other government standards may have been breached during
the procurement and/or implementation process and who may
be accountable;
c. the contractual arrangements between the State of Queensland and
IBM Australia Ltd and why and to what extent the contract price for
the Queensland Health payroll system increased over time;
d. any recommended changes to existing procurement, contract and
project management (including governance) policies, processes,
standards and contractual arrangements for major Queensland
government information and communication technology projects
initiated in the future to ensure the delivery of high quality and cost
effective products and systems; and
e. any other matter relevant to this review.
Commission to report
4. AND directs that the Commissioner make full and faithful report
and recommendations on the aforesaid subject matter of inquiry, and
transmit the same to the Honourable the Premier by 30 April 2013.
Application of Act
5. THE provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 shall be
applicable for the purposes of this inquiry except for section 19C –
Authority to use listening devices.
Conduct of Inquiry
6. THE Commissioner may hold public and private hearings in
such a manner and in such locations as may be necessary and
convenient.
ENDNOTES
1. Made by the Governor in Council on 13 December 2012.
2. Notifi ed in the Gazette on 14 December 2012.
3. Not required to be laid before the Legislative Assembly.
4. The administering agency is the Department of Justice and
Attorney-General

Commissioner
The Honourable Richard N Chesterman AO RFD QC was admitted to practice as a barrister in 1968, and appointed
Queen’s Counsel in December 1983.
He worked in private practice as a barrister for over 27 years, during which time he practised in all areas of litigation.
He specialised in commercial work and he was widely briefed in areas including banking and fnance, insurance, and
building and construction.
Mr Chesterman was also retained as Senior Counsel assisting a Royal Commission of Inquiry in Tasmania, and
appeared in three other major public inquiries, including one as chairman.
He was appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland in March 1998, and he served as a Judge of the
Commercial List of the Supreme Court from 2002 to 2008. He was appointed to the Court of Appeal on 8 December
2008. In 2011 he was made an Offcer of the Order of Australia for distinguished service to the judiciary. He retired
in April 2012.
On 13 December 2012, by Commission of Inquiry Order (No. 2) 2012, Executive Council appointed Mr Chesterman
to make a full and careful inquiry, in an open and independent manner, into the implementation of the Queensland
Health payroll system.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
6
Table of Contents
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
1. procurement…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………15
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….15
2. Reviews of the SS Initiative ……………………………………………………………………………16
Findings of April Review ………………………………………………………………………………………………………19
Mr Burns’ May Review
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………20
Mr Bradley and Mr Burns
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….25
Findings of Burns’ May Review
………………………………………………………………………………………….26
Mr Burns and Mr Bloomfeld
………………………………………………………………………………………………27
Mr Burns and Mr Bond
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………33
Mr Burns’ New Engagement
………………………………………………………………………………………………34
3. Request for Information (RFI) ………………………………………………………………………36
4. Request for proposal (RFp)………………………………………………………………………………37
Why a Prime Contractor?…………………………………………………………………………………………………….38
Responses to RFP
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..40
Mr Atzeni’s Preference for IBM
………………………………………………………………………………………….41
Contact Between Mr Burns and IBM during the RFP
……………………………………………………43
Access to Confdential Information
………………………………………………………………………………….45
IBM’s Conduct during the RFP
………………………………………………………………………………………….46
Email of Cheryl Jensen
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..51
Email of Joseph Sullivan
………………………………………………………………………………………………………53
Mr Bloomfeld’s Bonus
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………56
5. Invitation to tender (Ito)……………………………………………………………………………….57
LATTICE…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..60
Mr Burns’ Role in the Evaluation
……………………………………………………………………………………….61
Evaluation of ITO
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….62
Workbrain
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….62
The Evaluation Changes
……………………………………………………………………………………………………..65
Suitability of Workbrain
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….71
No Probity Advisor
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..74
No Conflicts Register
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….75
Price
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….76
Evaluation Process was not Administered Properly
………………………………………………………82
Selection of Prime Contractor
…………………………………………………………………………………………….82
Execution of Contract
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..84
6. procurement: Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………..85
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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2. Contract and project Management …………………………………………………………..90
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….90
2. overview…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….92
Urgency and Scoping…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..92
Governance and Major Players
………………………………………………………………………………………….94
Implementation of the Project
………………………………………………………………………………………….96
Cost and Time
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..97
The Management Processes
………………………………………………………………………………………………98
3. the Contract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………99
4. Scoping…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….100
What was Required …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 100
Mr Atzeni
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 104
Human Resources/Finance Integration
……………………………………………………………………….. 105
Change 184
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 107
Findings
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 112
5. the Defcient System and the opportunities to Redress it………..113
User Acceptance Testing………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 114
Mr Kwiatkowski
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 120
Mr Dymock
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 121
Mr Cowan
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 123
System and System Integration Testing
………………………………………………………………………. 123
Payroll Performance Testing
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 128
The Rescoping
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 132
Mr Price’s Memorandum of 6 July 2009
……………………………………………………………………… 139
6. the Decision to Go Live………………………………………………………………………………….143
Submissions ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 150
Findings and Conclusion
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 151
Consequences for Staff of the Go Live Decision
………………………………………………………… 151
7. System Inadequacies ……………………………………………………………………………………..154
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 154
Problems Identifed in UAT
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 155
The First Three Pay Runs
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 155
Payroll Stabilisation and Improvement
……………………………………………………………………….. 159
Other Factors Contributing to the Pay Problems
……………………………………………………….. 159
IBM’s Submissions
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 161
A Defcient System
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 162
3. Settlement ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….170
1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………170
2. preliminary observations………………………………………………………………………………171
3. the Supplemental Agreement ………………………………………………………………….171
The Delay Notice……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 173
Notice to Remedy
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 175
The Options Available to the State
……………………………………………………………………………….. 178
The KPMG Advice
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 183
Negotiation is the Preferred Option
……………………………………………………………………………… 185
Grierson Meets with IBM
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 186
Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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4. Factors that Influenced the Decision ……………………………………………………194
The Auditor-General’s Report…………………………………………………………………………………………. 195
Threat by IBM to Sue
………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 197
Assessment of Risks
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 199
The Unsupported System Fear
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 200
No Risk too Small
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 201
Investigation was Lacking
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 203
No Risk of Catastrophic Collapse if IBM’s Services were to be Terminated
………… 204
5. Mr Reid …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….206
6. Mr Grierson……………………………………………………………………………………………………………208
7. Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..210
4. Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..213
5. Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………………………..217
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………….217
2. Lessons to be Learned …………………………………………………………………………………….217
3. project Management for Future projects……………………………………………..220
4. Future of the Queensland Health payroll System……………………………220
5. principles of project Management …………………………………………………………..221
Appendicies………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..225
Appendix 1
establishment and operations
…………………………………………………………………..226
Appendix 2
QH payroll System timeline
…………………………………………………………………………230
Appendix 3
opening Remarks
………………………………………………………………………………………………232
Appendix 4
Copy of public Notice
………………………………………………………………………………………244
Appendix 5
Acknowledgements
…………………………………………………………………………………………..245
Appendix 6
Inquiry Staff
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………246
Appendix 7
Legal Representatives
……………………………………………………………………………………..247
Appendix 8
exhibits List
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………248
Appendix 9
Report Glossary
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..258
9
Introduction
0. Introduction
1.1 In 2002 the then Queensland Government established the “Shared Services Initiative” (SS Initiative, or the
Initiative), the purpose of which was to amalgamate and rationalise government services across a number
of departments and agencies. The Initiative was based on the Shared Services Model, an organisational
approach which had been embraced by large corporations in the United States of America in the 1980s and
had apparently been applied to the public sector with some success
1.
1.2 The Initiative promised to deliver high quality and cost effective corporate functions across the whole-ofgovernment. It was considered by the Service Delivery and Performance Commission to be “the largest
organisational reform undertaken within the State Government”
2. Arena Organisational Consultants
(Arena) in its Strategic Review of the Initiative described it as “one of the most signifcant projects of its
type undertaken in the southern hemisphere”
3.
1.3 The Initiative was intended to produce a higher standard of corporate service functions at a lower cost to
government in providing them. A centralised agency was to take on services such as collecting monies and
paying debts, purchasing goods and services, recording those fnancial transactions and managing and
paying public servants from individual departments and agencies covered by the SS Initiative. By centralising
the workforce the number of employees engaged in those activities could be reduced or redeployed, and by
developing and implementing a uniform set of business rules a common set of computer technology and
programs could be deployed for all the agencies and departments thereby reducing acquisition and licensing
costs, bringing about simplifcation in systems and applications.
1 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.2, at page 56.
2 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.2, at page 45.
3 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1, at page 3.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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1.4 Such, at least, was the theory, which was not unique to Queensland. It was essayed in other States at about
the same time. In June 2011 the Economic Regulation Authority of Western Australia brought down its ffth
and fnal report into “ … the Benefts and Costs Associated with the Provision of Shared Corporate Services
in the public sector”. The report noted the Western Australian Initiative had incurred costs of $401M “and
achieved minimal beneft in terms of savings … ” It concluded that
4:
The history of shared corporate services projects in the public sector in Australia shows that it is a
complex process with uncertain and distant returns. While there is some evidence of successes in the
corporate sector, there has not been one fully successful implementation in the public sector of any
Australian jurisdiction.
1.5 It recommended the dismantling of the Shared Services experiment in Western Australia. With the beneft
of that State’s experience the Economic Regulation Authority explained
5:
[A]ttempting to service multiple agencies with differing needs by using a single system is very costly,
fraught with challenges, and potentially unachievable. Servicing agencies with a system that is modifed
to meet all needs results in a system that is expensive, costly to maintain and prone to error, while the
alternative of servicing agencies with a standardised product results in large integration costs being
imposed on agencies.
1.6 A history of unsuccessful attempts to improve the effciency and economy of government services is likely to
make dreary reading except, possibly, for students of public administration, but the failure of the Queensland
Health Payroll System to deliver accurately calculated fortnightly remuneration to its employees can only be
explained in the context of the attempt by the State of Queensland (the State) to provide uniform payroll
systems in all departments and agencies. The attempt by the State to implement those uniform services was
abandoned in January 2009. The design and implementation of a new payroll system for Queensland Health
(QH) was the only remnant of the SS Initiative. Its failure, attended by enormous cost, damage to government
and impact on workforce, may be the most spectacular example of all the unsuccessful attempts to impose a
uniform solution on a highly complicated and individualised agency.
1.7 I will endeavour to make the history as brief as is consistent with providing a suffcient background to
understand the reasons for the failure.
2. History of SS Initiative
2.1 The SS Initiative formally commenced on 1 July 2003 with the establishment of four Shared Services providers
and CorpTech which was a technology centre located within Queensland Treasury. In August 2005 the Shared
Services Solutions Program (SSS Program) was established and required CorpTech to design and build a
whole-of-government human resources and fnance solution with a capital budget of $125M
6. Between then
and November 2005, CorpTech undertook the evaluation of products and programs best suited to deliver
human resource and payroll services for the SS Initiative. Relevantly for the functions of payroll and rostering,
the products chosen were SAP ECC 5 and Workbrain; and for time and attendance/rostering Workbrain was
chosen. IBM Australia Ltd (IBM), which held the relevant Workbrain licences contracted with the State of
Queensland to allow the use of Workbrain and to assist with the delivery of the Workbrain products
7.
Its failure, attended by enormous cost, damage to government and impact on workforce,
may be the most spectacular example of all the unsuccessful attempts to impose a uniform
solution on a highly complicated and individualised agency.
2.2 CorpTech became the technology service provider for the whole-of-government. Its frst Executive
Director was Mr Geoffrey Waite. CorpTech had two roles. One was to provide specialist information and
communication technology advice and services in the areas of fnancial transactions and human resources
for all government departments. The other was to design and implement fnancial transaction and payroll
systems as part of the SS Initiative.
4 Economic Regulation Authority, Inquiry into the Benefts and Costs Associated with the Provision of Shared Corporate Services in the Public Sector Final Report (10 June 2011), at
page xiii, Economic Regulation Authority Western Australia <http://www.erawa.com.au >.
5 Economic Regulation Authority, Inquiry into the Benefts and Costs Associated with the Provision of Shared Corporate Services in the Public Sector Final Report (10 June 2011), at
page xiii, Economic Regulation Authority Western Australia <http://www.erawa.com.au >.
6 Exhibit 2, at page 41.
7 Exhibit 4, Volume 1A, Item 1A, at pages 1-267.

11
Introduction
2.3 QH was included within the ambit of the SS Initiative. In March of 2006 QH had transferred responsibility
for the maintenance of human resource software and hardware to CorpTech. At this time the provision
of a new computerised payroll system for its employees was thought to be urgent because the existing
system, known as LATTICE, was nearing the end of its useful life. The supplier and licensor of the system
had declared it would not service or update it after 30 June 2008
8 and a new enterprise bargain under
negotiation between QH and its employees would add to the complexities of payroll calculation which
LATTICE could not accommodate.
2.4 CorpTech made little progress. It engaged a large number of contractors on a “time and materials” basis
to assist with its design and implementation of the solutions. Principally it dealt with Accenture Australia
Holdings Pty Ltd (Accenture) with respect to human resource and payroll programs and Logica CMG Pty Ltd
(Logica) for the delivery of fnance solutions. There were smaller numbers of contractors from SAP Australia
Pty Ltd (SAP) and a smaller number still from IBM. There were, as well, many contractors from independent
frms providing specialist services. These engagements were costly and not always effcient. Logica did
succeed in deploying fnance solutions to about 12 agencies. Payroll proved more diffcult and only one
department, Housing, was brought on line. Its payroll solution was not a complete success.
2.5 Towards the end of 2006, the SS Initiative was the subject of a review by the Service Delivery and
Performance Commission, which reported in March 2007 (the Keliher Report). The Keliher Report found that
the roll out of systems was signifcantly behind schedule and that an analysis of future costing and pricing
for the Initiative was required. It concluded that organisational change was necessary.
2.6 In response the then Under-Treasurer, Mr Gerard Bradley, commissioned a review to identify potential
courses of action. That review was delivered on 18 April 2007. Mr Terence (Terry) Burns, who became
someone of particular interest to the Inquiry, was involved in the review, and a subsequent one.
2.7 What emerged was the possibility of devolving responsibility for the design and implementation of the
SS Initiative to a single contractor. This notion was called the “Prime Contractor Model”.
2.8 The procurement process to fnd a Prime Contractor occurred in three stages. Differing terminology was
applied to each of the stages but for ease of comprehension and consistency they were designated:
a. The Request For Information (RFI);
b. The Request For Proposal (RFP); and
c. The Invitation To Offer (ITO).
2.9 The RFI took the form of an undated letter from Ms Maree Blakeney of CorpTech sent on or about 2 July
2007 to ten companies who had provided various services to CorpTech in connection with the SS Initiative.
Responses were to be sent electronically to Mr Burns by 12 July 2007.
2.10 Only four of the companies responded to the RFI. Subsequently the RFP was delivered in the form of an email
sent by Mr Burns on 25 July 2007 to IBM, Logica, Accenture and SAP, they being the respondents to the RFI.
The responses differed signifcantly in content and comprehensiveness. IBM and Accenture at least appeared
to have very different ideas on the likely outcome of the RFP process. Accenture, according to Mr Marcus
Salouk, thought it would lead to the awarding of a contract. Mr Lochlan Bloomfeld of IBM believed that the
process was inadequate for that purpose and that there would be a third stage, as there was.
2.11 The ITO was a much more detailed invitation. It was issued on 12 September 2007. Responses were received
from IBM, Accenture and Logica. SAP made the decision to “graciously withdraw from the Prime Contractor
selection process”
9.
2.12 IBM was the successful tenderer and on 5 December 2007 it and the State of Queensland executed a contract
for the provision of Shared Services to nominated departments. The replacement of QH Payroll remained a
priority. It was to be the frst system delivered. 31 July 2008 was fxed by the contract for that goal.
8 Exhibit 11, Annexure B.
9 Exhibit 49, Annexure E.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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2.13 The change of strategy was unsuccessful. By October 2008 IBM had not achieved any of the contracted
performance criteria; but it had been paid about $32M of the contract price of $98M; and it forecast that to
complete what it had contracted to undertake would cost the State of Queensland $181M
10. Accordingly the
Shared Services Solution across the whole-of-government was abandoned and IBM’s contract was reduced in
scope to providing a new payroll system for QH.
2.14 On 14 March 2010 after ten aborted attempts to deliver the new payroll system, it “went live”. It was
a catastrophic failure as all Queenslanders know. The system did not perform adequately with terrible
consequences for the employees of QH and equally serious fnancial consequences for the State. After
many months of anguished activity during which employees of QH endured hardship and uncertainty, a
functioning payroll system was developed, but it is very costly. It required about 1,000 employees to process
data in order to deliver fortnightly pays
11. It is estimated that it will cost about $1.2B over the next eight
years
12.
2.15 The replacement of the QH payroll system must take a place in the front rank of failures in public
administration in this country. It may be the worst.
The system did not perform adequately with terrible consequences for the employees of
QH and equally serious fnancial consequences for the State. After many months of
anguished activity during which employees of Queensland Health endured hardship and
uncertainty, a functioning payroll system was developed, but it is very costly. It required
about 1,000 employees to process data in order to deliver fortnightly pays
11. It is estimated
that it will cost about $1.2B over the next eight years
12.
3. Commission of Inquiry
3.1 On 13 December 2012, by Commission of Inquiry Order (No. 2) 2012, Executive Council appointed a
Commission of Inquiry to make a:
… full and careful inquiry, in an open and independent manner, into the implementation of the
Queensland Health payroll system …
Notifcation of the Order appeared in the Queensland Government Gazette on 14 December 201213.
The appointment, which took effect from 1 February 2013, and was to expire on 30 April 2013, required me
to inquire into the implementation, with respect to:
a. the adequacy and integrity of the procurement, contract management, project management,
governance and implementation process;
b. whether any laws, contractual provisions, codes of conduct or other government standards may
have been breached during the procurement and/or implementation process and who may be
accountable;
c. the contractual arrangements between the State of Queensland and IBM Australia Ltd and why and
to what extent the contract price for the Queensland Health payroll system increased over time;
d. any recommended changes to existing procurement, contract and project management (including
governance) policies, processes, standards and contractual arrangements for major Queensland
government information and communication technology projects initiated in the future to ensure the
delivery of high quality and cost effective products and systems; and
e. any other matter relevant to this review.
3.2 The three months allowed by the Order in Council proved inadequate. By Order in Council of 18 April 2013 the
time for the Commission to complete its inquiry and report was extended to 31 July 2013
14. Even the extended
term posed considerable challenges for the Commission and its staff and great credit is due to all who
contributed to completing such a large and complex task within what was, in the circumstances, a short time.
10 Exhibit 75B, Attachment 3.
11 Exhibit 1, at page 2.
12 Exhibit 1, at page 2.
13 Queensland Government Gazette, No 101, 14 December 2012, at page 543.
14 Queensland, Government Gazette, Commission of Inquiry Amendment Order (No. 3) 2013, No. 87, 19 April 2013, at page 532.

13
Introduction
3.3 The names of Commission staff, to whom I record my gratitude, appear in Appendix 6.
3.4 I express my particular appreciation to the Counsel appointed to assist my Inquiry, Mr Peter Flanagan QC,
Mr Jonathan Horton and Ms Anastasia Nicholas. The thoroughness of the Inquiry and the effciency of its
conduct were the product of their forensic skill, industry and dedication to the task they undertook. I also
acknowledge Mr David Mackie, the Secretary (Executive Director) of the Commission whose management
of the substantial Commission staff and organisational ability were instrumental in the rapid assembly of
staff, premises and resources, which allowed the Inquiry to begin work without delay.
The replacement of the QH payroll system must take a place in the front rank of failures in
public administration in this country. It may be the worst.
3.5 Because the time allowed to inquire and report was tightly limited a great deal of documentary information
had to be obtained urgently so it could be read and analysed for relevance and to identify lines of inquiry
which should be pursued. I delivered many Requirements to produce documents and to provide information
to government departments and agencies including the Crown Law offce. I was obliged to allow short
periods of time for responding. Similar demands were made upon IBM and its solicitors, Ashurst Australia.
The need to respond comprehensively and rapidly imposed considerable burdens on all those organisations.
A reorganisation of departments, the archiving of material electronically and physically and changes to
computer programs meant that the search for documents was arduous and challenging. I wish to record my
appreciation to the offcers and employees who were obliged to work long hours under pressure to comply
with the Requirements and, in particular, to the responsible offcers in the departments who oversaw and
took responsibility for the task. Because their efforts were so valuable to the work of the Commission I have
identifed them in Appendix 5 to this report.
3.6 I particularly acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of IBM in the conduct of the Commission’s
inquiry. Four of its employees who were important witnesses presently work and live outside Queensland.
I could, with some effort and expense, have compelled the attendance of witnesses from other States or
Territories of Australia but not from overseas. IBM brought, at its expense, Mr William (Bill) Doak from
Dubai, Mr Paul Hickey and Mr Nickolas Kwiatkowski from Canberra and Mr John Gower from Melbourne. I
record my appreciation for that assistance and for the cooperation of their solicitors, Ashurst Australia, in
producing many documents and a great deal of information which I requested.
3.7 I express my gratitude to Mr Salouk, formerly of Accenture, for his assistance. Early in its investigation,
Mr Salouk provided the Commission with a chronology and framework of the tender process and an early
understanding of procurement issues relevant to the Inquiry’s terms of reference. I am grateful for his time
and effort.
3.8 The Terms of Reference naturally called for an examination of the events which preceded and resulted
in the selection of IBM as the Prime Contractor for the delivery of Shared Services across Government;
the performance by the State and IBM of the contract with particular reference to the very substantial
increases in contract price and the failure to deliver a functioning payroll system; and circumstances in
which the State came to compromise any claim it may have had against IBM for its failure to deliver what
the contract promised, thus giving up any prospect of recovering its losses.
3.9 The Order in Council appointing the Commission of Inquiry obliged me to have regard to previous reviews
of the failed implementation of the payroll system. Two were mentioned particularly, the Auditor-General’s
Report “Information Systems Governance and Control, including the Queensland Health Implementation of
Continuity Project 2010”
15 to the Parliament of Queensland and a review by KPMG into the implementation
of the payroll system
16.
15 Exhibit 2.
16 Exhibit 1.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
14
3.10 No previous review dealt with the frst or third of the topics identifed earlier. No one has previously looked
at the tender process or the reasons for the abandonment of rights against IBM. There has been some
prior examination of IBM’s performance of the contract but of these only the Auditor-General’s Report
covered some of the ground investigated by this Commission. The other reviews undertaken by KPMG,
Price Waterhouse Coopers
17 and Ernst and Young18 looked at how to improve the delivery of payroll after
the catastrophe of March 2010 and what implications there were from it for the concept of whole-ofgovernment Shared Services. None undertook a forensic examination of the performance of the contract by
IBM and the State.
3.11 As the mid 20th century proverb has it, “Success has many fathers but failure is an orphan”. The truth of
the proverb was convincingly demonstrated in the statements and oral testimony given to the Commission.
Witnesses sought to reduce the importance of the roles they had played in the replacement of the payroll
system, or pointed to others who were more closely involved. Many witnesses claimed to have no memory
of important events which they observed or in which they took part. Many answers were evasive and some
were dishonest. All of this was to be expected but the evasions, failures of recollections and mendacities
increased the diffculty of the Commission’s task in obtaining a clear understanding of the reasons for
the failure of the payroll replacement implementation. A particular feature was the fact that no one
was prepared to assume responsibility for the failure (Mr Michael Kalimnios of QH being an honourable
exception). Even more remarkable was the fact that some witnesses involved in the delivery of the payroll
system proclaimed it a success.
3.12 Not every aspect of the payroll system replacement has been the subject of thorough scrutiny. I have
concentrated attention on the features which appear to have the most relevance to the Terms of Reference
and which will provide an adequate explanation of why the replacement was unsuccessful. I have also
looked at what lessons might be learned from previous mistakes so that this unhappy history need not be
repeated. The parts left unexamined would, if investigated, require a further Commission of greater length
and therefore expense without, in my estimation, any commensurate beneft.
3.13 A budget of $5M was allocated for the Inquiry. I was throughout anxious to adhere to the budget, being
conscious of the fact that it was public money being spent to investigate the implementation of a payroll
system which has cost, and is expected to cost, the taxpayer very substantially in excess of what was
contracted for. It was important to spend as little further money as possible. It was partly for that reason
that I did not pursue investigations which appeared of peripheral signifcance to an understanding of what
went wrong, or those where the time and cost of doing so would not have had proportional value.
3.14 Having determined within about a month of the Commission’s commencement that it could not be
concluded by 30 April 2013, I requested the extension to 31 July 2013 and developed a timetable for
gathering information and conducting public hearings that would allow me to complete each aspect of
the Inquiry in order according to an allocated time. Adherence to the timetable called for discipline and
commitment. It required a great deal of hard work by Counsel Assisting, Commission staff and the legal
representatives of persons given leave to appear. I record my appreciation to those representatives for their
effciency and cooperation in the conduct of the hearings. A list of persons given leave to appear, and their
legal representation, is set out in Appendix 7.
3.15 I have been able to complete the report in the time allowed and within its budget. Though I should not,
perhaps, say so, the Commission has been run effciently and economically. The credit for that should be
shared by all associated with it.
3.16 Commissions of Inquiry are important public institutions. They are rare and each is unique. Those two
features mean that each Inquiry, when established, must begin afresh in planning and organising its
investigation. Each learns valuable lessons in how to conduct an effcient Inquiry and encounters mistakes
which should not be repeated. I attach as Appendix 1 a description of how this Inquiry was conducted in
the hope that it may be of some assistance to those engaged in future similar endeavours.
3.17 I am satisfed that the Commission has been able to comply with the direction of the Executive Council and
can report accurately and fairly as to the origins and cause of the failure of the replacement of the Queensland
Health Payroll System.
17 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Shared Services Review, Review of Model for Queensland Government, September 2010 <http://www.health.qld.gov.au/qhpip/Docs/e_y_report_23nov.
pdf?bcsi_scan_a1c99feec31f2dec=0&bcsi_scan_flename=e_y_report_23nov.pdf>.
18 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at pages 357-398.

15
Procurement
1. Procurement
1. Introduction
1.1 In submissions delivered on its behalf, IBM complained that the three stages of the procurement process
which I have identifed in paragraph 2.8 (Introduction) were “a working assumption … adopted, uncritically
…”, and wrongly
1. IBM contends that the procurement process only commenced on 16 August 2007 when
the State decided to appoint a Prime Contractor and subsequently issued the ITO for that purpose. The
events preceding 16 August 2007 were described as “informal”, “casual”, and “loose”
2, forming part of a
“separate anterior process” to procurement, being reviews of the SS Initiative by Mr Burns and others
3. An
inquiry into these reviews and the “anterior process” was argued to be outside the Commission’s Terms of
Reference save to the extent that they may fall within (e), “any other matter relevant … ”
4.
1.2 The reason for the submission is readily apparent. The Inquiry uncovered several instances of serious
misconduct by IBM’s employees during the RFP and evidence of Mr Burns’ distinct partiality for IBM in the
course of his reviews. If the submission were accepted the report would omit a rehearsal of this evidence and
would not comment on its signifcance. The submission is, in any event, wrong. The process of procurement
began with the RFP on 25 July 2007 which, though slipshod and abbreviated, and probably undertaken
without proper authority, was nevertheless the frst formal step in calling tenders for a Prime Contractor. What
happened in the RFP was therefore a part of the procurement of IBM as Prime Contractor.
1.3 There is more force in the contention that Mr Burns’ reviews were prior in time and distinct in kind from the
procurement, but his intervention in the evaluation of responses to the ITO (undeniably part of procurement)
can only be understood by reference to the evidence of how he conducted his May review. For that reason
alone the “anterior processes” are relevant and necessary to the proper discharge of the Commission’s
responsibilities to investigate and report.
1 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 17.
2 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 18(a).
3 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 19.
4 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 23.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
16
1.4 The obligation to investigate the adequacy and integrity of the procurement of IBM as Prime Contractor
was given early impetus because of remarks made anonymously on public radio that the awarding of
the contract to IBM was tainted by collusion
5. The allegation was made by a woman identifed only by a
pseudonym, “Margaret”, who claimed to have been employed “with that project very early on”. She said
that IBM and CorpTech had colluded to sign a contract which allowed IBM to “make further money … by
adding to their business later”. Other tenderers were disadvantaged by reason of the fact that CorpTech,
with consultants, gave IBM information “very useful to their bid” which was withheld from the others.
Margaret claimed also that senior public servants failed to discharge their responsibilities conscientiously
and did not attend to what was occurring.
1.5 The informant expressed a willingness to co-operate with the Commission of Inquiry, if one were
established.
1.6 Shortly after the Commission was appointed, Counsel Assisting wrote to the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, on one of whose programs “Margaret” had appeared, and requested that she be contacted
and asked to approach Commission staff. She did not respond to the invitation and did not contact the
Commission which was, nevertheless, able to identify her, and interview her.
1.7 Ms Colleen Margaret Papadopoulos had no basis in fact for making the serious allegations she did6. She
worked at the relevant time as an offcer of QH, not CorpTech, and was not in a position to observe the
machinations she described. She had no worthwhile information to assist the Commission.
1.8 Nevertheless the Inquiry into the tender process did reveal serious defciencies in it and serious dereliction
of duty by those charged with the responsibility of spending the State’s money effectively.
2. Reviews of the SS Initiative
2.1 In March 2007 the Service Delivery and Performance Commission (the SDPC) reported (the Keliher Report)
on the progress of the SS Initiative. Among many recommendations it suggested a review of
7:
… the priorities and timing of the business solution roll-out … by 30 June 2007 on … the risks to
Government, including the need to expedite a payroll solution for Queensland Health … [and] the
projected costs of the roll-out …
2.2 The review undertaken by the SDPC revealed that many senior public servants involved in the Initiative had
reservations about it. At the same time the frst major implementation of a payroll system was delivered
in the Department of Housing. The work had been undertaken by Accenture and had taken considerably
longer than anticipated to complete the project. When it was put into operation the performance was
unsatisfactory. It was slow and inaccurate in parts.
2.3 Mr Waite reported to the Under-Treasurer, Mr Bradley. He recalled being told by Mr Waite that those
in CorpTech responsible for the implementation had lost confdence in its ability to continue with the
implementation
8. Mr Waite has a different recollection. He acknowledges that there was “a view …
gathering momentum that the [CorpTech] model … did not work”
9. That opinion was advanced by
representatives of individual departments and agencies who wanted to control their own IT services.
Mr Waite thought that CorpTech was in fact delivering effective uniform services though behind schedule
and over budget
10. The services that had been delivered were, with one exception, for fnancial transactions
and records. Human resources and payroll system delivery had proved much more diffcult.
2.4 No doubt prompted by the Keliher Report, Mr Bradley decided to determine what CorpTech’s next step in the
implementation of its program should be. He was influenced in that decision by the indifferent success of
the payroll implementation at the Department of Housing. Accordingly he sought the assistance of Mr Gary
Uhlmann from Arena to provide “a high level review to identify potential courses of action” which CorpTech
might undertake to revise the Initiative
11.
5 The recording of the interview with ‘Margaret’ was transcribed on behalf of the Commission of Inquiry.
6 Exhibit 60.
7 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.2, at page 50.
8 Exhibit 54A, para 14.
9 Exhibit 166, para 14.
10 Exhibit 166, para 13.
11 Exhibit 54A, para 14.

17
Procurement
2.5 Mr Uhlmann was well known to CorpTech and to Mr Bradley. He had had extensive experience in IT and
delivering computerised business systems to government and private enterprise. He had held senior roles in
the Department of Transport and in 1997 established his own consulting company (Arena) which had been
engaged by CorpTech to provide a variety of services in connection with the delivery of Shared Services and
a review of the process
12.
2.6 The “high level review” became known as the “April Snapshot” review13. It was conducted over fve days
by Mr Uhlmann, Mr Keith Goddard, Mr David Ekert (of Information Professionals) and Mr Burns. Mr Mark
Nicholls, Managing Director of Information Professionals, was peripherally involved.
2.7 The review commenced on 9 April 2007 with an initial meeting attended by Mr Uhlmann, Mr Goddard,
Mr Ekert, Mr Nicholls and Mr Burns
14. Mr Nicholls introduced Mr Burns and left shortly afterwards. In relation
to that frst meeting with Mr Burns, Mr Goddard said
15:
… I thought it was an interesting decision to involve a total outsider. On the positive side, that would
bring untainted and fresh views. On the negative side, he would have much foundation knowledge to
absorb. Over the frst six weeks, he established himself as ‘thought leader’ and injected an amount of
humour to the forum.
2.8 Mr Nicholls was also a consultant contracting services to government. He has qualifcations and extensive
experience in telecommunications and information technology. In 2005 he formed his own company,
Information Professionals, pursuant to which he provided his consulting services
16. He was not as well known
to senior managers of CorpTech as Mr Uhlmann, and for that reason on several occasions provided services in
conjunction with Arena and Mr Uhlmann
17.
2.9 Mr Nicholls’ primary interest was in Change Management and Communications. In collaboration with
Arena, Mr Nicholls’ company approached CorpTech for a contract to provide “Change and Communications”
services
18. Although the bid was initiated and managed by Mr Nicholls, it proceeded under the name of
Mr Uhlmann’s company Arena which was better known to senior managers of CorpTech than Information
Professionals. The initial goodwill between Mr Nicholls and Mr Uhlmann dissipated in confusion and conflict
over the precise terms of their collaboration and the distribution of the price paid by CorpTech for their
contracted services. The detail is irrelevant but the disagreements have engendered a degree of dislike
between the two men. It coloured but did not distort their evidence.
… the Inquiry into the tender process did reveal serious defciencies in it and serious dereliction
of duty by those charged with the responsibility of spending the State’s money effectively.
2.10 Mr Goddard was a project management consultant who contracted through his own company trading as
Informatics
19. He had a long standing business relationship with Queensland Treasury and had managed
numerous projects for the department. He had been involved in the Initiative from November 2005 as
a Project Management Advisor, and had conducted reviews of the Department of Justice and AttorneyGeneral fnance implementation project and the HR Payroll pilot project
20. He had also prepared an analysis
of the Initiative’s 50 planned projects
21. Mr Goddard had been insistent that the existing projections around
delivery timeframes and costs were inaccurate
22. Mr Goddard had previously worked closely with Mr Waite
and Mr Darrin Bond
23, and with Mr Philip Hood24, all CorpTech public servants.
12 Exhibit 21, paras 1-6.
13 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 158-181.
14 Exhibit 27, para 28.
15 Exhibit 27, para 31.
16 Exhibit 24, para 1.
17 Exhibit 24, para 17.
18 Exhibit 24, paras 14-16.
19 Exhibit 27, para 3.
20 Exhibit 27, paras 17-18.
21 Exhibit 27, para 19.
22 Exhibit 27, paras 20, 23.
23 Exhibit 27, para 13.
24 Exhibit 27, para 25.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
18
2.11 Mr Ekert was a Certifed Practicing Accountant with a Master of Business Administration25. Mr Nicholls,
through Information Professionals, secured Mr Ekert’s engagement with CorpTech as a strategist and planner
in December 2005. His role at CorpTech involved developing project plans for the Business Transformation
Area where he reported to the Program Director of CorpTech, Ms Jan Dalton
26. In early 2006 he was
appointed, as a contractor, to the role of Assistant Program Director in CorpTech
27. His sphere of expertise was
in strategy development and planning. Mr Ekert was asked to join the review team by Mr Nicholls
28. Mr Ekert
had previously worked with Mr Waite, Mr Bond, Mr Hood and other CorpTech staff.
2.12 Mr Burns was born in Zambia in 1943. After graduating from the University of Natal he joined IBM in Cape Town
as a trainee systems engineer
29. He was employed by the company for 13 years, leaving IBM in 198030, where,
according to his CV he “twice won the International Top Ten marketing award”
31. He was Manager for the Cape
Province for three years, a position he described as “one of the top roles there”
32. He was, he said, involved with
IBM in “some of the biggest” projects in South Africa
33. He was also successful in winning for IBM “a massive
opportunity” to computerise the operations of a stevedoring company
34.
2.13 After leaving IBM Mr Burns worked, for about 12 years, in his own businesses. He was then a consultant in project
and contract management. In 1998 he emigrated to New Zealand where he found work for about a year as a
“Programme Manager” for the delivery of “a signifcant new service delivery model for Air New Zealand’s major
Trans Tasman routes”
35. He then moved to the United Kingdom where he worked for three years, until 2003. His
employment there was again developing and delivering the implementation of automated business processes
in large organisations. In 2003 he returned to New Zealand where he worked for Fonterra which he described
as “New Zealand’s largest enterprise with a turnover of $12 billion and … the world’s largest exporter of dairy
products exporting … 24% by value of all New Zealand exports”
36.
2.14 According to Mr Burns’ CV, he “directed a Global Business Transformation programme involving … all the
international regional operating companies of Fonterra … ”, and directed “a large team of … personnel
including … IBM … and others”
37. He then worked for almost 18 months, until September 2006, as the
head of technology sales business unit for a large travel agency
38. He came to Australia for the frst time in
January 2007
39. His destination was Brisbane where one of his children was living.
2.15 Upon his arrival he approached several recruitment companies seeking employment. A few weeks later he
received an approach from Mr Nicholls.
2.16 Although Mr Waite was personally antipathetic to the review of CorpTech’s performance in the SS Initiative,
he approached both Mr Uhlmann and Mr Nicholls with a request that they undertake it
40. No doubt he did
so to give effect to Mr Bradley’s concerns.
2.17 Mr Waite, Mr Bradley and Mr Uhlmann all contend that Arena was engaged by CorpTech to conduct
the “April Snapshot” review
41. Mr Nicholls asserted that he and Mr Uhlmann were jointly approached by
Mr Waite
42. The difference of testimony is unimportant but underscores the point that CorpTech appears to
have been remarkably casual in its engagement of consultants and lax in recording the contracts it made
with them and the terms of engagement. There appears to be no documented contract between Arena
(Information Professionals) and CorpTech for the review. It is, however, clear that Mr Uhlmann (for Arena)
led the review, and that Mr Nicholls’ participation was minor.
2.18 How Mr Burns came to be engaged is also unclear though there is no doubt he involved himself
substantially in the review and imposed himself favourably on Mr Uhlmann and, initially, Mr Nicholls.
25 Exhibit 26, para 2.
26 Exhibit 26, para 5.
27 T7-87, L18-23 (David Ekert); Exhibit 26, para 8.
28 Exhibit 26, para 9.
29 Exhibit 46, para 3; Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 2.1, at page 1.
30 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 13; T13-59, L10-12 (Terry Burns); Exhibit 46, para 4.
31 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 13.
32 Exhibit 46, para 5.
33 Exhibit 46, para 8.
34 Exhibit 46, para 9.
35 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 2.1, at page 4.
36 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 2.1, at page 2.
37 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 2.1, at page 2.
38 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 2.1, at page 2.
39 Exhibit 46, para 47.
40 Exhibit 24, para 32; Exhibit 21, para 34.
41 Exhibit 166, para 18; Exhibit 54A, para 16; Exhibit 21, para 34.
42 Exhibit 24, para 32.

19
Procurement
2.19 At this time, coincidentally, Mr Nicholls’ Human Resource Manager read Mr Burns’ CV, no doubt as a
consequence of his endeavours to introduce himself to IT Management Consultants. Mr Nicholls discussed
with Mr Burns “his experience, his background, his suitability for different clients”, and introduced him
to Ms Dalton
43. Mr Nicholls decided to engage Mr Burns to assist with the review because Information
Professionals was, at the time, “heavily committed on other clients”
44. Mr Nicholls was obviously impressed
by Mr Burns. CVs are documents not normally noted for the modesty of their contents, and Mr Burns
described an uninterrupted series of engagements of major projects for very substantial internationally
known companies ending always in success. Personally Mr Burns was confdent and assertive in demeanour.
He gave the impression of competence, experience and extensive knowledge of large, complicated
initiatives introduced into substantial existing business structures. He was a stranger to self-doubt.
… there was inadequate program management and that the very concept of uniform Shared
Services was being assailed by the departments and agencies, identifed as recipients, who
wanted customised particularised services unique to their department, thereby increasing
the complexity and cost of the program and diminishing its utility as a cost saving whole-ofgovernment approach
53.
2.20 I think the likelihood is that although Arena was contracted to perform the review, Mr Waite spoke also to
Mr Nicholls, understanding that their two companies conjointly had provided services to CorpTech and that
both Mr Nicholls and Mr Uhlmann were to be involved in the review. Mr Nicholls had other engagements
but did not want to forgo the business opportunity. He therefore proposed Mr Burns though he says that he
advised Mr Waite that “we would need to supervise and work closely” with Mr Burns
45. The precaution was
sensible given that all that was known about Mr Burns was his CV.
2.21 There was also a disagreement about the basis of Mr Burns’ remuneration. Mr Uhlmann contended that
Mr Burns would take part in the review without remuneration and would come “free of cost” to Arena
46.
Mr Nicholls contended that Information Professionals paid Mr Burns a daily rate and invoiced Arena that
rate with a small margin which Mr Nicholls described as uneconomic
47. The agreement between Arena
and Information Professionals is not documented. There is a draft contract dated 10 April 2007 between
Information Professionals and Mr Burns to provide “consulting services” which are further described only by
the words “Strategic Analyst”
48. The draft does however provide for a daily payment to Mr Burns of $1,100.

2.22 I expect Mr Nicholls’ recollection of the fnancial arrangements is more accurate than Mr Uhlmann’s.
Mr Nicholls would not, I think, easily be mistaken on questions of income and costs.
Findings of April Review
2.23 The results of the fve-day survey were presented to CorpTech by Mr Uhlmann in a PowerPoint presentation

on 18 April 200749. The “overall conclusions” presented to the Under-Treasurer included50:
• Queensland Health [Payroll] should not be brought forward
• Refocus on DETA and other agencies
• Program timeframe will not be met …
• Program budget will be exceeded (+ $
90m to $135m)
• Program business case/benefits reducing
• Program governance is not delivering required outcomes …
• Scope of Standard Offer is increasing
• PMO [Project Management Office] is not effective

• Inaction now will result in program failure.
43 Exhibit 24, para 33.
44 Exhibit 24, para 34.
45 Exhibit 24, para 34.
46 Exhibit 21, paras 35, 39.
47 Exhibit 24, paras 43-44.
48 Exhibit 24, Annexure A.
49 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 158-181.
50 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 161-162.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
20
2.24 The presentation amplifed some points. Mr Uhlmann advised that the current rate of expenditure by
CorpTech on the program was $15,400 per person per month and that there were at the time 481 persons
involved in the project
51. Mr Uhlmann thought that if the program ran over time by 12 months the extra
cost would be $90M and if it ran over time by 18 months the additional cost would be $135M
52.
2.25 Other problems which Mr Uhlmann identifed were that there was inadequate program management and
that the very concept of uniform Shared Services was being assailed by the departments and agencies,
identifed as recipients, who wanted customised particularised services unique to their department, thereby
increasing the complexity and cost of the program and diminishing its utility as a cost saving whole-ofgovernment approach
53. Negotiations between CorpTech and the agencies were delaying the design and
therefore implementation of the program.

2.26 Sounding a note of alarm Mr Uhlmann advised that the program had reached a point of “critical
vulnerability”, citing in support facts that
54:

• DETA want to secede from the SSS
• Agencies losing faith in SSS ability to deliver
• Early implementers expectations reduced
• Agency … rhetoric and engagement not fully consistent
• Cost estimates are increasing
• Time estimates are extending
• Resource turnover is hampering
• SSS trying to appease all

2.27 Mr Uhlmann expressed the opinion that actions taken in the short term would determine whether the
project failed or succeeded and that “inaction will result in program failure”
55.
Of some interest to the Inquiry were Mr Uhlmann’s recommendations that the replacement of QH Payroll
should not be brought forward in time and that instead CorpTech should take steps to maintain the existing
2.28

payroll system into the future56. Another recommendation of signifcance was that CorpTech should appoint an
Operational Program Director to take over all control of the project to give it a discipline and focus it had lacked
57.

2.29 Mr Uhlmann noted that the program would fail unless frm remedial actions were taken. His key
recommendation was that an Operational Program Director be appointed urgently
58. The recommendation
was accepted. Mr Burns was appointed to the role.
Mr Uhlmann’s fndings were of obvious concern to Mr Bradley. The review had been conducted as an
2.30

overview and a more detailed examination and analysis were required. Mr Uhlmann suggested Mr Burns
would be suitable to undertake that more detailed examination and analysis
59.
Mr Burns’ May Review
2.31 Following the presentation there were discussions between Mr Waite, Ms Barbara Perrott (of CorpTech),
Mr Bond and others, including Mr Uhlmann, Mr Burns and Mr Nicholls, about the need for a more detailed
review in response to Arena’s overview
60. Mr Nicholls attended a meeting with Mr Waite at which the
appointment of a consultant to undertake the more detailed review was discussed
61. Mr Uhlmann was
unable to attend
62. He had anticipated that his company, Arena, would be re-engaged but the contract went
instead to Information Professionals whose principal, Mr Nicholls, was present at the meeting. Mr Nicholls
claims that Mr Waite was indifferent to the identity of the consultant and was content to nominate
Mr Nicholls’ company
63. Mr Uhlmann believes Mr Nicholls unfairly took advantage of his absence to secure
51 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 165.
52 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 165.
53 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 165-167.
54 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 171.
55 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 171.
56 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 172, 176-177.
57 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at pages 180-181.
58 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 172.
59 T6-18, L35-36 (Gary Uhlmann); Exhibit 21, para 47.
60 T7-14, L30-34 (Mark Nicholls).
61 T7-14, L49-56 to T7-15, L1-14 (Mark Nicholls).
62 T6-19, L51-55 (Gary Uhlmann).
63 Exhibit 24, para 47; T7-14, L48-56 to T7-15, L1-4 (Mark Nicholls).

21
Procurement
for his company what should have been Arena’s business64. The episode further soured relationships
between Mr Uhlmann and Mr Nicholls but little turns on the quarrel because Arena, had it secured the
contract, would have engaged Mr Burns to perform it, as did Information Professionals.
2.32 Ms Perrott’s recollection of the engagement is that she and Mr Waite to whom she reported at the time met
with Mr Nicholls, Mr Uhlmann and Mr Burns after Mr Uhlmann’s presentation of his “snapshot” review
65.
She thought that she and Mr Waite jointly decided at the conclusion of the meeting to engage Mr Burns
to conduct the further review which had been recommended
66. This introduction to Mr Burns also served
as the interview for his appointment to undertake the review
67. She admitted she did not know Mr Burns
prior to this meeting and did not know how long he had been known to either Mr Nicholls or Mr Uhlmann
68.
She did not check, or cause to be checked, Mr Burns’ references. She did not ask Mr Nicholls if his company
had checked Mr Burns’ references. She assumed that it happened
69. She believed that Mr Burns had been
engaged
via Arena70, but she was wrong about this, as I have pointed out. Mr Burns’ engagement did not
give him any authority to bind the State to any contract or arrangement, nor was he given any delegated
powers to make decisions on behalf of the State.
2.33 Having secured the contract and engaged Mr Burns to perform the May review, Mr Nicholls proposed a
modest increase to Mr Burns’ daily fee. Mr Burns thought it insuffcient, and told Mr Nicholls that he would
require a much more substantial fee for any future engagement. Mr Nicholls thought Mr Burns showed “both
ignorance and arrogance” in promoting his own worth and insisting upon increased remuneration before he
had even commenced the engagement and had not turned his mind to his employer’s (CorpTech’s) interest
71.
Mr Burns at the time had been in Australia but a few months and his knowledge of CorpTech and the
SS Initiative was limited to his fve days’ involvement in the “snapshot” review.
2.34 Mr Nicholls had a recollection that he telephoned Mr Waite to warn him that Mr Burns’ personal ambition
might influence the results of his review and that future negotiations on commercial terms would probably
be tinged by greed
72.
2.35 Information Professionals invoiced CorpTech and was paid by it for Mr Burns’ time for the fve weeks he was
engaged on the review
73. It in turn paid Mr Burns for the frst four weeks of his activity but not for the ffth
because of the dispute between him and Mr Nicholls which will shortly be related
74.
2.36 Following a meeting between Mr Nicholls, Mr Burns, Mr Waite, Ms Perrott, Ms Dalton and Mr Bond on
23 April 2007, Mr Nicholls and Mr Burns drafted Terms of Reference for the review which Mr Nicholls sent
to the others by email of 24 April 2007
75. On 27 April 2007 a communiqué, signed by Ms Perrott and
Mr Waite, was issued to CorpTech staff announcing Mr Burns had been appointed to conduct a review as
to implementation replanning of the SSS (the SS Initiative). The communiqué set out the terms of reference
of that review (the May Review) as follows
76:
To address the range of implementation issues and factors, the SSI Policy and Program Offce, in
conjunction, with CorpTech/SSS has engaged an experienced, independent Project Director to:
• replan the overall delivery timeline of the program from now until the completion of implementation;
• recommend appropriate strategies to accelerate the delivery of the SSS Program; and
• recommend structural, process and productivity improvements in the Program.
2.37 Queensland Government (Treasury) and Information Professionals contracted in writing for the
performance of the May Review
77. Both parties signed rather late: Mr Nicholls on 18 May and Mr Waite on
21 May 2007. By clause 3.1 Information Professionals was to provide “[s]ervices through its Key Personnel”.
Schedule 2 identifed the contractor’s Key Personnel as Mr Burns. Schedule 1 described the services
at some length. A steering group consisting of Mr Waite and Ms Perrott had been established as “the
64 T6-19, L50-55 to T6-20, L1-15 (Gary Uhlmann).
65 Exhibit 53B, para 2; T16-61, L42-55 to T16-62, L1-8 (Barbara Perrott).
66 T16-62, L2-5 (Barbara Perrott).
67 T16-62, L7-9 (Barbara Perrott).
68 T16-62, L14-23 (Barbara Perrott).
69 T16-68, L5-29 (Barbara Perrott).
70 Exhibit 53B, para 2.
71 Exhibit 24, paras 50-51.
72 Exhibit 24, para 52.
73 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.3.1, at page 15.
74 T7-27, L40-46 (Mark Nicholls).
75 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.7.2, at pages 30-31.
76 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.7.3, at pages 32-34.
77 Exhibit 140.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
22
sponsoring body” for the review, and Mr Burns had been appointed Interim Project Director to “manage this
assignment”, the objectives of which were “three main focus areas”
78:
• Re-planning the overall delivery timelines of the programme …
• Recommend and institute appropriate delivery accelerator strategies …
• Recommend and institute productivity improvements in the structure and processes of the programme.
Information Professionals was to be paid $2,250 for each day of the review.
2.38 The Commission was unable to fnd any executed agreement between Information Professionals and
Mr Burns. Mr Nicholls produced an unsigned copy of a deed, exceedingly brief in its terms, recording an
extension of the previous contract between his company and Mr Burns
79. It records that Mr Burns was to
be paid a daily rate of $1,500 for the period 23 April to 31 May 2007. Mr Nicholls also produced copies of
invoices delivered to his company from Cavendish Risk Management, which was Mr Burns’ company and the
vehicle by which he offered his services to CorpTech and others
80.
2.39 The May review commenced with a meeting called by Mr David Ford, the Deputy Under-Treasurer, on 30
April “to discuss CorpTech issues”
81.
2.40 Those attending were Mr Ford, Mr Waite, Ms Perrott, Mr Burns, Mr Bloomfeld of IBM, Mr Robert Pedler of
SAP and Mr Simon Porter of Accenture
82. Its purpose was to brief those contractors on the upcoming May
review to be conducted by Mr Burns, and introduce him to them
83.
2.41 Mr Bloomfeld, who reported on the meeting in an email of 1 May 2007, said that Mr Burns was appointed
to determine the new CorpTech implementation schedule, suggest a new organisational structure for
CorpTech “which does more to leverage its key implementation partners”, and identify “accelerators” to help
improve delivery
84. Mr Bloomfeld concluded: “Mr Burns was responsible to conduct a review which was really
to challenge how things were being done previously and to try and set about a new course of action.”
85
2.42 Mr Burns described the meeting as an opportunity to “meet and greet” the contractors who were involved in
the SS Initiative roll out
86. He said he expected to contact vendors and encourage them to provide him with
information so to assist him to discover means to deliver the Initiative more quickly and cost effectively
87.
2.43 Mr Bradley said he would not have asked Mr Burns to suggest a new organisational structure88. Such an
intimation would not have been made at the meeting. In fact Mr Burns did make such a recommendation: it
is likely he told Mr Bloomfeld he had that idea when the two men had spoken after the meeting.
2.44 In order to conduct his review, Mr Burns established 14 Focus Teams which were representative of the
major areas of the SS Initiative. The members of the teams were chosen because of their knowledge of
the Initiative, its frustrations, aims and achievements
89. They were asked to describe the status of the
Initiative as it applied to their area of responsibility and their anticipation of what was likely to occur,
and at what pace. From his consultation with the “coordinators” who led each team, Mr Burns obtained
“a consensus view from the program team itself on the revised Implementation Schedule, Primary
Recommendations, Risks and Issues”
90. Mr Burns, as an “external expert” added his own “Structural and
Process Recommendations”
91.
2.45 Despite being Mr Burns’ head contractor, Mr Nicholls had diffculty in obtaining information from Mr Burns
about his review. He noted he was “somewhat secretive” about his work and “very reluctant to share
information”
92. Mr Nicholls observed him to be indifferent to detail and to prefer the broad view93. The rift
78 Exhibit 140, at page 24.
79 Exhibit 24, Annexure A, at page 16.
80 Exhibit 24, Annexure D; Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.4, at pages 17-19.
81 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.4, at page 226.
82 Exhibit 35, para 43.
83 T16-66, L4-14 (Barbara Perrott).
84 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.4, at page 228.
85 T12-97, L50-54 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
86 T13-74, L43-50; T14-4, L18 (Terry Burns).
87 T14-83, L23-51 (Terry Burns).
88 T17-69, L48-55 to T17-70, L1-4 (Gerard Bradley).
89 T13-76, L29-46 (Terry Burns); Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 186.
90 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 186.
91 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 186.
92 T7-19, L25-26 (Mark Nicholls); Exhibit 25, para 55.
93 Exhibit 24, para 55.

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between the two men came when Mr Nicholls took a long planned holiday to Hawaii in the last two weeks
of May 2007. The review was due on 31 May. Mr Nicholls had intended to remain in communication with
Mr Burns by telephone and email during his absence. He telephoned Mr Burns from Hawaii and asked for a
copy of the draft report and to be informed of its progress
94. Mr Burns told him that he had no authority to
reveal the draft and that he had been instructed by Mr Bradley, the Under-Treasurer, not to inform anyone
of the contents of the report without express permission. Mr Nicholls was understandably astonished, given
that the review had been committed to Information Professionals which had subcontracted it to Mr Burns
95.
2.46 Mr Burns confrms that he was asked by Mr Nicholls for a copy of his report and he refused to give it
because it was “confdential” and he was “obliged to supply it to [his] client … CorpTech”
96. The evidence
in fact supports Mr Nicholls’ account that Mr Burns was to undertake the May review under contract to
Information Professionals and that he had no direct contract with CorpTech.
Mr Nicholls noted the oddity that someone virtually unknown, in the country only a few
months and with only six weeks’ experience of CorpTech and the vastly complicated
SS Initiative should have become the principal adviser to the Under-Treasurer on the future
of the Initiative
116.
2.47 Mr Burns’ account of things is that having participated in the “snapshot” review, Mr Uhlmann asked him
if he was interested in performing a more detailed analysis of the Initiative. He quickly accepted but said
he contracted the work through Arena
97. This is not borne out by the pattern of invoicing and Mr Uhlmann
offers no support for the existence of that arrangement. Mr Burns’ assertion that “Arena had the brief from
the Under-Treasurer to fnd somebody to do this review process”
98 is, I think, an attempt by Mr Burns to
refute Mr Nicholls’ criticisms of his conduct. Mr Uhlmann indicated that he had thought Arena would win
the engagement and was disappointed with Mr Nicholls for taking it for Information Professionals. Mr Burns
claims that he spoke to Mr Bradley prior to being engaged and that Mr Bradley expressed confdence
in his ability to “unravel” the problems with CorpTech and they parted on the basis that Mr Burns would
have direct access to Mr Bradley during his conduct of the Review
99. Mr Burns claims he insisted upon that
accessibility in order to have suffcient authority to make the review effectively. According to Mr Burns,
Mr Bradley was “very happy” because “he wanted a fast-track report and he used to ask me to come and
see him frequently
100”.
2.48 As mentioned earlier Mr Bradley engaged Mr Burns for the May review shortly after Mr Uhlmann had
presented the results of his “April Snapshot” review. According to Mr Bradley he met separately with
Mr Burns, to test his suitability for the appointment
101. Mr Bradley asked Mr Burns whether he “thought
that the same knowledge and experience could be of assistance to [CorpTech] in getting [its] project
back on track”
102. Mr Burns answered affrmatively, and requested that he have the right to speak to
Mr Bradley directly, during his review, without reporting through an intermediary, on the basis that he
would have to be critical of CorpTech staff
103. Mr Bradley agreed to meet him weekly104. Mr Burns formally
reported to Mr Bradley through Ms Perrott and Mr Ford. Ms Perrott remained unaware that Mr Burns was
communicating directly with Mr Bradley, bypassing her
105. There is no doubt that Mr Burns took advantage
of his ready access to the Under-Treasurer. He told Mr Bond, assertively it seems, that he had “a direct
line” to Mr Bradley
106. Mr Goddard, who shared an offce with Mr Burns, observed that he met or spoke to
Mr Bradley regularly
107.
94 Exhibit 24, para 57.
95 Exhibit 24, para 57.
96 Exhibit 46, para 84.
97 Exhibit 46, paras 61-63.
98 Exhibit 46, para 61.
99 Exhibit 46, para 64.
100 Exhibit 46, para 66.
101 T17-63, L49-50 to T17-64, L1-24 (Gerard Bradley).
102 T17-64, L17-19 (Gerard Bradley).
103 T17-66, L35-48 (Gerard Bradley); T13-78, L52-55 to T13-79, L1-4 (Terry Burns).
104 T17-66, L39 (Gerard Bradley).
105 T16-77, L12-19 (Barbara Perrott).
106 T2-58, L4-5 (Darrin Bond).
107 T8-24, L17-24 (Keith Goddard).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
24
2.49 It is clear that Mr Burns had used the opportunity of his May review to good effect, establishing a close
and cordial relationship with the Under-Treasurer and effectively replacing Information Professionals as
the reviewer. On his return to Brisbane, Mr Nicholls spoke to Mr Burns, Mr Waite and Ms Perrott
108. Both
Mr Waite and Ms Perrott were unaware that Mr Burns had been instructed not to discuss his work with his
employer. Mr Nicholls thought Ms Perrott showed little interest in Mr Burns over-extending his role or his
disregard of his contractual arrangements with Information Professionals
109.
2.50 Mr Burns delivered his May review110 at the end of May111 or very early in June 2007112. No copy was ever given
to Information Professionals
113. Mr Nicholls and Mr Burns met on 20 June 2007114. Mr Burns confrmed that he
had made a new agreement with Queensland Treasury and rejected the notion that he had any contractual
obligations to Information Professionals. For that reason Mr Nicholls withheld Mr Burns’ payment for the
ffth week of his Review, as already noted
115. Mr Nicholls noted the oddity that someone virtually unknown, in
the country only a few months and with only six weeks’ experience of CorpTech and the vastly complicated
SS Initiative should have become the principal adviser to the Under-Treasurer on the future of the Initiative
116.
Mr Nicholls was concerned at the unprofessional manner in which Mr Burns had discharged his contract with
Information Professionals and his evident interest in self-promotion and fnancial advantage. Accordingly he
wrote to the Deputy Under-Treasurer, Mr Ford, on 27 September 2007
117:
On utilising Terry in the assignment we performed for Geoff Waite, it was our expectation that we would
be supervising his work, and as a result make an informed assessment of him as a professional. As we
recruited Terry Burns off the street, after his relocation to Brisbane, he had not previously worked for
us, nor do I believe in Brisbane. Given our Program and Project Management credentials we are more
than capable of providing a sound assessment of his capabilities.
… [O]ur planned supervision was not able to occur, and as a result we were not provided with any
opportunity to properly supervise or review his work, or assess his capabilities. This matter has
previously been discussed with both Geoff Waite and Barbara Perrott.
As such, the purpose of this letter is to advise you of your need to ensure that you make your own
enquiries as you see ft to independently satisfy yourself of Terry Burns’ suitability for any current or
future roles. Please do not rely upon any implied recommendation or endorsement due to his prior
engagement by Information Professionals.
2.51 The letter was directed to Ms Perrott for a response118. Mr Ford spoke to Mr Nicholls but ultimately the
complaint was disregarded by Ms Perrott
119. She explained that she thought that events had superseded the
subject matter of the complaint. The report had been delivered in its fnal form, and acted upon. Moreover
she thought that Mr Nicholls could have made little contribution to a draft of Mr Burns’ report
120.
2.52 Her reaction missed the point of the complaint. It was not that Mr Nicholls had been deprived of an
opportunity to contribute to the contents of the report but that Mr Burns had disregarded his contractual
relationship, acted outside the scope of his engagement and acted as a man without constraint. The same
characteristics were later noted by Ms Perrott. Mr Nicholls’ letter should have warned her that Mr Burns
needed close supervision, but was unlikely to respond well to it.
2.53 A written reply came two months later, on 23 November 2007 by which time CorpTech had undergone the
process of the RFP, the ITO, and was in the last stages of negotiating a contract with IBM for it to deliver
the Shared Services Solution for the Queensland Government. Mr Ford wrote
121:
I have noted the contents of your letter and fully acknowledge your role and appreciate the importance
that Information Professionals places on sound supervision and assessment of practitioners. The
practices and standards outlined in your letter also align with CorpTech’s requirements regarding the
engagement of contractors and professional staff.
108 Exhibit 24, para 59.
109 Exhibit 24, para 61.
110 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at pages 182-400.
111 T16-72, L38-39 (Barbara Perrott).
112 Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.11, at page 380.
113 Exhibit 24, para 63.
114 Exhibit 24, para 74.
115 Exhibit 24, paras 73-74.
116 Exhibit 24, para 70.
117 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.5.3, at page 22.
118 T16-73, L27-34 (Barbara Perrott).
119 T16-73, L30-46 (Barbara Perrott).
120 T16-70, L2-3 (Barbara Perrott).
121 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 29.5.4, at page 23.

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2.54 Mr Burns delivered his Review in either late May or very early June 2007 in a meeting with Mr Bradley,
Mr Waite and Ms Perrott. He was critical of CorpTech’s performance under the leadership of Mr Waite.
Mr Bradley had allowed Mr Burns to speak to Mr Waite before the meeting
122. Ms Perrott said that she
2.55

and Mr Waite were given advance notice of what Mr Burns was going to raise with Mr Bradley, so the
information was not “new” to Mr Waite
123. Mr Burns told Mr Waite that his report was going to recommend
a different kind of skill set for the head of the program
124. He acknowledged that he told Mr Bradley that
Mr Waite was not qualifed to lead the Initiative
125. He did not know what Mr Waite’s qualifcations were126.
2.56 Mr Bradley found the May review presentation to be “confronting”127 in that Mr Burns declared the
implementation process unsustainable
128. The recommendations were rightly seen by Mr Waite to be a
criticism of him
129. He had diffculty accepting what was said in the report. Mr Bradley describes Mr Waite as
being upset. He left the meeting
130. Mr Bond said Mr Waite found what Mr Burns had to say “quite offensive
and walked out of the meeting”
131. “He left that day and took some leave and never returned”132. Mr Waite
had been the Executive Director of CorpTech from the time of its establishment on 1 July 2003 to 30 June
2007
133. He had no further involvement with the Queensland Health Payroll system from 1 July 2007 nor did
he have any subsequent dealings with Ms Perrott
134.
2.57 Ms Perrott assumed Mr Waite’s role, initially in an acting capacity. She was appointed Executive Director
CorpTech on 1 July 2007 and continued in that role until March 2009, reporting to Mr Bradley and then
to Mr Malcolm Grierson from 1 July 2008 when CorpTech and the SSS Program were transferred to the
Department of Public Works
135.
Mr Bradley and Mr Burns
2.58 As part of being engaged to conduct the May 2007 review Mr Burns was required to present a subset of
his CV and be interviewed by Mr Bradley. That interview took place in the second half of April 2007
136. No
one else was present. Mr Burns and Mr Bradley have varying recollections of what occurred. According to
Mr Burns, Mr Bradley said that he wanted Mr Burns to conduct the review personally. He told Mr Burns that
he was the “right person” to conduct the review
137. Mr Burns replied that he wanted a “very short line of
communication” to Mr Bradley
138. He recalled saying139:
Well, then the preferable way for me to act is I want to be able to report regularly to you. I want to be able
to get to you quickly because if I go down there and I say, ‘That there is a very senior person there that is
not actually doing the job’, I need to be able to come to you in confdence and say, ‘There is an issue that
you need to deal with, in my opinion.’
2.59 Mr Bradley recalled speaking to Mr Burns about his experience in rescuing signifcant projects and informing
Mr Burns that CorpTech were unsure of the way forward. He wanted some fresh insight into how CorpTech’s roll
out of the SS Initiative could be put “back on track”
140. Mr Bradley accepted that he granted Mr Burns the direct
communication he sought. Mr Bradley was to receive regular, about weekly, reports directly from Mr Burns
141.
2.60 Mr Bradley knew that in conducting his review Mr Burns would need to address the capacity of CorpTech
senior management. He requested Mr Burns to share his views about senior management with him
personally
142, and no one else.
122 T13-82, L11-13 (Terry Burns).
123 T16-72, L51-54 (Barbara Perrott).
124 T13-82, L7-16 (Terry Burns).
125 T13-81, L14-16; T13-82, L18-20 (Terry Burns).
126 T13-80, L52-53 (Terry Burns).
127 T17-84, L26 (Gerard Bradley).
128 T17-84, L29 (Gerard Bradley).
129 T16-73, L1-2 (Barbara Perrott).
130 T17-84, L33-36 (Gerard Bradley).
131 T2-38, L53-54 (Darrin Bond).
132 T2-38, L53 (Darrin Bond).
133 Exhibit 166, para 1.
134 Exhibit 166, para 4.
135 Exhibit 53A, paras 14-15.
136 Exhibit 46, para 63.
137 Exhibit 46, para 64.
138 Exhibit 46, para 64.
139 Exhibit 46, para 65.
140 T17-64, L10-14 (Gerard Bradley).
141 T17-66, L35-43 (Gerard Bradley).
142 T17-67, L10-21 (Gerard Bradley).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
26

2.61 Mr Bradley was not aware that Mr Burns informed CorpTech staff, including Mr Bond, that he had a direct
line of communication to Mr Bradley
143. Nor did Mr Bradley know that Mr Burns, together with Mr Goddard,
had in or about June 2007 forcefully advised Mr Bond not to have any further meetings with Mr Bradley
144.
As matters developed however, Mr Bradley knew that there were tensions between senior CorpTech staff
2.62

including Mr Waite and Mr Bond on the one hand, and Mr Burns on the other145. Mr Bradley recalled meeting
with Mr Bond in June 2007 when Mr Bond expressed his discomfort with the way Mr Burns was going about
his work
146. In spite of Mr Bond’s misgivings, Mr Bradley instructed him to work with Mr Burns and to assist him
in his replanning project at that time
147.
2.63 When asked whether he saw anything wrong in empowering Mr Burns, Mr Bradley responded148:
… I wasn’t seeking to empower Mr Burns in preference to any existing person within CorpTech. Indeed, he
worked within the structures that I set up at that time in terms of having a steering committee oversighting his
work, whether he created a different perception or not, I am not sure. The role that we appointed to after the
May report was a reasonably focused role, had a – it didn’t oversight large staffng resources or anything of
that nature, or overlap with a particular role of any other person within CorpTech. It was focussed on doing a
strategic piece of work around how we could develop a forward program beyond the current implementations.
I think in retrospect allowing him then to get to play more active roles through the tender process, in retrospect
we perhaps should have done something differently there, but at the time he was a resource who appeared to
have the relevant skills.
2.64 As previously observed, the SS Initiative had been established as early as 2002. There is no doubt that at the
time of his meeting with Mr Burns in April 2007, Mr Bradley knew that the Initiative had stalled. Mr Bradley
was seeking a solution to the problems highlighted in the April Snapshot review. However in empowering
Mr Burns as he did, Mr Bradley should have anticipated conflict between senior CorpTech staff and Mr Burns.
Mr Bradley knew that Mr Burns had recently arrived in Australia and had not previously been engaged by the
State. He must have appreciated that Mr Burns was a stranger to the functionings of the State Government.
In spite of his denial, Mr Bradley had clearly lost faith in senior CorpTech management to achieve the
SS Initiative. He was willing to empower Mr Burns, an outsider, in an attempt to reset the Initiative.
Findings of Burns’ May Review

2.65 The report sounded a note of alarm. The “overall status of the program as at May 2007” was said to be
“untenable”
149. Mr Burns declared that150:

… [T]he Program will not deliver the currently defned functional solution within the current budgeted
costs and within the current projected timeline. … The current budget of
$316 million will run out in June
2008 at the current monthly cost burn rate unless drastic cost reduction strategies are employed and will
then still require further signifcant additional funding.

2.66 Under “Urgent Action Needed” it was said151:
The remedial or close down actions need to be undertaken as a matter of extreme urgency in order to limit
further fnancial losses.
One of the remedial actions recommended was a further review152:
2.67

… [T]o re-examine all the base assumptions … and defne a revised Functional and Technical Solution model
and restated business case.
This should be completed within three months. [Emphasis in the original]

2.68 This further review was described as Phase III of the process of re-examining delivery of the SS Initiative.
(Phase I was Mr Uhlmann’s “April Snapshot” review; Mr Burns’ own May Review was Phase II.)

143 T17-67, L35-43 (Gerard Bradley).
144 T17-68, L5 (Gerard Bradley).
145 T17-68, L15 (Gerard Bradley).
146 T17-52, L1-15 (Gerard Bradley).
147 T17-52, L23-25 (Gerard Bradley).
148 T17-85, L13-29 (Gerard Bradley).
149 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 188.
150 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 188.
151 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 188.
152 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 190.

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2.69 Mr Burns made ten major recommendations. One was the commissioning of the Phase III review.
Others were the establishment of “a highly empowered Design Authority which will generate a restated
Functional and Technical Solution design … on behalf of the … Program Executive Board”
153; and “a
highly empowered PMO [Program Management Offce] to provide the disciplined processes … to meet the
implementation timeline”
154, and as part of “a new Organisational Structure” a Program Delivery Director
“with full accountability for the whole end to end program implementation”
155. Mr Burns recommended
that this Director sit at the apex of the organisation immediately below the governing Board of DirectorsGeneral (CEO Governing Board). The position was said to be necessary “to inject the required level of very
experienced program management expertise … fundamental to recovering the viability of the Program”
156.
2.70 The report contained no reference to a Prime Contractor and did not recommend that the structure of
the SS Initiative, by which CorpTech designed and delivered the services, be altered in favour of an external
contractor which would take over those roles.

2.71 Ms Perrott later appointed Mr Burns as Program Delivery Director157, the powerful position he had recommended
be created
158. He was also given responsibility for establishing the Solution Design Authority (SDA)159.
Mr Burns and Mr Bloomfeld
2.72 Mr Burns’ conduct during his May review, and his interaction with Mr Bloomfeld of IBM, became a subject

of particular interest to the Inquiry. Mr Bloomfeld was at relevant times Public Sector Lead of Queensland
IBM Global Business Services, seeking work for IBM from the State and local governments. He had
worked for Accenture until February 2007. He frst met Mr Burns at the 30 April meeting. The next day
Mr Bloomfeld sent an email to Mr Burns’ private email address, saying it had been “[g]ood to meet” the
previous afternoon
160. Mr Burns on 2 May asked Mr Bloomfeld to send emails to his CorpTech email address
and requested a meeting as soon as possible
161. They met that same day, 2 May 2007.

2.73 What was said at the meeting gave rise to the question whether Mr Burns held a bias in favour of IBM
which later influenced the choice of Prime Contractor. The best account of what occurred appears in
Mr Bloomfeld’s contemporaneous record, written in private and before the matter became controversial.
Mr Bloomfeld had two meetings on 2 May: one with Mr Burns and Ms Diann McMillan, an executive offcer
2.74

at CorpTech162, and another with Mr Burns alone. At 9:24 pm Mr Bloomfeld emailed Mr Colin Powell, Partner
and Asia Pacifc Financial Management Leader of IBM Global Business Services, marked “URGENT”
163:
Col,

Things are moving fast on this one. Subsequent to my email yesterday afternoon, I met with Terry
Burns twice today – once on the record and once off. He is expecting big things from IBM on this one –
‘innovative and expansive thinking’. This is based on his experience with what IBM was able to achieve
at Fonterra … Terry was very impressed with what we were able to do over there and is encouraging us to
really push the boundaries on this – it will be very well received by him.
Terry is almost at a stage that he is coaching us, and is already ‘strongly recommending’ the position
we should take in some areas. To give some further context, Terry admitted today with a grin that he was
once a ‘long time IBMer’. He has stated that ‘IBM is grossly under-represented on this engagement’ and
that what the CorpTech program needs is a ‘signifcant increase of involvement by IBM’.
Terry has asked us to put together a proposed approach, schedule, resource plan and cost model for
the CorpTech program. Once again, encouraging us that there are ‘no holy cows’ and as an example
he suggested that we shouldn’t discount those components of the program that currently have
Accenture involvement.
153 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 193.
154 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 193.
155 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 194.
156 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 208.
157 The evidence of Ms Perrott (T16-76, L47-50) and Mr Burns (T13-82, L49-51) suggests Mr Burns was appointed Program Review Director. It is evident that Mr Burns did ultimately
become the Program Delivery Director – Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.7, at pages 87-115.
158 T16-76, L43-50 (Barbara Perrott); Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 194.
159 T16-77, L1-5 (Barbara Perrott).
160 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.4, at page 227.
161 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 229.
162 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 233.
163 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 230.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
28
… I am keen to get the right support to seize on a small window of opportunity to reposition IBM. I fully
appreciate that we need to all agree on what our new position is, however in my view we need to put our
best foot forward in the frst instance, to then give us the luxury of choosing how/where we want to be
involved. If this window closes and we do not impress Terry and Qld Treasury, we will have no option but
to continue in our sub-optimal role …
2.75 Mr Bloomfeld sensibly acknowledged that what was said at the meetings was signifcant and caused him to
email Mr Powell, who was not his direct supervisor
164.
2.76 Mr Bloomfeld said he could not distinguish between what was said at the meeting “on the record” and the
meeting “off the record”
165. Again he sensibly conceded that it is unlikely that Mr Burns made the comment
about being an “IBMer” in front of Ms McMillan
166. He agreed Mr Burns gave him real encouragement to
have IBM “step up to the mark” and conduct the SS Initiative
167.
2.77 It was no doubt entirely appropriate for Mr Burns to speak to offcers of the companies engaged in the
SS Initiative to elicit ideas for improving delivery and to test any ideas of his own for practicability. He spoke
to employees of Accenture, though not, it seems, of SAP or of Logica (who was not invited to the 30 April
meeting). A large part of the 30 April meeting called by Mr Ford was to prepare the companies’ personnel
for such an approach. What, however, is extraordinary about Mr Burns’ discussions with Mr Bloomfeld, as
described in his email, is his declared partiality in favour of IBM.
2.78 Ms Perrott, who was at the 30 April 2007 meeting, testifed that nothing was said there about increased
involvement by IBM in the SS Initiative
168. Ms Perrott was not aware that Mr Burns had spoken to
Mr Bloomfeld in the terms recorded in the email. That type of communication was not part of Mr Burns’
brief
169. He was not engaged to give the impression to a vendor that it was being coached170. While Ms Perrott
said there may have been scope to make the process as competitive as possible at the program rebuild stage,
for the purposes of the review, that was not Mr Burns’ role
171. Ms Perrott also stated that at this stage she did
not contemplate that Mr Burns would have a continuing role at CorpTech
172.
2.79 Mr Goddard worked with Mr Burns in conducting the review, though in a subordinate role. The two men
shared an offce. Mr Goddard was effectively Mr Burns’ lieutenant and secretary. He was described as
the “detail man”
173 while Mr Burns preferred generalities and overviews; in the argot of the public service,
“high level analysis”. Mr Goddard prepared a schedule for the conduct of the May review. By reference to
it he informed the Commission that it was “only … in the June period”
174 that Mr Burns and he commenced
speaking in earnest to the external contractors, such as Accenture and Logica, to gain an understanding
of what contributions they could make to the program delivery. The early part of the review was focused
on “risk assessment” for which Mr Burns “ran a lot of workshops”. According to their own prepared schedule
they were not then “to do any sort of external organisation liaison”
175.
The report contained no reference to a Prime Contractor and did not recommend that the
structure of the SS Initiative, by which CorpTech designed and delivered the services, be
altered in favour of an external contractor which would take over those roles.
2.80 Mr Nicholls, whose company was contracted to perform the review and who had helped prepare the Terms
of Reference for it, expressed the opinion that the discussion of the type described by Mr Bloomfeld was
not within the scope of Mr Burns’ review
176. Mr Nicholls, too, made the point that two days into the review
Mr Burns “would not have been in a position to even know what the problem was at that stage”
177.
164 T11-79, L27-36; T11-83, L20-24 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
165 Exhibit 35, para 46(d)(i); T11-83, L10-13; T11-81, L16-17 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
166 T11-81, L44-55 to T11-82, L1-7 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
167 T11-80, L36-38 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
168 T16-89, L3 (Barbara Perrott).
169 T16-89, L16-22 (Barbara Perrott).
170 T16-89, L43-45 (Barbara Perrott).
171 T16-90, L3-8 (Barbara Perrott).
172 T16-90, L10-20 (Barbara Perrott).
173 Exhibit 27, para 88.
174 T7-112, L6-8 (Keith Goddard).
175 T7-112, L38-46 (Keith Goddard).
176 T7-26, L24-27 (Mark Nicholls).
177 T7-25, L19-22 (Mark Nicholls).

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2.81 All Mr Burns knew about CorpTech and the diffculties it was encountering in its delivery of the SS Initiative he had
learned from his involvement in Mr Uhlmann’s fve-day April review. That had been conducted at a “high level”;
in other words an impressionistic overview of what was a very substantial and complicated program involving
the work of dozens of separate contracting companies, hundreds of employees from both the private and public
sectors and the design, building and implementation of intricate and sophisticated software programs. Mr Burns
was a novice in an area where others had laboured for years and possessed substantial knowledge.
2.82 The other point to note is that his conversations with Mr Bloomfeld came at the beginning of his review,
and before he had had a chance to learn much. Nevertheless he admitted to being a “long time IBMer” and
volunteered that he had been very impressed with the work done by that company in New Zealand, and
that he would favourably receive any proposal by IBM for its involvement in the SS Initiative. Mr Bloomfeld
perceived Mr Burns to be “almost … coaching” IBM as to what it should propose. Mr Burns expressed the
opinion that IBM was “grossly under-represented” in the program. He volunteered the gratuitous advice that
it needed “a signifcant increase of involvement by IBM”
178.
Mr Burns’ conduct during his May review, and his interaction with Mr Bloomfeld of IBM,
became a subject of particular interest to the Inquiry.
2.83 Mr Burns said that he met “extremely regularly” with employees of Accenture and SAP who worked “down
the passage” from his offce and he had frequent informal discussions with them
179. He justifed his contact
with IBM personnel on the basis that he could not have that interaction with them because “they weren’t
present”. For that reason he “had to set up meetings”
180.
2.84 IBM’s submissions identify passages in the evidence (though not always accurately)181 which record
Mr Burns’ meetings with representatives of the various suppliers, Accenture, SAP, Logica and IBM, generally
in the period May to July 2007
182. Many of these meetings were said to be informal and some occurred over
coffee. It is submitted that in this context Mr Burns’ engagement with Mr Bloomfeld was unremarkable
183.
2.85 The submissions did not come to grips with the content of Mr Burns’ frst conversation with Mr Bloomfeld
as recorded in the latter’s email. The meeting may have been unexceptionable. What properly attracted
attention was Mr Burns’ gratuitous expression of support for IBM and the intimation that it should have
a substantial role in the SS Initiative. Inappropriate at any time in a conversation between a government
representative and would-be supplier, Mr Burns’ endorsement of IBM before he had begun his review fnds
no parallel in any interchange with Accenture, Logica, SAP or anyone else.
2.86 Both Mr Burns and Mr Bloomfeld sought in their evidence to diminish the obvious signifcance of their
conversation as recorded in the email. Mr Bloomfeld claimed that “coaching” as the word is used by IBM
staff does not have its ordinary meaning, but denotes someone who is “involved in the project and is really
focussed on bringing the best out of everyone to get them to the starting line to ensure a competitive
contest that provides the best outcome for the client”
184. A coach is a “motivator”. The diffculty with this
explanation, which appears born of desperation, is that there was on 2 May 2007 no contest and no
competition. Mr Burns was, or ought to have been, involved in gathering information for assessment and
analysis. That would no doubt include seeking ideas and suggestions, but there was no “starting line”
because no track had been surveyed or laid out. Mr Burns cannot have had any idea of what the contest was
two days into his review. A more substantial objection to Mr Bloomfeld’s explanation is that Mr Burns sought
to motivate only IBM. He did not have a similar conversation with any of CorpTech’s other IT suppliers.
2.87 Mr Burns likewise denied that he was coaching. He said he wanted the suppliers to take “decisive marketing
action” and that the project needed a “sharp incisive approach”
185. The same comments apply. No other
supplier was spoken to in such terms and Mr Burns cannot have known what the project needed on 2 May
2007, and could not have told then what the competition was.
178 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 230.
179 T13-94, L33-43 (Terry Burns).
180 T13-94, L44-50 (Terry Burns).
181 It was e.g. submitted that Mr Pedler recalled Mr Burns “strongly recommended a position that SAP should take”: Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June
2013 (Procurement), para 119(d). T15-17, L42 (Terry Burns) demonstrates the opposite. Mr Pedler said (T15-70, L19-25) he “absolutely (did) not” have a communication of the
type described in Mr Bloomfeld’s 2 May email and SAP was never given the impression that it was “that kind of trusted future organisation”. The answer relied upon in IBM’s
submissions ignored the qualifcation Mr Pedler immediately imposed on his answer.
182 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), paras 105-107.
183 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), paras 103-111.
184 Exhibit 35, para 46(d)(iv).
185 T13-97, L14-18 (Terry Burns).

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2.88 Mr Bloomfeld explained that the position which Mr Burns “strongly recommended” that IBM should take
was to “continue to push to take more responsibility in the (Initiative)”
186. Even if that is so, it shows Mr Burns
expressing an opinion to one supplier that it should be more involved in the program implementation before
he knew whether that was objectively so or not. Mr Burns claimed that he wanted a greater involvement by
IBM to introduce a competitive environment
187. This breaks down as an explanation at the point when he did
not encourage Accenture, Logica or SAP to be competitive. Even if Mr Burns was seeking to foster competition
it was indiscreet to the point of impropriety to tell one supplier that it was “grossly under-represented” on the
program. Mr Burns denied making such a statement but his denial cannot be accepted
188.
2.89 The contemporaneous record is the best evidence of what was said. It shows that Mr Burns acted entirely
inappropriately. It was no doubt proper to encourage IBM to propose new and, indeed, innovative
proposals to improve CorpTech’s program delivery. Mr Burns may well have been justifed in thinking that
IBM would be a likely source of creative thinking. What was inappropriate, and grossly so, was to say to a
prospective contractor with the government that it was under-represented on the project which needed a
greater involvement by it, and that he would favour a proposal from IBM. Those remarks exhibit exuberant
indiscretion, bad judgment and a partiality which should have disqualifed him from any objective
assessment of competing proposals if IBM were one of the competitors.
2.90 Neither Mr Bloomfeld nor IBM can be criticised for participating in the conversation with Mr Burns.
Mr Burns sought out Mr Bloomfeld to make the disclosures and to express his opinions about IBM.
Mr Bloomfeld does claim that he thought that Mr Burns would have similar conversations with other
suppliers
189 but that is disingenuous. He cannot have thought that Mr Burns would tell the others of his
fondness for IBM, and Mr Burns could not say to the others that he was a long time adherent of Accenture,
SAP or Logica. Mr Bloomfeld must have realised that IBM had been singled out for favouritism. That, as
I say, is no basis for criticising him or IBM, but he must have realised that IBM was being given a business
opportunity denied to the other suppliers.
2.91 What makes Mr Burns’ partiality more egregious is that at the early stage of his review at which he
displayed it he cannot have had any sensible idea of how the program delivery might be improved, or how
IBM might improve it.
2.92 It is noteworthy that Mr Burns was not similarly encouraging to the other major contractors involved
with CorpTech. Mr Porter of Accenture had no conversation in which Mr Burns displayed partiality for his
company or revealed his predilection for IBM
190. No representative of any of the other companies to whom
Mr Burns spoke had a conversation “off the record”
191.
2.93 The conversations between Mr Burns and Mr Bloomfeld differed in character and frequency from the
meetings Mr Burns had with representatives from Accenture. There were no meetings of this kind at this
time with Logica or SAP
192. There was a degree of cordiality and encouragement in Mr Burns’ dealings with
IBM which were not present when he met with the others.
2.94 The relationship between Mr Bloomfeld and Mr Burns as revealed in Mr Bloomfeld’s email of 2 May
2007 was markedly different from that between Mr Pedler of SAP and Mr Burns. Asked to comment upon
the email Mr Pedler could say “absolutely” that the nature of the communications he had with Mr Burns
were very different. SAP was “never provided (an) impression that we were that kind of trusted future
organisation”
193. Mr Pedler “never had that kind of closeness with Mr Burns”, who did not indicate to
Mr Pedler that the CorpTech program needed a signifcant increase in SAP’s involvement
194. Nor did he
reveal that he held such views about IBM. Asked to comment upon Mr Bloomfeld’s email of 28 June 2007,
which revealed further meetings between him and Mr Burns, he commented that his relationship, and that
of SAP, with Mr Burns was not at a “level that we … shared anything like” the communications that passed
between Mr Bloomfeld and Mr Burns
195. Mr Pedler had no recollection that Mr Burns ever “coached” SAP as
to how it might become more involved in the delivery of the SS Initiative; or recommended the position that
SAP should take in the implementation of the SS Initiative
196.
186 Exhibit 35, para 46(d)(v).
187 T13-98, L9-13 (Terry Burns).
188 T14-7, L17-35 (Terry Burns).
189 T12-101, L5-6 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
190 T16-17, L44-49 (Simon Porter).
191 T16-17, L24-33 (Simon Porter); T15-103, L52-55 (Robert Pedler); T1-108, L42-44 (Marcus Salouk); T2-14, L1-18 (Michael Duke).
192 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 107.
193 T15-70, L21-25 (Robert Pedler).
194 T15-70, L21-25 (Robert Pedler).
195 T15-72, L35-36 (Robert Pedler).
196 T15-71, L10-17 (Robert Pedler).

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The evidence shows that Mr Burns entertained a distinct preference for IBM in the course of
his May review.
2.95 Similarly Mr Porter was adamant that he had never had a meeting with Mr Burns “off the record”197. Such
a conversation would, he said, have been “quite memorable”
198. It would have involved the communication
of information that was not available to other contractors or potential participants in the SS Initiative.
Mr Burns did not reveal to Mr Porter his conviction that IBM should be more closely involved in the program
implementation
199.
2.96 Another indication that Mr Burns was improperly “coaching” IBM and was not seeking helpful suggestions
from it is that IBM had played a small part in the SS Initiative. Accenture and Logica were the substantial
participants. IBM provided personnel (quaintly called “resources”), small in number, to provide technical
expertise on the software it had licensed to the State. IBM’s local managers were not in a position to
offer Mr Burns “innovative” or “expansive” thinking without frst themselves learning more about the SSS
Program. This is a point made in an email from Mr Bloomfeld to Mr Burns of 8 May
200:
Terry,
We are progressing our thinking around your request and involving our shared services experts … .
As I explained previously, IBM’s involvement in the SSS Program to date has been relatively small and
as such our detailed knowledge of CorpTech’s current approach is low. As a result, there are a number of
items we would like … to help shape … our thinking … These include: …
2.97 Mr Burns replied that he would “get back … soon on these requests”201. True to his word Mr Burns replied with
some information on the same day. On 10 May he received a reply from Mr Bloomfeld asking for a meeting.
2.98 On 15 May 2007, Mr Bloomfeld again emailed Mr Burns202:
Terry,
In our discussion on Friday you asked for an indication from IBM of the aspects of the Shared Services
Program that we would be prepared to assist CorpTech.
In principle, IBM would be happy to consider our involvement in all aspects … – across both HR and
Finance. This would obviously be dependent on establishing the relevant arrangements between
Queensland Treasury and IBM. … [A]s you mentioned … current contractual arrangements … may
make involvement in certain areas prohibitive. In this case, our involvement may need to be limited to
a management position above other providers – where IBM … has management control to drive these
providers better than has been achieved by the CorpTech management team to date.
In particular, we would be prepared to take on the PMO role, as well as key roles in the Implementation
Rollout Team to better drive agency engagement and acceptance. Another area that has been handled
poorly in the past, that IBM could add signifcant value would be in the Change Management Team.
I think it would be good to catch-up tomorrow one-on-one for a coffee to discuss our latest thinking.
2.99 Mr Burns’ immediate reply noted that IBM had no ideas, innovative or otherwise, to improve program
delivery, but he held out the hope of work in other areas. He emailed Mr Bloomfeld
203:
I understand then that you do not have any signifcant new strategies to offer in the main solution area of
design and build or implementation roll out at this time.
I should point out that we have no contractual inhibitor at this time that would prevent us using another
vendor in any of those key areas to whom we would assign discreet (sic) work packages.
You (sic) other areas of interest are noted … for possible future engagement.
I will contact you in due course.
197 T16-17, L32, L35-42 (Simon Porter).
198 T16-17, L27-33 (Simon Porter).
199 T16-17, L48-53 (Simon Porter); T14-8, L14-20 (Terry Burns).
200 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 249.
201 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.5, at page 250.
202 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.6, at page 262.
203 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.6, at page 263.

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2.100 The obvious import of this exchange is that Mr Bloomfeld had understood from his conversations with
Mr Burns that because of the existing contracts between CorpTech and Accenture, and CorpTech and Logica,
it would be diffcult for IBM to take over their role in program delivery but offered IBM the role of Program
Manager or Change Manager; and that Mr Burns acknowledged IBM’s inability or reluctance to become
involved in the parts then being performed by Accenture and Logica but held out the promise that their
contracts would not prevent “us” (the choice of pronoun indicating Burns’ self-identifcation with CorpTech)
contracting with another company in discrete parts of what Accenture and Logica were contracted to do.
Mr Burns “noted” Mr Bloomfeld’s interest, on behalf of IBM, in the PMO and change management.
2.101 Mr Bloomfeld replied immediately to explain that his email had meant to indicate “a high-level view of where
IBM would be interested and capable of assisting CorpTech”, and that his intention was to “follow … up with a
more detailed document”
204. The next day, 16 May 2007, Mr Burns emailed his thanks for the intimation and
said that he was “looking to enter fnal negotiations with vendor/partners by mid next week”
205.
2.102 It is diffcult to know why Mr Burns would have made that last statement. It was either a deliberate
misrepresentation or the manifestation of a complete misunderstanding by him of his role in conducting
the May review, which was to do no more than investigate the causes of CorpTech’s failures and to suggest
remedies. Neither Ms Perrott nor Mr Bradley contemplated that as part of his review contracts would be made, or
negotiated
206. Certainly Mr Burns had not been authorised to conduct such negotiations. Mr Burns’ assertion is a
further example of the exaggeration of the power he assumed and expressed on behalf of CorpTech.
2.103 The last meeting relevant to this topic is recorded in another of Mr Bloomfeld’s emails sent internally to colleagues
at IBM. It was sent on 21 May 2007 and records a meeting with Mr Burns that afternoon. Mr Bloomfeld wrote
207:
He is trying to fnalise his report, however was able to counsel me on what he needs to see from us. He
has already received proposals from Accenture and SAP. … I walked through at a high level the areas we
could be involved. He needs us to flesh out our proposed areas of involvement as much as possible. This
includes … :
• Where does IBM want to play (e.g. PMO, HRBS, Finance, IR and agencies);
• He needs detail regarding exactly what role we could take in each area;
• Be clear to him that we are happy to work in an environment with mixed Accenture and IBM involvement

• Don’t forget the agencies …
NOTE: He doesn’t need costings at this stage. He just needs to work out where IBM will ft and justify our
involvement in these pieces.
2.104 There is no reason not to accept Mr Bloomfeld’s account of his conversation with Mr Burns as other than
accurate. It is noteworthy that Mr Burns is not recorded as asking for ideas or advice about improvements
to the SS Initiative. The conversation occurred at the conclusion of Mr Burns’ review, and at the time he was
writing his report. The investigations of problems and analysis of answers had been undertaken. He had
“proposals from Accenture and SAP”. What he wanted was justifcation for recommending IBM to Ms Perrott
and Mr Bradley. This is the only reasonable conclusion from what was said. Mr Burns “needs (IBM) to flesh out
our proposed areas of involvement”. He asked to be told where IBM wanted “to play”. IBM was urged not to
“forget the agencies”. He wanted the information from IBM “to justify (its) involvement”
208.
2.105 It must be remembered that Mr Burns did not recommend the appointment of a Prime Contractor in his
report and certainly did not identify any company as preferred for that role. It remains the point that he
encouraged IBM to bid for a greater role in the SS Initiative and supported its effort. There is no evidence
he did the same for any other company. The evidence shows that Mr Burns entertained a distinct preference
for IBM in the course of his May review.
2.106 There was one more meeting which is evidenced in an email Mr Bloomfeld sent internally on 3 June 2007209. It
recorded a meeting with Mr Burns “late on Friday afternoon”. That morning Mr Burns had presented his report
to the Steering Committee, Mr Bradley, Mr Waite and Ms Perrott. Mr Bloomfeld wrote
210:
204 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.6, at page 265.
205 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.6, at page 267.
206 T16-92, L15-17 (Barbara Perrott); T17-74, L25-30 (Gerard Bradley).
207 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.7, at page 270.
208 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.7, at page 270.
209 Exhibit 4, Volume 27, Item 25.11, at page 380.
210 Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.11, at page 380.

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The Steering Committee agreed to proceed with discussions with IBM regarding the PMO. In the frst
instance, this would involve us getting back to them with a proposal (i.e. exactly what we intend to do
and for how much). Terry said that Qld Treasury still needs to consider what others in the market may
offer, including SMS (the incumbent, who CorpTech is not happy with) … . To this end, Terry strongly
encouraged us to be competitive on our pricing.
Terry is looking for PMO “with bite”. …
Gerard Bradley is now considering the remainder of Terry’s recommendations. In parallel, Terry (and a
small number of others) would like to meet with IBM to better understand … all items of our offer. Terry
was clear that nothing in our proposal is currently off the table.
2.107 The terms of the email strongly suggest that Mr Burns and Mr Bloomfeld had between them agreed that the
best opportunity to involve IBM in CorpTech was to have it take over the PMO which, it will be remembered,
Mr Burns had recommended be given an enhanced and more powerful role in the program delivery.
Although nothing went to IBM as a result of Mr Burns’ encouragement during his May
review, it would be naïve to think that his partiality for it did not continue.
2.108 IBM did submit a comprehensive proposal to CorpTech that it take over the role of PMO211. The detail of the
application and attendant correspondence is irrelevant to the Inquiry. The application was unsuccessful.
2.109 Although nothing went to IBM as a result of Mr Burns’ encouragement during his May review, it would be
naïve to think that his partiality for it did not continue.
Mr Burns and Mr Bond
2.110 There is another example of Mr Burns’ conduct in the course of his May review which should be noted. In
2007 Mr Bond was a public servant of about 16 years’ experience
212. He was a program director of Business
Solutions, employed at CorpTech, reporting directly to Mr Waite
213. He was responsible for designing,
building and implementing the SS Initiative
214. He was in charge of a team consisting of four or fve hundred
people deployed on the Initiative
215. He knew Mr Bradley, Mr Waite’s superior, and enjoyed a cordial working
relationship with him.
2.111 Ms Perrott had earlier told Mr Bond he was to provide Mr Burns with whatever information he requested216.
He found Mr Burns “very assertive in his approach”
217. Mr Bond thought it unwise to entrust such an
important review to one individual who had no extensive knowledge of the SS Initiative or its history, and
ask him to “suddenly … [provide] fairly detailed recommendation[s] about where we should go”
218.
2.112 In May or June 2007, about the time Mr Burns’ review was coming to an end or had just ended, he, together
with Mr Goddard, went into Mr Bond’s offce, closed the door and in a “fairly aggressive” manner told him he
was “not permitted to go and see (Mr Bradley) anymore”
219. Mr Bond protested that Mr Bradley had extended
him the courtesy of seeing him whenever he thought it necessary. He told Mr Burns that he had an obligation
to inform the Under-Treasurer about matters of importance to the SS Initiative. Mr Goddard and Mr Burns
were, however, “insistent that” he did not go to Mr Bradley
220.
2.113 Mr Bond reported the incident to Ms Perrott221. According to Mr Bond, Ms Perrott supported Mr Burns.
She said “you know Terry is fairly aggressive … just put up with it … it’s going to be for the good of
government”
222. Ms Perrott then suggested that Mr Bond should consider his future with CorpTech and look
for a position elsewhere because the SS Initiative had not performed well
223.
211 Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.14, at pages 405-423.
212 T2-58, L37-38 (Darrin Bond).
213 Exhibit 8, para 4; T2-38, L6-7 (Darrin Bond).
214 Exhibit 8, para 7.
215 T2-38, L16-18 (Darrin Bond).
216 T2-57, L31-34 (Darrin Bond).
217 T2-57, L39-40 (Darrin Bond).
218 T2-57, L45-50 (Darrin Bond).
219 T2-58, L18-30 (Darrin Bond).
220 T2-58, L27 (Darrin Bond).
221 T2-59, L22-25 (Darrin Bond).
222 T2-59, L27-33 (Darrin Bond).
223 T2-59, L36-42 (Darrin Bond).

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2.114 Mr Goddard has no recollection of the conversation224. Mr Burns was inclined to doubt it occurred. I have no
such doubt. Ms Perrott confrmed that Mr Bond complained to her about it
225. Ms Perrott’s recollection of
her response is that she encouraged Mr Bond to speak to Mr Bradley because he had been committed to
CorpTech’s delivery of the program and the government made a decision to “go in a different direction”
226.
She doubted that she told Mr Bond to look for a position outside CorpTech in that conversation, although
she acknowledged she may have had a conversation to that effect with Mr Bond at some stage
227. She also
claims that she spoke sternly to Mr Burns about his misbehaviour
228. I think she is mistaken on all three
points. Mr Bond’s version of events is the accurate one. The government had not at the time Mr Burns spoke
to Mr Bond made a decision to engage a Prime Contractor for the delivery of the program. Mr Burns denies
that Ms Perrott ever cautioned him about his manner of dealing with public servants
229 and given the obvious
differences in their personalities, I doubt Ms Perrott would have made the attempt. Mr Bond had a clear
reason to remember the event.
2.115 The episode is signifcant in several respects. It shows the extent to which Mr Burns felt confdent in his position
in CorpTech and felt able to intimidate relatively senior public servants. The warning to Mr Bond to stay away
from the Under-Treasurer came at about the time Mr Burns had concluded his May review and was about to
present its criticisms of CorpTech and his recommendations for new positions (to which he was appointed) to
Mr Bradley. Mr Bond knew more about the SS Initiative than anyone else. He had led it for some years and was
deeply committed to it. Mr Burns’ overreaching was no doubt an attempt by him to prevent his conclusions and
recommendations being challenged by the man best positioned to do so.
2.116 Ms Perrott agreed that Mr Burns’ insistence that Mr Bond not speak to the Under-Treasurer was serious
misbehaviour and “indicative of Mr Burns not understanding the workings of government and the hierarchy
within government”
230. He attempted to interrupt the ordinary lines of communication between public
servants, and did so for the purposes of advancing his self-interest. The matter should have been reported
by Ms Perrott to Mr Bradley and should have coloured his reception of Mr Burns’ report. Instead I am
satisfed Ms Perrott did nothing other than advise Mr Bond to placate Mr Burns, and to consider leaving
CorpTech. Mr Burns was left unchallenged and uncontrolled. Ms Perrott’s weakness in dealing with Mr Burns
had serious consequences.
Mr Burns’ New engagement
2.117 Mr Uhlmann obviously remained on good terms with Mr Burns. He signed a document dated 30 May 2007
entitled “Policy and Program Offce Consultancy for the Shared Services Initiative” in which he offered Arena’s
assistance with “a new body of work required to realign the project within the agreed timing and resource
constraints”
231. The “new body of work” was Mr Burns’ proposed “Phase III” further review. Mr Uhlmann’s proposal
noted that “the fnal presentation of fndings and recommendations” from Mr Burns’ May review were “due for
completion this week”, and that the review relied “heavily on Terry’s knowledge, experience and IP”
232. The success
of the new body of work which Mr Burns’ review showed to be required could be, Mr Uhlmann said, “seriously
impacted if the knowledge and understanding provided by Terry was not available”
233. He went on234:
Terry has received another job offer with a major international organisation at a signifcantly increased
rate and is due to fly to Sydney on Monday the
4th June to sign the contracts but has agreed to undertake
this assignment with PPO should a decision be made and a contract signed this week.
There is therefore some time urgency to this proposal.
2.118 Mr Uhlmann then proposed a new consultancy “to lead a review of the currently defned standard offering
and the current proposed solution for all agencies and to verify the current solution direction … ”
235.
Mr Burns was proposed as the nominated consultant for the role. It was said that he was “only prepared to
contract through … [Arena] for this assignment with PPO”
236.
224 T8-26, L54-56 to T8-27, L1-35 (Keith Goddard).
225 T16-77, L53-54 (Barbara Perrott).
226 T16-78, L1-17 (Barbara Perrott).
227 T16-80, L22-34; T16-81, L30-40 (Barbara Perrott); Exhibit 53B, para 8.
228 T16-81, L30-45 (Barbara Perrott).
229 T13-85, L32-38 (Terry Burns).
230 T16-81, L20-24 (Barbara Perrott).
231 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.
232 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.
233 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.
234 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.
235 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.
236 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.1, at page 3.

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2.119 This document calls for comment. Although signed by Mr Uhlmann it must have been written by Mr Burns. The
author of the proposal knew that Mr Burns’ May review, which had not been delivered, would recommend a
further review. Mr Uhlmann did not know that
237. Although he acknowledged that he had signed the document
Mr Uhlmann was genuinely surprised by its terms when shown it in evidence. He had no knowledge of the other
“job offer with a major international organisation at a signifcantly increased rate” in Sydney which his letter said
Mr Burns had been offered
238. That was information Mr Burns gave him. I am satisfed there was no such offer.
Mr Burns was most unconvincing in answering questions about it. He had no corroborating details
239. It is, I think,
the case that Mr Burns recommended the further review intending to undertake the role himself. He wrote his
own encomium disguised as a proposal from Arena, and had Mr Uhlmann sign it.
2.120 Fortune is said to favour the bold. Certainly Mr Burns’ effrontery was quickly rewarded.
2.121 Given the terms of his self-promotion and Mr Uhlmann’s endorsement thereof, it is not a surprise that
Queensland Treasury on 15 June 2007 executed an agreement with Arena by which it was to
240:
• Develop an overarching Implementation Plan for the recommendation of a series of recent replanning
activities around the standard offering roll-outs.
• Review the recommendations for improvement and develop detailed improvement strategies relating to
the implementation approach, scope, timelines and costs for the remaining implementations of the HR
and Finance Business Solutions.
• Verify the overall delivery timeline of the program.
• Institute appropriate strategies to accelerate the delivery of the program.
• Institute productivity improvements in the structure and processes of the program.
The contract was for an initial term of three months which the State could extend for a further 12
months
241. The services were to be performed by Mr Burns242.
2.122 Important events occurred during the term of this contract, but before rehearsing them it is convenient to
conclude the account of Mr Burns’ successive contracts with the State.
2.123 On 17 September 2007, Mr Burns, for himself and not on behalf of Arena, proposed that243:
… Terry’s contract be extended from the 1st September until the 21st December to undertake the
following activities:
• Complete Phase III of the Program Rebuild project and provide expert independent advice to the
Executive during the transition phase.
• Negotiate final contracts with Prime Contractor vendor and help establish effective ongoing contract
management arrangements.
• Complete the establishment of the Solution Design Authority covering the mission statement, roles,
processes and resourcing requirements.
• Complete establishment of the Strategic Program Management Office covering the mission statement,
roles, processes and resourcing requirements.
• Establish the strategic business needs of all agencies across the sector and plan their inclusion in the
overall schedule Phase I and Phase II of the new program.
2.124 The proposal then recited that Mr Burns had obtained Arena’s consent to terminate its contract with the
intent that he would “contract directly through his own organisation for this assignment with PPO”
244. On
26 September 2007, Ms Perrott on behalf of the State executed a contract, also signed by Mr Burns on that
date, appointing Mr Burns as the “Key Personnel” to fulfl the role of Project Director, SSI Program Rebuild,
to undertake the same services specifed in the earlier contract
245. The term of that contract was extended
to 14 March 2008
246.
237 T6-21, L54-56 to T6-22, L1-22 (Gary Uhlmann).
238 T6-23, L13-23 (Gary Uhlmann).
239 T14-8, L39-53 to T14-9, L1-9 (Terry Burns).
240 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.2, Schedule 1, at page 37.
241 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.2, Clause 2 and Schedule 2, at pages 19, 38.
242 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.2, Clause 4.1 and Schedule 2, at pages 20, 38.
243 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.3, at page 52.
244 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.3, at page 53.
245 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.4, Clause 4.1, at pages 59, 60; Schedules 1-2, at pages 79, 80.
246 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.6, at page 85.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
36
2.125 On 27 February 2008, Ms Perrott approved the appointment of Mr Burns (for the new role of Program Delivery
Director, commencing 15 March 2008)
247, accepting the recommendation that the offer of the position be made
only to Cavendish Risk Management, and not to call for wider applications for the role because of “urgency and
specialist nature of the work”
248. Ms Perrott noted that Mr Burns had “previously flled the role of Project Director,
SSI Program Rebuild” and that there were “currently no available Public Sector Personnel with the specialist skills
to undertake” the role of Program Delivery Director
249. It was, she said, “critical that a continuity of approach be
maintained … and therefore it is proposed to re-engage Mr Burns.”
250.
As a result of receiving Mr Uhlmann’s April Snapshot review and Mr Burns’ fuller May review,
Mr Bradley formed the opinion that a profound change to the manner in which CorpTech was
going about implementing the SS Initiative was needed
255.
2.126 On 7 March 2008, Cavendish Risk Management responded to a Request For Offer251 from Queensland
Treasury to fulfl the role of Program Delivery Director for the SS Initiative by nominating Mr Burns
252. He
was accepted and on 27 March 2008 Ms Perrott and Mr Burns, on behalf of Cavendish Risk Management,
executed another agreement which was to continue until the services specifed in Schedule 1 of the
Agreement had been performed in accordance with the Agreement
253. The services were to act as Program
Delivery Director and
254:
• Provide detailed stakeholder management support and responsibility for overseeing management of the
Program and the Prime Contractor’s performance and delivery of outcomes under the contract with the
Prime Contractor;
• Provision of leadership and advice for the Program including oversight of the activities of the Solution
Design Authority (SDA) and the Strategic Program Office (SPO) in the execution of the program of work;
• Ensuring the Prime Contractor provides periodic Program progress and other reports as agreed in the Prime
Vendor Contract; and
• Participation in the delivery status review, providing a summary view of program status in assisting the
SPO in connection with the preparation of materials for such reviews as agreed in the Prime Vendor
contract.
3. Request for Information (RFI)
3.1 As a result of receiving Mr Uhlmann’s April Snapshot review and Mr Burns’ fuller May review, Mr Bradley
formed the opinion that a profound change to the manner in which CorpTech was going about
implementing the SS Initiative was needed
255. Mr Burns told him that he had a “fundamental concern” 256
that CorpTech’s mode of delivery was not viable and that the program should be signifcantly reduced in
scope with stringent new acceleration and governance processes put in place while further replanning of
the overall Initiative was undertaken.
3.2 A consequence of Mr Bradley’s conviction that reappraisal was necessary was the calling of a meeting on 2
July 2007 by Mr Ford
257. An invitation was extended to IBM, SAP, Accenture, Logica and SMS Management
and Technology
258. The purpose of the meeting was to announce Mr Burns’ Phase III review and to
indicate that ideas would be sought to assist with the replanning
259. There followed shortly after the RFI
which took the form of undated letters sent on or about 6 July by Ms Blakeney to ten companies
260, known
within CorpTech as “External Service Providers” which had provided various services in connection with the
delivery of the SS Initiative. Ms Blakeney’s letter borrowed heavily from the recommendations in Mr Burns’
May review, and invited “from our ESPs innovative ideas and scenarios on managing the design and
247 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.11.6, at pages 169-170.
248 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.11.6, at page 170.
249 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.11.6, at page 169.
250 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.11.6, at page 169.
251 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.5, at page 82.
252 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.6, at pages 83-86.
253 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.7, at pages 87-115.
254 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.7, at page 112.
255 Exhibit 54A, para 58.
256 Exhibit 54A, para 57.
257 T17-69, L15-19 (Gerard Bradley).
258 For example see Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.17, at page 429.
259 Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.18, at pages 431-447.
260 Only ten letters were produced to the Commission, although it is possible it went to further vendors.

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implementation process within the SSS program”. The recipients of the letter were invited “to provide high
level information” on how the Initiative might be delivered faster and cheaper
261. The letters were sent to262:
a. Arena;
b. Accenture;
c. Ascend Business Solutions Pty Ltd;
d. BearingPoint Australia Pty Ltd;
e. IBM;
f. Impart Corporation Pty Ltd;
g. Logica;
h. Pendragon System Consultants;
i. SAP; and
j. KPMG
263.
3.3 Responses were to be sent electronically to Mr Burns by 12 July 2007. Those who responded were to be given “an
opportunity to present your proposals to the evaluation team on Friday 13 July 2007”
264. Only four companies
replied. They were Accenture, IBM, Logica and SAP.
There followed shortly after the RFI which took the form of undated letters sent on or about 6
July by Ms Blakeney to ten companies , known within CorpTech as “External Service Providers”
which had provided various services in connection with the delivery of the SS Initiative.
4. Request for proposal (RFp)
4.1 The next step was the RFP which was sent to the four companies which had responded to the RFI. The RFP
was contained in emails sent by Mr Burns on 25 July 2007 in these terms
265:
The key information that we are looking for in the form of a frm proposal Is:
1. Is your frm prepared to enter into a prime contractor role across the whole program
2. What discreet (sic) work packages would you recommend to be outsourced to supplier partners
going forward and which of these packages would your frm be bidding on?
3. Following on from your conceptual approach presented recently – could you now provide cost ranges
and timescale ranges to complete the scope as defned in your approach. We understand that these are
price ranges only but we are anxious to use these costings and timescales to determine who we move
forward with into detailed negotiations on any of the identifed engagement options.
4. The preferred commercial model that you would recommend.
5. How you would propose dealing specifcally with our needs on legacy application support and
upgrade strategies.
6. The process that we wish to follow from here onwards is to collate these proposals from all interested
suppliers by the
7 August 2007 and we suggest that you may wish to make a presentation to the senior
management group before this date.
7. It is our intention to begin the detailed processes leading to further engagements by the
15 August 2007.
8. Please liaise with Trish Brabyn and Diann McMillan in regard to booking meeting dates and times.
Each of IBM, Accenture, Logica and SAP responded on the due date, 7 August 2007.
261 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6, at pages 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19-2; which borrowed from presentation Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.18, at page 445.
262 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Items 6.1.1 to 6.1.9, at pages 1-18.
263 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.1.10, at pages 19-1-19-2.
264 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Items 6.1.1 to 6.1.9, at pages 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19-2.
265 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.4, at page 41; Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.5, at page 548.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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4.2 Mr Burns gave evidence that he drafted the RFP email and circulated it for review and approval by
Ms Perrott
266 and Ms Blakeney before sending it to the vendors. Ms Perrott confrmed that she approved the
email before it was sent
267.
The next step was the RFP which was sent to the four companies which had responded to the
RFI. The RFP was contained in emails sent by Mr Burns on 25 July 2007.
Why a prime Contractor?
4.3 There is no clear evidence of when or why the Prime Contractor model for the SS Initiative frst appeared.
Mr Salouk’s evidence was that Accenture raised the notion of a Prime Systems Integrator, essentially a
Prime Contractor, in early 2007
268. Ms Perrott did not recall Accenture’s proposal269, but given her recent
arrival at CorpTech, this is not surprising. Mr Bradley similarly did not recall Accenture’s ideas at this time
270.
Ms Perrott recalled that the frst time a Prime Contractor model was mentioned was at the meeting to
which Mr Burns delivered his recommendations from the May review, attended by her, Mr Bradley and
Mr Waite
271. At this meeting, Ms Perrott recalls, the Prime Contractor model was a potential alternative
to the original model
272 raised by Mr Burns273, though Mr Burns and Mr Bradley do not recall the notion
being raised at this meeting
274. Mr Bradley’s recollection is that the Prime Contractor model was raised by
Mr Burns during a regular update meeting
275. Mr Burns did not clearly recall the time he decided upon the
Prime Contractor model, but remembered that he had received proposals from various vendors including
Accenture regarding structure
276, noting that a “partnership model” was the likely starting point for
discussing such a notion
277. The written report contains no mention of a Prime Contractor.
4.4 Mr Bradley submitted a Briefng Paper dated 16 August 2007 to the CEO Governing Board, which had
ultimate responsibility for and control of the SS Initiative
278. The Briefng paper laid out “key issues”, the frst
of which was “conceptual model for program delivery”, with respect to which it said
279:
A new program delivery model is needed to deliver the business solutions within an acceptable
timeframe and budget. … If approved, this model will be implemented by mid-September. Key
characteristics include:
a. Tighter control of scope through the establishment of a Solution Design Authority.

c. Redefnition of supplier partner arrangements.
With respect to (a) the paper recommended “that an empowered Solution Design Authority be introduced,
with the charter to contain … scope … [and] … to respond to subsequent scope issues quickly … ”
280.
With respect to (c) the paper said
281:
‘In the past the role of Prime Contractor has been undertaken by CorpTech, with the support of a series of
Implementation Partners (Accenture for HR/Payroll, IBM for HR Extended Functionality, SAP for specialist
product advice, and Logica for Finance).
… ‘
As part of … [Mr Burns’ Phase III review] two solution modelling processes have been utilised to identify a
preferred solution … :
Internal CorpTech scenario planning …
266 T14-48, L1-4 (Terry Burns).
267 T17-26, L37-39 (Barbara Perrott).
268 T1-19, L42-45 (Marcus Salouk); Exhibit 5, paras 20-26.
269 T16-63, L21-26 (Barbara Perrott).
270 T17-66, L15-20 (Gerard Bradley).
271 T16-62, L30-33 (Barbara Perrott).
272 T16-62, L48-50 (Barbara Perrott).
273 T16-63, L16-20 (Barbara Perrott).
274 T13-90, L31-33 (Terry Burns).
275 T17-79, L46-53 (Gerard Bradley).
276 T13-90, L40-46 (Terry Burns).
277 T13-91, L36-38 (Terry Burns).
278 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at pages 6-18.
279 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at page 7.
280 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at page 8.
281 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at page 8.

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Procurement
Externally managed implementation: a Request For Proposal … to four of the implementation partners
has been undertaken, seeking to confirm their commitment, capacity and capability to continue with the
program, and in doing so, identify a better and/or preferred vendor engagement and solution model.
The RFP closed on
7 August 2007.
4.5 The Briefng paper went on282:
An analysis of these options has confrmed the view that by engaging the supplier partners potentially
through a ‘Prime Contractor’ model … the program can achieve signifcantly reduced costs and an
accelerated … timeline.
4.6 The CEO Governing Board met on 16 August 2007, the same day as the recommendation, and formally
adopted the new model
283. This was three weeks after the RFP had been issued calling for offers to take on
the role of Prime Contractor and after four replies had come in.
4.7 There is a discernible difference between the terms of the RFP sent out and Mr Bradley’s description of
it. The RFP asked whether the four addressees were prepared to take on the role of Prime Contractor,
displacing CorpTech, “across the whole program”; to indicate “cost ranges and timescale ranges”; and to
describe their “preferred commercial model”
284. Mr Bradley informed the CEO Governing Board that the
RFP asked the four companies to confrm their existing commitment to continue with the program and to
identify a better “vendor engagement and solution model”, which might or might not have been the Prime
Contractor model
285.
4.8 The substantial discrepancy shows a degree of misunderstanding or mismanagement. The RFP itself had
defciencies, as will be discussed, but it asked for offers to become the Prime Contractor and put the recipients
to the effort and expense of responding, as they did comprehensively, before the CEO Governing Board had
resolved to adopt that model.
4.9 Mr Bradley’s Briefng paper refers to an analysis of the responses to the RFP which confrmed the view that a
Prime Contractor would reduce costs and delay. The conclusion is curious. The indicated “cost ranges” submitted
in response to the RFP by the two companies which quoted for the whole of the work were in excess of $150M.
CorpTech’s remaining budget for the implementation of the whole-of-government solution was about $110M.
More curious is the fact that there does not appear to have been any serious analysis of what was the best
available “vendor engagement and solution model”. The only model considered in the RFP was the Prime
Contractor one. There is no evidence of any considered thought having been given to whether that model was
the best one. Despite a thorough investigation of government records there is no evidence that the analysis
Mr Bradley describes was conducted. The RFP was not directed to receiving options for analysis. It was predicated
upon a decision having been made to appoint a Prime Contractor. The decision appears to have emerged in
conversations between Mr Burns, Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley, and was accepted by them without question.
4.10 The decision to move to the Prime Contractor model must have been made between 12 July 2007, when
responses to the RFI were due, and 25 July when the RFP issued. There is, as I have said, no evidence
recording the making of the decision or the reasons for it. Either Ms Perrott or Mr Bradley must have
sanctioned it and the Briefng paper of 16 August was presumably designed to seek authority for what had
already been put in place.
4.11 There is evidence of haste and a lack of premeditation in the change to the new model. Mr John Swinson,
a partner of King & Wood Mallesons (then Mallesons Stephen Jaques), was contacted by Mr Keith Millman
of the Treasury Legal Services Unit on 26 July 2007, the day after the RFP went out. Mr Millman advised
Mr Swinson by email that Treasury wanted advice “on the proposal to engage a ‘Prime Contractor’”
286.
Mr Swinson met Mr Millman on 27 July and was asked whether the State could appoint a Prime Contractor
and if the existing contracts with Accenture and Logica precluded that course
287. In a well ordered process
the State’s legal right to appoint a Prime Contractor would have been ascertained before it called for
tenders for such a contract.
282 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at page 9.
283 Exhibit 4, Volume 37, Item 39.23, at pages 38-48.
284 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.4, at page 41.
285 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 7.5, at page 8.
286 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 8.3, at page 5-6.
287 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 8.4, at pages 7-8.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
40
Responses to RFp

4.12
4.13
The RFP took the form of the one brief email from Mr Burns to the vendors dated 25 July 2007288.
The brevity of the RFP resulted in a certain amount of confusion amongst vendors. Mr Bloomfeld gave

evidence that he did not believe that the email of 25 July 2007 was an RFP, the outcome of which would be
the selection of a Prime Contractor
289. Accenture had similar concerns which it expressed to Ms Perrott on a
number of occasions
290. Mr Michael Duke of Logica gave evidence that he considered it was unusual for an RFP
to be issued by an email of that nature
291. Ms Blakeney, who was listed as the Procurement Advisor in the ITO
Evaluation Report, agreed that this was not the sort of RFP one would expect for a signifcant ICT contract as
it was lacking in detail, technical requirements and conditions of tender
292.

4.14 Nevertheless, the vendors expended signifcant time and resources in responding to Mr Burns’ request
contained in the email of 25 July 2007.
Logica submitted a detailed response although only for the Finance requirements of the SS Initiative
293.
4.15

Its estimated cost range for the work it undertook to perform was between $84.7M and $116.8M294. IBM’s
response was briefer
295. It estimated its cost of providing the whole of the work required to deliver the
Initiative at between $155M and $190M
296. SAP also responded but did not give a fxed price297. It proposed
a variety of pricing models for different components of the work. Its overall, indicative, estimate of cost was
between $93M and $123M
298. Accenture, which put in a detailed response299, gave an estimated price for
the whole of the SS Initiative of $176M
300.
4.16 Despite the extreme brevity of the RFP, the four companies which responded to it did so in considerable
detail giving comprehensive proposals for the delivery, as Prime Contractor, of the SS Initiative. The
process was intended by CorpTech’s offcers to result in the awarding of a contract. Detailed planning was
undertaken for the evaluation of the responses and their gradation according to predetermined criteria.
Teams of public servants and consultants were assembled for that endeavour.
4.17 Mr Salouk who led the Accenture bid was particularly concerned that the RFP end in the offer of a contract.
He sought and obtained an assurance to that effect from Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley
301. Accenture and Logica
by reason of their earlier involvement in the delivery of human resources and fnance solutions respectively
were best placed to understand what was required by CorpTech and to frame their responses accordingly. IBM
had had little involvement in the SS Initiative and was therefore at a comparative disadvantage. Mr Salouk’s
concern was that if the RFP were only a “dress rehearsal” for a later more formal tender process, Accenture
would lose its advantage and the content of its proposal might become known to competitors
302.
The brevity of the RFP resulted in a certain amount of confusion amongst vendors.
4.18 Notwithstanding the assurances given to Accenture, and CorpTech’s own initial intention to proceed from the
RFP to contract, it received legal advice that the process undertaken was inadequate for the basis of awarding
a contract. On 7 and 8 August 2007, Ms Blakeney emailed the four proposals to Mr Swinson who had been
retained to give legal advice, as required from time to time, to CorpTech
303. Mr Swinson reviewed the proposals,
though not in detail
304, prior to a meeting on 9 August with Ms Perrott, Mr Burns and Ms Joanne Bugden,
288 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.4, at page 41; Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.5, at page 548.
289 Exhibit 35, paras 93-94.
290 Exhibit 5, paras 35-41.
291 T2-17, L50-51 (Michael Duke).
292 T4-75, L50-51 (Maree Blakeney).
293 Exhibit 4, Volume 7, Item 6.6.1 at page 820-897; Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.6.2 at pages 898-1040.
294 Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.6.2, at page 909.
295 Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.7.1, at pages 1041-1072; Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.7.2, at pages 1073-1164.
296 Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.7.1, at page 1066.
297 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Items 6.4.1-6.4.5, at pages 354-441; Exhibit 4, Volume 7, Items 6.4.6-6.4.9, at pages 442-547.
298 Exhibit 4, Volume 7, Item 6.4.9, pages 537-543.
299 Exhibit 4, Volume 7, Items 6.5.1-6.5.3, at pages 548-819.
300 Exhibit 4, Volume 7, Item 6.5.3, at page 747.
301 Exhibit 5, paras 35-41.
302 Exhibit 5, para 38.
303 Exhibit 4, Volume 36, Item 38.1.9, at page 58; Exhibit 28A, para 19.
304 Exhibit 28A, para 20.

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Procurement
the Director of Finance Business Administration Contracts in CorpTech305. Mr Swinson advised that a formal
tender process was necessary and that the four proposals were “varied, vague on key elements and had many
carve outs” and could not “be treated as offers” capable of acceptance by the State
306. He also advised that
potential bidders must be given enough time to put together a considered and careful response.
4.19 His advice was accepted and CorpTech moved to the preparation and delivery of the ITO.
Despite the extreme brevity of the RFP, the four companies which responded to it did so in
considerable detail giving comprehensive proposals for the delivery, as Prime Contractor, of
the SS Initiative.
4.20 On 20 August 2007 Ms Perrott wrote to the participants in the RFP307:
Thank you for the information you provided as part of the selection process for services to support the …
Shared Services Initiative.
We have reviewed the responses submitted in the RFI process.
Our feedback to you is that Accenture’s and IBM’s responses were the most highly rated.
We are now entering a formal process to select a “prime contractor”. It is anticipated that a RFO will be
released to you this week or shortly thereafter. It is intended that RFO will be a tailored, short form request
that focuses on the key technical and business issues. … There will be a tight timeframe in which to
respond.
We will provide more information to you shortly. Please contact Terry Burns … if you have further
questions.
The letter reveals the inconsistency in terminology. The “RFO” is what I have designated “ITO” and the “RFI”
was the RFP.
4.21 Despite the RFP not resulting in a contract, events which occurred in the course of the evaluation of
the proposals have a distinct relevance to that part of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference which required
examination of the procurement process between the State and IBM.
Mr Atzeni’s preference for IBM
4.22 Mr Atzeni, an employee of QH, who was a member of one of the Evaluation Panels established as part of
the ITO, met with Mr Jason Cameron of IBM throughout 2007
308. Mr Atzeni was frst employed by QH in
1996, initially as a Clinical Nurse Consultant, and later as a Client Representative at CorpTech for QH as part
of Queensland Health Enterprise Solution Transition (QHEST) between 2005 and 2007. Part of Mr Atzeni’s
responsibilities as a Client Representative included mapping out QH’s business requirements for the
SS Initiative
309. His role was to ensure that the QH business and IT processes would be ready to receive the
whole-of-government payroll and rostering solution from CorpTech.
4.23 Mr Atzeni had a personal preference for IBM to assist with the QH payroll roll out, rather than Accenture310. This,
Mr Atzeni stated, was based on his concerns about the flawed Department of Housing roll out which Accenture
had conducted
311. His exposure to Accenture while working at CorpTech as the Client Representative for QH
persuaded him that Accenture would probably not deliver a new payroll system to QH in time to meet that
department’s need to replace the LATTICE system
312. He was clearly concerned that after mid-2008 LATTICE may
not work, with horrendous consequences for the QH Payroll
313.
305 Exhibit 4, Volume 36, Item 38.1.11, at page 61.
306 Exhibit 28A, Annexure JVS1.
307 Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.29, at page 689 (IBM). The executed letters to the other vendors are not in the possession of the Commission. However draft letters in the same terms
were produced: see Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.20, at pages 147-150.
308 Exhibit 29, paras 24-41.
309 T9-18, L2-3 (Damon Atzeni).
310 T9-50, L30-33 (Damon Atzeni).
311 Exhibit 29, para 13.
312 Exhibit 29, para 14.
313 Exhibit 29, para 15; T9-21, L3-11 (Damon Atzeni).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
42
4.24 It is interesting that those more closely connected with the delivery of the QH Payroll, Mr Atzeni and
Mr Hood
314, were particularly concerned at the lack of vendor support for the system and the prospect
that it might fail in operation. Those more removed from the department, Mr Uhlmann and Mr Goddard,
were more relaxed and thought that vendor support could be bought at a price or that CorpTech’s own
technicians could be trained for the support role
315.
4.25 Mr Atzeni conceded that he had a close proximity to IBM in 2007 which may have led to a perception that
he should have reconsidered sitting on the Evaluation Panel of the ITO. This, however, did not occur to him
at the time of the tender evaluations
316.
4.26 Mr Atzeni’s main point of contact with IBM during the RFP was Mr Cameron, an IBM employee engaged to
work within CorpTech during the time Accenture was prime subcontractor between early 2005 and mid-
2007
317. Mr Cameron spent some time working within QH from early 2007, providing advice to QHEST at
the request of Mr Atzeni
318. Mr Atzeni and Mr Cameron would also, on occasion, meet for coffee during this
period and were friends on Facebook
319.
4.27 Relevantly, the Commission heard the following exchange of information occurred between Mr Atzeni and
Mr Cameron:
a. On 8 March 2007 Mr Atzeni emailed Mr Cameron (and others) under the subject “Health Workbrain
requirements” a document called “SSS must provide by the 31 March.doc
”320.
b. On 16 March 2007 Mr Cameron sent Mr Atzeni, and his supervisor Mr Nigel Hey, a document called “QH
Development Estimates
”321. It provided an estimate of costings for QH to implement its own alternatives to
the Shared Services Solution.
c. On 30 April 2007 Mr Atzeni emailed Mr Cameron a “Workforce Edge” document
322, which was the strategic
analysis of the rostering transition prepared for QHEST
323. The body of Mr Atzeni’s email stated “For eyes
only” which can be understood to mean that he intended the email be for Mr Cameron’s eyes only
324.
d. On 24 June 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Atzeni, Mr Hey and Mr Bloomfeld attempting to coordinate a
meeting time
325.
e. On 25 July 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Atzeni approximately one hour after the RFP was issued to IBM,
requesting the implementation roll out plan template provided by CorpTech and requesting a meeting with
him and Mr Dougal Ferguson, the awards specialist at QH
326.
f. On 25 July 2007 Mr Atzeni emailed Mr Cameron, providing him with the requested roll out plan and
requesting a further meeting
327.
g. On 30 July 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Atzeni a link to the SSI review
328.
h. On 8 August 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Atzeni detailing how IBM’s presentation at CorpTech had gone
329.
i. On 13 August 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Hey and Mr Atzeni seeking the opportunity to share IBM’s
CorpTech presentation with them
330.
j. On 28 August 2007 Mr Cameron emailed Mr Atzeni the DETA (Department of Education Training and Arts)
requirements, stating “Happy reading”
331. Mr Atzeni then sent them on to Mr Hey on 30 August 2007 stating
“Unoffcially got these from IBM who go (sic) them for their planning
332.
314 T3-33, L7-18; T3-34, L33-46; T3-52, L7-27 (Philip Hood); T9-21, L20-25 (Damon Atzeni).
315 T6-12, L41-56 (Gary Uhlmann); T8-30, L13-55; T8-43, L17-26 (Keith Goddard).
316 Exhibit 29, para 45; T9-73, L1-10; T9-86, L1-3 (Damon Atzeni).
317 Exhibit 29, para 21; Exhibit 31, paras 4(a), 15.
318 Exhibit 31, para 16.
319 Exhibit 29, para 21; Exhibit 31, para 43; T9-65, L7-55 to T9-66, L1-42; T9-67, L31-34 (Damon Atzeni).
320 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.10, at page 10.
321 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.16, at pages 69-70.
322 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.49, at page 169.
323 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.44, at pages 124-164.
324 T9-51, L20-32 (Damon Atzeni).
325 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.70, at pages 420-422.
326 Exhibit 4, Volume 4, Item 4.86, at page 557.
327 Exhibit 4, Volume 4, Item 4.87, at page 558.
328 Exhibit 4, Volume 4, Item 4.90, at page 564; T9-85, L1-38 (Damon Atzeni).
329 Exhibit 4, Volume 4, Item 4.93, at page 569.
330 Exhibit 4, Volume 4, Item 4.94, at page 571.
331 Exhibit 29, Annexure DAA-37.
332 Exhibit 29, Annexure DAA-36.

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Despite the RFP not resulting in a contract, events which occurred in the course of the
evaluation of the proposals have a distinct relevance to that part of the Inquiry’s Terms
of Reference which required examination of the procurement of the contract between the
State and IBM.
4.28 Mr Atzeni, through these interactions with Mr Cameron, offered considerable assistance in IBM growing its role
in the SS Initiative. On at least one occasion, he gave Mr Cameron information confdential to government
333.
Mr Cameron said that all of the documents provided by Mr Atzeni were freely available to any person working
on the whole-of-government program and were not required to be treated as confdential
334. If that were so
one wonders why Mr Cameron asked for them, or why Mr Atzeni bothered to send them. Mr Atzeni met with
IBM staff very shortly after the RFP was issued to give it information relevant to its bid without which IBM
would have been at a disadvantage.
4.29 Mr Atzeni cannot be accepted when he gave evidence that he did not know why he was asked by Mr Cameron
to attend a meeting with Mr Ferguson
335. If he was not told of the reason for the meeting he would have asked.
When he realised some time later that the RFP process had commenced and put two and two together, he would
have remonstrated with Mr Cameron or told his superior, Mr Hey. There is no evidence he did either
336. There is
also a coincidence of time and circumstance in that the RFP email was sent out by Mr Burns to IBM on 25 July
2007 and approximately one hour later, Mr Cameron was requesting documents from Mr Atzeni and arranging a
meeting with him and Mr Ferguson the next day to discuss awards.
4.30 Further, Mr Atzeni should not have participated in the ITO. He may not have had a conflict of interest, but
he had a personal and actual bias in favour of IBM and against Accenture. Mr Atzeni readily acknowledged
that he should have reconsidered his position on the Evaluation Panel
337. Mr Atzeni gave evidence that he
made a disclosure about his history of working with IBM at the commencement of the evaluation, but,
through no fault of his own, the relevant forms could not be produced by the State
338. He was a minor
player in the evaluation process and it is unlikely that his individual preference influenced the choice of
Prime Contractor, but nevertheless he did not bring and could not have brought a fair, objective mind to the
evaluation process.

4.31 Although he had some reason to doubt Accenture’s capacity to perform the contract, he had no reason to
believe that IBM would do any better.
Contact Between Mr Burns and IBM during the RFp
4.32 The main criticism of Mr Burns in the course of the Inquiry relates to suggestions of partiality on his part to

IBM’s interests. That partiality manifested itself in private encouragement of IBM by Mr Burns during the
RFP process. At the very least, Mr Burns did not appreciate the special obligations of government agencies
in procurement processes to act fairly, and to treat all tenderers equally.
4.33 Mr Burns’ discussions and meetings with IBM representatives in contemplation of the RFP tender process
were inappropriate. Best practice in procurement requires that all competitors receive the same information.
That approach aids transparency as well as promoting effective competition. Effective competition in turn
ensures the best chance of obtaining value for money.

4.34 Critically, Mr Burns invited IBM for a “dry run” or rehearsal of its key RFP proposal presentation to be made
to CorpTech. This was not an opportunity afforded to any other vendor
339.

333 Exhibit 4, Volume 3, Item 4.44, at pages 124-164.
334 Exhibit 31, para 51.
335 T9-64, L29-56; T9-67, L10-29 (Damon Atzeni).
336 T9-86, L31-54 to T9-87, L1-6 (Damon Atzeni).
337 Exhibit 29, para 45; T9-73, L1-10; T9-86, L1-3 (Damon Atzeni).
338 Exhibit 29, paras 42-43; T9-71, L48-55 to T9-72, L1-5 (Damon Atzeni).
339 T14-39, L8-12 (Terry Burns).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
44
4.35 On 27 July 2007 Mr Bloomfeld sent the following email to Messrs Cameron, Paul Surprenant and
Christopher Prebble of IBM
340:
I just got off a call with Terry. A few points:
He has invited us to have a dry run before our presentation again. He said this would be particularly
important for us to test our presentation of our fnancial position;
He suggested that we request a meeting with Gerard Bradley and the steering committee, as a separate
exercise to our presentation of our proposal. He clarifed for me (which Trish has been unable to do so far) that
the 6 August meeting (still to be confrmed) will be to the same mob and it may be smart for us to get some
messages directly to the steering committee ‘unfltered’ …
4.36 Mr Burns’ RFP email to the vendors set out the requirements that CorpTech was looking for in a proposal.
Relevantly, the email offered the parties a meeting with representatives of the State, stating “we suggest
that you may wish to make a presentation to the senior management group before this date”
341.
4.37 The IBM “dry run” took place on Friday, 3 August 2007 with Mr Burns and Mr Goddard at IBM’s offces342.
The main criticism of Mr Burns in the course of the Inquiry relates to suggestions of partiality
on his part to IBM’s interests. That partiality manifested itself in private encouragement of
IBM by Mr Burns during the RFP process.
4.38 Mr Burns gave evidence that he had meetings with the vendors at which they could sound out ideas with
him, as the short timeframe meant that assisting the vendors to provide useful responses to the RFP was
necessary
343. Mr Bloomfeld gave evidence that the “dry run” meeting was consistent with the invitation
contained in Mr Burns’ RFP email
344. However that cannot be accepted. I fnd by inference that the purpose
of this meeting was to give IBM a rehearsal of the fnal presentation it was scheduled to give CorpTech on
Monday, 6 August 2007.
4.39 Mr Bloomfeld and Mr Burns could not recall the detail of what was discussed at that meeting345.
Mr Goddard could not recall attending the meeting at all
346. Nevertheless, it is of note that neither
Mr Burns nor Mr Goddard could be properly characterised as being senior management of CorpTech
(who Mr Bloomfeld himself identifed as being people such as Ms Perrott, Mr Ford and decision-makers
such as Mr Hood
347). Mr Bloomfeld conceded in evidence that this was not a presentation to the senior
management group referred to in Mr Burns’ RFP email
348. It was a presentation to two independent
contractors to the State
349.
4.40 One does not fnd in the RFP email an invitation to any other tenderer to do a “dry run” presentation before
Mr Burns and Mr Goddard. That was an invitation extended to IBM only. There was no similar attention
given to other bidders. IBM knowingly obtained a private advantage over its competitors by being given a
“dry run” of a key proposal. Nothing in the meeting said by Mr Burns to IBM was hindered by the presence
of a CorpTech or Queensland Treasury representative. No government offcial was present at that meeting.
4.41 The other RFP vendors also sought and received anterior meetings with CorpTech representatives prior to
their fnal RFP presentations. However, IBM alone received the beneft of a meeting with only Mr Burns
and possibly Mr Goddard to review and refne its presentation. Further, there is a distinct difference
between the nature of IBM’s “dry run” meeting on 3 August and any meeting its competitors had with
CorpTech representatives.
340 Exhibit 4, Volume 33, Item 35.34, at page 467.
341 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.4, at page 41; Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.25, at page 548.
342 IBM representatives were Lochlan Bloomfeld, Brooke Freeman, Christopher Prebble, Jason Cameron, Keith Pullen, Paul Surprenant and Sara Simpson; Exhibit 4, Volume 34, Item
35.47-35.48, at pages 592-594A.
343 T14-38, L13-38 (Terry Burns).
344 Exhibit 35, para 86.
345 Exhibit 35, para 85; T14-38, L17-18; T14-39, L1-4 (Terry Burns).
346 T8-2, L28-50 (Keith Goddard).
347 T12-22, L1-4 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
348 T12-22, L24 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
349 T12-22, L26-30 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).

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4.42 This meeting must also be viewed in the context of the general partiality exhibited by Mr Burns to IBM’s
interests. There was a marked disparity in the ease of access to meetings and information of this kind
given by Mr Burns to IBM, when compared with the other tenderers. Mr Duke (of Logica)
350, Mr Salouk351,
Ms Janine Griffths (of Accenture)
352, Mr Porter (of Accenture)353 and Mr Pedler (of SAP)354 all said they never
received treatment of this kind from Mr Burns. The Commission interviewed and took statements from
Mr Salouk
355, Mr Porter356 and Ms Griffths357, Mr Pedler358 and Mr Duke359. Each (other than Ms Griffths) was
made available for oral examination. Their evidence speaks for itself: none of these witnesses had any “dry
run” or “off the record” meetings, at no stage did Mr Burns coach or almost coach them and Mr Burns never
strongly recommended to them the approach they ought to adopt in their proposals, and he never imparted
to them the generally encouraging remarks he made to Mr Bloomfeld.
4.43 Evidence was presented to the Commission that Accenture similarly had an objective during the RFP to “test
ideas” with CorpTech management. Accenture provided an explanation of its proposal to CorpTech on 2
August 2007
360. However, that meeting can be clearly differentiated from the IBM “dry run”: it was between
senior Accenture representatives and senior CorpTech and Queensland Treasury representatives, including the
Under-Treasurer, Mr Bradley, the Deputy Under-Treasurer, Mr Ford, Ms Perrott as well as Mr Burns, Mr Goddard,
Ms Bugden and Ms Blakeney
361. Mr Porter gave evidence that this was a formal meeting, of short duration362.
4.44 Mr Duke and Mr Roland Baier of Logica had the beneft of meeting with Mr Burns on or about 5 July
2007 to discuss the SS Initiative
363. Likewise, Mr Duke also requested an additional meeting to gain more
information about the RFP process with only Mr Burns and Ms Perrott on 31 July 2007, to which Mr Burns
replied with a list of the meetings Logica had already had with CorpTech and resisted the suggestion of a
more intimate meeting
364. Logica executives met with Mr Burns regarding its proposal on 1 August 2007,
but Ms Perrott and Ms Blakeney, the “Legal and Procurement” team lead for the ITO evaluation, were also
present at this meeting
365.
The issue for consideration was whether IBM in the course of the RFP received or misused
confdential information belonging to the State or Accenture, its main competitor in the bid
process, which gave it a competitive advantage.
Access to Confdential Information
4.45 Mr Salouk, who led Accenture’s bid team, gave evidence that very early in the procurement process he
expressed concern to Mr Bradley and Ms Perrott on a number of occasions that Accenture’s confdential
information relating to its bid was being leaked to IBM
366. He recalls receiving repeated assurances
that CorpTech intended to “buy off”, or contract from, the RFP process and Accenture structured its bid
accordingly
367. When CorpTech proceeded to a subsequent ITO, Mr Salouk’s concerns remained that
Accenture’s RFP information had been reflected in the ITO and that IBM “caught up very quickly” between
the two processes
368. Mr Salouk, however, was not able to point to any specifc example of misuse of
Accenture’s information in the limited time and materials he had available to him
369.
350 Exhibit 7, paras 21-30.
351 Exhibit 5, paras 69-77.
352 Exhibit 59, para 19.
353 Exhibit 51A, paras 9-19.
354 Exhibit 49, paras 20-26.
355 Exhibit 5.
356 Exhibit 51A; Exhibit 51B.
357 Exhibit 59.
358 Exhibit 49.
359 Exhibit 7.
360 Exhibit 4, Volume 26, Item 24.64, at page 1169-1170; Exhibit 51B, paras 2-3.
361 Exhibit 4, Volume 26, Item 24.64, at page 1169-1170; Exhibit 51B, paras 2-3.
362 Exhibit 51B, para 4.
363 T2-12, L24-56 to T2-13, L1-19 (Michael Duke).
364 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 31.1, at pages 1-4.
365 Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 31.1, at page 2.
366 Exhibit 5, paras 35-41.
367 T1-58, L43-46 to T1-59, L1-3 (Marcus Salouk); Exhibit 5, paras 36, 40-42, 83.
368 Exhibit 5, paras 59-61, 113.
369 T1-66, L1-7 (Marcus Salouk); Exhibit 5, para 132.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
46
4.46 The evidence did, however, raise questions about the security of government systems during the procurement
process. During the RFP, IBM, probably Mr Bloomfeld
370, contacted Mr Burns to inform him that a staff
member at a government agency mentioned that they had access to an “evaluation matrix” which listed the
strengths and weaknesses of the respective RFP responses
371. The document was inadvertently stored on an
unsecured section of the Local Area Network (LAN). Mr Burns emailed Ms Perrott on 31 August 2007 about
this security breach, stating that he had received advice from Mr Swinson that the four vendors should be
formally notifed of this lapse
372. However, the Commission located no evidence that the vendors ever received
such notifcation. This appears to be another oversight by Ms Perrott on an important point.
IBM’s Conduct during the RFp

4.47 IBM’s conduct during the RFP came under examination in the hearings. The issue for consideration was
whether IBM in the course of the RFP received or misused confdential information belonging to the State or
Accenture, its main competitor in the bid process, which gave it a competitive advantage.
IBM solicited and received information during the RFP to which the other three tenderers did not have access.
4.48

This placed IBM at a distinct advantage over its competitors. IBM solicited information from Mr Damon
Atzeni, an employee of QH. IBM’s bid team received a “dry run” or rehearsal from Mr Burns for a key bid
presentation, which was an opportunity not afforded to the other tenderers. IBM improperly searched
CorpTech information systems, specifcally the LAN, for information regarding the vendor proposals and the
evaluation of those proposals. IBM also received and used information that Accenture would offer, as part of
its ITO response, a “Not-to-Exceed” price.
4.49 That this conduct took place prior to the offcial commencement of the ITO has no signifcance. The
information was, in the competitive commercial environment, self-evidently confdential, and valuable to
IBM. IBM acquired information in circumstances which prohibited its use by IBM, and attempted to obtain
confdential information from CorpTech which it should not have.
4.50 IBM’s Business Conduct Guidelines (Guidelines) applied to the IBM executives and employees (including
Mr Bloomfeld, Mr Joseph Sullivan, Mr Surprenant, Mr Cameron and Ms Cheryl Jensen [nee Bennett]) at the
time of the 2007 procurement process. They describe information which should not be used in a bidding
process.

4.51 Relevantly, the Guidelines state373:
Dear IBMer,

… (These Guidelines are) not just about compliance with the law and general standards of ethics.
By establishing these guidelines and giving them the weight of a governing document, we are
acknowledging that our choices and actions help defne IBM for others. We are ensuring that our
relationships–with clients, investors, colleagues and the communities in which we live and work–are
built on trust.
In other words, the Business Conduct Guidelines are a tangible example of our values and expressions of
each IBMer’s personal responsibility to uphold them.
I hardly fnd it necessary to remind IBMers to “act ethically.” I know you feel as strongly as I that anyone
doing otherwise does not belong at IBM …
The Guidelines that applied to the public sector374 relevantly provided375:
2.2.1 Obtaining and Using Information376
We operate in a highly competitive environment. Winning or losing a contract often depends on the
amount of accurate information we obtain for use in a proposal. An important part of an employee’s
job may be to get that information. However, you must ensure that we are legitimately entitled to the
information you gather or receive.
You may not obtain oral or written information, including government planning and budgetary
documents, which has not been released to the general public and which is subject to restrictions
370 Exhibit 35, paras 110-111.
371 Exhibit 4, Volume 33, Item 33.9, at page 36.
372 Exhibit 4, Volume 33, Item 33.9, at page 36.
373 Exhibt 84, at page 1.
374 Letter from Ashurst Australia to F. Copley, QHPSCI, regarding Requirement 15 to produce documents, dated 17 April 2013.
375 Exhibit 85, at pages 5, 7.
376 Exhibit 85, at page 5.

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Procurement
regarding its use unless you have obtained prior written approval of the offcial with government
authority. Similarly, when engaged in a government bid, you may not obtain or seek to obtain
information regarding our competitors’ bids or the Government Client’s decision process which is
confdential to the Government Client or any third party. These requirements also apply to information
obtained by third parties such as consultants, subcontractors, team members and others.
If you are uncertain about the status of information, it is your responsibility to resolve any questions
before obtaining the information. If you have already received it, resolve any issues with Contracts and
Negotiations or Legal prior to copying, using or distributing the information …
2.4. Working with Third Parties377
2.4.1 Subcontractors and Suppliers
… In particular, do not accept, use, or distribute any information from subcontractors and suppliers
without proper authorization. If you learn of any improprieties in our dealings with our subcontractors
and suppliers, you must report them to IBM management.
4.52 Further, Mr Bloomfeld, who led IBM’s bid, by 2007 had expertise in public sector work and signifcant experience
in government procurement. Prior to joining IBM, he had many years’ experience in bidding for public sector
contracts during his time at Accenture
378. He was well versed in government procurement processes, including the
requirements of the State Purchasing Policy, which required ethical, honest and fair behaviour
379. IBM provided
him with training in ethics and honesty, as it did to all of its employees engaged to work within CorpTech
380.
4.53 The methods of obtaining and using information relevant to the preparation of IBM’s bid raised questions
as to the probity of its employees in the procurement process. Exhibit 32 contained a series of emails
produced by IBM which became a focus of the Commission hearings.
4.54 In a covering letter from IBM’s solicitors of 18 March 2013 it was represented that IBM produced these emails
voluntarily in a corporate desire to act with complete candour, and to assist the Commission, and that they were
not required under any Requirement issued to IBM
381. These emails were, however, caught by Requirement 3
issued to IBM on 20 February 2013 and should have been produced in response to that request.
4.55 The Requirement relevantly demanded that IBM produce “any documents relating to the Request for Proposal
… and/or Request for Information … regarding the appointment of a Prime Contractor …”. To remove the
doubt, which IBM’s solicitors expressed, the Commission’s Offcial Solicitor wrote on 28 February 2013 that “…
[T]he materials sought … relate to the process prior to the ITO … ”. It is diffcult to understand how IBM could
not have realised that the emails “voluntarily” supplied fell within the description of documents relating to the
RFP, the procurement process which preceded the ITO.
4.56 On 3 August 2007 Mr Bloomfeld sent Mr Surprenant of IBM the following email382:
Paul,
Following is an email sent from Simon Porter to a mutual friend in the industry, who knows Barbara
Perrott. It gives us some insight into Accenture’s thinking.
We can speak on Sunday about how we allow for this in our presentation.
Please keep this to yourself.
Cheers
Lochlan
_______________________________
We had a session today with Bradley, Ford, Perrott … and a few others. From Accenture it was myself,
Salouk and Doug Snedden (Australia MD).
Be interested in any feedback you can get with respect to that session. Also interested in what meetings
IBM are having with those guys. Have they been in front of Gerard?
It is clear that Gerard wants to know our number ASAP. We said we can give a fxed price for the next
release, but would need to “Transition in” over an up to 6 month period, in which time we will be able to
fully cost and FP the whole deal.
377 Exhibit 85, at page 7.
378 Exhibit 35, para 4.
379 Exhibit 4, Volume 23, Item 23.3, at page 43.
380 Exhibit 40; T12-61, L29-54 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
381 Exhibit 32.
382 Exhibit 32, at page 3.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
48
Next Tuesday we will present a “Not-to-Exceed” (NTE) budget fgure. This is a fgure we think is a
reasonable estimation of the total program and something we will work with them on to scope and
manage the program within this number. This is a total Program Cost, ie. internal and external costs.
They say they have about $
100m left. They know that is not enough, but we want to know how much
more can they bare (sic). Perhaps you could test her on her expectations for an NTE and if she is not
forthcoming with information then try some ranges and assess her comfort… eg. do they expect + or –
$
200m? If above … how much … if below … how much.
One of our concerns is that a competitor will offer them a “silver-bullet” for a ridiculously cheap price … ie.
within the remaining budget. Make sure she has signifcant doubts that that can be achieved … it can’t.
Anyone who offers one is not credible.
You can also let her know “through your experience with industry” that everyone is sick of their
indecisiveness and will start walking away. They need to be decisive and not water down a decision ie
select an SI and don’t go half baked with a couple of vendors for an interim stage.
Our presentation and proposal are due on
7 August, so feedback straight after your meeting will be much
appreciated. Depending on how good it is, there could be a Grange based Cha Cha before retirement.
Cheers
Simon
Either at the time he sent the email to Mr Surprenant or at the time he provided the email to IBM’s solicitors
for production to the Commission, Mr Bloomfeld obliterated the address feld of the copy of Mr Porter’s
email that came to him so that from what was produced to the Commission it was impossible to identify the
addressee or addressees to whom Mr Porter wrote, and the person who forwarded the email to Mr Bloomfeld.
4.57 Messrs Bloomfeld and Surprenant were engaged in preparing IBM’s response at the time. Mr Porter was
a senior executive at Accenture. He was involved with Mr Salouk and Mr Snedden in preparing Accenture’s
response to the RFP. His email was forwarded to Mr Bloomfeld who sent it to Mr Surprenant with the
comment which appears at the beginning of the forwarded email.
The methods of obtaining and using information relevant to the preparation of IBM’s bid
raised questions as to the probity of its employees in the procurement process.
4.58 The Commission, despite issuing Requirements to provide documents and information to IBM, SAP and
Accenture, was unable to obtain a copy of the original email sent by Mr Porter, or the email which was
subsequently forwarded on to Mr Bloomfeld. It seems extraordinary that three major international IT
companies, with their resources and expertise, were unable to produce any record of the original emails
from their archives or server back-up.
4.59 On the evidence before the Commission, it is almost certain Mr Porter’s email was sent to Mr Pedler of SAP.
Mr Porter was reluctant to name Mr Pedler publicly and even initially, when interviewed by Commission
staff. However when pressed he gave it as his recollection that it was Mr Pedler to whom he sent the email.
4.60 Mr Porter addressed the email in a statement given to the Commission. He stated383:
I cannot be sure who leaked this email to Lochlan Bloomfeld and I am disgusted and appalled that it has
been circulated around IBM. It shows a total of integrity (sic) from IBM and the sender … considering the
context of the message the only parties outside of Accenture that I consider it likely for me to have sent this
email are our proposed sub-contractors within our RFP.
4.61 In sending the email, Mr Porter displayed a serious lapse of judgment. He disclosed Accenture’s pricing
strategy and gave an indication of its price to SAP, a competitor in the RFP. This is information I expect a
sensible IT company would prefer to keep to itself when engaged in a competitive tender. From CorpTech’s
point of view the email could be read as seeking to achieve “a united front” between two competitors on the
important question of price, thus lessening competition. Mr Porter explained that he did not consider that
SAP was a serious contender in the RFP, that it would never have won, and that if Accenture won it would
have engaged with SAP as a partner in the design and implementation of the SAP part of the solution
384.
383 Exhibit 51A, para 20.
384 Exhibit 51B, paras 6-7; T16-13, L1-28 (Simon Porter).

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That view is one Mr Pedler defnitely did not share385. SAP was, he said, serious in its bid and he at least was
annoyed that its credentials for the Prime Contractor role were not taken as seriously as the others
386.
4.62 Ms Perrott expressed the opinion that (assuming the email was sent to Mr Pedler) it indicated a level of
collusion between the two companies
387. This misstates the position. There is no evidence at all of collusion.
There is no evidence that Mr Pedler acted in any respect in response to Mr Porter’s email
388, or even
discussed its content with him, before or after it was sent. Mr Porter did not seek to have Mr Pedler provide
CorpTech with other than SAP’s genuine bid (perhaps because he thought it would not make one) and the
message he wished Mr Pedler to reinforce was Accenture’s genuine (and as it turned out realistic) opinion
that the SS Initiative would cost close to $200M to deliver. There is, as well, the request that Mr Pedler pass
on to Mr Porter what Ms Perrott had said about price, but acting responsibly Ms Perrott would not have told
Mr Pedler anything she did not also tell the other bidders.
4.63 Mr Pedler could not recall receiving the email, but said it was likely it came to him as the correspondence
“resonated” as being typical of the communications they would exchange
389. Mr Pedler was questioned
about whether he forwarded the email on to Mr Bloomfeld which he denied
390. Mr Pedler is a witness who
should be accepted as honest.
4.64 The relevance of the email to the Inquiry was that it suggested that Mr Bloomfeld had improperly used
confdential information. To investigate that point it was relevant to discover who sent it to Mr Bloomfeld.
He would not say
391. He was examined on the point twice: once in camera at the Commission’s offces392 and
a second time when he was examined publicly in the course of hearings. On both times he swore on oath
that he could not remember who forwarded him the email
393.
4.65 Despite being questioned at some length on these two occasions, Mr Bloomfeld persisted with that answer.
I am satisfed that it was not honest. It may be accepted that Mr Bloomfeld might have no recollection of
commonplace events years ago, and that he would forget the detail of day-to-day dealings, but it is impossible
to accept that he would not have remembered who sent him Mr Porter’s email. It was a seminal document,
which he described as being from “a mutual friend in the industry”
394. It was information which would
have been of moment to him, and material to a large bid he hoped to secure for IBM. He said as much to
Mr Surprenant. Mr Porter had little diffculty in recalling to whom he sent the email
395.
4.66 Mr Bloomfeld was a senior executive at Accenture for many years prior to joining IBM396. He dealt with the
email in his statement. He said he did not “directly recall” from whom he got it, but “it appeared to him” that
Mr Porter may have sent his email “to one of a number of people with whom (Mr Bloomfeld) may have worked
at Accenture … ”
397. Mr Bloomfeld went to the trouble of editing the email, making it impossible to identify
the “mutual friend”, someone he wanted to protect (thereby no doubt protecting himself)
398. He cannot have
forgotten who among his friends deserved that protection. He identifed in his statement that the sender of
the email was, probably, someone with whom he had worked at Accenture
399. When questioned in camera
Mr Bloomfeld, while denying he could recall the sender’s identity, helpfully offered to provide a list of names of
people who might have sent it. The list expanded over the time he was in the Commission’s offces and eventually
included 14 people, not one of whom was in the category of persons with whom he had worked at Accenture
400.
Mr Bloomfeld, in my judgment, provided a list of people none of whom, to his knowledge, sent him the email.
4.67 As I say I do not believe he does not remember who sent it to him. It was, despite his denials, an important
document to him and to IBM
401. He treated it as such. The Guidelines forbade the use of information not
legitimately obtained. He did not get Mr Porter’s email legitimately. If he had he would not have told
Mr Surprenant to keep it to himself. Mr Bloomfeld did not deal with it as his employer’s Guidelines required.
385 T15-65, L21-26 (Robert Pedler).
386 T15-126, L1-19 (Robert Pedler).
387 T16-107, L5-18 (Barbara Perrott).
388 T15-93, L29-42 (Robert Pedler).
389 T15-76, L3-5 (Robert Pedler).
390 T15-76, L24-25 (Robert Pedler).
391 Exhibit 37, at pages 3, 7, 8; Exhibit 35, para 97; T12-40, L32-55 to T12-41, L1-2 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
392 Exhibit 37, at page 4.
393 T12-40, L37-55 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
394 Exhibit 32, at page 3.
395 T16-12, L1-4 (Simon Porter).
396 Exhibit 35, para 4.
397 Exhibit 35, para 97.
398 Exhibit 32, at page 3.
399 Exhibit 35, para 97.
400 Exhibit 37, at page 10.
401 Exhibit 32, at page 3.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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He used it for his and IBM’s beneft. He said he thought Mr Porter’s behaviour in sending the email,
and suggesting the conduct described in it, was “shocking” and, he accepted, he ought to have brought
Mr Porter’s misbehaviour to CorpTech’s attention
402. That would have been “the proper thing” to do403. He
did not do it.
404
4.68 Given these features of the email Mr Bloomfeld’s repeated assertions that he could not remember who
gave him such important information must be rejected. Despite extensive inquiries the Commission has
been unable to determine who it was. It was not Mr Pedler. All that can be said is that to reveal the identity
would cause Mr Bloomfeld such embarrassment that he was prepared to lie to conceal it.
4.69 Mr Bloomfeld’s evidence was that he frst learned of Accenture’s “Not-to-Exceed” budget upon receiving
this email
405. He also learnt through this communication that Accenture proposed a six-month transition
time on the project
406. Ultimately, IBM’s proposed price and transition time was almost exactly half that
proposed by Accenture in its ITO bid
407.
4.70 Mr Bloomfeld’s receipt of the email was not widely published. He did not raise the concern with his
superiors, despite knowing that IBM’s Guidelines required him to do so. Instead, he forwarded it to his
subordinate on the bid team, asking him to “please keep this to yourself”
408. Accenture’s information had
been obtained illegitimately. Its use by Mr Bloomfeld was in breach of IBM’s Guidelines. Mr Cameron gave
evidence that he considered the receipt of this information to be inappropriate and it should have been
referred to senior management
409. Mr Cameron conceded that the information in that email should not
have been used, as it was confdential information which he expected had been improperly obtained
410.
Mr Bloomfeld himself admitted that he should not have used the information from Mr Porter’s email
411.
His employer “had an expectation” of him that he would not use it, because it was a “competitor’s private
information”
412. He conceded that it was “wrong” of him to send the email to Mr Surprenant and that he
should have reported Mr Porter’s conduct to CorpTech
413.
4.71 Mr Bloomfeld used the information in the email to prepare his presentation to the Complex Deal Meeting
held within IBM on 20 August 2007
414. He was the author of this presentation. It cites a budget of $108M
for the project, which is information Mr Bloomfeld accepted was provided to him by Mr Burns
415. It also
identifes a risk as being “CorpTech may look for total “Not-to-Exceed” cap as part of Prime Contractor
agreement with IBM responsible for delivering within capped budget”
416. Mr Bloomfeld accepted that
the only source of the information that Accenture was going to offer a “Not-to-Exceed” price was through
Mr Porter’s email
417. He also accepted that he used this information in a direct way, in the subsequent
Complex Deal Meeting presentation
418. Mr Bloomfeld asserted implausibly that he did not know the
information was confdential because he did not know to whom else Mr Porter had sent the email
419. That
assertion was only immune from scrutiny because Mr Bloomfeld chose not to reveal how he got the email.
The information was, on its face, of a kind likely to be confdential to a tenderer. Mr Bloomfeld’s earlier
evidence, conceding it was wrong to use the information and his admonition to Mr Surprenant to keep the
email to himself, are ample proof that Mr Bloomfeld knew the information to be confdential and valuable.
4.72 The information contained in Mr Porter’s email must have at least raised the apprehension at IBM that the
bid they intended to put forward was unrealistic, both as to price and timeframes. It must certainly have
given Mr Bloomfeld pause. As history demonstrates, IBM’s fnal price was nowhere near suffcient and its
aggressive timeframes were wholly inadequate. Mr Bloomfeld subsequently acknowledged in his letter of
July 2009 that normally this type of project would be one of three to fve years’ duration
420.
402 T12-42, L39-54 to T12-43, L1-55 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
403 T13-14, L37-39 (Lochlan Bloomfend).
404 T13-14, L37-51 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
405 T12-48, L44 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
406 Exhibit 32, at pages 2, 3.
407 T12-49, L11-26 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
408 Exhibit 32, at page 3.
409 T11-32, L6-12; T11-33, L32-34; T11-37, L10 (Jason Cameron).
410 T11-37, L1-13 (Jason Cameron).
411 T12-56, L49-56 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
412 T13-17, L54-56 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
413 T13-17, L50-56 to T13-18, L1-20 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
414 Exhibit 34; T12-56, L1-47; T13-16, L20-23 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
415 Exhibit 4, Volume 33, Item 35.33, at page 424.
416 Exhibit 34, at page 14.
417 T12-55, L50-54 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
418 T12-56, L1-47; T13-16, L20-23 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
419 T12-56, L35-44 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
420 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 285.

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Procurement
4.73 Mr Bradley stated that had he known about the circulation of Mr Porter’s email he would have given careful
thought to how CorpTech needed to design its ITO process to ensure more appropriate conduct from
the tenderers
421. He would have sought strong undertakings from the tenderers and questioned whether
certain individuals should have been allowed to continue in the process on the basis of whether they were
ethically appropriate for the role
422. Mr Bradley pointed to Accenture’s response when it discovered that one
of its contractors obtained unauthorised access to CorpTech’s confdential costing information after the
conclusion of the ITO, which he then offered to Accenture
423. Accenture immediately brought the issue to
the attention of CorpTech and the contractor’s engagement was terminated immediately
424. This proper
response when given unsolicited confdential information shows what IBM should have done. Mr Bradley
stated that he would have expected similar strong action by IBM in relation to Mr Porter’s email
425.
4.74 Both Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley gave evidence that, had they known about IBM’s conduct in seeking and
receiving confdential information to which it was not entitled, they would have considered excluding IBM
from the ITO, and they would have taken advice on the issue
426. Mr Swinson said that his advice, if asked,
would have been that the tender process had been “seriously jeopardised”
427.
4.75 Mr Bloomfeld sought to diminish the signifcance of his use of the information by saying it made no
difference to what was eventually presented to CorpTech
428. Even if that assertion was true, it misses the
point. The information was used for the purpose of developing a competitive strategy and to give IBM
an advantage in structuring the pricing of its bid. It was used so as to be prepared for the fact that the
question of a “Not-to-Exceed” price might arise.

4.76 IBM’s submissions contain an interesting and informative discussion on the law of confdential information.
The conclusion advanced was that Mr Porter’s email
429:

a. whilst possibly commercial, is not properly characterized as confdential in nature;
b. was not communicated in the circumstance of confdence;
c. cannot be confdential given the immorality of concealing what is, at a minimum, unconscionable
conduct, and possibly more;
d. IBM made no use of it that would excite a claim in equity.
Mr Bloomfeld cannot be criticised for being the recipient of an email he did not invite, and for taking a
commercial view and action about its contents. He was under no obligation to do anything else.
It is, of course, true that Mr Bloomfeld cannot be criticised for receiving an email, unless he solicited it.
There is no evidence he did, but because he would not reveal who sent it to him the point could not be
investigated. The submission that he cannot be criticised for taking a commercial view about the use of
the contents cannot be reconciled with Mr Bloomfeld’s evidence, elicited by Senior Counsel for IBM when
examining Mr Bloomfeld, that his use of the information was wrong, should not have occurred and was not
what IBM expected of him
430. Whether the information lost confdentiality by reason of its transmission
to Mr Bloomfeld depends upon who sent it and in what circumstances. Mr Bloomfeld’s determination
not to tell the truth about that makes it impossible to accept the submission that the information was not
confdential. His admission that he should not have used it suggests it was.
email of Cheryl Jensen
4.77 On 22 August 2007, Ms Jensen sent an email to nine IBM employees, including Mr Bloomfeld. Ms Jensen, a
Client Executive at IBM, said in the email that she received “intel” from CorpTech which she “thought [she]
should channel” back to the IBM bid team for discussion
431. Ms Jensen suggested in evidence that by “intel”
she meant information, rather than intelligence but that evidence cannot be sensibly accepted
432.
421 T17-89, L34-56 (Gerard Bradley).
422 T17-89, L47-56 to T17-90, L1-6 (Gerard Bradley).
423 T17-108, L9-56 (Gerard Bradley).
424 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.33, at pages 250-251; T17-89, L56 to T17-90, L1-3 (Gerard Bradley).
425 T17-90, L1-6 (Gerard Bradley).
426 T16-104, L26-33; T16-107, L20-23 (Barbara Perrott); T17-86, L39 (Gerard Bradley).
427 T19-84, L40-50 (John Swinson).
428 T13-13, L1-56 to T13-14, L1-21 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
429 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), paras 205-206.
430 T13-17, L54-56 to T13-18, L1-20 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
431 Exhibit 32, at page 4.
432 T15-42, L1-9 (Cheryl Jensen).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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4.78 Ms Jensen’s email records facts whose source can only be information confdential to the State:
a. Accenture is sitting at scoring of 76%
433;
b. IBM was perceived to want to off-shore more than Accenture which is why they have a higher rating at
this time
434;
c. Logica was not considered by CorpTech to be bidding at the time
435.
4.79 In sending this email, Ms Jensen acted in breach of IBM’s Guidelines436 (which she was aware of and had
received training in), in that she accepted that the information in her email was not publicly available at the
time. It was information she thought to be of worth to IBM and her distribution of it was aimed at giving
IBM a competitive edge
437. Ms Jensen believed that sending the email potentially gave IBM a tactical
advantage in putting together its bid, and helped it avoid any surprises in the bid process. It allowed IBM to
anticipate the moves of competitors and decrease IBM’s response time to any queries from CorpTech
438.
4.80 Ms Jensen could not recall the source of the intelligence contained in her email. She said that the
information in her email was mere “gossip or innuendo”
439. It was, at the time, information which
she obviously considered to be of great importance – suffcient to prompt her to send it to nine IBM
employees
440 (some of whom she did not know), including very senior executives. If the information was
publicly available or was idle gossip, one cannot easily understand why Ms Jensen would have had cause to
send her email. She did not treat it as mere gossip. The information is, in part at least, precise data.
4.81 The information that Accenture was sitting at scoring of 76% and that IBM were perceived to want to offshore more than Accenture appears441, verbatim, in a CorpTech evaluation spreadsheet which appraised the
respective strengths and weaknesses of the vendors’ bids. This was a document which should have been
confdential to CorpTech at the time.
4.82 Ms Jensen’s observation that Logica was not considered by CorpTech to be bidding at the time is signifcant.
Logica, of course, did prepare and submit a bid in the tender. However, on 24 August 2007 Ms Blakeney emailed
Mr Duke of Logica seeking his confrmation that Logica had decided to withdraw from the competitive bid
442.
Mr Duke responded the same day, expressing surprise and confrming that Logica were still very much in the bid
process and asking who suggested to CorpTech that the company was withdrawing
443. IBM knew of CorpTech’s
misapprehension regarding its competitor’s bid two days before Logica did, and presumably during a time when
Logica were expending signifcant time and resources in preparing a bid it was evidently unlikely to win.
4.83 Mr Bloomfeld told the Commission that Ms Jensen sat next to him, desk-by-desk, in IBM’s open plan
offce
444. Mr Bloomfeld also gave evidence that he considered Ms Jensen’s conduct in sending the email
to be inappropriate
445 and that he believed Ms Jensen was reprimanded by her supervisor for sending the
email, following a discussion between him and Mr Rob Pagura (of IBM, to whom Ms Jensen reported)
446.
Ms Jensen, however, had no recollection of that. Being professionally disciplined, had she been
447, is not
something she would have forgotten.
4.84 Mr Bloomfeld, in his statement448, said Ms Jensen’s email “indicated that information had been fed through
from CorpTech suggesting how the presentations provided by suppliers had been marked … . It seems …
consistent with the kind of scuttlebutt … common amongst large departments … . I believe that this is when
I began to have a heightened concern that documents were being leaked out of CorpTech”. There is an
inconsistency in the statement. The contents of Ms Jensen’s email cannot have been both “scuttlebutt”
and information “leaked from CorpTech” which gave Mr Bloomfeld “heightened concern” about a lack of
security in CorpTech.
433 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.18, at page 135.
434 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.19, at pages 141-142.
435 Exhibit 4, Volume 10, Item 11.21, at page 205.
436 Exhibit 85, at page 5.
437 T15-43, L23-56 (Cheryl Jensen).
438 T15-44, L1-11 (Cheryl Jensen).
439 T15-49, L48-56 to T15-50, L1-8 (Cheryl Jensen).
440 Exhibit 32A.
441 Exhibit 4, Volume 6, Item 6.3.19, at pages 136-142.
442 Exhibit 4, Volume 10, Item 11.21, at pages 204-206.
443 Exhibit 4, Volume 10, Item 11.21, at pages 204-206.
444 T12-65, L16-20 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
445 T12-65, L30-42; T12-66, L8-11 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
446 T12-65, L38 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
447 T15-49, L7 (Cheryl Jensen).
448 Exhibit 35, paras 104-106.

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Procurement
4.85 As mentioned, Ms Jensen did not treat the information she received (from whatever source) as worthless
gossip but as information of potential value to IBM. Mr Bloomfeld’s evidence that he thought the email to
have been sent inappropriately and that Ms Jensen had been reprimanded for sending it suggests that he
thought the information came from CorpTech and should not have been divulged. Mr Bradley thought the
information was probably CorpTech’s, and confdential to it
449.

4.86 There is no evidence that the information was, in fact, of any value to IBM, or was used by it in the ITO
response. There is evidence from Mr Bloomfeld that the information was not helpful and was not used
450.
The relevance of Ms Jensen’s email is that it shows she was prepared to pass on to colleagues information
IBM should not have had because she thought it might assist IBM’s bid.
4.87
email of Joseph Sullivan
4.88 On 29 August 2007 Mr Sullivan of IBM sent an email to Messrs Bloomfeld and Cameron which stated451:

As I told Jason this morning I have been unable to locate any of the vendor proposals on the G drive. One
of the government guys who told me he had looked through them all said that they have all been removed
along with quite a few other directories that were with them. So looks like we were just a little bit too late.
4.89 The G drive was a public-access fle in the CorpTech information systems network (or LAN) on which the
vendor RFP proposals and scoring matrixes were stored for a period of time inadvertently. The confdential
proposals should have been saved on a secure-access drive, but were stored on the G drive in error. The G
drive was a common repository accessible to anyone with a CorpTech log-on.
4.90 Mr Cameron452, Mr Sullivan453 and a number of IBM contractors were given CorpTech email addresses, log-in
accounts and access to the G drive during the time they were engaged to work at CorpTech. Mr Bloomfeld
denied instructing Mr Sullivan to conduct a search of the G drive
454. Mr Sullivan stated that looking for the
proposals would probably have been done on his own initiative, and not at anyone’s direction
455. Mr Sullivan
denied accessing IBM’s proposal or that of any other vendor and the email corroborates his denial
456.
4.91 Mr Sullivan currently resides in the United Kingdom and was not available to give evidence at the
hearings
457. Commission staff made enquiries about Mr Sullivan’s whereabouts with the solicitors for IBM
and issued a request for Mr Sullivan’s contact details, but were informed that he no longer worked for
IBM in Australia. Commission staff located Mr Sullivan in London, where he is an employee of IBM United
Kingdom. The Commission conducted a telephone interview
458 with him about the matters raised in his
email and Mr Sullivan also provided a statement to the Commission.
The proper response to a fear that the proposals were freely available on the G drive was to
bring the concern immediately to the attention of CorpTech. That was not done.
4.92 Mr Sullivan could not identify the “government guy” he referred to in his email but volunteered the names
of two CorpTech employees, Brendan Pollock and Nathan Hulse, with whom he had most contact
459. Both
Mr Hulse and Mr Pollock had no recollection of the events or the conversation with Mr Sullivan
460. Mr Hulse
was not working within CorpTech at the relevant time and had no access to the CorpTech G drive
461.
449 T17-86, L20-22 (Gerard Bradley).
450 T13-22, L22-47 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
451 Exhibit 32, at page 5.
452 Exhibit 31, paras 7-13; for example Exhibit 4, Volume 13, Item 13.1 at page 1.
453 Exhibit 152, at page 7, L13-27.
454 T12-76, L1-20 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
455 Exhibit 159, para 13.
456 Exhibit 159, para 13.
457 Exhibit 159, para 1.
458 Exhibit 152.
459 Exhibit 152, at page 4, L17-26.
460 Exhibit 153, para 8; Exhibit 154, paras 9-10.
461 Exhibit 153, paras 3-4.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
54
4.93 Mr Sullivan stated that “[g]iven the competitive nature of the project and therefore the confdential nature
of the proposals, access by Accenture staff to the proposals made to CorpTech by IBM … would have
been of concern” to him
462. Mr Sullivan also stated that “[t]he use of WorkBrain software for non-rostering
agencies was considered to be a signifcant point of differentiation for IBM’s proposal at the time. If this
had leaked to Accenture it would have been a real concern (to him) and IBM”
463. It was this concern, he told
the Commission, which prompted him to search the G drive and notify Mr Bloomfeld of the matter
464.

4.94
4.95
I cannot accept that evidence. The evidence, and that reasoning, do not withstand scrutiny.
Mr Sullivan was engaged on a full time basis at CorpTech as part of a “workforce management team”
465, led by

Ms Mary-Anne McCarthy of Accenture, which included CorpTech employees. Mr Sullivan played no part in the
preparation of IBM’s RFP bid, which was prepared internally at the IBM offce
466. It is unclear how Mr Sullivan
would have had an appreciation of the sensitivity of the Workbrain suggestion when he had not worked on the
RFP, nor begun work on the ITO
467.
4.96 Mr Sullivan accepted that the proposals were confdential and that they certainly should not have been
stored on the CorpTech G drive
468. He knew that he should not have had access to them. He never reported
his unsuccessful G drive search to anyone at CorpTech or his team lead, Ms McCarthy of Accenture
469,
even though she presumably would have had an interest in the potential breach of the confdentiality
of Accenture’s proposal. Accenture, by contrast, notifed CorpTech on 23 August 2007 that its bid
documentation was accessible on the LAN to a range of contractors and employees and followed up this
concern with subsequent messages and a letter to Ms Perrott on 22 October 2007
470.
4.97 Mr Bloomfeld gave evidence that, to the best of his recollection, in late August 2007 Mr Pullen, another
IBM employee working at CorpTech, expressed a concern to him that Accenture had had access to IBM’s
presentation to CorpTech and that those presentations were available to all staff at CorpTech on the LAN
471.
Mr Pullen, however, had no recollection of having a conversation with Mr Bloomfeld where he expressed
that concern
472. Further, Mr Pullen stated he had no access to the CorpTech computer network at the time
and had no direct contact with people who were working as part of the HRBS project
473. For that reason,
Mr Pullen said he was never in a position to have knowledge of the G drive issue to be able to report it to
Mr Bloomfeld
474.

4.98 Regardless, Mr Bloomfeld’s evidence suggests that he was aware of the G drive issue well before Mr Sullivan
sent his email. I fnd by inference that if Mr Bloomfeld did not instigate Mr Sullivan’s actions in searching
the G drive, he certainly had knowledge of them.
The evidence establishes that on 30 August 2007 Mr Bloomfeld notifed CorpTech that the “strengths
4.99

and weaknesses matrix” of the RFP evaluation was available on the LAN475. He knew that, having received
Ms Jensen’s email on 22 August. It is not clear why he waited over a week before informing CorpTech
476. By
the time he did inform CorpTech IBM had had the beneft of Ms Jensen’s “intelligence” and Mr Sullivan had
established that the RFP responses were no longer available on the G drive.
4.100 Mr Cameron, when questioned about Mr Sullivan’s email, agreed that the statement “so (it) looks like we
were just a little bit too late” suggested that Mr Sullivan had unsuccessfully searched for all of the vendor
proposals from the RFP on the G drive
477.
4.101 I am drawn to the same logical conclusion. The critical phrase in the email is “… [W]e were just a little bit too
late”. The phrase is inconsistent with Mr Sullivan’s avowed explanation for searching the G drive. It expresses
462 Exhibit 159, para 10.
463 Exhibit 159, para 11.
464 Exhibit 159, para 12.
465 Exhibit 159, para 2.
466 Exhibit 152, at page 9, L35-37.
467 Exhibit 152, at page 16, L1-13.
468 Exhibit 152, at page 13, L37-50.
469 Exhibit 152, at page 15, L21-51.
470 Exhibit 4, Volume 26, Item 24.63, at page 1158.
471 Exhibit 35, para 107; T12-71, L1-23 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
472 Exhibit 50, para 8; T15-82, L34-35 (Keith Pullen).
473 Exhibit 50, paras 9, 11.
474 T15-82, L43-51; T15-84, L18-20 (Keith Pullen).
475 Exhibit 4, Volume 33, Item 33.9, at page 36.
476 T12-78, L23-54 to T12-79, L1-9 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
477 T11-27, L39-41 (Jason Cameron).

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Procurement
regret, not relief that IBM’s proposal was safe from prying eyes. The only reason for regret can have been
Mr Sullivan’s failure to access the other proposals. Mr Sullivan had no plausible answer when asked why he
used the phrase, if what he was doing was ensuring the security of IBM’s information
478. The proper response
to a fear that the proposals were freely available on the G drive was to bring the concern immediately to the
attention of CorpTech. That was not done. Instead Mr Sullivan improperly searched the CorpTech G drive in an
attempt to obtain confdential vendor
proposals. The plural “proposals” is used in Mr Sullivan’s email, so the
proposal cannot only be that of IBM. This was serious misbehaviour. Mr Cameron and Mr Bloomfeld should
have identifed it as such, and Mr Sullivan should have been reprimanded accordingly. That did not occur.
4.102 The evidence concerning the three emails is disturbing. It shows that Mr Bloomfeld, who led IBM’s bid,
acted in breach of his employer’s Business Conduct Guidelines
479; misused a competitor’s confdential
information
480, observed without objection a colleague’s distribution of information “leaked” from
CorpTech; and endeavoured to gain unauthorised and unlawful access to its competitor’s information
from CorpTech’s database. Mr Bloomfeld’s use of Mr Porter’s email was admitted by him to be improper.
The honourable response to Ms Jensen’s email would have been to inform CorpTech immediately that its
confdential information was widely accessible and to have Ms Jensen cautioned or reprimanded about her
dissemination of the information. Mr Bloomfeld did not respond in that way. The most serious episode is
that in which Mr Sullivan sought to obtain access to Accenture’s and Logica’s responses. Mr Bloomfeld, if
he did not instigate the attempted access of the G drive, should have been appalled that the attempt was
made. The only reaction expressed by any IBM employee was regret at the failure. Mr Sullivan should have
been reprimanded if not dismissed. No action was taken against him. It is noteworthy that Mr Sullivan
directed his email to Mr Bloomfeld (among others) who was leading the IBM bid.
4.103 It is rightly submitted that a fnding of dishonesty against Mr Bloomfeld should not be made except on
clear evidence because of the likely consequences to him and his career were such a conclusion expressed
in a proceeding of this kind
481. It is argued that he would not have lied because to do so would have
jeopardised his career should that adverse fnding be made
482. Findings of dishonesty should only be made
when necessary and on evidence suffcient for such a serious fnding. I am nevertheless convinced that
Mr Bloomfeld was not honest in his testimony. I have dealt with his evidence about Mr Porter’s email and
need not repeat it. Likewise I am satisfed that Mr Bloomfeld was not truthful when he said he believed
Ms Jensen was reprimanded for her misbehaviour in broadcasting to IBM employees the CorpTech
information given to her. He should have at least notifed CorpTech immediately of the security lapse. His
explanation that Mr Pullen’s forebodings were an explanation for Mr Sullivan’s exploration of the G drive for
the RFP responses appears to be an invention.
4.104 Mr Bloomfeld resorted to falsehood in an attempt to conceal the serious misbehaviour he (and others)
committed on behalf of IBM in an attempt to position it favourably for the ITO. There was such a departure
from the integrity required by a participant in the procurement process as to provide substantial grounds
for excluding IBM from it, had the information been available to CorpTech. The misuse of a competitor’s
information and the attempt to gain unlawful access to similar information in CorpTech’s possession was
suffciently serious to justify the expulsion.
4.105 Ms Perrott’s evidence on the point was that had she known about Mr Bloomfeld’s use of Mr Porter’s email
and Mr Sullivan’s attempts to read IBM’s competitors’ proposals on the G drive, she would have consulted with
Mr Bradley, sought legal advice and spoken with the providers
483. She would have considered excluding IBM
from the ITO process
484. Mr Bradley thought it likely that the information contained in Ms Jensen’s email had
come from the evaluation matrix information confdential to CorpTech and IBM’s possession of it would have
caused him to ask “whether we should consider them as appropriate people to progress to the [ITO]”
485. He
would have viewed IBM’s possession of the information “very seriously” and may have excluded it from the
ITO process but not without giving it the opportunity to explain and provide reassurances about future good
behaviour
486. Likewise he thought Mr Bloomfeld’s use of Mr Porter’s email “a serious concern” which, had he
known about it, would have caused him to ask IBM “quite seriously about their capacity to continue in the
478 Exhibit 152, at page 16, L15-34.
479 Exhibit 84, at page 11.
480 Using the term generally rather than in its strict legal sense, in deference to IBM’s submissions.
481 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 13.
482 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 201.
483 T16-104, L18-43 (Barbara Perrott).
484 T16-105, L24-48 (Barbara Perrott).
485 T17-86, L14-51 (Gerard Bradley).
486 T17-86, L53-55 to T17-87, L1-7 (Gerard Bradley).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
56
process”487. Mr Bradley488 and Ms Perrott489 would have taken advice from Mr Swinson. Mr Swinson’s evidence was
that excluding IBM from the tender process would have been “a serious matter for all concerned”
490 a step that
would not have been taken without investigation and interrogation of IBM about the facts and any explanation
it had of its employees’ conduct. Mr Swinson expressed the opinion that Mr Bloomfeld’s use of the Porter email,
Ms Jensen’s dissemination of apparently confdential CorpTech information and Mr Sullivan’s attempt to read
competitors’ proposals on the CorpTech G drive had “seriously jeopardised the tender process. It would have
been diffcult to go ahead because the idea of a tender process is … there’s a fair and equal playing feld where
everyone has an equal share so if it turned out that that was not the case that would jeopardise the process.
It would also go to the integrity of the tenderers … you would want to look at that in more detail but it looks
relatively serious”
491.
4.106 IBM objects to a fnding that the misconduct of its employees should have led to its exclusion from the ITO
process. It argues that because no witness (Mr Bradley, Ms Perrott and Mr Swinson) said IBM should have
been excluded the fnding should not be made and, in addition, the evidence cannot reasonably support
that conclusion. I do not accept IBM’s arguments as to the facts. I have set out what I fnd them to be.
4.107 It is said as well that the ITO was a wholly separate process from the RFP and events in the former process
should be disregarded. I have already explained why that proposition cannot be accepted.
There was such a departure from the integrity required by a participant in the procurement
process as to provide substantial grounds for excluding IBM from it, had the information
been available to CorpTech. The misuse of a competitor’s information and the attempt to
gain unlawful access to similar information in CorpTech’s possession was suffciently serious
to justify the expulsion.
4.108 By reason of the Commission’s thorough investigation of the facts (which were not known at the time to
Mr Bradley or Ms Perrott or Mr Swinson) I am in a better position to express an opinion on the point than
were those witnesses. Moreover I have had the beneft of hearing evidence from the IBM employees whose
misconduct gave rise to the “serious concerns”. Those explanations do not allay the serious concerns.
Mr Sullivan did not attempt to access the G drive for the reasons he gave but to access competitors’
proposals. Mr Bloomfeld understood that. Mr Bloomfeld misused Accenture’s information. It is not the
point that some of the information was in the end not useful to IBM. One thing Mr Porter’s email did
tell Mr Bloomfeld was that Accenture was contemplating an RFP price of about $200M. Mr Bloomfeld’s
protests that the information in Mr Porter’s email was of no use and was not confdential cannot stand
against the fact that he used it (defensively) in preparing for a presentation to CorpTech.
4.109 The result is that conduct by some of IBM’s employees provided substantial grounds for excluding it from
the tender process and the response of those employees in denying wrong-doing, and misdescribing their
conduct, provides no basis for not acting on those concerns.
Mr Bloomfeld’s Bonus
4.110 In the course of the inquiry, the Commission was given unverifed information that Mr Bloomfeld received, as
a result of the awarding of the tender to IBM, a signifcant monetary bonus. On 26 April 2013 the Commission
wrote to Ashurst, the solicitors acting for IBM, asking whether the information received about Mr Bloomfeld’s
remuneration was correct
492.
4.111 On 12 May 2013 Ashurst responded in the following terms493:
We are instructed that Mr Bloomfeld did not receive a pay rise or bonus because of the awarding of the
tender to IBM.
487 T17-88, L40-46 (Gerard Bradley).
488 T17-87, L4-7 (Gerard Bradley).
489 T16-104, L32-33; T16-105, L10-22 (Barbara Perrott).
490 Exhibit 77, para 21.
491 T19-84, L49-55 to T19-85, L1-8 (John Swinson).
492 Letter from F. Copley, QHPSCI, to Ashurst Australia, regarding Mr Bloomfeld, dated 26 April 2013.
493 Letter from Ashurst Australia to F. Copley, QHPSCI, regarding Mr Bloomfeld, dated 12 May 2013.

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4.112 To put the matter beyond doubt, on 13 May 2013494 the Commission asked that Ashurst make enquiries of
Mr Bloomfeld and IBM as to whether Mr Bloomfeld was given any bonus for the fnancial year 2007/2008,
and the details of that bonus.
4.113 The Commission, despite making repeated follow-up requests, did not receive a response to this question
until 5 June 2013. By letter of that date, solicitors for IBM stated that as a result of further enquiries, they
had become aware that their initial response of 12 May 2013 “may (have been) potentially misleading”.
Mr Bloomfeld did, in fact, receive two payments in addition to his base salary in 2007/2008
495:
a. The frst was a proft sharing payment of 17.8% of Mr Bloomfeld’s base salary, being $55,000 paid in June
2008; and
b. The second payment was made as a result of winning a Service Eminence Award, in the amount of $12,000.
The Service Eminence Award was granted because of Mr Bloomfeld’s contribution to the whole-ofgovernment proposal.
4.114 This performance incentive payment to Mr Bloomfeld has some signifcance. It speaks to the fact that
winning the whole-of-government contract was a coup for IBM, and for Mr Bloomfeld.
4.115 Mr Bloomfeld commenced his employment at IBM on 18 February 2007. Prior to that, he was employed by
Accenture from 1991 to 2007
496. At the beginning of his time at IBM, Mr Bloomfeld’s focus was to identify and
develop new business opportunities in the public sector, because IBM Queensland was seeking to increase its
share of public sector work. His role had a sales focus. Accenture, Mr Bloomfeld’s former employer, was frmly
embedded in CorpTech in 2007. Mr Bloomfeld freely admits that he believed IBM was unlikely to displace either
Accenture or Logica as large contractors in CorpTech
497. He thought IBM was possibly being “strung along” in the
bid process, such was Accenture’s stronghold within CorpTech
498.
4.116 One can imagine, then, the signifcance of Mr Bloomfeld leading the winning bid for the Prime Contractor
role so soon after his engagement at IBM. This was one of the largest government ICT Contracts in the
State’s history, and it was awarded to a company that was generally not considered to be a front-runner in
the race. The reward indicates the importance to Mr Bloomfeld of IBM winning the bid.
5. Invitation to tender (Ito)
5.1 Following on Mr Swinson’s advice on 9 August 2007499, a decision was made to proceed to a formal tender
process. It was to be a closed tender with invitations offered to the four companies which had responded to
the RFP and maintained interest in becoming the Prime Contractor
500. Prior to issuing the invitations, SAP, by
email dated 26 August 2007, “graciously” withdrew from the process
501.
5.2 There was a sense of urgency about the drafting and issue of the ITO. Mr Swinson was told on 16 August
2007
502, the day the CEO Governing Board resolved to appoint a Prime Contractor, of the decision503. The
next day Mr Burns emailed him to ask whether it was possible to amend one of the existing contracts with
CorpTech’s suppliers to change it into the Prime Contractor
504. Mr Swinson said it was not but got from the
email a sense of urgency about the appointment
505. He said that “many people” informed him that there was
“a pressing urgency” about the appointment
506. Mr Burns, Mr Goddard and Mr Bradley were all imbued with
that sense of urgency
507. The reason for it, as explained by Mr Swinson, was that “money was being spent
and it … might have been spent heading in the wrong direction, so the new direction was needed. It would be
better to stop spending that money and start spending it heading in the right direction … ”
508.
494 Letter from F. Copley, QHPSCI, to Ashurst Australia, regarding Mr Bloomfeld, dated 13 May 2013.
495 Letter from Ashurst Australia to D. Mackie, QHPSCI, regarding Mr Bloomfeld, dated 5 June 2013.
496 Exhibit 35, paras 4, 5.
497 Exhibit 35, para 18.
498 T12-14, L26-27 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
499 Exhibit 28A, para 21.
500 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at page 5 (Section 1.1).
501 Exhibit 49, Annexure E.
502 Exhibit 4, Volume 36, Item 38.1.13, at page 63.
503 Exhibit 4, Volume 37, Item 39.23, at pages 38-48.
504 Exhibit 4, Volume 36, Item 38.1.21, at page 120.
505 T8-75, L29-30 (John Swinson).
506 T8-75, L41 (John Swinson).
507 T8-75, L43-50 (John Swinson).
508 T8-75, L54-55 to T8-76, L1-4 (John Swinson).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
58
5.3 The sense of urgency was made manifest in the very short time allowed by the ITO for responses. The ITO
itself was very substantial. Attached to it were many more documents provided in electronic form which
contained many thousands of pages of technical information
509. It was issued on 12 September 2007 and
responses were due on 1 October 2007, a period of just under three weeks which, at the request of one or
more of the tenderers, was extended by a week to 8 October 2007
510. This was a very short time to receive
considered responses to such a comprehensive and complicated ITO. Mr Goddard had thought the process
should take upwards of nine months
511. Ms Blakeney thought the timeframe was far too compressed to
achieve well considered proposals and to allow for their evaluation
512. Mr Hood513, Mr Swinson514 and even
Ms Perrott thought it was too short
515.
5.4 The ITO was drafted by a number of public servants and contractors516. Mr Goddard played a substantial
role as did Mr Hood, Mr Bond and Mr Ekert. The template for it was provided to them by Ms Blakeney.
5.5 The ITO invited517:
… offers for the supply of certain professional services relating to the Shared Services Solutions Program
of work. This Invitation to Offer is not open to the public and has been issued to three potential offerors,
who have been selected based upon their current knowledge of the Shared Service Solutions project. It is
intended that this Invitation to Offer process be conducted in a fair and streamlined fashion.
5.6 Offerors were encouraged to seek clarifcation on any part of the ITO. Questions were to be directed “only …
to the Contact Offcer listed … ”
518, Ms Blakeney. The offerors were requested519:
… to provide fxed price quotes for some items of work and best estimates for other items of work. The exact
scope of and a fnal fxed price for the other items of work will be determined and agreed in accordance with
the processes set out in the Contract.
5.7 Relevant provisions of the ITO were:
1.6.2 The Way Forward520
On 16 August 2007, the Shared Service CEO Governing Board agreed to a range of improvements to the
SSS Program to implement standard fnance and human resource business solutions across Queensland
Government agencies.
The planned improvements include:
• significantly accelerating the implementation timeline and reducing costs by engaging a Prime
Contractor to manage defined work packages on a fixed-price basis;

• mitigating risks associated with supporting legacy systems by giving priority to Queensland Health, the
Department of Emergency Services (DES), Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) and the Department of
Education, Training and the Arts (DETA) in the business solution implementation schedule …

2.6 Multiple Statements of Work521
The initial statement of work to be awarded as part of the ITO is contained [in] … the following line items.
These are defned further at … Section
3 … below.
• Line Item
1A – Transitioning
• Line Item
1B – Program Delivery Management
• Line Item
1C – Shadow Management
• Line Item
1D – Forward Planning
• Line Item
1E – Priority Core Development (including awards)
• Line Item
1F – Release and Production Support
509 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, Part G (Attachments in electronic form); Exhibit 4, Volume 32, Item 32.1, Part G.
510 Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.38, at page 791.
511 Exhibit 27, para 48 (f)(ii).
512 T4-79, L38-50 (Maree Blakeney); Exhibit 17, paras 25-27.
513 T3-57, L17-20 (Philip Hood); Exhibit 11, para 32.
514 T8-92, L29-30 (John Swinson).
515 Ms Perrott described a need to “hasten quickly”. She may have meant to say “hasten slowly”, but the description she actually gave was the appropriate one: T17-16, L1-6 (Barbara
Perrott).
516 See, for example, Exhibit 11, para 30.
517 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at page 5.
518 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at page 6.
519 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at page 7.
520 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at page 16.
521 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at pages 23-24.

59
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The awarding of subsequent statements of work will be dependent on the outcome and successful
completion of the initial statement of work. The line items for subsequent statements of work are listed
below and they are described at Part D … Section
4
• Line Item
1G – Release 6.0 – Priority HR Implementations
• Line Item
1H – Release 7.0 – Priority Finance/OSF Implementations
• Line Item
2A – Remaining Implementations
• Line Item
2B – Legacy Solution Upgrades
3. INITIAL STATEMENT OF WORK
3.1 The Statement of Work is composed of a number of … Line Items. … [e]ach work stream will require a
separate fxed price.
This section
3.1 Statement of Work includes the following line items:
• Line Item
1A
• Line Item
1B
• Line Item
1C
• Line Item
1D
• Line Item
1E
• Line Item
1F
4. FUTURE STATEMENTS OF WORK522
4.1 The Future Statements of Work are comprised of a number of … Line Items. … [e]ach work stream will
require separate price estimates.

4.1.1 Line Item 1G – Release 6.0 – Priority HR Implementations
The highest priority activity is the replacement of the legacy HR systems that utilise the Lattice Human
Resource Information System (Lattice) … . In replacing these solutions, the strategy is to replace the
legacy systems through a full or partial implementation of the shared services HR business solution. The
impacted agencies are Queensland Health … .
… It is desirable to implement these agencies in a rapid time frame, to reduce legacy and business risk
and cost. While the most critical risk is in relation to Lattice Support for Health, DES and QCS there are
also critical timeframes for DETA. …
5.8 The Program Review Steering Group met on 12 September 2007 to decide who should comprise the
Evaluation Panels for the responses to the ITO
523. It had also to decide the criteria and the weightings and
assessment methodology to be applied by the members of the Panels. One of the services Mr Burns was
to provide pursuant to his extended contract of 26 September 2007 was to negotiate fnal contracts with
“Prime Contractor vendor”
524.
The ITO … was issued on 12 September 2007 and responses were due on 1 October 2007, a
period of just under three weeks which, at the request of one or more of the tenderers, was
extended by a week to 8 October 2007
510.
5.9 On or around 13 September 2007, the Senior Executive Group appointed members to the Evaluation Panels
each of which was to consider a separate part of the responses
525. The Panels were:
• Functional and Business
• Technology
• Operations and Support
• Resourcing and Transitions
• Governance
• Implementation Roll Out
• Benefits
• Procurement and Legal
• Cost
522 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12.1, at page 28.
523 Exhibit 4, Volume 37, Item 39.14, at page 28.
524 Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.3, at page 52 (Proposal by Mr Burns, 17 September 2007); Exhibit 4, Volume 2, Item 3.4, at page 79 (contract executed).
525 Exhibit 4, Volume 39, Item 40.8 and Item 40.9, at pages 12-15.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
60
LAttICe
5.10 Queensland Health had operated a LATTICE payroll system which was implemented between 1996
and 2002
526. ESP was used as the rostering system527. The vendor of the LATTICE package was Talent2
which licensed it to the State. By about 2005 the LATTICE package was becoming obsolete and Talent2
appears to have given QH advance warning that its system would become unsupported
528, which is to say
Talent2 would not provide technicians to repair breakdowns or malfunctions and the system could not be
upgraded to allow it to process additional award complexities introduced as a result of changes to industrial
legislation or enterprise bargains.
5.11 Talent2 recommended replacing LATTICE with its new system, Talent2 HRIS (ALESCO)529 but by 2005 the
State had decided upon Workbrain and SAP as the appropriate products for the whole-of-government HR
and Payroll Solutions so that it was not possible for QH to accept Talent2’s suggestion.
In March 2007 the Keliher Report expressed concern that LATTICE would not have Talent2
support after mid year 2008, and suggested that the timetable for the its replacement in the
SS Initiative be accelerated.
5.12 CorpTech’s last published schedule of its proposed implementation of the SS Initiative showed QH’s payroll
being replaced over 2 years and 4 months, from March 2008 to July 2010. By early 2007 senior offcials in
QH were expressing alarm that LATTICE would be unable to deliver a payroll service to its employees
530. On
26 February 2007 the then Director-General of QH wrote to Mr Bradley
531:
… Queensland Health faces … signifcant risks in relation to the [government Human Resources Solution
Implementation]. The most signifcant … centres on … LATTICE … [which] will be withdrawn from vendor
support in June
2008. … It is totally unacceptable to maintain the system in an unsupported environment
post June
2008 as … risk of system failure, and therefore an inability to pay Queensland Health staff …
would be extremely high.
5.13 It was Mr Hood’s opinion that vendor support for LATTICE was critical because Talent2 had the most
thorough knowledge of the product and best understood how to maintain it in operation
532. Mr Hood
on behalf of the State attempted to negotiate an extended period of support from Talent2 but was
unsuccessful
533. IBM was able to obtain an extension of three months continued support from Talent2, to
30 September 2008, only
534. To address the risk that the system might fail CorpTech established a project,
PJ-30 (post June 30), which was essentially a team of CorpTech technicians and former Talent2 employees
who undertook the role of supporting LATTICE’s operation
535.
5.14 In March 2007 the Keliher Report expressed concern that LATTICE would not have Talent2 support after mid year
2008, and suggested that the timetable for the its replacement in the SS Initiative be accelerated
536. Mr Uhlmann
disagreed, as has been recounted, in his April Snapshot Review
537. He regarded accelerating the implementation
of the LATTICE replacement as an “extreme” risk and that the other risk, that LATTICE might fail, should be
reduced by establishing support for LATTICE from a source other than Talent2
538. Mr Uhlmann was sceptical that
Talent2’s refusal to extend support was its last word on the subject. It was, he thought, a question of price. As well
he pointed out that there were contractors “in the marketplace” with the skills necessary to support LATTICE
539.
5.15 Mr Hood informed the Commission that PJ-30 “successfully established the technical capability within
CorpTech … to support the LATTICE development environment”
540. It continued to function until Go Live
526 Exhibit 1, at page 11.
527 Exhibit 1, at page 11.
528 Exhibit 11, Annexures B and E.
529 Exhibit 11, Annexure B.
530 Exhibit 29, Annexure DAA-1.
531 Exhibit 29, Annexure DAA-2.
532 T3-33, L1-18 (Philip Hood).
533 Exhibit 11, paras 9-10; Annexures D and E.
534 Exhibit 11, para 42.
535 Exhibit 11, para 55.
536 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.2, at pages 35-157.
537 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 161.
538 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.3, at page 177.
539 T6-12, L38-60 (Gary Uhlmann).
540 Exhibit 66, para 29.

61
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in March 2010. However the fear that it might fail informed the decision, expressed in the ITO and the
contract between IBM and the State, to replace LATTICE urgently on an interim basis, i.e. pending the
whole-of-government SS Initiative implementation.
Mr Burns’ Role in the evaluation
5.16 Each Panel had its own designated leader. Ms Perrott chaired the Evaluation Panels. Mr Burns was
appointed Project Lead Advisor and was supported in that role by Mr Goddard and Mr Shaurin Shah.
Although Ms Perrott was nominally in control of the evaluation process it was in fact run and controlled
by Mr Burns. Mr Burns’ appointment as Project Lead Advisor was questionable leading as it did to his
assuming
de facto control of the process of selecting the Prime Contractor. By the initial date for receipt
of responses, 1 October 2007, Mr Ford had received Mr Nicholls’ letter drawing attention to Mr Burns’
disregard of contractual restraints, Mr Bond had complained about his interference in seeking to control his
communications with the Under-Treasurer, Ms Perrott herself had noticed that Mr Burns was not “someone
who was strong on detail”
541 and she understood, or should have, that he had benefted personally from
his recommendations, and self-interest was the apparent motive. As well as that, nothing in Mr Burns’ CV
showed that he had any experience of or understanding of the processes of government procurement.
She had come to think that he would not be offered a permanent role in the SDA or CorpTech
542. Despite
these indications of disqualifcation for the role, Ms Perrott appointed him. She claimed to have put controls
around him in that he was to report to her daily and to her senior management team weekly or fortnightly,
as well as periodically to the Steering Committee
543.

5.17 It is apparent from the accounts of those involved in the evaluation that Ms Perrott was largely absent
and that Mr Burns was ubiquitous. Ms Perrott’s account of her controls over Mr Burns are, I am satisfed, a
product of
ex post facto wishful thinking.
The public servants in CorpTech who were appointed to the Evaluation Panels were well aware that Mr Waite
5.18

had left his very senior role as a direct result of Mr Burns’ criticisms of his performance made directly to the
Under-Treasurer, and that Mr Burns maintained his personal contact with Mr Bradley. Ms Perrott accepted the
truth of that proposition, and agreed with the depiction of Mr Burns as an “empowered contractor” working
in and influencing the public service but not being part of it
544. Ms Perrott claims she was concerned about
Mr Burns’ “style and … the way he presented himself”, by which I take it to mean his manner of dealing with
public servants and the power he assumed over them
545. She said she talked to him about her concerns “on
several occasions”
546. I doubt Ms Perrott’s recollection. In my assessment she lacked the force of personality to
confront Mr Burns. In any event Mr Burns’ “style” did not change.
5.19 All witnesses agreed that Mr Burns was not to take part in the evaluation process. He agreed that it would
have been inappropriate for him, a non-public servant, to take part in the evaluation
547. Ms Perrott said,
rightly, that was not his role. She described him as a facilitator and an organiser or administrator
548. His role,
she thought, was to distribute materials to the members of the Panels, arrange meetings and ensure that
Panel leaders collected and collated their members’ scores and handed them to Ms Blakeney. Mr Burns
described his role as
549:
… to ensure that … the teams were properly staffed, that all the people nominated were there, that the
process operated correctly, that everyone understood the evaluation criteria for the basis of the scoring,
that they understood how the process would run … also … it included how queries and questions would
be handled and … relayed back to vendors.
5.20 Mr Hood was the Deputy Executive Director of CorpTech550. He was the Panel leader for “Operations and
Support”
551. He described Mr Burns as leading the ITO process552. Ms Colleen Orange, who was appointed
on short notice to lead the Cost Panel, described Mr Burns as leading the procurement process
553. Ms Rose
541 T16-79, L44-45 (Barbara Perrott).
542 T16-79, L29-40 (Barbara Perrott).
543 T16-70, L23-46 (Barbara Perrott).
544 T16-79, L14-17 (Barbara Perrott).
545 T16-79, L19-24 (Barbara Perrott).
546 T16-79, L22 (Barbara Perrott).
547 T14-67, L25-35 (Terry Burns).
548 T17-10, L30-50 (Barbara Perrott).
549 T14-56, L46-53 (Terry Burns).
550 Exhibit 11, para 5.
551 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 6.
552 T3-35, L7 (Philip Hood).
553 T3-75, L1-2 (Colleen Orange).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
62
di Carlo, a member of the Cost Panel, thought likewise554. Ms Orange said that it was Mr Burns who had
Mr Shah put on her Panel
555. Ms Blakeney said that the RFP and ITO processes were “driven” by Mr Burns556.
Ms Bugden, who was replaced by Ms Orange as Cost Panel leader, explained that if Mr Burns “asked you to
undertake a certain function, … that function would be undertaken”
557. Mr Swinson agreed that Mr Burns
could be properly described as the “Project Lead Advisor”, whose role “entailed liaising closely with the
people involved in the evaluation and conducting the scoring … having insight into their reason and process
along the way before fnalization (sic) … and providing such advice as they required”
558.
evaluation of Ito

5.21 The ITO closed at 10am on 8 October 2007559. Accenture, IBM and Logica responded in time. The responses
from IBM and Accenture addressed the criteria set out in the ITO. Logica’s bid was non-conforming
560. It bid
only for fnance solutions and not human resources.
Provision was made for the Evaluation Panels to address clarifcation questions to the vendors
561.
The ITO evaluation criteria were divided into categories. Each Panel assessed the three vendors. To assist three
templates were created: strengths and weaknesses, risks and issues, an evaluation report and of particular
relevance, scoring
562.
The last was designed to capture the individual team members’ scores for each category, which were then
5.22
5.23
5.24

to be moderated by the Panel leaders563. Each Panel was to recommend a vendor and provide commentary
justifying its choice
564.

5.25 At the end of four prescribed stages, each Panel’s report was to be collated into a fnal Report, signed by the
leaders
565. Ms Perrott, as Panel Chair, was to review the Evaluation Report and submit it to the Steering Group
for approval
566.
The evaluation documents were stored in a directory
567 to which Mr Burns (and Mr Goddard) had access.
5.26
Workbrain
5.27 Workbrain fgures prominently in the assessment of IBM’s offer and it will be helpful if something is said

about it and its proposed use by IBM.
IBM proposed to utilise Workbrain to perform the whole of the awards interpretation
function and for non-rostering as well as rostering agencies . This was a novel approach: it
was “innovative”
575.
5.28 Workbrain is a program, or series of programs, for workforce management, owned and licensed by
a Canadian company, Infor
568. It has particular application for the organisation and deployment of
employees on rosters, to record “time and attendance” and to calculate the monetary value of the time
worked according to the entitlements given to employees by industrial awards and enterprise bargains.
These functions are part of awards interpretation but do not comprise the whole of that function.
554 T4-25, L30-31 (Rose di Carlo).
555 T3-81, L36-38 (Colleen Orange).
556 T4-77, L50-51 (Maree Blakeney).
557 T6-58, L1-7 (Joanne Bugden).
558 T8-87, L1-11 (John Swinson).
559 The ITO originally prescribed that responses were due on 1 October 2007 by 10am: see Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, at pages 5-6. This was extended to 8 October 2007 by 10am:
see Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.38, at pages 791-792.
560 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 12.
561 Exhibit 4, Volume 12, Item 12, page 6 (clause 7.81).
562 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 3.
563 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 4.
564 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 3.
565 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 4.
566 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 5.
567 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 7.
568 Workbrain was assigned from Workbrain Pty Ltd (ABN 72 108 973 002) to Infor Global Solutions (ANZ) Pty Ltd (ABN 25 003 538 314) on or around 31 May 2009.

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5.29 Workbrain was selected as part of the procurement process for the SS Initiative in about 2005. A consortium
led by IBM was successful in having its primary products, Workbrain, Recruit ASP and SABA chosen
569. The
choice was made because those products offered a large and robust payroll solution with other products
considered “best-of-breed”
570. Workbrain was selected as the rostering solution so as to confgure a number
of time and attendance rules to allow immediate rectifcation of time violations. It was not chosen for time
sheeting, cost dissection, cost allocation or full award interpretation
571. Awards are complex and include
many features, such as fnancial, taxation, superannuation, progression as well as time and attendance. Time
and attendance deals with the hours an employee is required to work and includes things such as start time,
duration of day, number of hours worked before a break, rest periods and days to work
572. While complex it is
only one aspect of the total award. The initial design in CorpTech’s implementation was to put the key time
and attendance award rules into Workbrain and all other rules into SAP
573.
5.30 Only a few government departments were what was called “rostering agencies”. They were QH, Queensland
Corrective Services, Queensland Emergency Services and Queensland Police Service. Of these QH was by
far the largest. All other departments were non-rostering which means, in effect, that their employees
ordinarily worked 9 to 5 and did not usually work on weekends or public holidays. The payroll calculation for
these employees was considerably less complicated than for those agencies whose employees worked at
night, on a weekend or public holidays.
5.31 IBM proposed to utilise Workbrain to perform the whole of the awards interpretation function and for nonrostering as well as rostering agencies574. This was a novel approach: it was “innovative”575.
5.32 A statement prepared by Mr Kwiatkowski, a solution architect employed by IBM since 1998, delivered to the
Commission on or about 5 June 2013
576, described Workbrain as having “an award engine within its Time
and Attendance Module” which supports business processes
577. He explained578:
The number of awards isn’t the issue … it is the complexity of the pay rules that support a given award.
An organisation needs some form of award interpreter to understand the time data and then to create …
leave accruals and payment types based upon that time data. … Workbrain is a self-contained product.
Development and extension of Workbrain can … be done independently of … development within SAP …
. Workbrain development predominantly requires technical skills in the languages … “Java” and “XML”.
… SAP development … requires use of the specialised ‘ABAP’ programming language … Java and XML
… are common … so getting skilled resources is easier, and less expensive. … The development of pay
rules in Workbrain is XML based and may be developed in a … tool called the Workbrain Toolkit … used to
design and confgure all the time related components of awards, Enterprise Bargaining Agreements … and
business pay rules. This is generally more effcient than developing such rules in ABAP. Once created, these
pay rules … form a common repository of business rules … [which] could then be confgured across multiple
awards and calculation groups to address the complexity of the business requirements. … [A] single pay
rule would be used by multiple awards and therefore only needs to be written by a developer once.
5.33 Mr Bloomfeld said in his statement579:
… IBM proposed using Workbrain for Awards interpretation. Workbrain was already due to be part of the
Shared Service Solution (sic) for rostering, and CorpTech had already purchased a licence for the product in
or about 2003. It was, and is, considered an ideal product for rostering and award interpretation. … I was
aware that Accenture had attempted to write award interpretation in to SAP by programming each award
in the SAP programming language, ABAP. This is a particularly expensive and time-consuming process … .
I was aware of them having used this approach in the Department of Housing implementation, which was,
I understood … , the reason why it was delayed and over budget. The idea of hard-coding a further 160+
awards … seemed like a massive and unnecessary technical undertaking … which would … introduce a
number of errors … complicate SAP upgrades and so forth. It seemed unnecessary, particularly when the
Workbrain software was available and CorpTech had already spent money on it.
569 Exhibit 171, at page 1; Exhibit 4, Volume 1A, Item 1A, at pages 1-267.
570 Exhibit 171, at page 1; see also Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at page 70.
571 Exhibit 171, at page 1.
572 Exhibit 171, at page 2.
573 Exhibit 171, at page 2.
574 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at page 73.
575 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at page 378.
576 Exhibit 164, para 1.
577 Exhibit 164, para 14.
578 Exhibit 164, paras 14-19.
579 Exhibit 35, paras 158, 161.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
64
5.34 IBM’s response to the ITO said about its proposed use of Workbrain580:
IBM’s award implementation solution will use Workbrain ‘Awards Engine’ as the core system for building
time related components of awards for all Agencies. SAP HR Payroll will be used for payroll processing
and as the single source of truth for the HR/Payroll data. Workbrain will extend this SAP foundation to
deliver award interpretation in a signifcantly more cost effective manner. Whilst our proposed approach
is to leverage Workbrain for all agencies (both rostering and non rostering) IBM acknowledges that some
non rostering agencies may be concerned or confused by this approach. …
It is worth noting that many other organisations have successfully [implemented] a similar best of breed
approach for award interpretation including Qantas, Bunnings and Woolworths.

SAP HR Payroll. SAP HR Payroll functionality will be used for payroll processing. Workbrain interpreted
time related allowances, overtime, penalties and other elements will be interfaced into SAP. SAP CATS
functionality will be used for non-rostering Agencies for capturing attendance data.
Some of the information processed in SAP Payroll:
• Fixed allowances …
• Superannuation;
• Deductions;
• Taxation;
• Payroll reporting;
• Payroll processing; and
• Separation processing.
Workbrain Awards Engine
Workbrain will be used to confgure all time related award conditions and business related pay rules.
The benefts of using the Workbrain Awards Engine are as follows:
• Workbrain has a specialised module dedicated to the delivery of time related award conditions;
• Building awards in Workbrain is highly cost effective and efficient compared to designing similar
requirements in SAP;
• The Workbrain rules engine is very efficient for running these award related rules as it involves
configuration not customisation;
• Workbrain integrates very well with SAP/other payroll applications for importing employee/team related
data and exporting out payroll related data;
• The pay rules are easy to build and maintain using the Workbrain Toolkit;
• Workbrain pay rules are highly flexible and are designed with various configurable parameters to
address complex business requirements;
• In Workbrain application pay rules are highly parameterised (configurable) to offer the highest flexibility
against any EBA changes and any HR policy changes;
• The pay rules and pay rule conditions in Workbrain are reusable across multiple awards and Agencies
(Refer Figure
39.2 below);
• The Workbrain Toolkit enables automation of any pay rules to meet complex award and Agency related
requirements;
• Number of core and solution centre pay rules has been delivered with Workbrain application; and
• Workbrain application interprets time related components in real time, for rostering agencies, and is user
accessible as soon as the start and stop time has been entered and timesheet submitted. This gives the
line manager access to interpreted information along with start and stop time before approval.

The original SSS design for award interpretation in non rostering Agencies occurs entirely within SAP, with
no involvement from the Workbrain application. IBM proposes to change this design to utilise the Workbrain
application as an ‘awards engine’, where the time component and leave accrual component of awards
will be processed within Workbrain and SAP Award processing will be disabled. The collection of time and
schedule data will continue to occur within SAP, as will leave absence processing, and payroll processing.
580 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at page 73, 74-75, 81.
65
Procurement
5.35 Mr Bloomfeld explained in evidence that it was the use of Workbrain to interpret awards and compute the
value of time worked in accordance with award conditions for payroll calculation in non-rostering agencies
that was “innovative” in the IBM proposal and offered a more effcient and therefore faster and cheaper
implementation of the HR part of the program
581. The alternative, coding the award conditions into SAP,
was complicated, slow and expensive
582. Mr Atzeni concurred in thinking that it was the use of Workbrain for
non-rostering agencies that offered the promise of a faster, more effcient implementation
583. Mr Bond on
the other hand explained that the novelty lay in using Workbrain to perform the whole awards interpretation
function and not just time and attendance
584. I have more faith in Mr Bond’s opinion than the others; it
appears to be supported by IBM’s own document. The IBM response made this claim for its proposal
585:
IBM has based our proposed solution on what could be considered the existing baseline solution
architecture. The one notable exception to this is the Workbrain application whose use has been
expanded to include awards interpretation.

The benefts of implementing all awards in Workbrain rather than splitting between SAP and Workbrain
include:
• Economies of scale through developing only one set of rules … utilised across all Agencies …
• Implementing all awards in Workbrain provides a single system of record for their configuration,
therefore providing significant efficiencies …
• The Workbrain rule and leave accrual engine is extremely efficient … providing considerable time savings

• The system architecture of the Workbrain rule engine is designed to allow simple and efficient integration
with custom components. …
• Changes to award agreements can be made quickly and easily via the pay rule editor …
• Configuration of pay rules in Workbrain is simple relative to SAP …
It is clear that IBM was proposing a new use of Workbrain. For that reason it identifed as “reference sites”
organisations whom it said were using Workbrain in the manner it proposed, and could verify its usefulness.

5.36 On this topic the IBM response said586:
Rostering agency reference site – Woolworths

Woolworths piloted Workbrain for their Supermarkets division in 2006 and broadened the scope to
include
2850 stores across Australia and NZ in late 2006 (200,000+ employees). …
Non-rostering agency reference site – Pacifc National
5.37 Mr Bond led the Functional and Business and Technology Evaluation Panels. It was their role to determine
the validity of the claims IBM made for Workbrain. The proposed use was untried unless, as IBM claimed,
the reference sites had indeed used it as IBM proposed to, and had done so successfully.
the evaluation Changes
5.38 Mr Bond, in his frst statement, said587:
When the evaluation process was underway, it became clear that IBM was not winning the components of
the tender I was evaluating, Accenture was. This was perhaps two-thirds of the way through as we were
starting to look at scores and bring them together.

Mr Burns said he did not believe that we were considering all aspects and he pointed out a number
of other dimensions that we should consider. … He said that we were not giving a fair hearing for all
companies that had tendered. He recommended we revisit our scoring. We did this and IBM became the
successful tenderer for the components I was scoring.

581 T12-5, L10-14; T12-91, L9-32; (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
582 Exhibit 35, para 161.
583 T31-97, L17-28 (Damon Atzeni).
584 Exhibit 171, at pages 1-2.
585 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at pages 61, 83.
586 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at pages 84-85.
587 Exhibit 8, paras 13-18, 22.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
66
The view Mr Burns expressed was that we had not fairly looked at all aspects of all offers. There were
some dimensions he asked us to consider. I cannot precisely recall exactly which they were. I believe they
were things such as human resource capability, experience and such things. He said that we should go
back and reread the submissions and re-evaluate based on having taken these points into consideration.
Mr Burns said “I think you need to consider these particular dimensions”. He was not specifc about a
particular vendor. He was broad in his description of what he wanted. He pointed out that perhaps we
could take a different view or a different angle. The view he communicated was that in looking at criteria
we were looking at it from the wrong angle, and we should look at it from a different perspective.

As a result of Mr Burns’ statements … my team reassessed and modifed the scoring allocated to Accenture
and IBM. The effect of this was that Accenture ceased to be the primary choice of the evaluation components
I led. Had it not been for the talk from Mr Burns, Accenture would have led those evaluation components,
rather than IBM. … I believe the statements by Terry Burns … was said to all the leads of the subteams…
5.39 Mr Bond said in evidence588:
[W]e then submitted those scores to a central coordination type body … following that … a meeting that
was held. It might have been sometime after but we’re only talking hours or maybe a day. Terry called
a meeting and stated that he felt we weren’t being fair within the evaluation … we weren’t considering
new options … The effect of what was said was that we hadn’t really considered all capabilities within the
offers and we need to go back and reassess based on the advice that he was giving us.
5.40 Mr Burns recommended the scoring be “revisited”. When asked whether Mr Burns was correct to say that the
capabilities of all the offers had not fully been considered, Mr Bond responded “I wouldn’t have thought so”
589.
5.41 Mr Burns did not mention any vendor specifcally, but it was a “two-horse race” at this time between IBM
and Accenture
590.
5.42 Mr Bond’s Panels did reassess their scoring and the difference in value between IBM and Accenture closed
signifcantly
591. One Panel had previously commented that IBM’s proposal of including awards in Workbrain
was “high risk”
592. The assessment changed and IBM was ranked more highly than Accenture by reason of its
innovative idea. Mr Bond recalled Mr Burns addressing the meeting and urging the value of invention. He said
593:
… Just because you don’t fully understand how it’s going to work doesn’t mean that it’s not possible.
5.43 Other witnesses corroborate Mr Bond’s account of the meeting. Mr Goddard, in his statement, recounts
“one unusual event”, which led to rescoring and “brought about a change in ranking of supplier position –
IBM became front runner – overtaking Accenture”
594. Mr Goddard said that one of the Panels had used a
different basis for evaluation from that used by others
595. The difference related to whether the responses
were to be judged by the ability of the offer to deliver the fxed price components of the work, or the
fxed price and estimated price components for future work. Mr Goddard’s description of which approach
favoured Accenture and which favoured IBM was confusing and in part contradictory, but he was adamant
that there was a meeting to determine which approach was appropriate which led to an alteration in
assessment methodology which in turn led to the change in ranking
596.
5.44 Mr Mander was a member of the Functional and Business Panel led by Mr Bond597. Mr Mander also provides
some corroboration. He links the change to a presentation given by IBM, probably on 17 October 2007 as part
of the iterative clarifcation process by which the Panels asked questions of the offerors and were given answers
in documentary form or by way of presentations
598. The 17 October clarifcation session was a presentation599.
It gave further detail as to how and whether awards interpretation would occur in Workbrain. The presentation
consisted of several diagrams displaying the flow and processing of data from SAP to Workbrain and vice
588 T2-62, L27-54 (Darrin Bond).
589 T2-63, L15-16 (Darrin Bond).
590 T2-64, L38-39 (Darrin Bond).
591 T2-64, L47-48 (Darrin Bond).
592 T2-66, L37-39 (Darrin Bond); Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.3, at page 329.
593 T2-71, L14-15 (Darrin Bond).
594 Exhibit 27, paras 83, 87.
595 T8-14, L1-10 (Kevin Goddard).
596 Exhibit 27, paras 83-86; T8-14, L1-56 to T8-15, L1-7 (Keith Goddard).
597 Exhibit 25, paras 30-31.
598 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.44, at pages 1453-1463; Exhibit 25, paras 70-77.
599 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.45, at pages 1496-1505.

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Procurement
versa600, a table detailing what award items would be processed in Workbrain and those that would be processed
in SAP
601, and fnally two diagrams of award processing rules602. The documentary presentation was very general
and would have needed substantial oral clarifcation from IBM staff to be persuasive.
5.45 Mr Mander’s recollection of the point which Mr Burns urged as the basis for reassessment was the use of
Workbrain as the “awards engine”, to have the whole of the awards interpretation function undertaken in
one program, which was, in Mr Mander’s description, a “game changer”
603. He thought it a notion which, if
successful, would have accelerated the implementation of payrolls across government departments
604. IBM’s
spokesman presented a convincing theoretical exposition of Workbrain’s capacity to perform the function
605.
5.46 The evaluation scoring sheets support the evidence of a change.
5.47 Originally the Technology Panel had Accenture at an average score of 3.25 and IBM at 3.0606. This frst
version of the evaluation sheet described the IBM proposal with regards to integration as “higher risk”,
whereas the Accenture solution “reduced complexity”
607. Though Accenture’s proposal required more effort
and change to the Shared Services infrastructure in their model and IBM used an “established proven
arrangement”
608, this evaluation recommended Accenture.
5.48 A subsequent sheet had the IBM average score increase to 3.17 and Accenture’s reduce to 3.03609. The
commentary accompanying the analysis reflected the change. The description of the IBM integration
proposal no longer included the description as “higher risk”, but noted that the Workbrain strategy might be
viable
610. The schedule proposed by IBM was praised for being potentially quicker and aggressive, though the
work required for agency detail may be underestimated. Accenture’s proposal now needed to be verifed for
functionality, the recruitment solution was highly questionable; the “reduced” complexity was removed from
the Accenture integration analysis. This second evaluation sheet still recommended Accenture
611.
5.49 The fnal Technology evaluation sheet612 maintained the scoring and comments from the previous version.
The Evaluation Panel now recommended that IBM be considered Prime Contractor
613. Three versions of the
written report of the Technology team were provided to the Commission
614. The frst version of the report listed
12 strengths for IBM and 13 for Accenture
615; the second 13 strengths for IBM and 15 for Accenture616; the
fnal 12 strengths for both IBM and Accenture
617. As for weaknesses: the frst listed three for IBM and eight for
Accenture
618; the second seven for IBM and nine for Accenture619; the fnal report recorded three for IBM and eight
for Accenture
620. Notably the strengths regarding Accenture’s identifcation of concurrent employment issues
and a desire to take full responsibility for most of the activities for the project appeared in the second draft but
disappeared in the fnal report
621. IBM’s weaknesses remained the same in the frst and fnal versions, but those
listed in the second version were more damning than the fnal version, noting a lack of suffcient detail, that the
solution required further evaluation to show that it works, that IBM would take no responsibility for application
integration and that IBM underestimated the level and complexity of the QH solution
622. The single change for
Accenture was the addition in the second version (and subsequent removal in the fnal version) of the weakness
regarding the lack of nomination for Technology Architect
623.
600 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.45, at pages 1498-1499.
601 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.45, at page 1500.
602 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.45, at pages 1502-1503.
603 Exhibit 25, paras 76-77.
604 T7-56, L1-7 (Robert Mander).
605 T7-55, L51-52 (Robert Mander).
606 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.8, at pages 129-130.
607 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.8, at page 130.
608 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.8, at page 130.
609 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.7, at pages 127-128.
610 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.7, at page 128.
611 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.7, at pages 127-128.
612 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.4, at pages 108-109.
613 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.4, at page 109.
614 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.10, at pages 132-141 (frst version), Item 18.4.6, at pages 116-126 (second version), Item 18.4.1, at pages 91-103 (fnal version).
615 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.10, at pages 133-135.
616 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.6, at pages 117-119.
617 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.1, at pages 93-95.
618 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.10, at pages 136-137.
619 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.6, at pages 120-121.
620 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.1, at pages 96-97.
621 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.6, at page 118.
622 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.6, at page 120.
623 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.4.6, at page 121.

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68
5.50 The Functional and Business team’s scoring followed a similar pattern. In the frst version of the evaluation
sheet IBM’s average score was 2.63 and Accenture’s is 3.16
624. The evaluation of sub-category one for scope and
functionality described Accenture as having “strong methodologies around scope management and approach to
scope delivery” and having a “strong understanding of the program”; though the Panel appeared to be concerned
that Accenture may limit scope, and therefore reduce functionality
625, and that there was no mitigation for the
LATTICE system risk
626. IBM’s approach was “potentially very high risk” and there was little detail on how the
Workbrain approach to awards would work
627. The second and third sub-categories, Process and Operation, and
Schedule and Timelines, described Accenture’s proposals as “strong”, whereas IBM’s plans were “risky and unclear”.
5.51 Subsequently the scores became 3.05 for Accenture and 3.15 for IBM628. Both were described as having
strong methodologies for scope management and delivery and an understanding of the need for solution
standardisation across government departments
629, while the concern regarding scope limitation now
existed for both
630. IBM replaced Accenture as having a “strong understanding of the program”631. Concerns
were raised about the functionality of the SABA and RecruitASP functions proposed by Accenture
632. The
Workbrain proposal by IBM was portrayed as being suitable and likely to generate savings. There was
still concern that the reference sites did not reflect the size of the Initiative. The process and operations
sub-category listed both vendors as having strong methodologies, with a number of options for training
and change, though IBM was criticised for lack of clarity regarding support. IBM’s proposal for LATTICE
replacement was praised. No recommendation was made
633.
5.52 The reports from the Functional and Business Panel were similar634. The frst listed 17 strengths for
Accenture, reduced to 11 in the fnal report, while IBM was described as having nine strengths in the frst
report, which increased to 12 in the fnal report. The weaknesses for Accenture in the frst report number
27, which increased to 28. IBM’s weaknesses number 16 in the frst report, decreasing to 15 in the second.
Most notably, Accenture was extensively criticised for assumptions that require further investigation – this
criticism appears in weaknesses list of both reports
635. IBM’s weaknesses were less vehemently stated – this
is shown especially for the weaknesses regarding the use of Workbrain for awards interpretation
636. The frst
version of the report expressed concern about “lack of detail and clarity of how this will work, particularly for
non-time based rules … real-time integration to SAP and processing of retrospective changes … exclusion of
leave takings … is also a concern. There is also concern regarding how ESS will work in SAP and/or Workbrain
using this approach”. The criticism manifestly dwindled in the fnal report to “… concerns over the approach
for using Workbrain as the awards engine. These include future dated leave requests, the use of CATS and
the complexity of the integration”. The differences are good evidence of the effect the “game changer”
presentation had on this team.
5.53 The Governance Panel was headed by Mr Michael Lewis. Its frst scoring sheet listed Accenture’s average
score as 4.20 and IBM’s score as 3.20
637. There were no comments on this document. On the second scoring
sheet IBM increased to 3.93 and Accenture’s score dropped to 3.90
638. The recommendations commented
on this version of the sheet were complimentary to Accenture but did not mention any reason for the
increase in score of IBM. The third scoring sheet
639 maintained the same scores, but the recommendation
was almost entirely about IBM. Accenture was criticised for wanting to place more of its staff into
“strategic, management and execution levels, and project management” which would be more costly –
an aspect that was previously praised for adding “strength to the governance model”. IBM’s proposal for
LATTICE replacement was commended twice, and provides an “overall” better response to the ITO.
5.54 The versions of the Governance Panel’s written reports held by the Commission have no differences of note640.
624 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.3, at pages 328-329.
625 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.3, at page 328.
626 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.3, at page 329.
627 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.3, at page 329.
628 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at pages 326-327.
629 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at page 326.
630 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at page 327.
631 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at page 326.
632 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at page 327.
633 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.2, at page 327.
634 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.5 at pages 331-343 (frst version); Item 18.7.1, at pages 312-325 (fnal version).
635 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.5, at page 337; Item 18.7.1, at page 317-318.
636 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.7.5, at page 335 (frst version); Item 18.7.1, at page 316 (fnal version).
637 Exhibit 4, Volume 20, Item 18.8.5, at page 564.
638 Exhibit 4, Volume 20, Item 18.8.3, at page 562.
639 Exhibit 4, Volume 20, Item 18.8.1, at page 551.
640 Exhibit 4, Volume 20, Item 18.8.2, at pages 552-561 (frst version), Item 18.8.1, at pages 540-551 (fnal version).

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5.55 Mr Hood headed the Operations and Support Evaluation Panel. This Panel’s scoring did not change from the
original scoring of Accenture 3.48 and IBM 3.32
641, but the comments by the Panel changed from the frst
to the second sheet. Accenture was recommended on the frst sheet because of their “strong understanding
of the design build” and implementation of the SS Initiative
642. The second praised IBM for the Workbrain
proposal’s simplifcation of ongoing support and maintenance of awards
643. The speed of IBM’s proposed
implementation was perceived to mitigate against the LATTICE risk. Accenture’s proposal did not provide
the same risk mitigation. Accenture was recommended on the frst scoring sheet
644. In the second sheet the
recommendation was modifed to state that though Accenture scored higher, the Panel did not think that
the scoring difference was signifcant, and recommended both as suitable for Prime Contractor
645.
5.56 The Commission was provided with three versions of the fnal report for the Operations and Support
Panel
646. Accenture was given eight strengths in the frst and second versions, but six in the fnal one –
strengths regarding rostering for Corrective Services and Treasury migration were removed. IBM had four
strengths in the frst and fve in the second. A strength regarding the “[u]se of Workbrain to build awards
leverages confguration options within the application which facilitates rapid build and testing” was added.
The fnal report listed fve strengths for IBM, including the previously added Workbrain strength. The
weaknesses for Accenture followed a similar structure to the reports of other teams: four in the frst, fve
in the second, where a weakness about the lack of LATTICE support was added, and six in the last, where
the lack of LATTICE support continued, in addition to an item regarding the need for CorpTech to perform
LATTICE support until a fnal solution was provided. Interestingly, this last weakness regarding CorpTech
appeared in the weakness list for both IBM and Accenture in the fnal report.
5.57 Mr Hood was completely, and unconvincingly, unable to explain why his Panel altered its recommendation to
favour IBM. In his statement provided to the Commission, he responded to a question whether Mr Burns had
convened a meeting of Panel leaders at which he urged them to reconsider their evaluation. He stated
647:
I do not recollect such a meeting, although, if such a meeting occurred, I would likely have been in
attendance.
5.58 When pressed in evidence he accepted there could have been a meeting, which he attended, where “teams
were asked to go back and review their process”
648. He maintained he had no recollection of Mr Burns
making the statement. When asked if anyone put pressure on him, and the other leaders, to change
recommendations he said
649:
Not as such. … I believe that we were advised to review the process.
5.59 He said he had “no direct recollection” of Mr Burns stating “that all teams were to go back” though he had
a recollection that his team “did review the process of its scoring”
650. He asserted that he had resisted any
untoward pressure by pointing to the fact that his team scores did not change
651. When asked why the
recommendation had changed he had no intelligible answer and sought refuge in a claim that the changes
were immaterial alterations to the wording of the recommendations. He evaded admitting that the changes
to language were changes to meaning
652. He did ultimately, and grudgingly, accept that his team653:
[C]ame to a view which it expressed, the scoring favoured Accenture and Accenture should have the bid.
After the meeting the scoring didn’t change but (the) assessment of scoring did.
5.60 Mr Hood’s unsatisfactory testimony and his misleading statement that he had no recollection of the meeting,
and his attempts to gainsay the clear import of the evidence that some urging at the meeting led to the
reassessment, all point to the conclusion that he was embarrassed by his acquiescence in the importunity.
There is suffcient evidence to remove any doubt that Mr Burns called the meeting, urged the reassessment
and succeeded in obtaining it. Mr Hood’s embarrassment and evasions are a tacit admission that the scoring
changed by reason of an intervention which should not have occurred.
641 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.2, at page 41.
642 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.2, at page 41.
643 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.1, at page 40.
644 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.2, at page 41.
645 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.1, at page 40.
646 Exhibit 4, Volume 19, Item 18.2.5, at pages 47-52 (frst version); Item 18.2.6, at pages 53-60 (second version); Item 18.2.1, at pages 23-40 (fnal version).
647 Exhibit 11, para 69.
648 T3-46, L1-8 (Philip Hood).
649 T3-45, L47-48 (Philip Hood).
650 T3-46, L1-8 (Philip Hood).
651 T3-45, L27-35 (Philip Hood).
652 T3-47, L1-30 (Philip Hood).
653 T3-47, L26-29 (Philip Hood).

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70
5.61 Mr Lewis, who led the Governance Panel, was an even more unsatisfactory witness. He, too, denied any
recollection of the “rescoring” meeting
654, though he accepted that his Panel scores changed to prefer
IBM
655. He was evasive with respect to the simplest proposition, such as whether his Panel even read the
ITO responses prior to scoring them
656. He had no explanation for the increase in IBM’s score657. When
confronted with the fact that his Panel had actually decreased Accenture’s score, he was equally bereft of
explanation
658. Mr Lewis, I regret to fnd, was not candid about his Panel’s rescoring and the reasons for it.
5.62 It is, I think, the fact that the pressure Mr Burns put on the Panel leaders, though effective, was improper
and affected the integrity of the procurement process. It is for that reason that Mr Hood and Mr Lewis
were evasive. They are, I conclude, deeply embarrassed that they permitted themselves to be manipulated
and to acquiesce in the distortion of the procurement. The embarrassment is no doubt increased by the
magnitude of the subsequent failure of the project for which they recommended IBM.
5.63 Mr Burns denied interfering in the evaluation of the responses659. He was adamant that that was not part
of his role and that he did not do it. He did, however, admit that he addressed “all the teams together”
660
at a time when “they were getting towards the end of their process, as we were beginning to start to form
up and they felt they’d [had] proper responses to their queries from the vendors”
661. His best recollection of
what he said was this
662:
Is the process working? Are you comfortable you’re understanding it? Have you given all proper
consideration to all aspects? … Have you had adequate responses from the vendors? Are you satisfed
with the special questions that (you were) asked? … Are you okay with the reference checking? … Are you
comfortable you can score correctly?
5.64 Given Mr Burns’ role as facilitator and leader of the ITO it is a fair inference that there would have been
no such meeting unless Mr Burns had called it. The other point to note is that an address in the terms he
recounts would not have led to a general re-evaluation or rescoring so as to change the relative rankings of
the two offerors. There is no doubt that that happened. It seems likely, therefore, that something more than
Mr Burns remembers was said.
5.65 Mr Burns was equally dismissive of the notion that he could have influenced the independent judgment
of a substantial number of public servants, many of whom were quite senior and many of whom had had
extensive experience with the Initiative and procurements. As he put it
663:
If I had said anything that they considered as impropriety, I’m convinced there would have been rapid
movement to the door, to go and raise it with people, particularly with the probity offcer.
5.66 IBM’s submissions make an allied point, that in evaluating the ITO responses the State had access to
experienced public servants who were IT specialists, qualifed accountants as well as external contractors
knowledgeable in IT contracts to advise, and to serve on the Panels
664. Those persons were required to, and
no doubt did, review and score each of the responses by reference to the information contained in them as
well as answers given to particular questions and clarifcations presented by the tenderers. The number and
composition of the Panels was meant to ensure that no individual had a controlling vote in the outcome and
that differing views would be accommodated and moderated to produce a consensus.
5.67 Mr Burns’ point is a good one, but there are three answers to it. The frst, one of detail, is that there was no
Probity Offcer
665. There should have been but the appointment was never made. The second answer is that
Mr Bond did complain
666. The third is that Mr Burns was a man of particularly forceful personality. Ms Perrott
describes him, accurately I am sure, as being “forceful” and “diffcult to control”
667. He had also, as I have
mentioned, been instrumental in having Mr Waite leave CorpTech. His familiarity with Mr Bradley was also well
known, as I have mentioned. These factors would have discouraged dissent from Mr Burns’ admonitions.
654 T4-60, L1-56 to T4-61, L1-33 (Michael Lewis).
655 T4-50, L27-28 (Michael Lewis).
656 T4-46, L30-52 (Michael Lewis).
657 T4-53, L10-34 to T4-54, L1-37 (Michael Lewis).
658 T4-50, L3-54 to T4-54, L1-53 (Michael Lewis).
659 T14-74, L15-23 (Terry Burns).
660 T14-71, L44-49 (Terry Burns).
661 T14-72, L34-38 (Terry Burns).
662 T14-72, L23-31 (Terry Burns).
663 T14-75, L37-41 (Terry Burns).
664 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 59.
665 This matter is examined in greater detail later in this report.
666 Exhibit 8, para 23.
667 Exhibit 53C, para 6.

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5.68 The substance of IBM’s point, also good on its face, is diminished by what actually happened. Mr Burns was
able to influence the Panel leaders and to affect the outcome of the evaluation. That it occurred is a serious
criticism of the public servants engaged in the evaluation, but there is no doubt about the fact.
Mr Bond was alarmed by Mr Burns’ intervention. It was clearly improper. He should have had no part to play in
5.69

the evaluation of the responses or their scoring in accordance with the predetermined criteria. It was certainly
not his role to influence the scoring in favour of one offeror. In a contest between two bidders to say that one
is being treated unfairly and that the scores which favour the other should be reassessed can only have one
consequence. Mr Bond took his concerns to Ms Perrott. He was again rebuffed. According to Mr Bond
668:
Her response to me was that I had had my opportunity and that Terry Burns was now leading the initiative.
… One of my main concerns was that someone who was not a public servant was leading the actual
evaluation and … I felt that was inappropriate.

5.70 In oral testimony Mr Bond said he told Ms Perrott he “was concerned with the way that the evaluation was
going that Terry was leading”
669. He explained that Mr Burns had instructed Panel members to rescore but
he (Mr Bond) may not have “referred to the actual meeting”
670.
Ms Perrott’s response to Mr Bond was that he “should support Terry, let him get on with trying to fnd a new
way to deliver the solutions and should be as supportive as possible”
671.
Ms Perrott had no specifc recollection of being told by Mr Bond of Mr Burns’ intervention
672. She does
5.71
5.72

recall a conversation in which she discussed his future at CorpTech but does not link it to his unease about
Mr Burns’ interference
673.
5.73 I accept Mr Bond’s evidence. Apart from my assessment of his credibility much of what he says has
circumstantial corroboration. It is clear that Mr Bond’s express concern to Ms Perrott was not limited to
the fact that Mr Burns, who was not a public servant, was leading the ITO process. He had a particular
concern, properly entertained, that Mr Burns was inappropriately interfering in the assessment. Given the
facts as mentioned earlier it is not likely that any of the public servants to whom Mr Burns spoke would
have challenged him. Ms Perrott’s response to Mr Bond reinforces that conclusion. Despite her saying that
she tightly controlled Mr Burns and cautioned him about his excesses, when given direct evidence of his
misbehaviour which had the immediate potential of distorting the evaluation process, she did nothing and
told Mr Bond that he should support Mr Burns.

5.74 Mr Bond’s approach to Ms Perrott is signifcant. Mr Bond knew at once that the pressure put on the Panel
members was improper and was likely to affect the integrity of the tender process.
It is, I think, a fair inference that Mr Burns urged the Panel leaders at the meeting he called to give IBM
5.75

credit for the potential its proposal had for a faster and therefore cheaper implementation of payroll
solution. Following the meeting the references to the risk in each of the proposals was ameliorated and IBM
led the scoring.
Suitability of Workbrain
5.76 I have previously described IBM’s innovative use of Workbrain, and the need for verifcation that the
proposal was practicable. The Evaluation Panels led by Mr Bond and Mr Hood were aware of IBM’s novel
approach. Because it was untried it was rated as risky and Accenture’s more conventional approach was
preferred. This assessment was made with knowledge that IBM had supplied reference sites for its proposed
use of Workbrain. Again the best account comes from Mr Bond. He said
674:
… IBM changed the design as to how the awards would be interpreted. The initial design placed the
awards engine in SAP; while WorkBrain was intended to process rosters and send that information into
SAP. But IBM changed that technical design to do award interpretation in WorkBrain. In my opinion this
was a problem, because complex award interpretation was to now be undertaken in an application that
was not designed for such work. SAP is a strong, robust HR solution. It is built for large scale purposes
668 Exhibit 8, para 23.
669 T2-64, L11-12 (Darrin Bond).
670 T2-64, L14-16 (Darrin Bond).
671 T2-64, L18-21 (Darrin Bond).
672 T17-4, L1-21 to T17-6, L1-16 (Barbara Perrott).
673 Exhibit 53B, para 8.
674 Exhibit 8, para 40.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
72
and it is built for complex award interpretation. [IBM’s] model … created a greater reliance upon there
being good interfaces between SAP and WorkBrain.
5.77 Following Mr Burns’ urging the scores and/or commentary changed, as I have described. Mr Bond and
Mr Mander
675 both accepted that there was sense in considering, or reconsidering, the IBM proposal because,
if it were effectual, it would be benefcial to the SS Initiative. Once more Mr Bond put it well
676:
The IBM offer would have shown a schedule that was much more aggressive than the Accenture one, and
therefore if that innovation … was able to be delivered then it would be a great outcome for the initiative. …
[B]ecause my team was somewhat uncomfortable, we asked for certain guarantees … that this would work.
5.78 The risk, of course, remained. If innovation were to be rewarded, elementary prudence required that proof
that it actually worked was important, if not vital. The proof offered by IBM, and accepted by CorpTech, was
to contact the reference sites and obtain from them an account of how Workbrain performed in practice as
an awards interpreter. Approaches were accordingly made to the users identifed by IBM.
5.79 On 9 October 2007, a Clarifcation Request was issued by CorpTech to IBM. It contained a number of
questions one of which was
677:
We have been unable to gather information from Woolworths. Please provide an alternative reference
site … [s]pecifcally around the use of Workbrain for award interpretation.
5.80 Woolworths had declined to answer CorpTech’s questions on the basis that its payroll system was commercially
confdential
678. IBM’s response on 11 October 2007 proposed instead Bunnings Warehouse, at an address in
Victoria, and Pacifc National Pty Ltd (Pacifc National) as “reference sites where schedule and time data are
imported into Workbrain from external systems and awards are interpreted and applied in Workbrain”
679.
5.81 In answer to a further question680:
How do you propose that CorpTech gains an acceptable level of confdence in the proposed Workbrain
awards solution given the inadequate reference response from Woolworths?
5.82 IBM responded681:
Workbrain’s Time and Attendance workforce solution has been implemented in many large organisations
in North America, Europe and Australia to accurately calculate gross payroll and comply with complex
regulations. In Australia this include[s] … Bunnings Warehouse, Pacifc United (sic) and Woolworths.
5.83 On 15 October 2007, Mr Bloomfeld replied specifcally to Ms Blakeney’s question of 9 October to inform
her that the Project Director for Workforce Management at Bunnings Warehouse would answer CorpTech’s
question about the use of Workbrain, and also identifed Mr Craig Smith of Pacifc National who had “now left
Pacifc National and is working at Woolworths on their Workbrain implementation”
682. Pacifc National was
also unhelpful. Its workforce of 2,900 was too small to be of relevance to QH’s much larger and more complex
one
683. Bunnings did not support IBM’s use of Workbrain because it did not have it interface with SAP684.
Ms Blakeney asked for a further reference site and in an email of 17 October 2007 Mr Bloomfeld suggested
the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
685.
5.84 There was no evidence that any reference site offered the promised support. IBM proffered a promotional
pamphlet from Infor about Workbrain and some research publications
686, the most important of which was
by Gartner, a well regarded source, which compared a number of workforce management IT solutions used by
retailers
687. It gave Workbrain a rating of “strong positive” in that context688. IBM also sent some “Workbrain
performance test results conducted by the IBM Customer Benchmark Centre”
689. These were of limited use.
675 T7-55, L29-56 to T7-56, L1-16 (Robert Mander).
676 T2-71, L16-22 (Darrin Bond).
677 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.43, at page 1197 (Question 16).
678 Exhibit 124, at page 27.
679 Exhibit 4, Volume 15, Item 15, at page 788.
680 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.43, at page 1198 (Question 19).
681 Exhibit 4, Volume 15, Item 15, at page 791.
682 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.42, at page 1194.
683 Exhibit 124, at page 63.
684 Exhibit 124, at pages 8, 43.
685 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.46, at page 1507.
686 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.43, at pages 1440-1452; Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.44, at pages 1455-1463.
687 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.44, at pages 1457-1463.
688 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.44, at pages 1462-1463.
689 Exhibit 4, Volume 30, Item 25.43, at pages 1439-1452.

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5.85 Mr Bond’s evidence on this was690:
There wasn’t enough advice given by [the frst two reference sites] and … one other [reference]. There
was not enough assurance that this was going to be a possible solution for us. … They did provide
more references … the referees described … having award interpretation within Workbrain, but not with
integrating … back to SAP. In one case, one of the referees was unwilling to provide too much detail
because they felt it was their commercial advantage.
5.86 Mr Goddard sat in on the Evaluation Panel to which Mr Bond recounted his interrogation of the reference
sites. He said
691:
I recall … something like Australia Post or Qantas … may have been … looking to actually integrate
Workbrain and SAP [but] … they hadn’t actually got to the point of integrating and using it. My
recollection is that there was no thought by those organisations for actually using … Workbrain as the
awards engine. … [I]nternationally I believe they came back and there was … some organisation …
more advanced … but again I am pretty confdent … they hadn’t contemplated using Workbrain in that
additional awards engine capability. So it basically came back inconclusive as to whether it could be
done or … couldn’t be done, so basically (things were) left in a position of … it’s a risk from a technical
perspective, a signifcant risk.
5.87 Dr Manfeld explained that benchmarking by research, though useful, does not give the necessary
confdence that a system will work in practice. He said
692:
It’s not conclusive simply because in real life, applications have so many variables that you can’t say
because it achieves a certain benchmarking threshold in the lab, it’s going to achieve the same number
of users or an equivalent benchmarking threshold in the feld, you can’t say that, but the existence of
those benchmarks from the manufacturer are a confdence raising data point in terms of assessing the
prudence of proposing the proposal of the solution.

Can I summarise your evidence in this way: you have said what the aspects of the reference site which are
confdence raising and which support the conclusion you reach? There seem to be fve aspects which are
the areas of, let’s just say reservation for a minute about the reference sites, one was that one or more of
them had used only a subset of the functionality of Workbrain that was to be used in the interim solution.
That’s one aspect you’ve mentioned. The second aspect you’ve mentioned is there wasn’t a site which
used the relevant functionality for above 30,000 employees. Is that correct?—That’s right.
Next you mentioned that none, from what you had been able to see, integrated Workbrain with SAP?—
Yes.
Fourth, from what you saw, and only from what you saw, you couldn’t see that any had been
implemented into a system of award complexity equivalent to Queensland Health?—That’s right.
And, lastly, I think you mentioned the Woolies one was under build. Does that sum up the fve
reservations which one might reasonably have about the reference sites, albeit arriving at the
conclusions you do?—That nicely sums up the risk equation.
5.88 According to Mr Bond the risk was to be addressed by including a requirement of “proof … of how this would
work”, in the contract
693.
5.89 This was clearly unsatisfactory from the State’s point of view. It had initially assessed the IBM proposal to
be risky, even “high risk”, because of the lack of evidence that Workbrain could in practice perform according
to theory. As a result, I fnd, of Mr Burns’ urging, the innovation was rescored and given an enhanced value
subject to the qualifcation that references to its works and practice be provided by IBM. The references
given were unsatisfactory.
5.90 The evidence of the interrogation of the companies provided as a reference is sparse, indeed fragmentary,
but it is suffciently clear from the evidence of Mr Bond and Mr Goddard that no satisfactory responses were
obtained. I am reinforced in that conclusion by the fact that IBM did not provide any information to the
Commission contrary to what the fragments suggest.
690 T2-74, L41-45; T2-75, L55 to T2-76, L1; T2-76, L9-13 (Darrin Bond).
691 T8-9, L25-46 (Keith Goddard).
692 T30-36, L1-9; T30-36, L26-50 (Dr David Manfeld).
693 T2-76, L45-52 (Darrin Bond).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
74
5.91 Another point arises for consideration. No witness from IBM explained why or on what basis IBM thought
that the reference sites supplied were appropriate. The obvious inferences are that IBM did not trouble
to ascertain for itself whether the sites were appropriate in providing them to CorpTech; or knew that the
references were not using Workbrain as it proposed and hoped the State would not inquire too closely.

5.92 Mr Bond explained why, despite having got unsatisfactory responses, CorpTech moved to accept the IBM
proposal and deal with the risk by way of contractual warranty. He said
694:

[T]here was pressure placed upon the team to have the evaluation done quickly and … move into contract
negotiations, and there was advice that this could be addressed post contract … to ensure that IBM did
have the capability to perform this.
He identifed the source of the pressure as Mr Burns and Ms Perrott.
5.93 The Mater Hospital, whose Chief Information Offcer, Mr Malcolm Thatcher, helped the Commission on a
point which will be discussed subsequently, also provided the Commission with the Hospital’s assessment
of the appropriate solution for its rostering, award interpretation, and time and attendance functions
undertaken when implementing its new payroll system. It made a detailed comparison of two solutions, one
of which was Workbrain. It did not choose Workbrain, noting that
695:
There are some signifcant functional issues, some unresolvable, that would make management of
labour process and service to our employees less optimal. The key areas of weakness for this solution
are its inability to have more than one roster attached to an employee (example: Oncall Rotation and
Labour allocations built independently, however running concurrently), inability to perform roster
swaps and copy rosters. Even though these may appear minor defciencies the impact these elements
have on the business is quite substantial, in particular with the medical staff.
5.94 The report also noted696:
Four areas of non-compliance identifed for the Workbrain product could have signifcant impact on the
business in terms of useability and non-delivery of effciencies associated with roster development … .
These non-compliant areas included:
• …The ability to have more than one rotation attached to an employee for the same period with different
rotation patterns …
• … The ability to consider employee breaks between Rosters …
• … The ability to swap rosters between employees whilst roster is active …
• … The ability to swap copy rosters between employees whilst roster is active … [emphasis added]
No probity Advisor

5.95 CorpTech had a “Signifcant Purchase Plan” as part of its “SSS Program Sourcing Strategy”697. It regulated such
processes as the ITO. It contained a section 4, “Procurement and Risk Management” part of which provided
698:

4.3 Probity
An independent probity auditor will be engaged to monitor, advise and report on the probity of the
procurement processes.
The omission to appoint a Probity Advisor was a serious one.
5.96 The Evaluation Report for the selection of the Prime Contract identifed the “Evaluation Panel Advisors and
scoring team members”
699. According to the table there were two Probity Advisors, Mr David Stone, in-house
Legal Counsel to Treasury who was described as “Procurement and Probity Advisor”; and Mr Swinson who was
described as “Legal Review and Probity Advisor”
700. Both deny ever having been appointed as a Probity Advisor.
694 T2-77, L7-12 (Darrin Bond).
695 Mater Misericordiae Health Services Brisbane Ltd, Electronic Rostering/T&A/Award Interpreter – Business Case (10 November 2007) at page 8.
696 Mater Misericordiae Health Services Brisbane Ltd, Electronic Rostering/T&A/Award Interpreter – Business Case (10 November 2007) at page 9.
697 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 22, at pages 1-30.
698 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 22, at page 17.
699 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 5.
700 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 5.

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5.97 Mr Stone said that he was not on the Evaluation Panel and did not know why his name was included in the
table. He said
701:

My involvement was peripheral in … that, being in-house counsel, people sometimes ask you questions
and you try … to answer them. I recall being invited to various meetings regarding the evaluation process
but I did not attend most of them. I gave some advice on a probity issue in relation to the evaluation
process, but I did not have a standing or overarching role as probity advisor or auditor.
The role of a probity advisor is quite a signifcant one. It would involve having a particular fle,
developing a protocol, keeping a register and attending the evaluation meetings. I was never asked to
assume such a role.
5.98 Mr Swinson said702:
My attention has been drawn … to the Evaluation Report … which mentions my role as “Legal Review and
Probity Advisor”. It is incorrect to describe me as probity advisor. I was never retained by the State to be
probity advisor on the project nor ever asked to do so. I was not aware of who was probity advisor. … My
role is best summarised in a signoff letter that I gave … about the time that the fnal draft of the contract
was prepared. … I am not aware of anyone else on the tender evaluation panel who could properly be
classed as an external probity adviser. As far as I am aware, there was not an external probity auditor for
this tender.
5.99 Mr Swinson’s letter described his and Mallesons’ role in these terms703:
We have acted as legal adviser to the State in connection with this (ITO) process. … As legal advisers,
we have reviewed and commented on the tender process and negotiation strategy. We have also taken
a leading role in the negotiation process and in drafting relevant contractual provisions and schedules.
… We have not provided any fnancial, audit, tax or technical advice to the State in connection with the
Agreement.
5.100 Mr Swinson gave evidence that he did give advice to the State from time to time when asked about probity
questions, but he was not appointed to be a proactive advisor ensuring that the procurement process
retained its integrity. He said
704:
I wasn’t probity advisor; I was a legal advisor on probity issues but not a probity advisor in the sense that
some people might understand …
and that he was consulted on probity issues which arose, attended a meeting at which probity
arrangements were put in place, but that was the limit of his role in relation to probity
705.
5.101 The omission to appoint a Probity Advisor was a serious one. The oversight might at frst instance have been
Ms Blakeney’s but Ms Perrott was the person in charge of the ITO
706 and the evaluation of responses. She
should have noticed the lack of the external Probity Advisor and appointed one. The advisor would have
been someone to whom Mr Bond could turn for support when Ms Perrott refused to act. The presence of a
Probity Advisor may well have deterred Mr Burns from his improper intervention.
No Conflicts Register
Another oversight in the ITO and its evaluation was the lack of a Conflicts Register.
5.102 Another oversight in the ITO and its evaluation was the lack of a Conflicts Register. There was no statutory
requirement that there be a Conflicts Register. The legislation, applicable at the time, was the
Financial
Administration and Audit Act
1977 (Qld) which authorised the Treasurer to make Financial Management
Standards and Policies. One such policy was the State Purchasing Policy
707. It did not itself prescribe how
conflicts of interest were to be dealt with but one of its subsidiary “Better Purchasing Guides”, “associated”
with the Policy did
708. It was the Ethics, Probity and Accountability in Procurement Guide which was
701 Exhibit 61, paras 18-19.
702 Exhibit 28A, paras 30-31.
703 Exhibit 4, Volume 11, Item 11.55, at pages 781-782.
704 T8-87, L29-32 (John Swinson).
705 T8-87, L37-44 (John Swinson).
706 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 13.
707 Exhibit 4, Volume 23, Item 23.3, at pages 17-52.
708 Exhibit 4, Volume 23, Item 23.4 at pages 53-82.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
76
jointly authored by the Director-General, Department of Public Works and the Chairman of the Crime and
Misconduct Commission. It helpfully identifed and defned “three types of conflict of interest”
709, discussed
them and noted the “several management strategies available”
710 to determine the existence of such
conflict and to remove or neutralise them. One such strategy was a Register “where details of the conflict of
interest are declared …”. Ms Blakeney had compiled a Conflicts Register for the RFP and had those involved
in the evaluation (or most of them) sign a statement declaring whether he or she had any conflict
711.
Mr Burns indicated “none” in the sheet he signed and returned to Ms Blakeney
712.
The lack of the Conflicts Register… is another indication that the ITO process was lax and
some of those in charge of it were inattentive to their responsibilities.
5.103 Despite extensive searches undertaken by and on behalf of the Commission, no evidence was found that
a Conflicts Register had been compiled for the ITO. There was no evidence of any other management
strategy undertaken to identify and deal with conflicts. Given that the Register had been utilised for the
earlier process and no other approach was adopted, a suitable Register should also have been compiled
for the ITO. The omission may be thought immaterial given that the ITO was a continuation of the
procurement process, but it was in form, a new process, more formal in nature and more comprehensive.
The existing register should have been updated, or a new one made.
5.104 It may be thought that Mr Burns would have returned the same reply to the new Register as he did to the
frst, that he did not consider that his behaviour during his May review gave rise to any conflict of interest
which needed declaring. Mr Swinson, whose opinion I accept, thought that:
a. Mr Burns’ early employment by IBM in South Africa was irrelevant and did not need to be disclosed
713;
b. his more recent involvement with IBM and Fonterra in New Zealand was something that should have been
disclosed
714.
It certainly seems to have been a factor in Mr Burns’ desire to involve IBM in the SS Initiative.
5.105 It is not, I think, clear that Mr Burns’ conflict arising from (b) should have disqualifed him from the ITO. What
the evidence does establish is that he displayed a distinct and persistent preference for IBM, and a desire to
assist it in its endeavours to obtain work from the State of Queensland, which should have disqualifed him. It
is not likely he would have disclosed his bias even if Ms Blakeney had proffered him the appropriate form. The
lack of the Conflicts Register probably has little signifcance for that reason, but it is another indication that
the ITO process was lax and some of those in charge of it were inattentive to their responsibilities.
price
5.106 This topic is important to a consideration of the adequacy and integrity of procurement.
5.107 The tender closed on 8 October 2007. On 12 October 2007 Mr Bloomfeld emailed IBM’s Executive
Summary of its response to Ms Blakeney
715. It identifed the price of $98M, but only in a footnote716. That
sum did not appear in the detail of the response. The summary stated “Our Agency-centric strategy will help
you cost-effectively achieve these goals through maximised uptake of the solution”. “Cost-effectively” has a
footnote reference: “Note that IBM’s price for Phase 1 and 2 is $98 million (excluding expenses)”
717.
5.108 After IBM entered into the contract there was a marked increase in its ITO price estimates brought about
by Change Requests and an increase in the estimates for completion of the Initiative as a whole. The extent
to which price increased, and why, is addressed in detail in Part 2 of the Report.
709 Exhibit 4, Volume 23, Item 23.4 at page 64.
710 Exhibit 4, Volume 23, Item 23.4 at page 65.
711 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Items 9.1-9.28, at pages 1-28.
712 Exhibit 4, Volume 9, Item 9.19, at page 19.
713 T8-84, L1-56 (John Swinson).
714 T8-100, L8-39 (John Swinson).
715 Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.40, at pages 1164-1178.
716 Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.40, at page 1166.
717 Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.40, at page 1166.

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5.109 IBM’s bid was, by far, the lowest price of all the vendors. IBM’s RFP pricing range was $156 to $190M718.
Its ITO pricing, however, was far less; approximately $98M
719. Accenture, by contrast, bid a fgure of
approximately $175M at the RFP stage and $176M at the ITO stage
720. Logica submitted a proposal for the
fnance components only on the Initiative. It did not offer to provide HR solutions. Its price in response to
the RFP was approximately $116M
721 and in response to the ITO was $118M to $120M722.
5.110 The State evaluated the ITO responses against the background that its remaining budget for the
Initiative was about $108M
723. IBM knew, having been told by Mr Burns, that the remaining budget for the
SS Initiative project was in that order
724. (The other vendors also knew the amount of its remaining budget.)
5.111 During the procurement process, Mr Salouk informed Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley that the State ought not
accept a price within the budget, because it was inadequate to complete the project to the government’s
specifcations
725. IBM was aware, too, that Accenture held this view and thought it important, Mr Bloomfeld
having received Mr Porter’s email on 3 August 2007. Mr Bloomfeld’s email of 3 August 2007, which
contained Mr Porter’s email relating to price, revealed the following matters
726:
a. the government had a budget of approximately $100M which it knew was insuffcient to get the work done;
b. as a bidding strategy, Accenture intended to offer a “Not-to-Exceed” fgure so as to give the comfort that
comes with greater price certainty;
c. a likely “Not-to-Exceed” range was + or – $200M;
d. Accenture assessed there to be a real risk that relevant government offcials may be persuaded by a bid
within the remaining budget;
e. Accenture believed such a bid to lack credibility because it was impossible to deliver the required services for
that price;
f. Accenture anticipated the need for a six month transition period.
5.112 Those matters must have caused IBM to assess whether the price it intended to put forward was realistic.
It is implausible to assert that the information it had received about the State’s budget, and about
Accenture’s approach to price, did not have some effect on its subsequent bid. On 17 September 2007,
after the ITO had been delivered to IBM, Accenture and Logica, representatives of those companies were
asked to attend an “industry briefng” on what CorpTech expected from the ITO
727. It was represented by
Ms Perrott, Mr Goddard and Mr Burns. Mr Salouk who attended on behalf of Accenture was asked whether
CorpTech had said at the meeting that their pricing “had to have regard to the remaining budget”
728. He
replied “No, defnitely not”. He was asked if Mr Burns had suggested to him that Accenture needed to have
regard to pricing its response to ft within that budget. He answered
729:
No, he defnitely didn’t. … I’m confdent of that because Accenture … probably would not have bid had
that been the case … [b]ecause we knew that we could not deliver the program for the remaining budget.
So it would have been pointless to invest another million dollars in … preparation (for) a proposal …
knowing that you’re not going to be considered.
5.113 Accenture’s assessment of the situation must have made IBM doubt that its ITO price was realistic. History,
as I have said, shows that the fgure to have been unachievable.
5.114 Mr Burns had at an earlier stage urged IBM to be competitive in its pricing730. Although budget was
always going to be a key consideration in winning a bid for government work, and Accenture and Logica
knew in general terms what the remaining budget was, it is not clear that they received that same direct
encouragement from Mr Burns. He, with his direct line to Mr Bradley, was likely to know, and be able to pass
on, whether CorpTech could accept an offer which exceeded the existing budget.
718 Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.7.2, at page 1132.
719 T12-32, L14 (Lochlan Bloomfeld); Exhibit 35, para 147.
720 Exhibit 4, Volume 18, Item 17, at page 656.
721 Exhibit 4, Volume 8, Item 6.6.2 at page 984.
722 T2-23, L40 (Michael Duke).
723 Exhibit 4, Volume 1, Item 1.4, at page 200.
724 Exhibit 35, para 62; Exhibit 4, Volume 28, Item 25.28, at page 662.
725 T1-37 L31-56 to T1-38, L10 (Marcus Salouk).
726 Exhibit 32, at page 3.
727 Exhibit 4, Volume 29, Item 25.34, at page 730.
728 T1-57, L20-24 (Marcus Salouk).
729 T1-57, L28-36 (Marcus Salouk).
730 T11-113, L38-43 (Lochlan Bloomfeld); T12-100, L14 (Lochlan Bloomfeld); T14-7, L45 (Terry Burns); T14-19, L4 (Terry Burns).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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5.115 It must have been apparent to IBM during the procurement process that, at least to some extent, its
estimates of price and timeframes would have to be taken at face value by the State. Of course, proper
processes should have been employed to scrutinise responses, but IBM was much better placed to estimate
the cost and timeframes of the solution it was proposing. That better position was informed not least by the
specialised skill and knowledge that IBM had and which, as it knew, CorpTech lacked.
5.116 The State, had it taken proper care for its own interests, ought to have known of the possibility that
IBM’s pricing was unrealistically low. There was a wide variation between the pricing in IBM’s RFP and
ITO responses, despite those estimates being provided only a few months apart. Contrasted against this,
however, is the Accenture pricing structure which was largely consistent between RFP and ITO stages
731.
So was Logica’s. Its price for only the fnance component was substantially higher than IBM’s price for the
whole solution.
5.117 IBM’s evidence was that the startling difference of $90M (taking its highest estimate) between its RFP and
ITO pricing was explained by the fact that its knowledge of the scope of the project increased when the ITO
and its many volumes of annexures was released to the market. However, any increase in knowledge is an
increase which Accenture and Logica too ought to have enjoyed, as respondents, like IBM, to the ITO. Why,
the question remains, did IBM consider that new information to so radically change its pricing and neither
Logica nor Accenture take that view?
5.118 Ms Brooke Freeman, an IBM Business Development Executive who played a role in the preparation of IBM’s
bid price, gave a statement to the Commission which addressed this question. Ms Freeman said that the
decrease from IBM’s RFP price estimates was a result of reviewing more than 1300 documents provided
with the ITO
732. The ITO pricing, she claimed, reflected a removal of duplication of effort and revised
staffng costs, and reviewed risk ratings and proft margins for the project
733. Ms Freeman also said that
IBM’s RFP and ITO pricing estimates were calculated in different ways and on two different bases
734. Travel
expenses in the latter bid were signifcantly reduced.
5.119 Ms Freeman’s explanation for the lower ITO price, was735:
a. IBM is disinclined to put forward its … most competitive price at a preliminary stage where there is
no guarantee that the information will not become available to competitors.
b. Clients … react badly to a fnal price which is signifcantly higher than a preliminary … estimate.
Accordingly, IBM … adopts generous assumptions in a preliminary pricing estimate which increase
that estimate.
c. More information … is usually available at the time a fnal bid price is prepared …
d. … [M]ore aggressive proft margins can be adopted.
5.120 The explanation is implausible.
5.121 For the frst point to be convincing there needed to be proof that IBM expected, or at least feared, that
the price estimate submitted by the respondents to the RFP would become available to competitors. I am
not aware of any such evidence. CorpTech’s offcials endeavoured to keep all of the responses confdential.
IBM’s attempt to gain access to its competitors’ responses was unsuccessful. A greater diffculty for
accepting the explanation is that the approach involves IBM giving a misleading price to the offeror, who is
expected to read it and regard it seriously, in order to confuse competitors, who are not expected to read it.
The State, had it taken proper care for its own interests, ought to have known of the
possibility that IBM’s pricing was unrealistically low. There was a wide variation between
the pricing in IBM’s RFP and ITO responses, despite those estimates being provided only a
few months apart.
731 T1-69, L9-12 (Marcus Salouk); Exhibit 5, para 67.
732 Exhibit 57, para 24(b).
733 Exhibit 57, para 14.
734 E xhibit 57, para 21.
735 Exhibit 57, para 16.

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5.122 The second point describes IBM’s approach to tendering for very substantial government contracts as one in
which it overstates its price by huge amounts (in this case between $60M and $90M in round terms) to allow it
to propose a realistic price later. Such an approach must surely run the risk, from IBM’s side, of pricing itself out
of the competition and depriving itself of the opportunity to tender competitively in a later round. It imposes
on the State the risk that if the price were accepted it would be overcharged by that same amount. The
strategy put an enormous premium on Mr Bloomfeld’s assessment that the RFP would not result in the State
awarding a contract, and that there would be a second round. He was right, as it turned out, but the State had
initially intended to contract from the RFP and only Mr Swinson’s advice dissuaded it from that course.
5.123 I cannot accept Ms Freeman’s explanation for the drop in price. I accept that her points (c) and (d) may be,
in general, explanations for a difference in price.
The clearest point to emerge from this aspect of the evidence is that there were serious
shortcomings in the State’s scrutiny and assessment of price during its evaluation of the
ITO responses.
5.124 Ms Freeman also provided the Commission with a table setting out “the approximate difference between
IBM’s ITO response price and how much higher that price would have been if the … approach adopted
in the (RFP) was adopted in (the ITO)”. The fgures are said to be “illustrative only, and … necessarily
approximate”
736. Signifcantly the comparison undertaken by Ms Freeman was only between the ITO fgure
of $98M and the lowest fgure in the range proposed in the RFP, $156M. The difference is explained by
four items. There is a saving, already mentioned, of travel expenses of $25M
737. A lower gross proft margin
reduced the price by $14.5M
738; a reallocation of the source of personnel from IBM to design and build the
solutions saved a further $10M and the charge out rates for some resources was reduced saving another
$3.8M
739. These savings together amount to $53.3M. The comparison leaves unexplained the remaining
difference of about $40M if one takes as the starting point the highest fgure in IBM’s RFP range.
5.125 The discrepancy was also put to Mr Bloomfeld. It was, in fact, agitated several times during his
examination. I had struggled to understand IBM’s explanation for the decrease in price which appeared to
me signifcant in its implication. I asked Mr Bloomfeld directly for an intelligible answer. He eventually gave
a considered response after an overnight adjournment. There were, he said, three reasons for the reduction:
a. IBM if successful would take over the implementation of the SS Initiative partly performed by others. During
the ITO process and the ability it gave respondents to seek information from CorpTech, IBM gained a better
understanding of what was left to be done to achieve the Initiative and could adjust its estimate of work and
the price of that work accordingly.
b. As part of the same process of gathering information IBM had gained a comprehensive understanding
of the content of Industrial Awards, so could better assess what work was required to accommodate the
complexities.
c. It gained a better understanding of the complexities of concurrent employment – “how the government
would handle employees … employed by a particular department but … seconded into another … . … [D]
epending on how that was defned … it would make a difference as to whether … it applied to a vast number
of … employees or a smaller number”
740.
5.126 In fairness to Mr Bloomfeld it should be recorded that at an earlier stage in his evidence, he did refer to a
decrease in proft margin as affecting the later price. His answer which I have just outlined was, however, his
last and best answer.
5.127 Mr Bloomfeld advanced a different reason in his statement. There he said741:
… I am able to identify, by way of example, several aspects of the ITO Response by IBM which may go
some way to explaining its bid price.
First, IBM’s response was to conduct extensive forward planning to enable the … solution to be designed
736 Exhibit 57, para 22.
737 Exhibit 35, para 154.
738 Exhibit 57, Annexures at page 337.
739 Exhibit 57, Annexures at page 338, 339.
740 T13-36, L33-55 to T13-47, L1-20 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
741 Exhibit 35, para 150-155.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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so as to capture as many of the requirements of departments and agencies at the outset rather than
… as individual additional solutions in each … agency. This … represents … a … cost effective way of
proceeding.
Secondly, the IBM approach was to use Workbrain for Awards interpretation which would have meant
considerably less programming effort … than using SAP … and … allow for less complex and less time
consuming implementation.
Thirdly, IBM proposed a single instance of SAP … (and) an optimised … model …
Fourthly … travel costs and other expenses were not included …
Fifthly, IBM priced … services … with low proft margins and low mark-ups …
5.128 Mr Bloomfeld had two different versions of explanation for the variation in price. Ms Freeman had a third.
There is some overlap but not enough to dispel the suspicion that IBM had no defnitive explanation for the
difference in price.
5.129 I am not confdent that any of the various answers satisfactorily explain the very great reduction in price.
The removal of travel expenses does seem to have occurred (though IBM was not absorbing that cost: it was
passing it on to CorpTech) and proft margins may have been reduced, but the differences in explanation
and Mr Bloomfeld’s hesitancy in claiming that the causes described in his statement were the effective ones
make me sceptical that IBM’s bid was a genuine estimate of the real cost of designing and implementing the
balance of the SS Initiative.
5.130 IBM’s submission appears to advance another explanation for its lower price, that its response, provided
with the pricing spreadsheets, included “a detailed set of assumptions” which included
742:
a. For awards and rostering:
i. that appropriately skilled client resources … from applicable agencies will be available to
advise the awards team …
ii. that CorpTech would be responsible for compiling awards, acts and requirements … using the
awards templates provided by IBM …

c. For Legacy Solution Upgrades:
i. that the scope of work required to reach Queensland Health’s minimum requirements for an
interim solution are within the range or allowed for in IBM’s build estimates … presented in
the form of RICEF category and complexity …
iii. that the existing (Department of Housing) Payroll solution included the functionality
expected to deliver the minimum Queensland Health requirement.
5.131 Then it is pointed out that several of these assumptions were invalidated by subsequent events743. The argument
appears to be that IBM’s price was lower because it was offering a simpler solution for the SS Initiative, more
straightforward and less complicated (and less useful) than the other responses, the delivery of which required a
greater effort by CorpTech (no doubt at its cost) to assist with the design and requirements for the solution.
5.132 The argument is plausible but I note it was not one put forward by Mr Bloomfeld or Ms Freeman. To the
extent the submission is factually correct the evaluation of the responses by CorpTech’s offcials should have
revealed that the lower price was buying a smaller product so that the price comparisons had to do more than
contrast overall fgures. There is nothing in the fnal Evaluation Report to suggest that point was understood.
5.133 The points I have discussed give rise to a suspicion that the price of $98M advanced by IBM was not realistic
and that the SS Initiative described in the ITO documents could not have been delivered for it. The factors,
though signifcant, are too general in their nature to allow a conclusion that IBM’s price was not a genuine
estimate, but was put forward to secure the contract by substantially underbidding its competitors. An
examination suffcient to come to a conclusion, one way or the other, would take weeks, if not months, and
involve a detailed investigation of facts now lost or forgotten and with the prospect that no conclusive answer
could be arrived at. The task was properly undertaken.
742 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 76.
743 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 14 June 2013 (Procurement), para 77.

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5.134 The clearest point to emerge from this aspect of the evidence is that there were serious shortcomings in the
State’s scrutiny and assessment of price during its evaluation of the ITO responses.
5.135 Ms Bugden, who holds a Masters degree in Financial Management and is a Certifed Practising Accountant
(CPA)
744, was responsible for assessing price for the RFP745. She left CorpTech and was unable to take part
in the ITO price assessment. She was replaced by Ms Orange, who is also a CPA and commenced work at
CorpTech on 17 September 2007
746, two days after the ITO issued. Ms Orange did not anticipate playing a
role in the ITO evaluation when she joined CorpTech
747. Ms Bugden, however, gave formal notifcation that
she would be unable to lead the pricing evaluation for the ITO on 8 October 2007, the day the ITO closed
748.
5.136 Ms Orange received little to no briefng about the appraisal requirements from Ms Bugden, Ms Perrott or anyone
else
749. She had never before been involved in a government ITO or procurement process750. Ms Orange was
not provided with a copy of the RFP bids of IBM, Logica or Accenture
751. No one informed her of the range of
pricing that those three entities had provided in the previous stage of the procurement process or gave her
an explanation of the RFP price estimates
752. She did not therefore know that Logica and Accenture had been
consistent in estimating price between RFP and ITO but that IBM’s price had reduced by tens of millions of dollars.
5.137 This was a serious dereliction of duty on the part of Ms Perrott who ought to have ensured that Ms Orange
received adequate briefng and support to make an informed assessment of price. It was irresponsible for
Ms Perrott not to ensure that Ms Orange was provided with the requisite information to conduct her assessment.
Ms Orange was unfairly and unexpectedly burdened with a critical issue in the evaluation process. She clearly
struggled in the role for reasons beyond her control.
5.138 The pricing schedules in IBM’s response were diffcult to comprehend. They were presented in a form
which made ascertaining the price for particular items of work designated in the ITO the subject of further
computation. It was Mr Shah’s role to perform the calculations from information found elsewhere in the
response, and from questioning IBM
753. Mr Bloomfeld in evidence helpfully produced a schedule which
explicitly set out IBM’s costings which reconciled readily to the footnoted price of $98M
754. He explained
that the schedule had not been given with the response (which would have made Ms Orange’s task much
easier) because the ITO had not asked for pricing to be displayed in that way and because the short time
allowed for the response did not allow for it
755. The last answer does not explain why the schedule, or an
equivalent, could not have been given to CorpTech at or about the time it sent the Executive Summary.
The State seemed to have treated price as the determining factor in the assessment of the
ITO bids which meant that it was always going to be particularly attracted to the lowest
price offered.
5.139 Ms Bugden’s statements indicate the sorts of questions that an experienced cost evaluator might have
asked by way of clarifcation from IBM in an attempt to come to grips with the price differential between
Accenture’s response and IBM’s, and between IBM’s two prices. Ms Orange did not have the requisite
experience to identify the questions, and was working under a considerable pressure of time
756. She is not to
be criticised on either count.
5.140 The determination of price was a key question of great complexity which demanded close attention by
Ms Perrott. Continuity of pricing evaluators would have greatly assisted the scrutiny of IBM’s signifcant price
reduction. If Ms Perrott could not fnd a suitably qualifed and experienced replacement for Ms Bugden, she
should have taken on the role herself.
744 Exhibit 14, para 1.
745 Exhibit 22.
746 Exhibit 13, para 4.
747 Exhibit 13, para 6.
748 Exhibit 14, Annexure A.
749 T3-73, L2 (Colleen Orange); T17-7, L17 (Barbara Perrott).
750 T3-73, L9-10 (Colleen Orange).
751 T3-73, L15-18 (Colleen Orange).
752 T3-73, L20-21 (Colleen Orange).
753 T3-77, L7-14 (Colleen Orange); Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 6.
754 Exhibit 42.
755 T13-43, L49-55 to T13-44, L1-3 (Lochlan Bloomfeld).
756 Exhibit 14B, paras 5-14.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
82
5.141 Ms di Carlo was another member of the price Evaluation Panel for the ITO, said to be appointed to the role
by the Under-Treasurer, Mr Bradley
757, due to her early involvement in the SS Initiative business case. Ms di
Carlo was probably the author of Annexure D to the fnal Evaluation Report
758 which deals with the issue of
price. The Annexure states “The IBM Offer represents both the least cost, and most cost-effective option”
but it is hard to identify a basis for that assessment
759. No one who the Commission interviewed or from
whom it took evidence was willing to take responsibility for the assessments contained in Annexure D, or to
explain how the estimates in that document were arrived at.
5.142 Mr Shah was the fnal member of the price Evaluation Panel but had no formal accounting, fnancial or IT
qualifcations. Mr Shah is qualifed as a Mechanical Engineer
760. Mr Shah had a close working relationship
with Mr Burns and was described in evidence as being “Mr Burns’ lieutenant”
761.
5.143 The Commission sought to explore with the individuals said to have had some involvement with the
evaluation of the pricing component of the ITO responses and the preparation of Appendix D to the
Evaluation Report what was the reasoning behind the assessment that the IBM proposal was the “least
cost”. No witness was prepared to take responsibility for having drafted Appendix D. That can only mean
that what might have been regarded by the State as the most important element of the ITO responses was
something to which inadequate attention was given and little true scrutiny applied.
5.144 The State seemed to have treated price as the determining factor in the assessment of the ITO bids which
meant that it was always going to be particularly attracted to the lowest price offered.
5.145 The events to which I have alluded, and which occurred after the contract was entered into, were the
culmination of the price which IBM proposed and which the State too lightly and uncritically accepted.
Those matters are dealt with later in my Report, but I have mentioned them briefly here so that it is
understood how the problems identifed contributed to the State later (in early 2009) losing confdence in
IBM, and which ultimately led to a decision to limit IBM’s work under the contract to the Interim Solution.
One particular feature of those later developments was that the price which IBM estimated in late October
2008 to complete the Program was almost exactly the same as Accenture had put forward in its ITO
response, and was within the range of prices IBM had given in the RFP.
evaluation process was not Administered properly
5.146 Another indication of the lack of oversight is that not all Panel members were kept involved for the entire
evaluation process. Mr Atzeni left after three days, on about 12 October 2007
762. Mr Mander went back to his
department and although present for the 17 October presentation by IBM, did not take part in his Panel’s fnal
deliberations
763. The Panel reports were not signed by the members until November and in some cases were
not signed at all. The processes of probity and administration appear to have been outsourced to Mr Burns
whose primary interest was in securing IBM’s appointment.
Selection of prime Contractor
5.147 The Evaluation Report for the Prime Contractor for the SSS Program was fnalised on 23 October 2007764. It
recommended that
765:
• [A]pproval [be given] to enter into … negotiation with the highest ranked Offeror – IBM Australia Pty Ltd ;
• endorsement of the Offer from IBM …, subject to successful … negotiations and Contracting approval …
5.148 Ms Perrott signed the recommendation as Chair of the Evaluation Panel on 23 October 2007 and the
leaders of each Panel also signed on that day or the succeeding two days
766.
5.149 The three offers had been evaluated according to predetermined criteria and the weightings given to each
criterion. The Evaluation Report explained
767:
757 T17-7, L55-56 (Barbara Perrott); T17-82, L29-37 (Gerard Bradley).
758 T4-27, L1-15 (Rose di Carlo); Exhibit 15, para 78.
759 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 27.
760 Exhibit 18, para 1.
761 T7-46, L16-26 (Robert Mander).
762 T9-78, L21-35 (Damon Atzeni).
763 T7-63, L36-41 (Robert Mander).
764 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at pages 1-31.
765 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 13.
766 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 13.
767 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at pages 8-9.

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4.2 Cost Analysis
An analysis of the cost was undertaken for the life of the project.
A cost beneft analysis was performed by taking the total expected costs and apply (sic) this to the total
expected beneft (overall weighted score) of each Offer in order to select the overall value for money solution.
The cost beneft ratio is determined by the following formular (sic):
Cost Beneft = Weighted Score
Total cost
The higher the result, the better value for money.
4.3 Weighted Score outcome
Detailed below is a summary of the scoring against each criterion for each Offeror. Refer to Appendix A for
detailed scoring per category and sub-category.
LogicaCMG –
Overall weighted Score
per criteria
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
0.33 0.67 0.25 0.24 0.27
Grand
Total
1.77*
Score out of 5
IBM –
Overall weighted Score
per criteria
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
0.60 1.34 0.43 0.48 0.53
Grand
Total
3.38
Score out of 5
Accenture –
Overall weighted Score
per criteria
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
0.60 1.31 0.41 0.47 0.52
Grand
Total
3.31
Score out of 5
*LogicaCMG did not meet the minimal requirements and was not assessed using the Cost Beneft
Analysis ratio.
4.4 Cost Beneft Analysis
IBM provides a greater cost beneft than the second ranked offer Accenture.
5.150 The Evaluation Report noted that768:
Upon completion on (sic) the evaluation and scoring, the highest ranked Offeror will be invited to
participate in post offer negotiations to settle any issues the Evaluation Panel has identifed as areas for
improvement or further negotiation …
5.151 A summary of the Evaluation Report contained the following769:
6.1 The offer from IBM … meets the requirements as detailed in the [ITO] and provides the Best Value for
Money to the Shared Services Solution Program.
Key strengths of the IBM proposal are:
• an early mitigation strategy for LATTICE payroll users, but specifically replacing the LATTICE payroll
application for Queensland Health by August
2008;
… •
an aggressive schedule of work that appears realistic based on the proposed innovation solution for
undertaking award interpretation…
… •
a value for money proposal that is within the funding allocation for Phase 1 of the Program Rebuild
Strategy as approved by the CEO Governing Board on 16 August 2007.

768 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at page 10.
769 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at pages 10-12.
Vendor Cost to complete Phase I
IBM $78.5M
Accenture $123M
Cost Beneft
IBM 0.043
Accenture 0.027

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
84
6.2 The offer from Accenture … meets the requirements as detailed in the [ITO] and has ranked second in
the evaluation process.
… •
Accenture provide (sic) an offer that exceeds the funding allocation for Phase
1 of the Program rebuild
Strategy as approved by the CEO governing Board on
18 August 2007.
6.3 The offer from LogicaCMG failed to provide an overall satisfactory score for the total program
requirements as outlined in the ITO. Logica offered a solution for the Finance Sub-program only, based
on current methodologies …
Logica provided an offer that, for the Finance Sub-Program component alone, exceeds the funding allocation.
5.152 Appendix D to the Evaluation Report contained a “Summary of Financial Issues”. It read770:
The IBM Offer represents both the least cost, and most cost-effective option. On the non-cost dimensions
… IBM scored marginally higher than Accenture. Both IBM and Accenture offers demonstrate key
strengths. The IBM offer better articulated a mitigation strategy for Queensland Health’s Lattice system,
providing an early replacement by the end of August
2008. …
The major differentiation between IBM and Accenture was cost. IBM prices were generally less expensive.

Funding Limits $153M remains as the pool of “central” funds that is available to fund the remainder
of the systems development and roll out … Known in-house expenditure for which a central funding
allocation is required is outlined below:
$153M
SPO and SDA structures (for 3 years) $12.8M
Infrastructure provisioning $13.7M
CITEC service fees $6.0M
Accommodation and other $18.8M
Contingency $30.6M $81.9M
Available for Prime Contractor payment $71.1M
[citations omitted]
5.153 There then follows an analysis of “IBM deliverables that can be funded from available funding sources”771.
5.154 No such analysis was undertaken with respect to Accenture’s bid.
5.155 The content of Appendix D strongly suggests that IBM’s offer found particular favour with the Evaluation
Panel because the proposed price fell within the remaining budgeted funds for the SS Initiative. Accenture’s
price was about $90M more than IBM’s and would, to be accepted, have required Cabinet approval for
a substantial increase in the funds available for the Initiative. Logica’s price, for fnancial solutions only,
exceeded the amount available to CorpTech to complete the whole program.
execution of Contract
5.156 IBM was the successful tenderer and on 5 December 2007 it and the State of Queensland executed a contract
for the provision of Shared Services to nominated departments
772. The replacement of QH Payroll remained a
priority. It was to be the frst system delivered. 31 July 2008 was fxed by the contract for that goal
773.
770 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at pages 27-28.
771 Exhibit 4, Volume 22, Item 19, at pages 28-29.
772 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at pages 1-188.
773 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 231.

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6. procurement: Conclusions
6.1 The requirement to make an inquiry into the implementation of the QH Payroll System, with particular respect
to the adequacy and integrity of the procurement of the System, necessarily involved an investigation of
the process (and circumstances surrounding it) by which IBM was chosen to become the Prime Contractor to
design, build and install the payroll system. The submissions made on behalf of IBM contain a slight criticism
that the focus of the evidence in this aspect of the Inquiry was upon IBM and not the other tenderers. One can
understand that IBM and its employees should have found the scrutiny uncomfortable and, perhaps, wished
others to share the experience. The criticism misunderstands the charge committed to the Commission. It was to
inquire into
IBM’s implementation of the system, and the adequacy and integrity of the State’s procurement of
IBM which meant that the interaction between it and the State’s offcers was the proper focus of attention.
6.2 The frst point for comment is the actual decision to appoint a Prime Contractor to take over responsibility
for the implementation of the SS Initiative. It is an appropriate starting point for a discussion of the events
which ultimately led to the failure of the payroll system. Without the decision to change the model of
delivery there would not have been a Prime Contractor, and no procurement process.
6.3 I have already noted the obscure provenance of the decision to move to a Prime Contractor, and the
absence of evidence that the decision followed any discussion or analysis of the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of replacing CorpTech by a Prime Contractor.
The haste with which the appointment was made is as remarkable as the lack of
consideration preceding the decision to appoint the Prime Contractor.
6.4 The decision to appoint a Prime Contractor to take over and coordinate the SS Initiative may not have been
a bad one. No doubt powerful arguments in support of it could have been made. Accenture had promoted
the idea in the years prior to 2007. Whether that approach was to be adopted should have been the result of
careful discussion and analysis.
6.5 There were contrary views. Mr Goddard’s was that a Prime Contractor would not in the end provide a lower
price than CorpTech’s own implementation, but would increase the risk to government in losing control of its
own program
774. Mr Uhlmann had a similar view. He said775:
You could have brought someone in to … to bring all the project disciplines into play, get all the right people
with the right sort of expertise supporting around the PMO … get that applied to your current partners and
then drive that and hold them accountable … . If … the prime contractor’s role is … to replace all of that … I
would not have support (sic) that … [because] … it’s about who can best accelerate the packages of work …
and … whoever has got the background knowledge and the skills and expertise on the ground, you want to
leverage that … you would not get rid of that sort of knowledge and background expertise … .
6.6 Such evidence as there is suggests that Mr Burns thought of the idea some time after he concluded his May
review and communicated the idea orally to Mr Bradley. He made no written recommendation, and there is
no evidence of any analysis or consideration of the merits of the notion committed to paper. The decision
to change models of delivery was made prior to 25 July 2007 when the RFP was sent out. Approval for the
substantial change in model was not sought until 16 August 2007. The memorandum seeking approval
did not present a case for the change and did not accurately describe CorpTech’s proposal contained
in Mr Burns’ 25 July email, which sought offers to take on the Prime Contractor role. It did not seek
contributions to a debate whether a Prime Contractor should be appointed.
6.7 It was not inevitable that the appointment of a Prime Contractor would fail to deliver what CorpTech
hoped from it. History has shown that the decision to transfer responsibility for the SS Initiative to a
private enterprise contractor was unsuccessful, but there were several reasons for that. Had there been a
mature discussion about the proposal, those directing the State’s decisions might have gained a realisation
that a Prime Contractor was not a panacea for the ills of the SS Initiative and that the work of the Prime
Contractor required oversight. That realisation, acted upon, might have changed the course of events.
774 Exhibit 27, para 50; T7-105, L33-51 (Keith Goddard).
775 T6-27, L48-56 to T6-28, L1-10 (Gary Uhlmann).

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6.8 What is clear, and should have been obvious at the time, is that the appointment of a Prime Contractor did
not absolve the State from its responsibilities for insisting that the Prime Contractor deliver what the contract
required and for ensuring that the SS Initiative was implemented effectively and within the contract price.
That is to say the State could not, having appointed a Prime Contractor, sit back and await the delivery of
a complete and completely functional SS Initiative. It had to monitor the performance of the contract and
intervene, as the contract permitted, where appropriate. As Part 2 of the Report reveals, it did not do so.
It is signifcant that a year later, in October 2008, IBM proposed a price for the
completion of the SS Initiative which was close to Accenture’s and almost twice what it
had offered in the ITO.
6.9 The haste with which the appointment was made is as remarkable as the lack of consideration preceding
the decision to appoint the Prime Contractor. If one looks over the series of reviews which commenced with
the Keliher Report in March 2007, one sees anxiety about the progress and cost of the SS Initiative turning
to alarm which then overcame rational decision making. The issue of the RFP before the CEO Governing
Board had authorised the appointment of a Prime Contractor is the clearest example. The terms of the RFP
itself indicate haste and a disregard for detail. It is extraordinary that such a succinct communication should
have been thought a suffcient basis for procuring a multi-million dollar contract. There is no doubt that was
Ms Perrott’s and Mr Bradley’s intention. The ITO itself was so condensed in time as to make it all but inevitable
that important questions of detail and principle would be overlooked or compromised.
6.10 The likely explanation lies in human psychology. I expect that Mr Burns’ proposal that CorpTech’s problems
be transferred to a Prime Contractor who would assume all responsibility for the delivery of the SS Initiative
for the amount of the remaining budget was accepted with relief. Mr Burns appeared competent,
experienced and knowledgeable. Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley accepted his suggestion and avoided looking
to see whether it contained blemishes. From their point of view CorpTech’s problems became the Prime
Contractor’s, and Mr Burns was not to be hindered in the transmission of responsibility. It is diffcult to see
what else can explain Ms Perrott’s rejection of Mr Bond’s complaints and her neglect in inquiring into the
discrepancy in price, next to be discussed.
6.11 The evidence establishes that Mr Burns entertained a distinct partiality for IBM and, indeed, displayed
a bias in its favour from the time he was appointed to conduct the May review. It was evident until the
making of the contract between IBM and the State of Queensland on 5 December 2007. The bias is shown
in his early conversations with Mr Bloomfeld, his encouragement to IBM, his “coaching”, and providing it
with information he did not give to Logica, Accenture and SAP. It is most evident in his intervention in the
ITO evaluation at a time when the Panels thought Accenture’s bid superior.
6.12 The obvious question is: what was Mr Burns’ motive? He of course denied any partiality or misbehaviour
so his testimony shed no light on the topic. It would be naïve not to consider the motive was self-interest
of some kind. There is no evidence that IBM induced Mr Burns’ partiality, or provided any consideration for
it. The investigative powers of a State Commission of Inquiry are necessarily limited, but within the limit of
those powers and the extent to which their use was justifed by the evidence, the Inquiry found nothing to
suggest any form of corruption.
6.13 That being plainly said, as it should be, it would be equally naïve not to consider that Mr Bloomfeld, and his
colleagues at IBM, knew that Mr Burns was behaving extraordinarily for a man charged with the responsibility
of investigating a very substantial government IT program and guiding the procurement process for a
contractor to take it over. Mr Bloomfeld’s emails to his superiors indicate that he understood that a valuable
business opportunity was being offered to IBM which it should do its utmost to exploit. He cannot have
thought the same favouritism was extended to his competitors.
6.14 It is likely, as I say, that Mr Burns hoped in some way for a personal beneft from his generosity to IBM. He
certainly looked for advancement from the State and used his appointments to obtain it. It may be that,
having secured that advantage, he had no further need to ingratiate himself with IBM.
6.15 The question of motive fnds no answer in the information available to the Commission.
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6.16 Mr Burns’ bias should have precluded him from taking any part at all in the procurement processes defned
by the RFP and the ITO. Had his role been limited, as it was meant to be, to administrator and facilitator
of the evaluation process, his bias may not have had much consequence. As it was, Ms Perrrott’s neglect
of her responsibilities and in particular her obligation personally to oversee the evaluation process, and
Mr Bradley’s empowerment of Mr Burns, gave him a free hand to influence the selection of the Prime
Contractor. Although Ms Perrott nominally led the process, Mr Burns was its
de facto leader. His capacity
to influence events was increased by the haste and unnecessary sense of urgency which overlay the
procurement and the blurred lines of responsibility under which Mr Burns was allowed to operate.
6.17 His intervention in the evaluation has been described at length. It was grossly improper. It is disappointing
that of all the senior public servants who observed it, only Mr Bond took up the matter with the Executive
Director of CorpTech, and extraordinary that Ms Perrott should not investigate it thoroughly. That
intervention and the changed scoring flawed the process and tended to distort the result.
6.18 That failure is the fault of the State and its offcers and is not something for which IBM can be criticised.
6.19 There must, however, be a question over the price advanced by IBM. The evidence is not suffcient to give a
defnite answer but there is substantial suspicion that the price was fxed, not by reference to IBM’s genuine
assessment of what the implementation would cost, but by reference to the money remaining to Mr Bradley
for the SS Initiative, and Mr Burns’ understanding that Mr Bradley would react unfavourably to a price much
in excess of that budget.
6.20 The price offered by IBM was probably the critical factor in its selection as Prime Contractor. Mr Burns’ success
in having the evaluations rescored, while signifcant and unseemly, may not itself have been suffcient to move
the balance in IBM’s favour. The fnal scores remained close and both IBM’s and Accenture’s proposals were
assessed as satisfactory. What made the difference was IBM’s substantially lower price. It is apparent from
Appendix D to the fnal Evaluation Report that the price differential overwhelmed other considerations.
6.21 The evidence rehearsed shows that the State should have been deeply sceptical that IBM’s price was
genuine and that the SS Initiative could be delivered for that price. Its price was about half Accenture’s and
substantially lower than Logica’s which bid for part only of the Initiative. The price was also substantially
lower than its own price bid for the RFP and the prices proposed by three of its competitors in that process.
6.22 IBM’s explanations for the reduction were unconvincing. To the extent that explanations were advanced
which may have validity, no witness from IBM affrmatively ascribed the reduction to them. Mr Bloomfeld
and Ms Freeman differed in their accounts of what caused the drop in price and Mr Bloomfeld vacillated
between explanations.
Indeed the whole ITO process was marked by extreme haste and a sense of urgency which
was unnecessary and led to most unfortunate results.
6.23 It is signifcant that a year later, in October 2008, IBM proposed a price for the completion of the
SS Initiative which was close to Accenture’s and almost twice what it had offered in the ITO. IBM witnesses
explained this phenomenon by saying that, in the intervening year, agencies and departments had
increased their requirements so that the implementation would have been of a larger and more complex
solution. That was a frequent refrain, and appears self-serving, though to ascertain defnitively the extent to
which a rise in price was justifed by the government’s demands for a more elaborate solution would require
substantial further investigation without promise of certainty in results, and for no suffcient purpose.
6.24 The evidence supports the conclusion that IBM’s price should have been the subject of full and careful
scrutiny by Ms Perrott and the Cost Evaluation Panel with particular reference to the discrepancy between
it and its earlier price, and between it and competitors’ prices. There was no such scrutiny. Ms Orange was
unaware of the discrepancy and no one bothered to tell her of it. Ms Perrott, who was aware of it, failed to
understand its signifcance, or disregarded it.

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6.25 The evidence gives rise to a suspicion that IBM offered a price to win the tender which did not genuinely express its
estimation of the true costs involved. I cannot make a defnitive fnding to that effect but the evidence suggests
that is a distinct possibility. What is clear is that the discrepancy should have been investigated by CorpTech.
6.26 Both Ms Perrott and Mr Bradley had been warned by Mr Salouk that the SS Initiative could not be
implemented for the money remaining in the State’s budget for it. They might legitimately have thought
that Mr Salouk and Accenture had a self-interest in promoting the notion that a larger sum would have to
be paid to the successful tenderer. Nevertheless there was corroboration for Mr Salouk’s assertion in the
prices advanced (except for IBM’s ITO bid). CorpTech’s own experience with the SS Initiative was that it had
proved more diffcult, had taken longer, and had cost more than budgeted for. Mr Salouk’s assertion was
not therefore on its face implausible. The corroboration offered by the other prices should have led them to
wonder whether IBM’s bid was realistic.
6.27 Mr Burns’ intervention in the ITO evaluation requires another comment. Improper as it was, it would not
have led to IBM becoming the highest ranked bidder had the Evaluation Panel leaders acted in accordance
with their own logic. IBM’s proposed use of Workbrain, though offering accelerated roll out and reduced
cost, was risky because it was untried. That was the view of the Panel members. Mr Burns urged the
rewarding of innovation and his argument was accepted but with the qualifcation that the reference sites
had to provide proof that the proposal worked in practice. That proof was not forthcoming. Logically, then,
the situation should have reverted to the original. There should have been a third appraisal resulting in the
reinstatement of the Accenture bid as the better one because it was less risky. But rationality and sense
gave way to haste and muddle, and the State committed itself to an untried solution.
It is equally impossible to know what the result of appointing a Prime Contractor other than
IBM would have been. The only fnding possible is that IBM should not have been appointed.
6.28 Indeed the whole ITO process was marked by extreme haste and a sense of urgency which was unnecessary
and led to most unfortunate results. I have described some aspects of confusion caused by the haste.
6.29 It has been urged on IBM’s behalf that there is nothing of itself unusual in scores and assessments
changing during an evaluation. The point must be conceded. The process was one of continuing evaluation
made by reference to additional information being provided by all bidders in response to questions posed
by CorpTech and expansions and clarifcations given with respect to their bids. Mr Burns’ involvement
on the occasion described fell outside this pattern. He told the Panel leaders, in effect, that they were to
change their scores and their approach to the two bids. The Panel members had at the time the additional
information and clarifcations that had been provided. It was up to them to assess as they thought best.
Instead they were importuned to take a particular view.
6.30 It is clear from the confusing and contradictory alterations in the scoring and the commentaries that
whatever it was that led to the change was not a process of rational assessment of additional information.
6.31 Mr Bloomfeld (and some of his colleagues at IBM) disregarded IBM’s ethical Guidelines and the obligation not to
use the State’s confdential information. Mr Sullivan, with Mr Bloomfeld’s knowledge if not his encouragement,
sought access to Accenture’s and Logica’s RFP responses and expressed regret that they were “a few days late”.
Ms Jensen, or someone close to her, had access to the confdential RFP responses in CorpTech’s database and
sought to exploit it for IBM’s beneft. This conduct shows such disregard for the responsibilities of a tenderer, and
a readiness to take advantage of the State’s lapse in security, as to make it untrustworthy. IBM’s disqualifcation
from the ITO would have been an appropriate course for CorpTech to take. There can be no criticism of
CorpTech’s offcials on this count. IBM’s misbehaviour was obviously kept hidden.
6.32 Much the same comments apply in relation to Mr Bloomfeld’s use of Mr Porter’s email.
6.33 By his own admission Mr Bloomfeld’s use of that email was improper. He should, he admitted, have told
Ms Perrott about it. IBM’s own Guidelines prohibited his use of it. He did use it and as far as the evidence
goes none of his IBM colleagues expressed the slightest concern for the disregard of their own ethical rules.

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6.34 With the beneft of hindsight, and relying upon information revealed in the course of the Inquiry, some of
which was not known to CorpTech, it is clear that IBM should not have been appointed Prime Contractor.
There are three reasons for the conclusion. The frst is the ethical transgressions of its employees arising
out of the use of Accenture’s information, the dissemination of CorpTech’s information and the attempt to
read its competitors’ proposals. As discussed such conduct constitutes substantial grounds for excluding
IBM from the ITO in response to which IBM had no satisfactory answer. The second is that its price was not
subjected to the careful scrutiny necessary to satisfy CorpTech that accepting the price would give it the
solution it required. The third is that Mr Burns’ intervention in the evaluation process distorted and seriously
flawed the selection of the Prime Contractor.
6.35 Something must be said about Mr Atzeni. His misdemeanours are minor in the scheme of things but
cannot avoid criticism. Mr Atzeni’s close working relationship with Mr Cameron, while itself innocuous,
ought to have been disclosed and ought to have made him question whether it was appropriate for him
to participate in the evaluation. More signifcantly he should have realised that his personal preference for
IBM over Accenture disqualifed him on the basis that he would be unlikely to assess the bids impartially
and objectively. Mr Atzeni’s bias in favour of IBM had its origin in his honestly held belief that Accenture
had not performed well in rolling out the Department of Housing solution. Evidence before the Commission
would certainly support the reasonableness of that opinion. Mr Atzeni, however, had no basis for thinking
that IBM would inevitably do better. His role as evaluator was to assess the proposals objectively, without
preconception, and Mr Atzeni came to the task believing that Accenture would not perform well.
6.36 Mr Atzeni’s lack of judgment would have made no difference to the selection of IBM as Prime Contractor.
6.37 It is impossible to know what would have happened had IBM been excluded from the ITO. Accenture may
have been appointed by default, or the process may have been recommenced with invitations being extended
to SAP and Logica, perhaps for part only of the implementation. Alternatively the prices submitted by
Accenture and Logica being greatly in excess of the available budget may have persuaded the government to
give up the idea of appointing a Prime Contractor.
6.38 It is equally impossible to know what the result of appointing a Prime Contractor other than IBM would
have been. The only fnding possible is that IBM should not have been appointed.

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2. Contract and
Project Management
1. Introduction
1.1 The Terms of Reference relevant to this part of the Inquiry are those that direct me to inquire why and to
what extent the price for the Queensland Health Payroll system increased; inquire as to the adequacy of
the contract, project management, governance and implementation processes; and identify any laws or
contractual provisions that were breached and who might be accountable. Each of these topics was pursued
in the oral examinations, which in turn were informed by statements of those (and some additional) witnesses
and some 15 volumes of documents which had been identifed by the Commission (the Bundle). Most of those
documents were obtained by the Commission pursuant to requests made under the
Commissions of Inquiry
Act.
In addition, documents were tendered as exhibits and others added to the Bundle.
1.2 Twenty nine witnesses gave statements and were examined over some 15 hearing days1. Statements of a further
six witnesses were tendered
2. Three of the witnesses were experts: Mr John Gray, a solicitor with experience in
negotiating and drafting agreements of the kind that existed between the State and IBM; Dr David Manfeld,
who had qualifcations and experience in designing and implementing large and complex information technology
systems; and Mr Shane Parkinson, a software tester. Mr Gray and Dr Manfeld were retained as experts by the
Commission. Mr Parkinson was engaged by IBM. His report was not provided to the Commission until after
the conclusion of the hearings allocated to this issue. His report was not, therefore, made available to Mr Brett
Cowan (the witness upon whose evidence that report had the most direct bearing) before his oral evidence was
given. The very late delivery of Mr Parkinson’s report and of statements of IBM employees Mr Mark Dymock and
Mr Kwiatkowski necessitated the resumption of public hearings on 18 June 2013 and for Mr Cowan to be recalled.
1.3 Experts aside, the witnesses can be divided into fve categories: those from CorpTech who had dealings with
IBM and were involved in the system implementation; those from QH who had some responsibility for the
system which was to be delivered or for the scoping of the work to be undertaken; six witnesses who were
current or former IBM employees; the Directors-General of the Health and Public Works Departments; and
those with technical knowledge of the system and the problems which it evidenced in the implementation,
being Mr Cowan, the testing professional who conducted the User Acceptance Testing (UAT) on the system
and Ms Jane Stewart, who was responsible for the support and maintenance of the system immediately
after Go Live to the time she gave evidence.
1 Hearings took place on 22 to 24 April, 29 April to 3 May, 6 to 7 May, 13 to 16 May and 18 June 2013.
2 Exhibits 64, 65, 66, 67, 120 and 121.

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1.4 The “Queensland Health Payroll system” is, in the context of the contract, the computer system and
associated services to be delivered under what was known as Statement of Work 8 (SOW 8). That system
(the system) was (initially at least) an interim measure. It was referred to in evidence also as the “Interim
Solution” and the “Project”. I too adopt these terms below.
1.5 The reasons why the price increased and the inadequacies in the project management processes are largely
the same. For that reason, I have found it convenient to deal with them together. I have not identifed any
laws or contractual provisions that were breached. As will appear below, the parties, fully informed and each
capable of protecting their own interests, agreed to such variations to the contract as were necessary to
authorise or ratify the departures from the contract which occurred. The process by which they did so was
through documents known as “Contract Change Documents” and “Change Requests”. I refer to them simply
as “Changes”. The problems with the Project come down, in large part, to multiple failures by multiple
people to discharge their responsibilities properly.
1.6 In particular, the problems might be summarised as follows:
a. the scoping of the system (ie its defnition) was seriously defcient and remained highly unstable for the
duration of the Project. That being so, and although the problem was frmly known to each party, no
effective measures were taken to rectify the problem or to reset the Project;
b. the State, who would ultimately bear the risk of a dysfunctional payroll system, gave up several
important opportunities to restore the Project to a stable footing and to ensure that the system of which
it would ultimately take delivery was functional. Dr Manfeld characterised the approach of both parties
as being “Plan A or die”;
c. the decision to Go Live miscarried, both because it ought to have been obvious to those with
responsibility for making that decision that the system would not be functional and because the
decision to Go Live involved no proper and measured assessment of the true risks involved in doing so;
d. the system, when it went live, failed to function in a way in which any payroll system, even one which
was interim and to have minimal functionality only, ought to have done.
1.7 Each of these problems was caused to a signifcant degree by the situation of real or perceived urgency
in which the State had placed itself by having left the decision to replace LATTICE until that system was
showing signs of failure.
1.8 The story of the Project’s conception through to its implementation is one of bad decisions: a failure
of State employees in particular properly and diligently to discharge their responsibilities; IBM as a
commercially motivated vendor doing little to rectify or make up for the State’s shortcomings; the State
lacking in discipline in expending very large amounts of taxpayers’ funds; and, in general, an almost total
reluctance by both parties to face what had become obvious at a relatively early stage of the Project, that
the system which the State had commissioned and which IBM was to deliver would be seriously defcient
and not operate as any payroll system ought, namely to pay staff on time and to do so accurately. That, for
both parties, ought to have caused them to take measures to avoid the inevitability of a seriously flawed
system. The implementation of it brings discredit to them both: the State for its imprudent and uncontrolled
expenditure of taxpayer funds and its failure to ensure public servants were paid and paid accurately; and
IBM because it is in part responsible for a system which, on any measure (whether it be cost, customer
management or simply its having implemented a system for a large customer which did not operate as it
ought), was a failure.
1.9 Dr Manfeld characterised these problems as a “death spiral”3. In doing so, he said that one does not need
the beneft of hindsight to have known that the Project was in distress. He summarised the problems as
being an ITO process which was unrealistic in timeframe, a lack of any proactive State response to the clear
and obvious diffculty of establishing an agreed baseline scope, an abbreviated testing phase through which
the system was allowed to progress despite clear signs of failure and a decision to Go Live with a not-ready
system which lacked an objective risk assessment
4.
1.10 Before considering these issues in more detail, I make some introductory remarks.
3 Exhibit 123, at page 9, L30.
4 Exhibit 123.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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The problems with the Project come down, in large part, to multiple failures by multiple
people to discharge their responsibilities properly.
2. overview
Urgency and Scoping
2.1 IBM’s ITO response had offered to provide the State with a system which would replace, on a like for like
basis, the LATTICE payroll system then operating in QH. That solution was to be undertaken in priority to
others under the Program, and to be of an “interim” nature only. The Interim Solution was to have minimal
functionality
5. The reason for the system having these two limitations was that there was a risk LATTICE
would fail: a replacement for LATTICE was needed quickly. The risk of failure was considered so imminent
that there was no time to design and build a full replacement. The trade-off for doing so was that there
be an Interim Solution with less than full functionality, but which could, because of these economies, be
implemented more quickly than a full replacement.

2.2 The contract required IBM, after having completed the Interim Solution, to undertake some roll outs in
other agencies, and later to return to QH to complete what was described only as the “remainder” of the
work on that particular system
6.
It was not spelled out in the contract just what was the dividing line between an Interim Solution with
2.3

minimal functionality and a more complete one. There were, nevertheless, mechanisms under the contract
for that to be ascertained as part of the early scoping of the system which was to be undertaken, including
by IBM identifying, in conjunction with QH, that agency’s “critical requirements”
7.
2.4 The occasion for an Interim Solution was a consequence of the State having, by the time the procurement
process was initiated, permitted the LATTICE system to reach a state of real or perceived atrophy. It
ought to have been replaced earlier. As will be seen, the unsatisfactory state of LATTICE became the
overwhelming factor in deciding to Go Live, a situation which the State had brought about by failing
to make arrangements earlier for its replacement or for the more certain and reliable support and
maintenance of it.
2.5 Were it not for the real or perceived declining state of LATTICE, there would have been no need for the
solution to have been an interim one, and no occasion to have chosen QH, perhaps the most complex State
agency, as the one into which IBM was frst to deliver a system under the contract. It would have been
preferable, putting the condition of LATTICE to one side, for IBM to have frst delivered systems in simpler
and smaller agencies than QH as a way of easing both IBM and the State into the diffcult undertaking
upon which they were embarking. To do so would have given both parties an opportunity, without
the complexity and pressure which attended the roll out of a solution (of any kind) within QH, to have
experienced and dealt with problems and unexpected issues which inevitably arise and to do so in a calmer
and far less diffcult environment.
2.6 From the outset, the circumstances of urgency infected the Interim Solution. The time within which IBM
was to scope the project was in the order of one month. It had, in Statement of Work 7 (SOW 7), some two
weeks within which to do so (although IBM seems to have made a start on the work before the contract was
signed)
8. That period was extended by a further two weeks under Statement of Work 8A (SOW 8A)9.
2.7 The situation of urgency was not solely the State’s doing. IBM bid a more aggressive timeframe than
Accenture for the QH system, something which the State embraced given its view of the need for LATTICE
to be replaced as soon as possible.
5 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 2.
6 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 133.
7 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 99.
8 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 96-108.
9 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 1-5.

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2.8 Scoping the Interim Solution posed special challenges. It was necessary to decide what part of the system
would not be implemented at this stage, and be deferred until the “remainder” stage, what was meant
by “minimal functionality” and what were QH’s “critical Agency requirements”. SOW 7 said “[IBM] in
conjunction with the SDA [Solution Design Authority] will determine the critical Agency requirements”
10.
2.9 The Solution Design Authority (SDA) was a body of which Mr Burns was the head at this early stage11. Mr James
Brown later replaced him in this position
12. The SDA had the function of defning and maintaining solution
scope, architecture and design for the Program under each Statement of Work
13. It failed, as will be seen,
almost entirely in its role because scope was, at least from the State’s point of view, never properly defned.
2.10 It was essential, given the short time available, and the fact that the system was to be one which paid
staff in an accurate and automated way, that careful attention be given to ascertaining what requirements
QH needed the system to satisfy, albeit recognising that it was not to be the fnal system and had to be
implemented in about nine months.
2.11 Having allowed such a short time within which to scope the Interim Solution, the parties owed it to each
other, and to themselves, diligently to attend to their respective tasks (as allocated in SOW 7): the State to
communicate so many of QH’s business requirements, and IBM to ensure that, relying upon its experience
and expertise, such requirements as were communicated appeared to be suffcient to result in a system
which was reasonably likely to pay staff, and to do so accurately. IBM, in its submissions, contends that it
was dependent upon the State, as the end user of the system, in gathering requirements during the scoping
process
14. That, however, while perhaps an accurate statement of what actually occurred, puts IBM’s
obligations too narrowly. IBM was to ascertain critical Agency requirements in
conjunction with the SDA,
suggesting a more equal responsibility in scoping. Moreover, IBM brought to that activity the experience of
having scoped large projects in the past, something which its submissions ignore.
Were it not for the real or perceived declining state of LATTICE, there would have been no
need for the solution to have been an interim one, and no occasion to have chosen QH,
perhaps the most complex State agency, as the one into which IBM was frst to deliver a
system under the contract.
2.12 IBM’s response to the ITO made clear its understanding of the importance of accurately and promptly
defning scope. In its 11 October 2007 clarifcation IBM answered the question “what do (IBM) see (as) the
key risks in rolling out the interim Health HR solution by September 2008 … ? Will the interim solution and
Queensland Health agree a Scope of Work that will be achievable in the timeframe available?” in these
terms
15:
IBM has had previous and positive discussions with Queensland Health regarding the additional
functionality that must be deployed … to reach the level of minimum functionality required to operate.
Initial scope confrmation activities will confrm if the required level of functionality is achievable in the
timeframe … . Scope will require careful and rigorous management. It is important that Queensland
Health works closely with the interim project team to manage expectations around scope.
Scoping could have been performed more thoroughly. A good (perhaps the best) method of ascertaining
the scope of the system required to deliver accurate and timely pays was to observe what the operators of
the LATTICE system actually did each fortnight. That would have meant IBM personnel “sitting down with
a payroll clerk at the computer … seeing how they actually did their job”
16. Both Mr Hickey 17 and Mr Prebble
18 accepted this would have been “a step in a full requirement of scoping”. It was not done apparently
because it would have taken “an enormous amount of time” and the time allowed for scoping was “tight”
and “compressed”. Mr Hickey “assumed that (QH) … would have had that information”
19.
10 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 99.
11 Exhibit 65, para 12.
12 Exhibit 75A, para 5.
13 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 108; Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 242.
14 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 57(d).
15 Exhibit 4, Volume 15, para 783.
16 T26-78, L51-53 (Paul Hickey).
17 T26-78, L50-L53 to T26-79, L1-L8 (Paul Hickey).
18 T27-35, L8-30 (Christopher Prebble).
19 T26-79, L1-4 (Paul Hickey).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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2.13 There was less than adequate fulflment of the State’s scoping responsibilities in particular. QH was passive,
perhaps lazy, in the identifcation and communication of its business requirements, with the result that
it did not communicate to IBM all the requirements necessary to produce a functional (albeit minimal
and interim) payroll system. IBM, despite making genuine attempts to elicit QH’s business requirements,
was under pressure to commence designing and building the system. It knew, sometime after the scoping
exercise was fnished, that aspects of it were incomplete or not settled. It learned later (if it did not know
before) that the system would not, without considerable changes to it, pay staff and pay them correctly.
2.14 Despite this, and instead of the State insisting that these matters be resolved before proceeding, and
checking to see that the scope IBM had produced was complete and satisfactory to deliver a functioning
payroll system, the State accepted IBM’s scope documents, incomplete, qualifed and unsatisfactory as
they were, the effect of which was to commit itself to a Project doomed, if not reset and corrected, to
failure. IBM knew at that stage that the scope of the Project would need to be changed and extended: it
contemplated as much in SOW 8, which was the defnition (at the most general level) of the system.
2.15 It was in IBM’s short-term commercial interest to behave in this way. It was working under almost
impossible time constraints, and it had told the State that formal variations to scope might be required.
The State accepted those arrangements.
2.16 With the scope of the Project in this wholly unsatisfactory state, the parties embarked on the roll out.
QH was passive, perhaps lazy, in the identifcation and communication of its business
requirements, with the result that it did not communicate to IBM all the requirements
necessary to produce a functional (albeit minimal and interim) payroll system.
Governance and Major players
2.17 A governance structure was put in place. The principal bodies for this purpose included the SDA which, as I
have said, had responsibility for, among other things, defning and maintaining solution scope, architecture
and design. It later merged with the Strategic Program Offce (SPO) to become the Program Delivery Offce
(PDO) within CorpTech
20.
2.18 The Queensland Health Enterprise Solution Transition (QHEST) was the information technology program
management offce within QH created to manage a number of projects within QH, including the
Queensland Health Implementation of Continuity (QHIC) project (another name, it would seem, for the
Interim Solution). Mr Hey was the Program Director until April 2008 when the QHEST Management Team
was replaced and Mr Anthony (Tony) Price was appointed Director
21. The primary function of QHEST, as the
QH project management offce, was to report on the Project to the Project Board
22.
2.19 An Executive Steering Committee (ESC) (or Group) existed from the outset. Its responsibilities included
approving solution strategy, schedule and changes and managing key issues and risks
23. The Government
members of it were the Executive Director of CorpTech (Ms Perrott and later Ms Margaret Berenyi),
representatives from QH, the Shared Service Agency and, initially at least, a representative from the
Department of Education, Training and the Arts (DETA). Mr James Brown was advisor to that Board, and
it was common for there to be invited guests, being, in effect, managers in areas of Government with an
interest in the decisions under consideration. There were occasions when the ESC met with Government
members only
24. IBM, too, had representatives on the ESC25. They included, later in the Project, Mr Doak,
IBM’s program manager.
2.20 Another body which made critical decisions was the Release Steering Committee. It was accountable to
the ESC and the Executive Director of CorpTech. The Release Steering Committee was responsible for
providing advice to the Release Steering Committee Chair on the business, resource and change readiness
20 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 19 and 41.
21 Exhibit 18, para 26; Exhibit 29, paras 8-9; Exhibit 58, paras 4-8; Exhibit 83, paras 8-9; see Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 296-1 – 296-32.
22 Exhibit 89, paras 32-33.
23 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at pages 98-99.
24 See for example, Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at pages 12, 168; Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 98, 126, 156; Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 8, 53; Exhibit 63, Volume 11, at page 228.
25 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 286; Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 37; Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 263; Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 14, 324.

Contract
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for the Interim Solution. This included reviewing and approving project deliverables by IBM26. The Release
Steering Committee made decisions on the project exiting UAT and its compliance with Go/No Go gates.
The QH members of the Committee met separately on occasion. As at 10 December 2008, the QH members
of it included Mr Peter Douglas, Mr Price, Mr Russ Wilde, Mr Burns, Ms Brigid Bourke, Mr Paul Monaghan,
Ms Janette Jones, Mr Adrian Shea, Ms Sylvia Chapman, Ms Amanda Doughty, Mr Kalimnios and Mr Hood
27.
The QHIC Release Steering Committee also met regularly as a whole. As at 23 December 2008, it comprised
the members of the QH Release Steering Committee, together with Mr Doak and Mr Hickey from IBM, and
Mr James Brown and Mr John Beeston from CorpTech
28.
2.21 The governance structure was far from clear. There were very many bodies and very many people
involved in decision-making about the Project. The Auditor-General observed that some alterations to the
governance structures which had been approved by the ESC on 19 June 2008
29:
… were complicated and … ineffective in establishing a shared understanding of stakeholder
expectations in relation to the quality of project deliverables.
2.22 On 1 July 2008, CorpTech was transferred from Queensland Treasury to the Department of Public Works.
The effect of this change was to make the Minister for Public Works (Mr Robert Schwarten) and the
Director-General of that Department (Mr Grierson) ultimately responsible for the Program and the Project.
2.23 In August 2008, the QH Audit and Operational Review Unit reviewed the governance of the Project and
concluded
30:
Signifcant improvement to project governance, project planning and monitoring, project reporting,
organisation change management and project communication is required to ensure that the QHIC Project
delivers its expected outcomes and scope by October
2008.
2.24 The governance structure was again revised in June 200931. A “Project Board” was established at the
peak of that structure; it had met for the frst time on 2 April 2009
32. It was chaired by Mr Kalimnios, QH’s
Deputy Director-General of Corporate Services. Mr Shea, Executive Director of Corporate Services, was the
Deputy Chair. Other members included Mr Doak and Mr Gower of IBM, Ms Berenyi as Executive Director of
CorpTech, Mr James Brown and later Mr Ray Brown, the Chief Information Offcer of QH
33.
2.25 Beneath that body was the Project Directorate. Its responsibilities included overseeing the management
of the Program and IBM’s performance and delivery under the contract
34. The Project Directorate was
initially chaired by Mr Burns as the Program Delivery Director (PDD)
35, but Mr Price and Mr James Brown,
for most of the relevant time, held that position. The PDD reported to the Executive Director of the
Corporate Services Reform Offce, initially, Ms Perrott. Other members of the Project Directorate were staff
of CorpTech (including Ms Doughty, Mr Pierre Pienaar, Ms Stewart, Mr Malcolm Campbell, Mr Hood), of QH
(including Mr Price, Ms Jones and Ms Naomi du Plessis), and of IBM (including Mr Hickey, then Mr Gower,
Mr Doak and Mr Dymock). It became a responsibility of the Project Directorate to recommend to the
Project Board whether to Go Live.
2.26 The Auditor-General noted a lack of evidence about many features of governance bodies, including
documented and approved terms of reference and found as follows
36:
[I]t was not clear which Accountable Offcer had responsibility for the overall governance and successful
completion of the whole project.
2.27 The Auditor-General’s conclusions about the lack of clarity in the governance structure and in the
understanding of those who were involved in it are ones at which I too have arrived. There seemed to
have been an unhealthy willingness to establish bureaucratic bodies to govern the Project, and to have
meetings, but at the expense of people turning their minds independently and in a disciplined way to the
responsibilities each of them had. Dr Manfeld, who has considerable experience and qualifcations in this
26 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 59, 60.
27 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 280-283.
28 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 334-335.
29 Exhibit 2, at page 18.
30 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 296-2.
31 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 104; Exhibit 2, at page 19.
32 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 1-4.
33 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 104.
34 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 97.
35 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 2.
36 Exhibit 2, at page 20.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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feld, expressed the view, which I would adopt, that37:
There was plenty of active oversight of the program. However, successful governance is not just about
having processes, but about how governance processes and tools are used to get the result.

2.28 Those processes and tools were, it will be seen below, used poorly.
Implementation of the project
2.29 Within about six months from its start, problems with the Project’s scoping emerged. A dispute arose about
how the system was to integrate with the existing (legacy) fnance system within QH. IBM claimed it had

been delayed in its work. The State decided that further workshops were needed (to be facilitated by IBM)
to ascertain what ought to be done and paid IBM $1.88M as a result of the delay which IBM claimed. It was
the frst in a large number of very costly variations to the contract.
2.30 Numerous other variations to the contract followed. Many of the Changes effecting those variations
offered as their basis that business requirements had been “missed”. No adequate inquiry appears to have
been conducted as to the cause of that having occurred. The State, having been less than diligent in its
participation in the scoping exercise, seemed content to agree to these variations and to pay IBM to make
them. That there were missed requirements is evidence of defciencies in the scoping exercise.
2.31 Variations to the contract continued up until the system went live. They number in the order of 220. Some
were proposed by IBM, some by the State. It is not always of signifcance which party initiated each change.
In some cases, Changes were the culmination of negotiation or discussion, such as Change 184 which the
parties had agreed well before that variation had been initiated, in a formal sense, by the State.
2.32 The detail of all the Changes could not be pursued in evidence, and nor would it have been productive to do
so. In each case, the parties willingly agreed them. The relevance of them to the Terms of Reference is the
effect they had on price, on the time it took for the system to be completed and delivered, and what they
reveal about the adequacy of the scoping of the system and whether the system was likely to function as a
payroll system ought when it went live.
2.33 The system cost, in terms of payments to IBM alone, over four times more than the contract price. It took
three times longer to deliver than originally scheduled. When it went live it was seriously defcient, causing
very many QH staff not to be paid, or to be paid inaccurately. Neither party could have been under any
misunderstanding that this was the inevitable result. It was obvious well before Go Live that the Project had
been inadequately scoped. Testing (especially UAT) revealed thousands of defects, a large percentage of
which concerned functional aspects of the system. A competent and experienced tester (Mr Cowan) did
precisely what his role called for in advising the customer (as the party deciding whether to accept the system)
of these very major problems. Despite these warnings (ones which Dr Manfeld said were the clearest sign he
had seen of a system in distress) the State decided to Go Live
38.

2.34 That decision miscarried. It was in no sense a measured assessment of the risks involved in doing so. The
prevailing view was that LATTICE was at imminent risk of failure and that there was a real possibility, perhaps

a likelihood, that it would fail to pay any staff at all, and that if it failed it might be irrecoverable. That
view, unsupported by any assessment which I would consider to be suffciently measured and analytical,
overwhelmed other important considerations such as the inevitability, as Mr Cowan had warned, that the
system would experience considerable functional diffculties.
2.35 Had the parties simply adhered to the controls which they had in place at the commencement of the Project, the
system would never have progressed to the point at which serious compromises had to be made to Go Live. The
system had reached that stage only because of conscious decisions made by the parties to “lower the bar” as
Dr Manfeld said
39 by changing the criteria by which it would be permitted to proceed to the next stage and by
decisions to downgrade the Severity of defects which had been identifed. Being aware of the major functional
issues, and having removed them as a basis for preventing the system progressing towards Go Live, the parties
prepared a “Solution and Defect Management Plan” (Defect Management Plan). This plan proposed to deal with
such defects as were then known by, among other mechanisms, what was known as a “workaround”, namely a
manual intervention, or by simply deferring the fxing of the problem until after Go Live. This was folly, but it was
37 Exhibit 123, at page 8, L33-37.
38 T30-51, L34-39 (Dr David Manfeld).
39 Exhibit 123, at page 10, L28-30.

Contract
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made worse by the fact that, on no view could the parties have thought that all the major functional defects had
been identifed. Mr Cowan had made absolutely clear that it was likely that further major defects existed, which
it was not the role or function of the type of testing he was conducting to discover
40.
2.36 It was always inevitable, therefore, that without the Project being reset, these decisions would lead to a
system which was seriously functionally defcient. Despite that, no real practical alternative was put in place.
Although CorpTech had, very sensibly, resourced itself to maintain LATTICE, that option was either considered
not feasible or was not suffciently investigated. There appears to have been inadequate consideration given
to the option of upgrading the LATTICE system or coming to some arrangement with its vendor (Talent2) to
maintain support until some other alternative could be found.
The system cost, in terms of payments to IBM alone, over four times more than the contract
price. It took three times longer to deliver than originally scheduled. When it went live it was
seriously defcient, causing very many QH staff not to be paid, or to be paid inaccurately.
Neither party could have been under any misunderstanding that this was the inevitable result.
2.37 The Project is a story of many woeful failures by many people on many occasions. From the outset it was flawed.
There was never any serious attempt to rectify these flaws and the problems it produced were compounded by a
series of decisions which ensured that the system would be costly, late and seriously functionally defcient. Despite
these issues, which were obvious, there were few dissenting voices and no senior manager who took any suffcient
steps to put the Project on a proper footing.

2.38 It remains to say something by way of introduction about the cost of the system and the time it took to
implement it.
Cost and time
2.39 The contract price for the system was $6,194,932.9841. It increased ultimately by a factor of more than four:

to $25.7M. Within the wider program, there were increases also. As I indicated above when discussing the
issue of price in the “Procurement” component of this report, by 31 October 2008, estimates which IBM had
provided under SOW 4 “Go Forward”, when combined with the amounts the State had paid or committed
to pay to IBM, suggested that the cost to the State of completing the Program would be in the order of
$181M. This was almost double the price which IBM had estimated in its ITO response and, perhaps not
entirely accidentally, as I have shown above, about the same as Accenture had put forward in its response.
2.40 Just as the price increased sharply, so too did the time within which the Project was to be delivered. IBM
originally stated the interim LATTICE Replacement solution would be in place by 31 July 2008 (Go Live
date)
42. SOW 8 initially indicated the Interim Solution would be deployed by late September 200843. A
revised schedule was proposed and accepted by the QHIC Steering Committee on 3 June 2008, which
altered the Go Live date to 18 November 2008 and this was recorded in Change 60
44. IBM supplied a Notice
of Delay to CorpTech on 8 August 2008, indicating the Go Live date would not be achieved until March or
April 2009
45. IBM’s “Proposal for the delivery of the QHIC project”, under cover of their letter to CorpTech
dated 23 February 2009, proposed Go Live date of 29 June 2009
46. Change 129 stated the parties had
been working together to achieve a Go Live date no later than 30 June 2009
47. Change 184 then noted
the parties were working together to deliver a Go Live date of 6 November 2009
48. Change 200 deferred
the Go Live date to 20 November 2009
49. Change 201 altered the schedule to 24 November 2009 as the
commencement of Go Live, with completion of business cutover at 4 December 2009 and the acceptance of
the replacement solution at 14 January 2010
50. Change 202 then noted the parties were working towards a
40 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 306.
41 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-26. For discussion of contract price, see Exhibit 78, paras 10.38-10.48.
42 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 231.
43 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 17, 35.
44 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 92.
45 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 231. The current Go Live date recorded in this letter was 17 November 2008.
46 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 151.
47 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 23.
48 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 129.
49 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at page 146.
50 Exhibit 63, Volume 11, at pages 132, 133.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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revised Go Live date of 22 March 201051. After those nine changes, the Project Board approved Business Go
Live on 14 March 2010
52 with the frst pay day of 24 March 201053.

2.41
2.42
There are two main reasons why the price increased to the extent it did. They are related.
First, the system was unsatisfactorily scoped: the State was less than diligent in advising its business

requirements to IBM and negligent in accepting the highly qualifed, incomplete and uncertain scope
that IBM presented. This produced the need for a series of expansions and changes to scope, but most of
which ought to have been included from the outset if the system were to be one which paid staff and did
so accurately. The State agreed to these changes in scope, and to pay IBM in respect of them. The parties’
attempt to resolve once and for all the uncertainties and extent of the scope in mid-2009 cost the State
$9M and yet was unsuccessful in achieving its objective. There was never, at any time before Go Live, an
effective resolution between the parties of this problem.
2.43 IBM submitted that it is unrealistic to think that it could have brought about a Project reset in response
to the unstable scope
54. IBM did make an attempt to have scope locked down, by urging the State to stop
making changes to it. But to do so was pointless without there having been any assessment (which it seems
there never was) whether, even if the scope were locked down, the system would function as a payroll
system ought.
2.44 Second, it became clear in the course of the implementation that the system, as scoped, would not result
in its being a functional system. Once the State realised this (something which ought always to have been
clear) it dealt with functional defects in an ad hoc manner (ie as they evidenced themselves). The State
paid IBM to perform work which was directed to see that the system would be functional, something which
the original Project scope ought to have included. IBM submitted that a software developer does not know
what correct pay is other than by reference to business requirements as provided to it by the customer. It
said that IBM’s contractual obligation here was to build the solution according to the business requirements
which had been supplied to it by the State
55. These submissions, however, understate IBM’s role and
responsibilities. IBM was more than a software developer. It was a prime contractor, and one which had
held itself out in its ITO response as having experience with systems of this kind. It was both designing and
building the system. These factors show IBM to have had an obligation to be more than merely a passive
recipient of the customer’s instructions.
the Management processes
Both parties ignored all the warning signs of a project in serious distress. Rather than reset
the Project or take decisive steps to put it on a stable course, they altered or lowered the
thresholds which had been put in place to protect against the very thing which eventuated: a
system of poor quality which was not ready to Go Live.
2.45 The Terms of Reference directed me also to the adequacy of contract, governance, implementation and
project management processes. They were seriously inadequate.
2.46 The system was inadequately scoped and neither party took any effective measures to stabilise it. Both
parties ignored all the warning signs of a project in serious distress. Rather than reset the Project or take
decisive steps to put it on a stable course, they altered or lowered the thresholds which had been put in
place to protect against the very thing which eventuated: a system of poor quality which was not ready to
Go Live. Doing so meant that the system, when it went live, would not be functional and constituted a clear
breach of the most fundamental principles of project management. Poor decisions were made, Dr Manfeld
said, under the intense pressure of the time imperative
56. I would agree, and add only that the pressure of
time was something which the parties had imposed upon themselves, and it was therefore something which
it was within the control of the State, in particular, to deal with, including, as I have said, by investigating
51 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at page 73.
52 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 67.
53 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 209.
54 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 85.
55 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 79(f).
56 Exhibit 123, at page 12, L38.

Contract
99
alternatives to upgrade LATTICE or maintain its support while hard decisions were made about the system
then still under construction.
2.47 The Project was, from the outset, one which was conducted in an atmosphere of urgency, and which, in
large part, had been of the State’s creation in its failure at some earlier time to commence gathering its
business requirements, making any necessary changes to its internal processes and deciding what measures
it would take to either upgrade or replace the LATTICE system. When the Project was commenced, the
timeframes within which the various stages of it were to be undertaken were hopelessly short, including for
scoping. The Project was managed, contrary to the requirements of well-established project management
methodology, by undertaking a number of tasks at the same time (including different forms of testing).
There was a lack of rigour in this approach. It meant that the Project was not required to pass various
checkpoints before proceeding. Where checkpoints did exist, their purpose was circumvented by changing
the criteria required to meet them or by their being ignored altogether.
2.48 The State had several opportunities to take action to either remove itself from the Project or to redress
the defciencies and restore it to a course which would have resulted in a functioning payroll system. It
surrendered those opportunities.
2.49 The resulting system performed precisely as all the cogent warnings had suggested: slowly and unreliably.
3. the Contract
3.1 IBM and the State entered into a contract on 5 December 2007 for the appointment of IBM as prime contractor
for “the Shared Services Solutions Program for the Queensland Government”
57. It was signed by Mr Bradley, the
Under-Treasurer, on behalf of the State and by Mr Peter Munro as authorised representative for IBM
58.
3.2 The contract was a “GITC” Version 5 Agreement. The Government Information Technology Conditions
(GITC) arrangement was one initiated in about 1991 to provide standard contractual terms and conditions
for use in the acquisition of information and communication technology products and/or services. They
are, in effect, terms and conditions drafted in consultation with the industry, the variations to which are
commonly pre-agreed between a potential supplier and the State. IBM had agreed with the State a deed of
variation to the standard GITC conditions (dated 28 July 2005) which applied to orders placed by the State
with it in the future including for the system
59.
3.3 The contract itself comprised these standard terms (as varied) and some additional “General Terms”
drafted by Mallesons Stephen Jaques Lawyers (now King & Wood Mallesons). They contained, in addition to
what were described as “guiding behaviour principles”
60, miscellaneous provisions which included terms of
particular concern or application to the parties, including about Workbrain
61 and the acceptance procedure
for deliverables under the contract
62.
3.4 The contract comprised also a series of schedules which were referred to and incorporated by clause 4.1 of
the General Terms.
3.5 Mr Gray, a solicitor and partner of HWL Ebsworth with some experience in negotiation, drafting and advising
on information technology contracts, was asked by the Commission to consider whether the contractual
arrangements were adequate, whether the scope of work was suffciently identifed and defned in the
contract and whether the contract was typical for large IT design implementation programs
63. His view
was that the contract, although typical of public sector IT contracts, lacked an emphasis on the State’s
required outcomes
64. “[D]iligent attention by the State” was required, given the nature of the contract, to the
governance and contract management of the Project
65. This was indeed its effect. IBM was both the prime
contractor and project manager.
57 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 1.
58 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 42.
59 Exhibit 63, Volume 3, at pages 1-9.
60 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, Clause 2, at pages 30-34.
61 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, Clause 5.3, at page 37.
62 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, Clause 6, at page 40.
63 Exhibit 78, Annexure 1.
64 Exhibit 78, para 6.2(a).
65 Exhibit 78, para 6.5(a).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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But it was the State, ultimately, whose responsibility it was to ensure its staff were paid and paid accurately,
and the State which faced what risk there was of LATTICE failing. For these reasons if no other, the State had
the responsibility diligently to ensure that IBM adhered to its obligations under the contract and to ensure that
the system which was to be delivered was likely to be functional.
3.6 The services to be provided by IBM were defned in the Schedule 1 “General Order”. It defned the “services”
to be provided as “ICT contracting Services as specifed in each SOW contained in the [attached] DVD … ”
66.
In accordance with Schedule 17, that defnition said, each SOS may become a SOW
67.
3.7 The term “service” in the contract’s standard terms (clause 1) was defned to mean the information
communication technology service to be provided by the contractor (IBM) to the Customer (the State)
under the Customer contract
68. There seems nowhere to have been an express statement that IBM was to
deliver the services
69, however that is a term which would be necessarily implied in order to give business
effcacy to the contract.
3.8 The DVD to which reference has been made contains six Statements of Work (SOW) and three Statements
of Scope (SOS). The SOWs which for present purposes are relevant are:
a. SOW 4 “Forward Planning”, under which IBM was to, among other things, review and achieve standardised
business processes for the HR [Human Resources], Fi [Finance] and OSF [Other SAP Functionality] solutions
through sector engagement, to “baseline” the defnition and scope of the standard offer and to fx the price
of the delivery for all future work streams for the Program
70;
b. SOW 5 was for the “Priority Core HR & Finance and Development”. This SOW was for the core build for the
HR and fnance solutions which was directed, in large part it would seem, to the overall program rather than
specifcally to the Project
71; and
c. SOW 7 “LATTICE Replacement Interim Solution Scoping and Planning”. This is the SOW under which the
Interim Solution was to be scoped (later extended by SOW 8A)
72.
3.9 The three SOSs which were annexed to the contract at the time it was signed were:
a.
Statement of Scope 1 – This concerned only the Interim Solution and was superseded by SOW 873;
b.
Statement of Scope 2 – “Phase 1 – Priority Implementations” which included a roll out of a Human Resources
system in the DETA and the remainder of the work on QH’s HR system
74;
c.
Statement of Scope 3 – “Phase 2 Implementations” which provided for the remaining Queensland
government agencies
75.

3.10 The SOSs created, in themselves, no binding obligation. The express expectation, however, was that they
would be converted as the Program progressed into SOWs.

4. Scoping
What was Required
4.1 IBM was, under SOW 7, to determine the scope for the Interim Solution. It was to do so by 24 December
2007
76. But it could not have done so alone. It required the State, at the very least, to make known
its business requirements, being the detail of what the system was required to do. It also required QH
to cooperate in agreeing what were, in the context of the system being an interim one, its “critical
requirements”, and in doing so to keep them to a minimum.
4.2 SOW 7 said, as I noted above, IBM, in conjunction with the SDA, was to agree the “critical Agency requirements”77.
66 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at pages 45-46.
67 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 46.
68 Exhibit 63, Volume 1, at page 201.
69 Exhibit 78, para 9.17.
70 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 41.
71 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 62.
72 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 96-108.
73 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 228-252.
74 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 253-283.
75 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 284-311.
76 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at pages 107-108.
77 Exhibit 6, Volume 2, at page 99.

Contract
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These arrangements necessitated IBM and the State agreeing what the scope was to
include. … the State was left with the need to agree these matters with IBM, something
which, if it ever did, it did more by default and neglect than with considered thought.
4.3 The time within which scoping was to occur was extended by two weeks, by SOW 8A, to 18 January 2008,
as was the amount payable to IBM for doing so. SOW 8A was introduced into the contract on 21 January
2008 by Change 2
78. IBM was paid a total of $910,355 under SOW 7 and SOW 8A79.
4.4 The “deliverable”, under SOW 7 and 8A was SOW 8, the scope for the “Replacement, LATTICE Design,
Implement and Deploy” (that being the Interim Solution)
80.
4.5 SOW 8 was produced on 18 January 200881. It was incorporated into the contract by Change 5, which was
signed by IBM on 18 January 2008 and by the State (Ms Perrott) on 22 January 2008
82. Ms Perrott had
by then taken over the role of Executive Director of CorpTech, so it fell to her to manage the project and
contractual relationship with IBM and to authorise any contract variations.
4.6 SOW 8 also contained a list of assumptions. Dr Manfeld explained that it is by doing so that contractors
customarily convey the limits of the work they are to undertake and the bases upon which their
commitment to fulfl the work has been based
83. IBM’s assumptions included84:
Our [IBM’s] defnition of scope and the RICEF [Reports, Interfaces, Conversions, Enhancements, Forms]
estimates are accepted.
Queensland Health can provide the required internal resources as required and detailed in our [IBM’s]
high level project plan.
Queensland Health can provide the required skills and experience sets as detailed in our [IBM’s] high
level project plan.
That
PJ30 is the contingency in the event of a substantive failure of this project to deliver within the
timeframes defned by this SOW(
8).
4.7 PJ30 was the State’s plan to maintain LATTICE in the event that the Interim Solution either failed or was
not completed by 30 June 2008. It included drawing upon specialists within CorpTech (supervised by
Mr Hood) who had knowledge of LATTICE and who could and did, to a basic level at least, maintain it
85.
4.8 Mr Gray expressed opinions about the risks which arose from the contract with respect to the solution
scope, which he identifed as the attributes of the work product to be delivered by IBM under the contract.
He expressed the view that the extent to which the solution scope was set out in the contract was “very
limited”
86. The correctness of that view is evident from the fact that much of what SOS 1 said about scope
had been extracted from IBM’s ITO response, something which SOS 1 made no attempt to conceal
87. Apart
from the broad and general statements which SOS 1 contained, there was no description of the scope of
the Interim Solution. The shortcomings in the Contract are not ones which are properly attributed to the
lawyers who drafted it, but to the State’s overwhelming desire to implement the SSP with urgency.
4.9 Such scoping as there was to be for the Interim Solution was to be undertaken under SOW 7. The State had
an opportunity to decide whether to accept that scope. SOW 7 provided, relevantly
88:
Scope Requirements
In determining the scope for the interim solution, the contractor in conjunction with the SDA will determine the
critical Agency requirements for Queensland Health for interim solution. The Agency-specifc requirements
will be kept to an absolute minimum for the LATTICE Replacement interim solution enough to satisfy the basic
functions of paying, rostering and managing their human resources.
78 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 7-9.
79 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 107; Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 4.
80 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 2.
81 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 15-40.
82 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 14.
83 T30-71, L3-10 (Dr David Manfeld); T30-61, L30-41 (Dr David Manfeld).
84 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 39-40.
85 Exhibit 66, paras 21-32.
86 Exhibit 78, para 10.7.
87 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 231; Exhibit 78, para 10.10.
88 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 99.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
102
The LATTICE Replacement interim solution that the contractor has proposed should be viewed as part of
the WoG implementation program and for Queensland Health part of a phased implementation of the
fnal solution. The contractor will prioritise activities to ensure that this key piece of work executed will be
leveraged and will not be duplicated unless necessary. Using this approach the contractor will ensure
that the work delivered is a sub-set of what is required for WoG rollout to Queensland Health in later
releases wherever possible and practical.
4.10 These arrangements necessitated IBM and the State agreeing what the scope was to include. Mr Gray
considered that it would have been preferable either for the State to have retained a “casting vote” (or for the
SDA’s preferences on scope disputes to prevail) or for the minimum solution scope to have been defned
89.
Instead, the State was left with the need to agree these matters with IBM, something which, if it ever did, it
did more by default and neglect than with considered thought.
4.11 SOW 8, Mr Gray noted, defned scope less specifcally than SOS 1, something he considered both unusual and
concerning
90. I did not fnd SOW 8 to be an informative document on communicating the scope of the system.
It seemed to me to be a document which did little more than repeat the earlier more general statements
which had been made by IBM in its ITO response. SOS 1 contained IBM’s proposal (again repeated from IBM’s
ITO) that the “existing Queensland Health LATTICE HR/Payroll system [be] replaced by a solution based on
the SSS DOH Solution” and that it be completed and the Interim Solution be in place by the end of July 2008
(based on an assumption the Project could commence about the frst week in November 2007)
91. The use of
the system deployed in the DOH (Department of Housing) was one which IBM proposed to “leverage” as a
“well understood and manageable baseline to build the [interim] solution upon”
92.
The decision to use the Housing solution as a basis for the Interim Solution was just one
of a number of poor decisions motivated by a perceived need to rush the delivery of a
replacement for the LATTICE system.
4.12 The Department of Housing system contributed little if anything to the Interim Solution, something which
ought to have been obvious to both parties. Housing was not an agency which had rostering
93. It did not
use Workbrain
94. That Department was a much smaller agency than QH and one whose arrangements and
affairs, on any view, were far less complex. No part of the Department of Housing solution had involved
using Workbrain as an awards interpreter, something IBM had promoted as not only an innovative feature
of the Interim Solution, but also one which, as I have mentioned, caused the Evaluation Panel to prefer
IBM’s bid over that of Accenture.
4.13 Mr Kwiatkowski from IBM, who gave evidence at the end of the public hearings, sought to explain the changes in
scope which occurred and the increases in price which accompanied those changes by saying that a basic code
review or quality check would have identifed that the Department of Housing solution was seriously defcient
95.
He did not know of IBM having undertaken any such basic review before agreeing to use it as the starting point
for the Interim Solution
96. But nothing so elaborate was necessary to know that the Housing solution offered
little if any assistance given the radically different, less complex and much simpler environment for which it
had been designed and in which it had been implemented. I do not accept IBM’s submission on this point that,
from a SAP perspective, the Housing and QH systems were not signifcantly different: that “payroll is payroll”
97.
This seems to have been offered by IBM as a reason why it was not imprudent for IBM to have relied upon the
Housing solution in the way it did. On any view, the awards within QH were far more complex: Housing had
only a very few applicable awards (“calc groups” was the language used); but QH had some 221 such groups
98.
Moreover, to look at the two systems from a SAP perspective ignores the fact that the QH system was also to
have Workbrain as a major component of it.
89 Exhibit 78, para 10.27.
90 Exhibit 78, para 10.35(b).
91 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 231.
92 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 233.
93 T28-3, L9-10 (Natalie MacDonald); T27-6, L6-8 (Christopher Prebble); T36-11, L31-32 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
94 T27-6, L11-12 (Christopher Prebble); T28-3, L12-13, (Natalie MacDonald); T36-11, L34 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
95 Exhibit 164, paras 50-51.
96 T36-11, L25 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
97 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 46.
98 T26-66, L5-7 (Paul Hickey); Exhibit 103, at Annexure 66.

Contract
103
4.14 Although I found much of what Mr Atzeni said to be unreliable his opinion on the differences between QH
and Department of Housing payrolls was persuasive. He said
99 “Housing and Health (were) very different
agencies in terms of scale … complexity of awards … rostering requirements and different softwares …
“. As well as that, he pointed out that Workbrain had never previously been implemented (as an awards
interpreter) and the integration with Workbrain and SAP had been identifed by IBM as “innovative”
100. The
awards interpretation “had to be rebuilt (from Department of Housing) so that Workbrain had precedence
… and SAP picked out the tabs on the … payroll … “. Another point of difference was that there had been
signifcant flaws in the Department of Housing payroll implementation and any similar flaw “would be
exponentially greater” in QH in terms of their consequences
101.
4.15 IBM’s submission oversimplifes the assessment which was to be made between the Housing and QH
systems. Such differences as there were between the two systems, IBM submitted, were already defned
by CorpTech in technical specifcations that CorpTech had produced
102. Even if that were so, it is diffcult to
see what material beneft the Housing solution might have provided given the differences I have identifed,
and the need to apply such specifcations (untested as they must have been) as CorpTech had fashioned.
In any event, what IBM now submits is at odds with its confdent assertion in SOS 1, quoted above, that the
Housing solution was a well understood and manageable baseline upon which to build the Interim Solution.
IBM lacked both a good understanding of the Housing solution and its (limited) utility as a baseline for the
Interim Solution.
4.16 Mr Gray noted that SOS 1 had recorded an assumption by IBM that the Housing solution included the
functionality expected to deliver the “minimum [Queensland Health] Requirements”, but that nothing in
the contract shows that to have been checked or validated
103. IBM never seems properly to have checked or
validated it, something which, as I have said, required little effort to achieve. IBM’s submissions confrmed
that its approach had been to depend upon the customer (as end user) to communicate its requirements
104,
for it to “document” scope and obtain the State’s acceptance of that articulation of it
105.
4.17 Leaving aside these factors which rendered the Housing solution of little, if any, assistance in designing and
building the Interim Solution, the parties recognised the need to rectify problems which had been identifed
in that system. Part of the exercise which IBM was to undertake pursuant to SOW 7 was to address
issues which it had identifed in the HR/Payroll solution which had been implemented in the Department
of Housing. IBM was to re-engineer that solution to resolve a number of issues and plan a number of
rectifcations in the scope of the Interim Solution
106.
4.18 The decision to use the Housing solution as a basis for the Interim Solution was just one of a number of
poor decisions motivated by a perceived need to rush the delivery of a replacement for the LATTICE system.
4.19 The scoping exercise also included IBM producing a scope defnition document which was more detailed
than SOW 8. On 24 December 2007, IBM provided to the SDA the “QHIC Project Scope Defnition-Version
0.12” (QHIC Scope Defnition)
107. But SOW 8 notes that, as at 8 January 2008, IBM had not received
comment from the customer regarding it and that SOW 8 had been based on that version of the QHIC
Scope Defnition
108.
4.20 A meeting took place on 17 January 2008 attended by representatives of IBM, QH, QHEST and the SDA109.
As a result, version 1 of the QHIC Scope Defnition was produced
110. That version of the document was
accepted with minor revision by the State on or about 25 February 2008
111. IBM, however, qualifed its
position with respect to it. SOW 8 contained this rider
112:
99 T31-50, L1-50 (Damon Atzeni).
100 T31-50, L1-5 (Damon Atzeni).
101 T31-50, L19-22 (Damon Atzeni).
102 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 45.
103 Exhibit 78, paras 10.12-10.13.
104 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 57(d).
105 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 33(b), 33(c).
106 Exhibit 63, Volume 2, at page 100-102.
107 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 17.
108 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 17.
109 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 16, 64.
110 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 63-203.
111 Exhibit 72 (it is not clear from the signature who made the acceptance on behalf of the State.) IBM submits it was accepted by Mr David Ekert, Chair of the SDA, as the signature on
the document reflects the signature of Mr Ekert’s statement (Exhibit 26): see Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 18.
112 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 16.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
104
1.2 Open Issues
It was agreed at the “QHIC Scope Defnition” deliverable review meeting held on the 17th of January, 2008
that a number of open issues remained unresolved as this point of time and that when resolved may result
in a change to the scope of the work required under this SOW (
8) and that this, at the discretion of the
Contractor, may necessitate a change to this SOW (
8) under the agreed change control process.
4.21 The reference to “open issues” was to a list of “issues” in section 5 of the QHIC Scope Defnition113. Those
issues included that of “concurrent employment” being something in respect of which it was said the
“[f]unctionality in the SO [Standard Offer] is still under review for WoG requirements …”
114. Of fnance
integration, it was said
115:
A number of FAMMIS Finance related issues have been raised with the QHIC Project Team and there
has not been suffcient time available to evaluate the impact of this request. At this point, the Finance
Integration scope remains as described by this document.
4.22 IBM, both through the parts of SOW 8 to which I have referred and in the QHIC Scope Defnition itself,
made clear to the State that it had reserved its position to insist upon changes to the Project scope
occurring by way of formal variations to the contract and, it could be safely inferred, upon being paid more
to effect those scope changes.
4.23 The scoping activities were, as I have said, to be achieved within an impossible timeframe. For them to have
had any chance of succeeding, it was necessary for the State actively to involve itself and, in particular, by
communicating to IBM QH’s business requirements and checking the scope which IBM produced to see,
with IBM’s assistance as an experienced contractor, that the defned scope was likely to result in the delivery
of a payroll system which was functional.
Mr Atzeni
4.24 Mr Atzeni, as “Human Resources Business Integration Manager”, had responsibility for identifying QH’s
business requirements and ensuring that its interests were protected in identifying what it was that the
Interim Solution would deliver in a functional sense. He was empowered to assemble the required teams
and to make decisions about functional requirements
116. Mr Atzeni had also been involved in the evaluation
of the ITO responses, so was no stranger to the kinds of business requirements which a contractor might
need to know.
4.25 Mr Atzeni, in his oral evidence, agreed that too little time was allowed for the scoping exercise117. Despite
this, he made no complaint at the time about the timeframes being too demanding
118. The tight timeframe
was exacerbated by the fact that scoping for the whole-of-government roll out was being conducted at the
same time as for the Interim Solution, meaning that both IBM and the State were required to focus on more
than one large and diffcult undertaking at the same time
119.
4.26 Mr Atzeni accepted knowing at the time that QH had to provide responses to requests for information and
provide cooperation quickly and that a failure to do so would compromise the timely delivery of those things
which the contract required
120. Despite this, neither Mr Atzeni nor anyone else ensured in writing that those
people attending the workshops had a proper understanding of what it was they ought to seek to achieve
at them
121. The participants, it seems, had not done much more than ascertain that the Interim Solution
ought to be functional
122.
4.27 IBM, on the other hand, had very clear ideas as to the functional requirements being minimal and
expressed that view to the workshop participants
123. This was a source of friction between the IBM
participants on the one hand and the State participants on the other
124.
113 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 83-85.
114 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 83.
115 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 84.
116 Exhibit 122, paras 2, 4.
117 T31-69, L30-39 (Damon Atzeni).
118 T31-69, L41-44 (Damon Atzeni).
119 T31-70, L44-50 (Damon Atzeni).
120 T31-70, L31-39 (Damon Atzeni).
121 T31-71, L36-49 (Damon Atzeni).
122 T31-71, L41-49 (Damon Atzeni).
123 T31-72, L9-17 (Damon Atzeni).
124 T31-72, L19-20 (Damon Atzeni).

Contract
105
4.28 Mr Atzeni did express the view in an email at the time that he did not have “much confdence that [the IBM
representatives] understand the needs and risks of QH”
125. It was his role, however, to ensure that they did126.
He had responsibility to see that IBM had an adequate understanding of the needs and risks of QH, or, at
the very least, to correct any erroneous view which IBM held in that regard
127.
4.29 It became apparent in the oral examination of Mr Atzeni that he had been provided with documents by IBM in
early January 2008 which made clear the basis upon which IBM was scoping the Interim Solution, and inviting
feedback from QH
128. Mr Atzeni, in his statement129, was less than candid in revealing his involvement in these
matters, including materially, as to the knowledge he had of certain documents being in IBM’s possession and
upon which it relied in scoping the Project
130.
4.30 Mr Atzeni was sent, for example, the Business Attributes Document (referred to in evidence as the “BAD”).
The BAD was considered to be a baseline of QH’s confgurations requirements
131. He knew that IBM would
rely on it, and did nothing to advise IBM that it should not do so
132. He did not ensure that all the relevant
information to be used in awards interpretation was identifed to IBM, and when there were later changes
(ones which ought to have been communicated earlier) he complained that he was sick of paying IBM for
the changes, but in circumstances in which, he agreed, only one Change (No 113) had done so
133.
… it was necessary for the State actively to involve itself and, in particular, by
communicating to IBM QH’s business requirements and checking the scope which IBM
produced to see, with IBM’s assistance as an experienced contractor, that the defned scope
was likely to result in the delivery of a payroll system which was functional.
4.31 Mr Atzeni was not the only representative of the State who had responsibility for ensuring that business
requirements were communicated fully and accurately to IBM. He did have, however, as his own statement
made clear, a role of facilitating communication between IBM and the subject matter experts to defne
specifc agency requirements. He was also the point of contact for IBM to organise meetings and workshops
with the necessary subject matter experts to defne the interim solution scope and specifc business
requirements
134. Although sole responsibility may not rest with Mr Atzeni for the scoping inadequacies, the
roles he occupied and with which he was entrusted, leave him with very signifcant responsibility for those
shortcomings.
4.32 I have been brief in my treatment of these matters, because Mr Atzeni accepted the facts I have set out
above in his oral examination. Mr Atzeni was negligent in discharging his responsibilities of ensuring the
business requirements of QH had been communicated to IBM such as would result in a functional payroll
system, and to correct any material erroneous view which IBM held about those matters. This was a serious
shortcoming, and one which was a major – perhaps the most major – material contribution to increased cost
of the system to the State, and to the problems concerning scope which plagued the system until it went live.
4.33 The very different understandings which the parties had of the scope, the extent it remained between them
the subject of dispute, and the costliness to the State of its position are demonstrated in particular by two
series of Changes to the contract. Both were explored in oral evidence.
Human Resources/Finance Integration

4.34 The frst series of Changes is that which concerned “HR Fi Integration”, being the means by which the new
(Human Resources) solution would interact and work with the existing (or “legacy”) (fnance) system.

125 Exhibit 122, Annexure B.
126 T31-73, L8 (Damon Atzeni).
127 T31-73, L10-30 (Damon Atzeni).
128 T31-77, L13-28 (Damon Atzeni); Exhibit 133.
129 Exhibit 122.
130 And, as IBM submits, Mr Atzeni conceded in his oral evidence that his statement was wrong in signifcant respects: see submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June
2013 (Contract), para 34.
131 T31-54, L1-11 (Damon Atzeni); T31-89, L5-7 (Damon Atzeni).
132 T31-89, L13-16 (Damon Atzeni).
133 T31-92, L11-48 (Damon Atzeni); Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at pages 95-107.
134 Exhibit 122, para 2.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
106
4.35 SOW 8 allocated “accountability” for the detailed design of the “Integration (Legacy & Other)” to the IBM
Solution Architect, with QHEST to “advise” and for the “Build” of the “Integration – Legacy” to the QHEST
Test Manager, with IBM to “advise”
135. The QHIC Scope Defnition maintained those accountabilities
for detailed design (with QH now added as being to “advise”). For Build, Integration – Legacy, the
accountabilities remained the same as in SOW 8
136.
4.36 The QHIC scope defnition dealt specifcally with this, both in the manner set out above and as follows137:
The following approach has been used to scope the integration components required to deliver the
interim solution:

Given the complexity with the MAN Series applications, their interrelationships with multiple other
applications in the HR and Finance landscape and the signifcant QH business and change impacts that
would be associated with a removal in the required project timeframes, replacement of the MAN Series
applications is not in scope for the QHIC Project. Where integration with a MAN Series application is in
scope, a custom integration component will be specifed and developed. These interfaces are specifed
in Section 6.5.2 below. These custom developments will be specifed and delivered based on existing
interface detail supplied by QHEST (e.g Internal FTE Payroll Extract). QH will be responsible for the
identifcation, development, testing, implementation and training of all changes required to the FAMMIS,
DSS and the MAN Series applications as a result of the implementation of modifed or introduced
integration components required to implement the interim solution.
4.37 This passage does not, on its face, make entirely clear whether and to what extent the State would be
responsible for building or instituting (ie doing other than identifying, developing, testing, implementing
and training) that part of the system.
4.38 There were other documents that, like the QHIC Scope Defnition, were deliverables under SOW 8138. They too
contained descriptions of the system which was to be delivered. Although not perhaps directly contradictory
with the QHIC Scope Defnition, those other documents did nothing to clarify whose responsibility it was to
make sure the new HR solution integrated properly and functionally with the fnance system.
4.39 The Project Execution Plan (also a Project deliverable139), despite allocating accountabilities in the same way
as SOW 8 and the QHIC Scope Defnition
140, stated that the Interim Solution would141:
[I]ntegrate the Interim HR/Payroll solution with key existing Queensland Health enterprise architecture:
FAMMIS (fnancial management).
4.40 A later version of what appears to be the same plan, under the heading “Solution Scope”, states that the
Interim Solution will
142:
… migrate the data required to operate the solution
• based on the Workbrain application suite deliver:
• an integrated rostering solution
• an integrated awards interpretation “engine”
• an integrated Leave management solution
Integrate the interim HR/Payroll solution with key existing Queensland Health enterprise architecture:
• FAMMIS (Financial Management)
• DSS (Decision Support system)
• Others as specified in the QHIC Project Scope Definition …
4.41 This issue produced several changes to the scope of the Project. In mid-2008, the State paid IBM $1.88M
for a “schedule delay” arising from what the Change Request document seems at pains to make clear were
“customer based issues”, said to have affected IBM’s ability to deliver to the original schedule and causing a
6.5 week delay in the Go Live. These matters were the subject of Change 60
143.
135 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 23-24.
136 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 77.
137 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 128.
138 See for example, Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 26.
139 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 26; Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-13.
140 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 214-215.
141 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 219.
142 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 180-181.
143 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 88-95.

Contract
107
4.42 Change 61144 effected an amendment to SOW 8, but one which is said to reflect “the agreed scope for the
implementation of this revised approach”. The changes proposed (if they be changes)
145 included, most
materially, IBM “facilitat[ing] HR<–>Finance integration workshops”, preparing minutes of those workshops
and building SAP HR/Payroll components including technical specifcations
146.

4.43 QH took responsibility for attendance at those workshops and designing, building and unit testing of legacy
development. The Change Request document also stated
147:

The currently proposed solution is acceptable to Queensland Health who bears the risk associated with
this change from the original solution, and that approval to proceed will be provided by
11/ 7/2008.
4.44 It seems unlikely that, even if such workshops took place and minutes were generated, that much more
was done. HR/Finance integration remained, for some twelve months afterwards, if not a subject of debate
between the State and IBM (something which Mr Doak accepted
148), a matter which had come to no
satisfactory ending, such that each party would know with clarity what were their respective obligations
and how the integration would be effected. IBM submitted, and I agree, that it is “remarkable” that issues
about requirements relating to integration were continuing to affect sign-off of design documents as late
as February 2009, especially in circumstances in which the original SOW 8 Go Live date was September
2008
149. It was, in fact, wholly unacceptable that the Project was in this state of uncertainty on so
fundamental a matter so late into its implementation.

4.45 The issue remained unresolved. Soon after Change 61, and on 8 August 2008, IBM advised the State that
“HR fnance design continues to be debated which is preventing completion of application development”
150.
Integration was one of the issues with which the later Change 184
151 sought to deal. That Change was
4.46

executed on 30 June 2009152. One of its expressed functions was to “clarify” the project scope by the
“QHIC Scope Clarifcation” which was annexed to it
153. It included within the scope of the integration,
Staff Movements and End of Month Accruals (including casual employee requirements)
154. Functional
and technical designs were to be provided for these. But the Scope Clarifcation expressly excluded other
matters, including Nurses PDE (concurrent employment)
155. The State paid IBM $9M in connection with
this Change
156. It is impossible to know, even from the negotiations which preceded it, what portion of that
amount might have been attributable to the clarifcation of the integration issue. The Change seems to
have been the result of commercial negotiations and not any rigorous or detailed analysis by either party
of the extent to which previously defned obligations were being departed from. The mere fact that the
negotiations were conducted on such a basis shows just how uncertain as between the parties the scope
of the Project had become and the necessity of resolving the dispute. I say something later of the flawed
process by which Change 184 was arrived at, and the valuable rights of the State which it gave away,
without any proper consideration being given to them.

4.47 It took, therefore, some 12 months from the start of the Project for this aspect of scope to reach any form
of stability.
Change 184
4.48 I have already said something of Change 184. This was, like other Changes (including 60 and 61) what Dr

Manfeld described as a “cleansing” change157 which, he said, showed an intention by the parties to clarify
once and for all the instability which up until those points had existed
158.
144 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 96.
145 Said to be in SOW 8 v 1.4 which should, it seems, be read as a reference to v 1.2.
146 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 96.
147 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 97.
148 T24-102, L33-38 (Bill Doak); T25-26, L27-42 (Bill Doak); T25-77, L13-16 (Bill Doak).
149 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 101(b).
150 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 230.
151 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 128-209.
152 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 141.
153 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 130, 140; Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 144-157.
154 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 148.
155 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 148.
156 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 125.
157 T30-81, L42-43 (Dr David Manfeld); T30-85, L32-34 (Dr David Manfeld).
158 T30-80, L9-42 to T30-81, L1-51 (Dr David Manfeld).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
108
4.49 Change 184 was preceded by a series of Changes directed at having IBM prove that the system it was to
implement functioned properly. The fact that this was necessary shows a high level of dissatisfaction or
suspicion by the customer that the work IBM was undertaking might not achieve what the State required of
it. I consider these Changes below when dealing with the issue of Payroll Performance Testing.
4.50 There were considerable negotiations in the lead-up to Change 184. They were initiated when, on 8 August
2008, IBM issued a Delay Notice to the State
159. The reasons IBM offered for the delay were, in addition
to the debates about HR-Fi design mentioned above: differing expectations of the role and responsibilities
by IBM and client stakeholders; IBM test tool and process issues having prevented the achievement of a
very aggressive test schedule; and additional technical testing requirements having been requested by the
client as of 6 August 2008. The State’s response, dated 2 September 2008, was, in effect, that there was no
failure by it to which the delay was attributable
160.
4.51 These exchanges led to discussions between the State and IBM in November 2008 and the agreement of
the parties to Change 129
161. Mr Christopher Bird (CorpTech’s contract manager) said that QH had raised
concerns with him to the effect that IBM had done nothing to give QH confdence that IBM would deliver
a working solution
162. Of that, Mr Beeston (a contractor, but engaged by CorpTech as, ultimately, Director
of the SPO) said IBM proposed conducting a “demonstration test” to show that it could run the payroll
within the payroll window
163. Mr Bird drafted, with the assistance of Mr Swinson from Mallesons, a condition
precedent to be incorporated in contract change documentation seeking to require IBM to meet objective
test criteria to prove that the Solution was in fact viable
164.
4.52 Change 129 contained a “condition precedent”, being that if the testing regime prescribed in Enclosures
1 and 2 of it were not passed, the incorporation of that Change into the contract was to be without legal
effect and all contract amendments were to be ineffective and void
ab initio165. IBM would, if the tests were
not passed, fnd itself in default under the contract.
4.53 Enclosure 1 concerned Payroll Performance Testing (aimed at knowing, in effect, how long it took to
produce the pay using the system). Enclosure 2 was directed to the awards interpretation function of
Workbrain. Change 129 set 30 November 2008 as the time by which these tests were to be passed
166.
Several subsequent Changes extended the time within which IBM had to satisfy the State that those tests
had been passed: Change 174
167 extended the time until 5 December 2008; Change 177168 extended the
time by a further 6 days; and Change 179
169 extended the time to 23 December 2008.
4.54 It was at this point, with the Payroll Performance Testing not having been passed (a matter I deal with
below) that negotiations about and, ultimately, the agreement to, Change 184 commenced.
4.55 On 21 January 2009, the State wrote to IBM saying that it was of the view that successful integration was the
responsibility of IBM
170. It invited IBM to make a proposal to address any variations that IBM proposed to the
parties’ obligations and referred to initial without prejudice discussions which were then being coordinated
171.
By letter of 23 February 2009, IBM advised that it had been working with CorpTech and QH to clarify the scope
required to deliver the Interim Solution in two releases and that IBM had provided a defnition of the scope in
them
172. The State’s response to that letter on 2 March 2009173 recorded IBM’s acceptance that Staff Transfers,
End of Month Accruals, Balance Sheet and Nurses PDE (Concurrent Employment) were within the scope of
the contract. The State proposed paying IBM $2M as “an additional performance payment” upon the State’s
formal acceptance of the Interim Solution
174. As part of these arrangements, IBM had asked that there be no
more changes to the scope of the Interim Solution
175. To that, the State responded176:
159 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 230-231.
160 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at pages 4-6.
161 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 22.
162 Exhibit 73, para 38.
163 Exhibit 65, para 57.
164 Exhibit 73, paras 39- 40.
165 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 22.
166 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 27.
167 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 190, 194.
168 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 266, 270.
169 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 285, 289.
170 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 56-57.
171 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 56.
172 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 147.
173 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 161-165.
174 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 162.
175 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 163.
176 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 163.

Contract
109
The solution scope is as set out in SOW8 and approved CRs. Note that existing CRs raised to address
defects are NOT considered variations to scope. [emphasis in original].
4.56 IBM, in response, acknowledged a continuing disagreement in relation to scope177. Its detailed response
to the State’s proposal
178 was to assert that the cost to complete the delivery of the Project would be
$3M, with the State to pay an additional $6M on accepting IBM’s proposal
179. IBM attached to its letter a
document “QHIC Scope Defnition Changes for Version 2”, which was said to describe the changes to the
scope of the Project
180.
4.57 Mr Grierson, Director-General of the Department of Public Works, gave evidence that during this period
he had become frustrated with the “fnger pointing” by IBM, QH and CorpTech in respect of scope
181. In
response to an email on 18 February 2009 from Ms Berenyi (by this time Executive Director of CorpTech,
having replaced Ms Perrott) to Mr Doak requesting that IBM provide a commercial proposal containing
pricing for the outstanding scope for the LATTICE Replacement, Mr Grierson directed Ms Berenyi to
“continue to seek a ‘fair and equitable’ outcome” stating that he was “not interested in IBM coming forward
with a $$ wishlist”
182. His view was that if there was additional work which QH had not requested it was “only
fair” to pay IBM for it; whereas if it was work that should have been provided for in scoped work orders, he
would not have paid for it again
183.
4.58 The State, by letter dated 31 March 2009184 agreed to pay some $10M to IBM185. The Change itself was
authorised by the Associate Director-General of the Department of Public Works, Ms Natalie MacDonald on
30 June 2009
186. It had been recommended earlier by Ms Berenyi to the Acting Director-General, Mr Max
Smith. He approved the new arrangement on 31 March 2009
187.
4.59 A meeting took place on 9 June 2009 between IBM and the State. It was proposed to offer IBM an additional
$9M subject to approval as consideration for an extension of project to be completed by November 2009 (it is not
clear why the State thought itself obliged to provide consideration for this, when it was a delay), compensation
for IBM developing additional functionality and for the engagement of additional IBM resources to meet the
required timeframe
188. The State’s agreement to the arrangement was communicated to IBM by letter dated 25
June 2009
189. IBM was quick to accept. It did so that same day190.
4.60 Change 184 was executed a few days later191. It, and the negotiations which preceded it, were predicated
upon the Project being completed and going live on 6 November 2009 and upon the system (pursuant to
the clarifed scope) being one that was functional, albeit that there might be workarounds
192:
The proposed revised Change Request (CR184) will give rise to the following contract amendments, with
all other obligations remaining unchanged:

3. Agree that formal acceptance of the Solution includes the provision that all go-live requirements,
including the correction of outstanding issues that prevent Queensland Health employees being paid
correctly within the agreed processing window, has been achieved. Any work-arounds or issues that
have been agreed to remain unresolved prior to go-live will be agreed subject to a comprehensive
management plan being presented for their satisfactory resolution.
4.61 Ms MacDonald said that it had been her understanding of this Change, and her intention in authorising
it, that it would put to rest all the uncertainties about scope
193. It did not, and she accepted that194. Her
understanding of it was that it would ensure that the resulting system would be functional
195. But she
177 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 166-168.
178 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 170-173.
179 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 170; see Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 246 for composition of $6M payment.
180 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 171; Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 249.
181 Exhibit 116, paras 39-40; T28-75, L18-24 (Malcolm Grierson).
182 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 133.
183 Exhibit 116, para 39.
184 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 320.
185 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 321.
186 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 141.
187 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 314.
188 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 115.
189 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 125-126.
190 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 127.
191 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 141.
192 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 125-126.
193 T28-8, L28-31( Natalie MacDonald); T28-15, L29-32 (Natalie MacDonald); T28-34, L25-26 (Natalie MacDonald).
194 T28-22, L27-31 (Natalie MacDonald).
195 T28-6, L32-33 (Natalie MacDonald).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
110
accepted that nowhere in the Change document was that made a requirement196. Ms MacDonald did not
trouble to familiarise herself with even the most basic documentation which informed the decision to enter
into Change 184. She said she merely relied on what other more junior offcers provided to her
197. She had
no knowledge of the Changes which preceded 184, including the series of Changes which commenced with
129 and by which IBM had agreed to the “condition precedent”
198. It was a miscarriage of responsibility for
Ms MacDonald not to have satisfed herself, at the very least, about these matters, and, more importantly,
about the details of the Change she was asked to authorise, and which involved the payment of a very large
sum of public money to IBM (well in excess of the original contract price) and that it would achieve the objects
she thought it was designed to.
4.62 Change 184 did not resolve the uncertainties in scope and nor did it result in a Go Live on 6 November 2009.
It failed to achieve the objects which were the bases upon which Ms MacDonald authorised it.
4.63 Change 184 was followed by at least 6 further Changes. Some were for additions to scope which arose
because of legislative changes (Changes 210
199 and 220200 costing $1.795M). Some were because of events
which occurred after November 2009 (such as to accommodate new enterprise bargaining arrangements,
see Changes 204
201, 206202 which cost $1,581,200 in total). Changes of these kinds were mostly known to
the State at the time it entered into Change 184, but were postponed because the system was to have gone
live before the need arose to make these adjustments.
4.64 Some Changes were for matters which were clearly ones which ought to have been resolved as part of the
attempt to clarify scope:
a. Change 202
203 (costing $1.85M) postponed the Go Live date from November 2009 to March 2010,
perhaps, it seems, because the State had decided that going live close to Christmas time was
undesirable
204. Why the State could not have made that decision before Change 184 was entered into is
unclear. If, as Mr Atzeni said
205, it was undesirable to Go Live so close to Christmas, that would seem to
be something which ought always to have been known and to have been factored into the negotiations
about Change 184;
b. Change 208 (which did not require any additional payment by the State), followed IBM issuing a
delay notice, advising that it could not achieve provision of the complete Deployable Solution by the
scheduled date of 18 December 2009
206. The delay notice states the cause to be that one aspect of
the criteria could not be achieved, namely no Severity 2 defects
207. The notice went on to say that “[t]
his has been caused by non resolution of defects by third parties, disagreement on the classifcation of
items in QC [Quality Centre], timeframes for retesting, etc.” Change 208 “reviewed and amended” (both
euphemisms for “relaxed”) deliverables and key milestones
208. One clear example is the relaxation of the
requirement that there be no Severity 2 defects when the system exited UAT, it being permissible from
that time forward for such defects to be the subject of a “comprehensive management plan”
209.
4.65 The volatility in the Project scope was highly unsatisfactory. It was a major contributor to the sharp increase
in the price. It caused the quality of the system to be compromised. It produced great diffcultly for IBM
having to build and test a system which was in a state of flux.
4.66 The problems which were experienced with scope, which existed from the outset of the Project to the time it
went live, were both avoidable and a not uncommon problem in Projects of this kind. IBM relied upon there
having been completeness in the communication to it of QH business requirements. The State, on the other
hand (principally Mr Atzeni), seems to have thought that IBM, having agreed to deliver a payroll solution,
would be obliged to deliver one that paid staff and did so accurately, even if all QH’s requirements had not
been communicated and found their way into the various scoping documents. This was folly on the part of
those within the State who took that view.
196 T28-18, L21-44 (Natalie MacDonald).
197 T28-8, L15-19 (Natalie MacDonald); T28-20, L14-17 (Natalie MacDonald).
198 T28-20, L5-10 (Natalie MacDonald).
199 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at pages 241-246.
200 Exhibit 113, para 155(f), Annexure 16.
201 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at pages 135-139.
202 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at pages 221-227.
203 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at pages 72-98.
204 Exhibit 63, Volume 11, at page 229.
205 T31-57, L38-55 to T31-58, L1-14 (Damon Atzeni).
206 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at pages 228-257.
207 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at page 210.
208 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at page 229.
209 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at page 243.

Contract
111
4.67 The State had clear notice, as I show below, that its tenacious adherence to that view would, ultimately, be
productive of great problems for it rather than IBM because it was the customer to whom the system would
be delivered and which had the responsibility of paying staff.
4.68 Despite having had some considerable responsibility for scoping the Project (and been paid almost $1M for
doing so) and knowing that there existed a difference in view with the State as to how the Project was to
be defned, IBM was content for scope to remain vague and to deal with that lack of clarity by relying upon
and encouraging the State to vary the contract and its scope and to charge the State for those changes.
IBM chose to leave scope uncertain and to “protect”
210 it because it suited its short-term commercial
interests to do so.
IBM, commercially motivated as it was, had communicated the points beyond which further
agreement would be required to be reached (and implying the need to pay more money).
These points were not ones which would have resulted in a functional payroll system, and that
is a matter which reflects poorly on IBM. But it had been suffciently clear in stating these
limitations. The State, however, ignored those statements and proceeded as if, whether it
assisted or not, IBM would be both capable of delivering, and would be obliged to deliver, a
functional payroll system.
4.69 IBM sought to set scope by preparing a Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM)211. It is a document which
defnes each function to be implemented and the tests to cover those functions
212. It also contains the
business requirements which form the basis of the system as taken from the scope documents. Mr Campbell
gave a good account of an RTM. He said
213:
… (each business) requirement … has to be delivered. In normal project management practice each
requirement is … followed by a functional design which is the interpretation of the business requirement
into a … system requirement. The functional specifcation is then converted into a technical specifcation
… that the … programmer uses to program the code to deliver that particular business requirement,
and then the last part of that is there’s a user acceptance test. In project management methodology
there’s a technique called ‘requirements tractability matrix’ which traces each requirement … agreed
by the customer all the way through functional design, technical design, user acceptance testing … the
particular business requirement has been delivered.
Mr Parkinson, the software testing expert engaged by IBM, defned the RTM as “a way of enabling you
to track how much is changing and what [are] the priorities in which you need to test to achieve a certain
level of coverage against the risk profle you’re willing to accept”
214. A project of the size and complexity of
the QH payroll system ought to have had an agreed clear RTM
215, and from the outset216. Mr Campbell also
explained that IBM used a project methodology, specifc to it, called “Ascendant”. He described it
217:
The frst phase of all … methodologies, and … ascendant … in particular is that there is time set aside to
undertake what is commonly called the business preparation phase … a series of interactions with the
customer so that the … the vendor would understand completely what the requirements were, they would
document those requirements by way of a business requirement and … the customer would … sign off
that scope document which represents the business needs of the customer at that point in time.
4.70 IBM did not completely follow its Ascendant methodology. It was adapted, as Mr Prebble218 explained:
Some of the detailed requirements gathering that would have been relevant in a greenfeld
implementation wasn’t undertaken as there was a base which was the Department of Housing payroll
system that we were building on, so the process was more around identifying the deltas between that
system and Queensland Health’s requirements as they explained them.
I understand “deltas” to be differences in code or data outputs.
210 T27-31, L51-56 to T27-32, L1-11 (Christopher Prebble).
211 Exhibit 105.
212 T24-20, L44-45 (Brett Cowan).
213 T18-17, L50-:55 to T18-18, L1-L10 (Malcolm Campbell).
214 T36-55, L38-42 (Shane Parkinson).
215 T18-39, L2-15 (Malcolm Campbell); T24-20, L39-41 (Brett Cowan); T26-7, L9-14 (John Gower), T30-54, L31-34 (Dr David Manfeld).
216 T24-21, L1-5 (Brett Cowan).
217 T18-17, L37-45 (Malcolm Campbell).
218 T27-5, L9-15 (Christopher Prebble).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
112
4.71 But the RTM here was never agreed. The document was controversial219. During the debates between
IBM, CorpTech and QH over whether defects discovered in UAT were functional defects or missed business
requirements, Mr Campbell asked to see the RTM as a means of settling the dispute. Mr Gower said that none
existed but, Mr Campbell said, “to his credit … he [Mr Gower] did endeavour to retroft some type of traceability
matrix to make that discussion between IBM and QH more productive, but it was really after the event”
220.
4.72 QH said that it was not a representation of the full business requirements221. IBM urged the State to accept
it. In the Quality Assurance Position Papers of July 2009, the Steering Committee Members were told, “IBM
continues to push for a requirements traceability matrix and they wish to make it entry criterion for UAT as
a means of forcing QH to sign acceptance of the document that they produce”
222. Even the name of that
document, IBM said, could not be agreed. There was some suggestion that, in July 2009, that IBM had
renamed the document the Test Requirements Matrix
223. Mr Doak says the document was so controversial
that it came to be called (by him at least) “The Apple”
224.
4.73 There are reasons why the State was reluctant to accept IBM’s RTM. As I point out below in the context of
UAT, there was a realisation by both parties in mid-2009 that the system which would have resulted from the
scope documents as formally submitted and agreed would not have functioned properly, in the sense of not
paying staff or not paying them correctly
225. I point to mid-2009 as the relevant date because that is the time
by which IBM accepted responsibility for fxing defects which affected pay; something quite different from
the way in which the scope documents defned the system. Had the State accepted IBM’s RTM, it would also
have been accepting the incomplete scope which had earlier been set by reference to the seriously defcient
communication of QH’s business requirements. That, while perhaps not consistent with where the State stood
given its acceptance of the deliverables defning scope
226, was explicable on more practical grounds.
Findings
4.74 The scope of the system was inadequately defned. Had the system as originally scoped been delivered, it
would have failed entirely to function as any payroll system might reasonably be expected to function. That
fact was known to IBM who, through the assumptions it enumerated in SOW 8 and the “issues” it listed in
the QHIC Scope Defnition, notifed the State that changes to scope were likely to be required. Some of the
State representatives, however, considered that the scope documents were to some extent beside the point
because of IBM’s promise to deliver a payroll system that was “stable, supported and supportable”
227.
4.75 The submissions on behalf of the State accept that “it would have been safer to insist upon agreement on
scope before allowing further development to proceed” and that the State “could have exercised greater
authority in this regard.” Despite this, it was submitted that “IBM’s preparedness to proceed would have
been a powerful sign to those responsible for the State’s involvement that it was safe to proceed”
228.
What is uncommon here is that, despite the problem being a known area of risk, the parties,
both experienced in supplying and purchasing large IT systems respectively, were content to
proceed notwithstanding they both had very different views as to scope. They thus ignored an
area of risk which was known to them and one which they ought to have done more to resolve.
4.76 For the State representatives to take such a view was unjustifed and grossly negligent. IBM, commercially
motivated as it was, had communicated the points beyond which further agreement would be required
to be reached (and implying the need to pay more money). These points were not ones which would
have resulted in a functional payroll system, and that is a matter which reflects poorly on IBM. But it had
been suffciently clear in stating these limitations. The State, however, ignored those statements and
219 T25-4, L43-45 (Bill Doak); T26-7, L24-31 (John Gower).
220 T18-77, L45-49 (Malcolm Campbell).
221 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 322.
222 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 274.
223 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 274.
224 T25-4, L53 (Bill Doak).
225 T24-108, L28-L36 (Bill Doak).
226 SOW 8 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 15-40; the QHIC Scope Defnition Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages 63-203; Exhibit 72; the Project Execution Plan Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at pages
204-227.
227 T30-28, L36-38 (Jane Stewart); was taken to the Project Execution Plan which stated “Essentially a risk mitigation project, the interim solution will provide a stable, supported and
supportable HR/Payroll solution to [QH]. Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 210; Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 180.
228 Submissions on behalf of the State of Queensland, undated (Contract), paras 57-58.

Contract
113
proceeded as if, whether it assisted or not, IBM would be both capable of delivering, and would be obliged
to deliver, a functional payroll system. Both of those assumptions were wrong. They are based, I think, on
a fundamental misconception that, by appointing a prime contractor, the State had no responsibility to
ensure the system was designed and built properly.
4.77 The genesis of many of these problems was the rushed scoping exercise. A total of about one month was
allowed for this to occur. That, on any view, was too short. Mr Thatcher, Chief Information Offcer of Mater
Misericordiae Health Services, explained that in a recent successful HR roll out which he oversaw not only did
the scoping exercise take three years, it was accompanied by considerable focus and discipline in deciding the
“target state” that the organisation wished to achieve
229. Here, the parties had not only to arrive at a scope,
but in the process of doing so had to make hard judgments about what was and was not to be required as part
of a system which was to be both interim and have minimal functionality.
4.78 IBM characterised the problems with the Project’s scope as being a failure by the State to adhere to the
agreed scope, and not any failure by IBM to defne and obtain agreement upon it
230. To do so gives an
overly narrow construction to IBM’s obligations. Scope had not, at least so far as the open issues were
concerned, been agreed. It also leaves out of account IBM’s role as both Prime Contractor and Project
Manager, and the very real interest it ought to have shown in ensuring that the Project scope would result in
a payroll system which operated as any such system ought; to pay staff and do so accurately.
4.79 Scope, having had this very unsatisfactory beginning, remained ill-defned, volatile and unclear. Neither
party took any effective measures to defne and stabilise scope at any time during the Project. IBM seemed
content to have defned scope in a way which it must have known could not result in a functional payroll
system and to rely, whenever challenged, on the text of the QHIC Scope Defnition. Its task was to gather
requirements. It did so incompletely, relying on its obligation to do so stopping short of being responsible
for eliciting such requirements from its customer. The State, on the other hand, was recalcitrant in adopting
a less than diligent approach to ascertaining and communicating its business requirements to IBM. It
regarded IBM as responsible for eliciting requirements from it, and considered instead IBM’s obligation to
deliver the project to be for a “stable, supported and supportable” system
231. In short, the State assumed
it had contracted for, and would get, a system which paid staff accurately, perhaps with some manual
intervention, but, largely, to do so in an automated way. IBM considered its obligation, subject to some
matters set out below, to be to deliver the system which would follow (and no matter what it looked like as a
result) from a strict application of the QHIC Scope Defnition.
4.80 Uncertainties as to scope are not uncommon problems in IT contracts. What is uncommon here is that,
despite the problem being a known area of risk, the parties, both experienced in supplying and purchasing
large IT systems respectively, were content to proceed notwithstanding they both had very different views
as to scope. They thus ignored an area of risk which was known to them and one which they ought to have
done more to resolve.
5. the Defcient System and the opportunities to Redress it
5.1 I have mentioned above that both parties knew before completion of the Project that the system would,
without some major reconsideration of it, fail to pay staff, or do so in a seriously inaccurate way. Neither
party followed basic project management principles by insisting that the Project be reset or by taking other
effective measures to rectify problems which remained with the system until after Go Live.
5.2 The State relied upon assertions from IBM that it would correct all defects which affected the correctness
of a pay, ignored clear warnings before Go Live that the system, once implemented, would in all likelihood
cause pays to be incorrect, and that defects existed which had not then been identifed but which were
likely to be major.
5.3 The State decided to Go Live with the system having chosen to manage such defects, postpone others and
to ignore those defects not yet identifed. It did so because, partly through its own fault and partly through
that of IBM, the system had taken so long to implement that it was left with no choice but to Go Live with a
system of poor quality because of the real possibility that the ageing LATTICE system would fail.
229 T31-18, L31-56 to T31-19, L1-13 (Malcolm Thatcher); Exhibit 129, para 4.
230 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, 7 July 2013, paras 264, 330.
231 T30-28, L36-38 (Jane Stewart).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
114

5.4 These conclusions emerged from the consideration of the matters set out below, each of which was the
subject of written and oral evidence and the subject of written submissions from those parties who had
been given leave to appear.
IBM conceded there were “bugs” after Go Live in the computer system which it had designed and built
232.
5.5

It submitted, however, that there is no direct or reliable evidence that the cause of any problems which were
experienced in staff being paid and being paid accurately were the result of “coding” (ie programming)
errors (accepting, as it must, that liability for such problems must lie with IBM)
233. It submits that there is
“overwhelming evidence” that the causes of the failure accurately to pay staff were “non-system” issues
234.
I reject those submissions so far as they suggest that it was non-system issues only which caused the
problems with the system paying staff. The evidence of Mr Cowan and Ms Stewart in particular, being
evidence which I would accept for the reasons I give below, is that the system which IBM had designed and
built itself contributed materially to the failure of staff to be paid and to be paid accurately after Go Live.
This is not to suggest that there were not other “non-system” problems, but that the system issues were a
material contributor to the system’s post-Go Live problems.
5.6 There were several points in the Project which ought to have been a warning to both parties of serious
defciencies in the system. Those points were ones which the State gave up opportunities, if not to bring
SOW 8 to an end, to reset the scope of the Project and ensure the system would function as a payroll
system ought. My main focus is on the State for present purposes because it was the customer, and the
party with the pressing self-interest in seeing that the system which it received and paid for did the job it
was required to, namely paying staff.
5.7 The points upon which I focus for present purposes are:
a. the system’s entry into and exit from UAT (and especially Phase 4 of it) (UAT4);
b. systems and systems integration testing;
c. the decision by the State, in or about January 2009, not to enter into any new Statements of Work with
IBM under the contract;
d. upon the system failing the payroll performance testing for which Changes 129, 174, 177 and 179 provided.
User Acceptance testing
5.8 There were four phases of UAT. QH engaged KJ Ross and Associates, a software verifcation and validation
consulting frm, to conduct that testing. The purpose of it was as Mr Cowan (the KJ Ross test manager) said
in his 27 January 2010 report (“Final UAT Report”)
235:
User Acceptance Testing is designed to be a signifcant element of the acceptance and handover of a
built system to the end users and business owners. It is not designed to provide complete coverage of
functionality, nor can it give a comprehensive indication of the risk involved with deploying a system. It
should, as a side effect, give a good insight into the quality of system Requirements and the quality of
system & Integration Testing which happened in a prior phase of the project.
5.9 Phase 1 of UAT commenced in January 2009236. Phase 2 commenced on 27 January 2009. Its start was
delayed because some testing was still being executed. That phase ran until 9 April 2009, despite being
scheduled to fnish in mid-February. The fnance functionality had not, at that stage, been built, so a
separate UAT was required for those components
237.

5.10 The third phase of UAT began on 6 May 2009 and were planned to run until 26 June 2009. It ran in fact until
17 August 2009. At that point it was stopped. 691 major (Severity 2) defects were identifed in that Phase,
and 1003 defects in all
238.
The fourth and last phase of UAT commenced 3 September 2009 and was planned to run until 5 October 2009.
5.11

Again, a large number of defects were identifed: some 805 major defects, 14 “showstoppers” and 1007 in all239.
232 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 7.
233 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 6.
234 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 13(g).
235 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 288.
236 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 289.
237 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 289.
238 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 289.
239 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 290.

Contract
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5.12 In the four phases of UAT, 2,422 defects were in total identifed240. Although IBM urged that sheer numbers
of this kind are irrelevant and misleading and one should focus instead on the nature of the defects, those
contentions can be disposed of
241. As Mr Cowan explained, sheer numbers can indeed be as reliable an
indication of system problems of a signifcant kind, particularly when one is speaking of the orders of
magnitude as is the case here. Mr Cowan said, for example, in his oral evidence, that 75 per cent of the
defects were “true defects”
242 and that he had concerns with the large number of defects243. Dr Manfeld
agreed. In his report
244 he said, in effect, that the number of defects was an issue, even leaving aside how
they were to be treated.
5.13 The identifcation of these defects was not, in any event, done without regard to their nature and severity.
The Master Test Plan
245 and UAT test plans246 had stated criteria by which defects were to be categorised247:
Severity Description
1 – Showstopper • The entire application, component or function will not work, and no bypass is available.
• Testing cannot proceed.
Major impact to testing schedule.
• A Severity 1 defect must be addressed as a matter of the highest priority.
2 – Major
• Major component or function will not work.
• Testing is severely impacted, but can proceed.
• Payroll results are incorrect – e.g. a Payrule in Workbrain is incorrect.
Major impact to testing schedule.
• A Severity 2 defect must be addressed as a high priority.
3 – Minor
• A minor portion of the application, component or function will not work, but a workaround
is available.
• Testing is impacted, but can proceed.
Minor impact to testing schedule.
• A Severity 4 (sic) defect should be addressed prior to release or have a remediation
action plan.
4 – Cosmetic • Cosmetic or minimal impact.
• Spelling or format error on internal report – no material impact on client.
• Inconsistency of formatting.
• Alignment of fields on a page. Cosmetic or minimal impact.
• A Severity 4 defect should be fixed when practicable.
• No impact to Test Schedule.
5.14 Those criteria, for Severity 2 defects, were later elaborated upon248. Moreover, many Severity 2 defects were
dealt with on an ad hoc basis and on one occasion at least, IBM was paid specifcally to correct them (Change
194
249). Many defects were downgraded from Severity 2 to Severity 3250. There were several levels at which
such defects were classifed and reclassifed by agreement between the parties, including the daily defect
meetings in the later stages of UAT4.
5.15 On any view, the results of UAT showed the system to be suffering very serious problems. Mr Cowan said in
his Final UAT Report that the State had two options available to it
251:
1. Delay the rollout of the system into production until a full System and Integration Test is
conducted. … The risk inherent in this option is the appetite of the government for delay, but the
risk of system issues in production would be greatly reduced.
240 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 305.
241 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 139.
242 T24-62, L45-47 (Brett Cowan).
243 T24-64, L4-21 (Brett Cowan).
244 Exhibit 123, at page 6, L26-27.
245 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 291-43.
246 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 258.
247 Criteria from Master Test Plan, Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 291-43 (emphasis original).
248 Exhibit 81.
249 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 84-88.
250 See, as examples, Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 320.
251 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 287.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
116
2. Accept the risk that the functional scenarios not touched by the UAT will not perform as expected
and that the defects discovered will need to be fxed in Production. The risk inherent in this option
is that the defects discovered may be so many and/or so complex that they cannot be appropriately
managed in a timely manner in production. With the state of the system as revealed by UAT, we can
only say that there will be many issues in production, but not give any indication of how large that
number will be, nor their impact on the productive system. A true System and Integration Test would
be able to give a better insight into this risk (as per option
1).

5.16 Dr Manfeld said of Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report252:
I haven’t seen such an unequivocal sign of distress in a project.
This was an opinion on which Dr Manfeld was not challenged by any party in the oral examination of him.
There could have been no clearer warning of the functional defciencies in the system and the real risk of
there being defects beyond the very large number which Mr Cowan had to that date detected. Had there
been any doubt up until this point, Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report put the matter beyond doubt. One does
5.17
5.18

not need to have any technical knowledge to take from that report a very clear warning that, if the system
proceeded to Go Live in its then state, there was a real likelihood, indeed perhaps an inevitability, that it
would contain defects of a functional kind.
5.19 UAT was a QHEST deliverable253. Criteria were set for the system entering and exiting UAT. This, the
Commission heard, is standard project management practice, the purpose being that the criteria are set in
advance so that decisions as to whether the system ought to proceed to the next stage or “gate” are not
made pragmatically and in response to pressing demands.

5.20 A memorandum written by Ms Jones early in the Project explained the importance of these criteria254. She
said testing arrangements of this kind were to provide assurance that
255:

[I]mplementation issues which may arise can be managed and assurance can be demonstrated at each
testing gate that the system implementation outcome will provide continuity of payroll services …
and
Queensland Health provides senior managers and unions with the assurance that the new systems will
not be commissioned into production without testing assurance that payment outcomes meet minimum
integrity measures and that future payments will be produced and correct to a reasonable level
similar
to, or improved on, current outcomes of the legacy HR systems
. [emphasis added]
5.21 I have emphasised some words in the preceding quote because they show an expectation or assumption
that the system would be no less automated or functional than the system which it was to replace. That is
inherent in the concept of a “replacement” solution. IBM, in its submissions, sought to equate the LATTICE
system to the Interim Solution by pointing to need in the former to make manual adjustments and effect
workarounds
256. The obstacle which such a submission faces is that nowhere in the scoping documents is
this made clear. And the evidence suggests to the contrary: it was only in the period immediately preceding
Go Live that the parties prepared the Defect Management Plan whose purpose it was to record the manual
adjustments and workarounds (among other things). Pragmatism – not scope defnition – motivated its
preparation.
5.22 Two documents were produced which defned the testing regime and the thresholds to be met. The frst was
the Master Test Plan. Developing a test strategy was an accountability of IBM under SOW 8 as initially cast
257. It
became a deliverable of IBM under SOW 8 version 1.2 (attached to Change 60)
258. QHEST had responsibility for
“UAT strategy and approach”
259.

5.23 The Master Test Plan stated that there would be UAT Entry (and Exit) Criteria defned in the QHEST Test
Plan LATTICE and ESP Replacement Solution UAT
260.

252 T30-51, L34-39 (Dr David Manfeld).
253 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-13.
254 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 275-1.
255 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 275-1.
256 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 81 and 82.
257 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 24.
258 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-13.
259 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-16.
260 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at pages 291-35, 291-36.

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5.24 The QHEST Test Plan prescribed those criteria to be, for entry261:
All Severity 1 and Severity 2 defects resolved from Unit and System Testing.
5.25 The exit criteria were262:
All Severity 1 and Severity 2 defects from UAT or concurrently executed test phases have been resolved.
There could have been no clearer warning of the functional defciencies in the system and
the real risk of there being defects beyond the very large number which Mr Cowan had to
that date detected. Had there been any doubt up until this point, Mr Cowan’s Final UAT
Report put the matter beyond doubt.
5.26 The entry criteria were not met. When the system entered UAT3 in May 2009, it had numerous Severity
2 defects
263. It is simply wrong for IBM to submit that it presented for UAT a system free of Severity 2
defects
264. Whether those “problems” were defects in the sense of being functional problems which were
within scope for IBM to fx is for present purposes beside the point. The fact is that the system proceeded
through this “gate” without these defects frst being resolved or there being agreement about the way in
which such problems with the system were to be treated in the future as between the parties. It is another
example of the parties failing to take effective measures to rectify obvious problems which had emerged,
and permitting, notwithstanding that, the system to proceed to the next stage of its implementation.
When the system entered UAT4 in September 2009
265, again the entry criteria were not met. The Project
Directorate agreed to permit the system to enter UAT4 with it having 11 Severity 2 defects outstanding
266.
A review of the Project undertaken by SAP in September 2009 concluded that there were serious concerns
with quality, stability and operational readiness of the solution and that that situation had been caused
“primarily” by factors which included
267:
Entry into UAT did not technically satisfy UAT entry criteria – concessions were made (such as
downgrading Severity 1 issues to Severity
3 – P0 & P1) to facilitate progression into UAT4.
5.27 As Mr Cowan observed in his Final UAT Report268:
The entry and exit criteria were defned prior to starting UAT4. Through the process of execution of UAT4,
the exit criteria were amended based on agreement within the Project Board (minutes can be sourced as
required).
5.28 Just as the entry criteria were ignored or their thresholds lowered, so too were the exit criteria.
5.29 Until 24 December 2009, the UAT exit criteria were as the Master Test Plan had prescribed. Change 208
both effected a change to those criteria (by lowering them) and deeming the system to have passed. The
new criteria which replaced the requirement that there be no Severity 1 or Severity 2 defects were
269:
No Severity 1 defects and a comprehensive management plan for Severity 2, 3 and 4 defects.
5.30 Without such an alteration, the system could not have exited UAT4 while it displayed Severity 2 defects.
Many Severity 2 defects remained. As recorded above, Mr Cowan noted in his Final UAT Report some 26
known Severity 1 and 2 defects then existed
270.
5.31 The parties made decisions which permitted the system to enter and exit UAT in spite of the criteria which
they had imposed at the outset with the intention they be adhered to. They did so also by downgrading
the severity by which defects had been classifed. One example of this was evidenced by a “Briefng” which
Mr James Brown and Ms Berenyi sent to Ms MacDonald on or about 27 July 2009
271. In it, they said:
261 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 247.
262 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 247.
263 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 61-63.
264 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 145.
265 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 290.
266 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at page 79.
267 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at page 241.
268 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 294.
269 Exhibit 63, Volume 12, at page 243.
270 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 304.
271 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 320.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
118
• The project is currently within the second phase of User Acceptance Testing Phase with a key
milestone scheduled for 31 July 2009: Entry into User Acceptance Testing (End to End). The agreed
condition for milestone to be met is that there are no Severity 1 or Severity 2 errors or as determined
by the Project Board
• Queensland Health, IBM and CorpTech have reviewed the Severity 2 defects and have agreed that a
number be reclassified to Severity 3, Priority 0 classification. This will allow IBM to concentrate on
the priority Severity 2 defects for UAT, and then to have the Severity 3 Priority 0 defects rectified as
an exit criteria for UAT.
5.32 The memorandum records no justifcation for downgrading these defects, beyond asserting that
there has been agreement that the reclassifcation can occur, and in the context of UAT. Nor could
Mr James Brown provide any convincing justifcation for his having recommended this course when
asked about it in his oral examination
272:
Counsel Assisting: And what were the reasons that you reclassifed these?
Answer: I didn’t reclassify these; this was the working party that was assigned to review those errors
within Queensland Health and then this – – –
Commissioner: But you must have been satisfed?
Answer: Oh, sorry.
Commissioner: You must have been satisfed that these reclassifcations should occur. What made
you satisfed?
Mr Brown: I was satisfed by the participation of the individuals and the working group that assessed the
business impact on those errors and came up with a different assessment.
5.33 Mr James Brown ought to have interested himself in the important act of reclassifying these defects, an
act which bore directly upon the extent to which the system would be likely to be functional after Go Live
and which concerned a protection put in place to ensure that the system did not proceed without meeting
pre-set standards.
5.34 The disregard which both parties exhibited towards the thresholds which they themselves had established is
shown most clearly by the minutes of a meeting of the QHIC Project Board on 12 May 2009, which records
as follows
273:
It was agreed by the Board to disregard all current language – eg severities, defects, buckets, etc.
Issues relating to the project will now be referred to as a Go-Live problem or resolution is not necessary
prior to Go-Live. The Project Directorate are to defne what at this stage is a Go-Live problem and
what is not. Michael stated that the Project Directorate should be informing the Board what the
requirements for go live are.
5.35 Mr James Brown, when asked about these matters, said that this was a way of “simplifying the language around
the multiple defnitions that people had for errors”
274. I reject that evidence. If the desire were to correct looseness
in language which had occurred, then it would have been a simple task to direct those people to the Master Test
Plan which set out the criteria by which to classify defects and stated the entry and exit criteria for the various
test stages. This, however, was not done and it was because, as other witnesses accepted, of the pragmatic
approach which was being adopted
275. Mr Gower’s description of what happened was that276:
… [G]iven the ongoing discussions about defects, requirements etc the Board said “let’s just focus
on what is required and what is necessary … to avoid … the diffculty of … things which had proved
intractable as between the parties”.
5.36 Dr Manfeld stated it to be generally acceptable within project methodology to change the Severity rating of
a defect provided it is well documented and considered by the Project Board
277. He considered downgrading a
defect in combination with an alternative resolution, such as a workaround, to be, generally speaking, acceptable,
but did note that “in the end there is still a defect which has to be fxed”
278. There is good reason why, he said,
272 T19-20, L1-13 (James Brown).
273 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 82.
274 T19-25, L26-28 (James Brown).
275 T21-89, L12-15 (Michael Kalimnios); T24-108, L33-34 (Bill Doak); T24-112, L54-56 (Bill Doak); T27-59, L26-40 (Margaret Berenyi); T27-61, L24-36 (Margaret Berenyi); T20-21, L1-17
(Janette Jones).
276 T26-15, L46-55 to T26-16, L10-12 (John Gower).
277 Exhibit 123, at page 11, L16-20.
278 Exhibit 123, at page 6, L23-24; T30-73, L14-53 (Dr David Manfeld).

Contract
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Severity criteria are defned up front, and that “any change is a signal for caution”279, but that, in a project of this
size, it was a cause of “great concern”
280. The evidence of Mr Cowan was consistent with Dr Manfeld’s opinions281.
5.37 Dr Manfeld was critical in his report of the “wholesale treatment of entry and exit conditions”282 and of
the State’s decision to “lower the bar for testing”
283. His criticisms are well-directed. Had these decisions not
been taken, the system would never have been allowed to proceed to Go Live in its seriously defcient state.
5.38 These matters need not be explored in greater detail. Most of the relevant witnesses accepted that they had
either acted pragmatically about these matters
284 or had made decisions about them in order to meet the
schedule of the Project
285.
5.39 IBM sought to discredit Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report and the oral evidence which he gave. Two statements
of IBM staff (Mr Kwiatkowski
286 and Mr Dymock287) and a report of an expert tester, Mr Parkinson288, were
provided to the Commission on 4 June 2013, after public hearings had fnished. They were delivered at
this late stage despite Mr Cowan’s statement having been served on IBM some 7 weeks earlier, on 16 April
2013
289 and him having given oral evidence on 2 May 2013. No explanation was offered by IBM for this
delay. Mr Parkinson was only instructed to prepare a report on 17 May 2013
290. Mr Kwiatkowski had been
asked to give a statement in March, but he did not fnalise it until shortly before 4 June 2013
291. He was not
asked, however, before June, to fnalise it
292. Mr Dymock was only asked to prepare a statement in early to
mid-May
293. If IBM had wanted to challenge Mr Cowan’s evidence, there was opportunity to do so when he
gave evidence in May. The delay was unexplained.
The parties made decisions which permitted the system to enter and exit UAT in spite of the
criteria which they had imposed at the outset with the intention they be adhered to. They
did so also by downgrading the severity by which defects had been classifed.
5.40 Having received this further material, it became necessary for the Commission to resume public hearings to
permit the examination of Messrs Parkinson, Kwiatkowski and Dymock and to give Mr Cowan an opportunity
respond to it. Hearings resumed for one day on 18 June 2013 to permit this to occur.
5.41 I set out below some of the main challenges sought to be made to Mr Cowan’s evidence and the reasons why
I found those challenges to be of no material effect upon his professionalism, his thoroughness, the analysis
he undertook and supervised as part of Phase 4 of UAT and the opinions he expressed in his Final UAT Report.
5.42 Mr Parkinson, like Mr Cowan, was an expert in the feld of testing. He too had experience working in large
organisations with a reliance upon information technology, including, most recently, as Head of Testing for
News Limited
294. He had no involvement whatsoever in the system. IBM had provided him with very limited
documentation: he had seen, relevantly, the Final UAT Report, the evidence of Mr Cowan (written and oral), the
report of Dr Manfeld and a transcript of his oral evidence
295. He had not been provided with Mr Cowan’s daily or
weekly summaries of UAT results
296, or the other reports which Mr Cowan had written297. He accepted that it was
“unhelpful” to offer the view he did on the basis that there may be documents that testers brought into existence
which would explain this but for him not to have them
298. The views he expressed were ones which resulted
279 Exhibit 123, at page 6, 21-23.
280 T30-50, L39-42 (Dr David Manfeld).
281 T24-11, L30-56 (Brett Cowan); T24-33, L19-55 to T24-34, L1-3 (Brett Cowan).
282 Exhibit 123, at page 11, L18-20.
283 Exhibit 123, at page 10, L28.
284 T21-89, L12-15 (Michael Kalimnios); T24-108, L33-34; T24-112, L54-56 (Bill Doak); T26-15, L46-55 (John Gower); T27-59 L26-40 (Margaret Berenyi); T27-61, L24-36 (Margaret
Berenyi); T20-21, L1 to 15 (Janette Jones).
285 T20-92, L20-22 (Mr Price); T28-30, L34-42 (Natalie MacDonald).
286 Exhibit 164.
287 Exhibit 163.
288 Exhibit 165.
289 Exhibit 168.
290 Exhibit 165, at pages 21-25.
291 T36-7, L10-20 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
292 T36-7, L17-18 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
293 T36-63, L30-31 (Mark Dymock).
294 T36-41, L14-20 (Shane Parkinson).
295 Exhibit 165, at page 1.
296 T36-43, L52-53 (Shane Parkinson).
297 T36-43, L47-49 (Shane Parkinson).
298 T36-48, L48-51 (Shane Parkinson).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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from the theoretical questions asked of him, and so he responded by saying how, from a theoretical perspective
testing ought to be approached. He said
299:
… the questions that were posed to me, they were posed to me from a theory perspective in terms of how you
would approach testing around some of those issues those questions presented, and so I answered those
questions based on that presentation of those questions.
5.43 Except to the limited extent Mr Parkinson’s evidence is useful to understand the theoretical standards to which
UAT might aspire, I did not fnd his evidence to be of assistance. His lack of any detailed knowledge of the system
and, more importantly, the task which Mr Cowan actually undertook, meant that he was unable to say whether
the analysis Mr Cowan had done, the testing which he supervised or the views Mr Cowan expressed in his Final
UAT Report were reasonable and reliable. Mr Parkinson, quite correctly, accepted this in saying that he would not
substitute his view, given the limited information available to him and the fact that tester (here, Mr Cowan) was
more immersed in the nuances of the testing regime, for that of Mr Cowan
300. No part of Mr Parkinson’s evidence
offers any basis to criticise any of Mr Cowan’s views or the testing regime over which he presided.
Mr Kwiatkowski
5.44 Mr Kwiatkowski joined IBM straight after completing his university training. His involvement with the Interim
Solution was having “worked… [on] aspects of [it]” from about June 2008 until after Go Live
301. But he was not
full time on the Interim Solution. He worked also on the SSP
302 and, as he explained in his oral evidence, he started
“rolling off” the Project in February 2010
303. He returned full time for limited periods: including in March/April to
oversee, as he described it, some of the “performance management [issues with] the Workbrain application” and
again in June to conduct a stabilisation performance review
304.
5.45 In his statement, Mr Kwiatkowski accepted there had been “integration issues” in the system, but which he
characterised as minor
305. He said that the State had choices as to the integration method which was to be
adopted. IBM recommended a message-based system but the State chose to stay with the one it was then
using (known as comma separated variables (CSV))
306. He sought in his statement to characterise this choice
as something which showed the State had “responsibility” for integration method, despite the identifcation
of potential diffculties by IBM
307. The point leads nowhere. He accepted in his oral evidence that it was open
to the State to continue to use its method of comma separated variables, that IBM had never told the State it
ought not use it, and that it was, in effect, a matter of choice which was open to it
308. It did not seem to me to be
any answer to there having existed integration problems, or a basis to say that they were the fault of the State.
Nowhere in his statement or in his oral evidence did he say so.
5.46 Mr Kwiatkowski had some involvement with UAT, but not, it seems, any close involvement. His involvement was
not close enough, for example, to have been provided with a copy of the Final UAT Report
309. He did not have
responsibility, he accepted, for anything which that report threw up at that time
310. He had some responsibility
for some of the UAT criteria, responsibility for involvement in the outcomes of UAT, he said, but that was more
technical and not really the outcome of the UAT testing itself
311. His evidence too, therefore, is of limited value
given his lack of involvement in the work which Mr Cowan undertook at the time. For that reason, I need mention
only briefly the criticisms he makes of the Final UAT Report, having seen it, as he told the Commission when he
gave oral evidence, for the frst time only “recently”
312.
5.47 He said that problems were experienced in the test data used in UAT, that defects had been identifed which
were “false defects”, that there was a lack of detailed scripts and that the UAT test planning was defcient
313. He
said that Mr Cowan had focused too narrowly on the number of defects and paid no or insuffcient regard to the
context in which those defects arose or how the business would use the solution
314. None of these assertions is
any basis to impugn the Final UAT Report or the work which Mr Cowan undertook before preparing it.
299 T36-44, L10-15 (Shane Parkinson).
300 T36-54, L50-56 to T36-55, L1-2 (Shane Parkinson).
301 Exhibit 164, para 1.
302 Exhibit 164, para 1.
303 T36-6, L35-38 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
304 T36-6, L45-50 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
305 Exhibit 164, para 25.
306 T36-9, L22-38 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski); note in Exhibit 164, paras 32 and 33 CSV is defned as “Comma Separated Value”.
307 Exhibit 164, para 43.
308 T36-9, L31-56 to T36-10, L1-14 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
309 T36-23, L40-50 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
310 T36-23, L44-45 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
311 T36-23, L47-57 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
312 T36-23, L35-40 (Nickolas Kwiatkowski).
313 Exhibit 164, paras 99-114.
314 Exhibit 164, para 127.

Contract
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5.48 Mr Cowan took into account the false and duplicate defects: he readily accepted that such defects had been
identifed
315. He thought that there were more than a trivial number – in the order of 20 per cent316. He thus
factored into his assessment that just under a quarter of the defects were ones which ought not to be treated
as such. As to test scripts, and the detail and accuracy of them, Mr Cowan explained that subject matter
experts assisted in the preparation and running of them
317. This accorded with Mr Parkinson’s theoretical
statement of the testing process. He agreed that such people are an “extra way” in which scripts can be
verifed for their accuracy from a business point of view
318. He went on to say319:
So to be quite honest, business SMEs are better used to verify the business rules, which in your case…
[is] the award, … and it’s those business rules that need to be validated.
5.49 Mr Kwiatkowski’s limited involvement in UAT is no doubt a reason why he was not aware of these matters
when he gave his evidence. His criticisms, so far as they can be regarded as such rather than merely as his
own observations about the documents, having been provided only recently with the Final UAT Report, are,
I fnd, uninformed by both the theory of which Mr Parkinson gave evidence and the actual work undertaken
by Mr Cowan in his execution of UAT.
Mr Dymock
5.50 Mr Dymock too dealt with the topic of UAT in his statement320. He pointed out that there was a range of
possible explanations for the defects which Mr Cowan had identifed, one of which was that the defects were
true or valid, and the others being that they were incorrectly raised, by reason of incorrect data, duplicate
defects, and items that, in truth, were new requirements
321. At no stage did Mr Dymock suggest, either in his
oral evidence or in his statement, that all or most of the defects which Mr Cowan had indentifed in his Final
UAT Report were not valid ones. He said that about 24 per cent of the Severity 2 defects identifed during
all rounds of UAT were duplicates, “no defects” or were not reproducible
322. This was about the same as
Mr Cowan’s own estimate of the defects which were within this category, as I have mentioned above.
5.51 Mr Dymock’s criticism of the Final UAT Report (to the very limited extent he was critical) was that it
contained insuffcient interpretation of tests results, particularly from a business standpoint
323. It is true
that the Final UAT Report does not descend into the minute detail of analysing the nature of each defect or
seek to explain the signifcance of each. Much of that detail, however, can be found in the daily and weekly
summaries which Mr Cowan prepared and to which Mr Dymock made no more than passing references. But
in no way is it a legitimate criticism in my view to say of the Final UAT report that it lacks suffcient detail.
That report was one which Dr Manfeld had no diffculty in understanding to be a clear sign of a system in
distress. I arrived at the same view, even before having had the advantage of Dr Manfeld’s opinion. The
report was intended for a wide audience (including the members of the Project Directorate and Project
Board). It was important that it remain readable, and that its central points not be lost in minute detail. If
further explanation were required, Mr Cowan could have been asked to give it. In any event, as Mr Cowan
pointed out, the number and nature of the defects he identifed to some extent displaced the need for
detail because there were, in his opinion, no shades of grey in this case
324.
5.52 What also became clear in Mr Dymock’s evidence in particular is the nature of the task which Mr Cowan
undertook. His was not an exercise which used as its basis the requirements which, in a formal sense,
comprised the scope of the Project. IBM had, by this time, brought into existence an RTM, as I have
mentioned above. But it was never agreed by QH as being exhaustive of all the requirements which it
needed in order for the system to meet its needs. Although conducting UAT without there being an agreed
RTM may have been unusual, I have set out above the reasons why QH was no doubt reluctant to accept
that RTM, being principally that by mid-2009 IBM itself, through Mr Doak, had implicitly at least accepted
the system, were it to Go Live on the basis of the formal scope documents, would result in more than
negligible defects in pays
325. That, to some extent, superseded the requirements earlier communicated
because they were, necessarily, incomplete.
315 T36-98, L20-30 to T36-99, L1-9 (Brett Cowan).
316 T36-98, L24-26 (Brett Cowan).
317 T36-94, L52-56 to T36-95, L10-22 (Brett Cowan).
318 T36-56, L1-18 (Shane Parkinson).
319 T36-56, L4-9 (Shane Parkinson).
320 Exhibit 163, paras 43-73.
321 Exhibit 163, para 58.
322 Exhibit 163, para 59.
323 Exhibit 163, para 61(b).
324 T36-97, L10-19 (Brett Cowan).
325 T24-108, L28-L36 (Bill Doak).

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5.53 It is understandable, then, that Mr Cowan was instructed by QH not to use IBM’s RTM326. He accepted, quite
properly in my view, that a UAT tester would ordinarily have an RTM by which, once a problem with the system
was identifed, to trace it back to a requirement. But the purpose of this exercise is more to know how the
problem has come about than to explain whether the problem is serious or not. If the UAT tester, assisted by
subject matter experts, has run a particular pay scenario which has shown the system to have produced a wrong
result on pay, it is no comfort to the customer to know that one or more of the requirements which inform that
calculation have been missed when the requirements were communicated, or that the requirement has been
wrongly coded (ie recorded in computer programme language). The immediate problem for the customer is that,
were the system to Go Live at that point, a staff member will be paid inaccurately.
5.54 The approach of Mr Cowan was to test the system to see if it was functional, namely, to ascertain whether
the pay scenarios which he ran resulted in pays and ones which were accurate. As his Final UAT Report
shows, in UAT4 at least (being the only stage in which he was concerned), there were very many cases in
which those test scenarios failed to produce a pay or an accurate pay.
5.55 Mr Dymock explained that IBM agreed, but without accepting formal contractual responsibility for doing so, to
fx such defects as emerged in UAT4 as affecting net pay
327. “Many” of these problems, Mr Dymock accepted,
were ones which required what he described as a “code change”, namely a change to the programming used in
the system: between, in his view, half and 75 per cent
328. IBM in its submissions, implicitly at least, accepts that
it is responsible for any such errors.
5.56 Upon these defects being identifed and assigned to IBM, and fxed by it, IBM would update the RTM329.
The result was an RTM which was being altered on the run.
It follows that even with Mr Cowan’s testing in UAT, and even with IBM’s rectifcation of such
defects as identifed in UAT, it was likely that the system contained further defects which had
not been identifed and which would affect pay.
5.57 These facts, however, confrm Mr Cowan’s approach to have been competently conducted and properly based.
He was engaged to advise the customer
330. He knew the RTM had not been agreed and had been asked by the
customer to disregard it. The purpose of UAT, all the relevant witnesses accepted, was to ascertain whether, from
a business process point of view, the system was ready to Go Live. Mr Cowan, by focusing, then, on actual pay
scenarios, was properly discharging his responsibilities to the customer. Had he not done so, and merely proceeded
from the outset on the basis of IBM’s RTM, fewer (perhaps far fewer) of the defects affecting pay would ever have
been identifed, and the RTM would never have been updated to incorporate them. The system would, if that
had been the case, have possessed even more problems which affected pay than was the case. Moreover, the
customer would not have received the warning it did of the likely problems with the system’s functionality. Had he
directed testing only to the requirements earlier identifed, and accepting as I do that they were incomplete, UAT
would never have run scenarios outside those requirements. The most, in these circumstances, which UAT would
have identifed were defciencies in the coding of previously communicated requirements.
5.58 There was one further problem, however, which Mr Cowan’s approach identifed in the system and in the
requirements as had by that time been communicated to IBM. UAT, Mr Dymock accepted, tested only a
sample of the system
331. That meant that, given the problems which Mr Cowan had discovered in the parts
of the system which were tested in UAT, it was reasonable to assume defects existed in parts not tested,
and defects, which, like those actually detected, affected pay.
5.59 It follows that even with Mr Cowan’s testing in UAT, and even with IBM’s rectifcation of such defects as
identifed in UAT, it was likely that the system contained further defects which had not been identifed and
which would affect pay. This is, in effect, what Mr Cowan said in his Final UAT Report. It is a proposition
with which Mr Dymock agreed in his oral evidence
332.
326 T36-93, L51-55 (Brett Cowan).
327 T36-64, L21-24 (Mark Dymock).
328 T36-70, L40-46 (Mark Dymock).
329 T36-80, L29-33 (Mark Dymock).
330 Something which Mr Dymock accepted: T36-78, L30 (Mark Dymock).
331 T36-64, L47-57 to T36-65, L1-12 (Mark Dymock).
332 T36-79, L22-30 (Mark Dymock).

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5.60 These factors lead me to conclude, contrary to IBM’s submissions, that had Mr Cowan conducted UAT
by reference only to IBM’s RTM as it stood at the outset of that form of testing, very many defects in the
system would not have been identifed which were likely to affect the pays the system produced. Moreover,
it is very likely that the system, after the completion of UAT, contained further such problems which had not
to that date been discovered, but which also affected the pays the system later produced.
Mr Cowan
5.61 Mr Cowan conducted the exercise he was retained to carry out competently and professionally. Moreover,
his approach to that task stands as a rare example in this Project of a cogent warning provided to the
parties of problems which clearly existed, but which both parties had to some extent been reluctant to
accept and to resolve. Had the warnings he gave in his Final UAT Report been heeded, then the system
ought not to have gone live when it did and many of the problems experienced by the system would have
been avoided.
5.62 There is one aspect of IBM’s submissions with which it is convenient to deal at this point. IBM insists upon
the use of the term “defect” to denote only a failure to meet a requirement communicated by the customer
and within the scope of the solution
333. The term, however, was also used in the course of the system
implementation to refer to a shortcoming in the system, regardless of whether it arose from a previously
communicated requirement of the customer. This, IBM correctly submitted, is evident in particular in
Mr Cowan’s use of that term in the course of UAT4
334.
5.63 There are at least three reasons, however, why the caution which IBM urges is misplaced. First, as I have
elsewhere recorded, and as the IBM witness Mr Dymock in particular accepted, daily meetings took place at
which IBM was represented during the later stages of UAT4 in which such “issues” as arose were assigned
to the party assessed as being responsible for it. Those issues were referred to as “defects”. This occurred,
Mr Dymock explained, notwithstanding that not all of those issues were ones which IBM considered itself
contractually bound to correct
335. Secondly, also as elsewhere detailed, by mid-2009, IBM (through Mr Doak)
was accepting responsibility for fxing such “defects” (Mr Doak’s word) as affected pay (or net pay)
336. This
was done without reference to requirements and whether there had been some failure of the customer to
articulate them. Thirdly, Mr Cowan’s identifcation of problems was informed by subject matter experts who
tested the system by reference to actual pay scenarios. Defects which that process identifed were, leaving
aside false and duplicate defects (which Mr Cowan accepted arose), defects in the sense that the problem
needed to be fxed in order for the system to pay staff accurately.
System and System Integration testing

5.64 SOW 8 provided for a test phase for the Project which included system testing337. System testing and system
integration testing were an IBM deliverable
338.
The purpose of system testing was to verify that the individual solution components functioned individually
as well as together to form the Workbrain/SAP HR Payroll Solution proposed by IBM
339.
The QHIC Scope Defnition identifed that a core component of system testing would be to validate
the Workbrain confgurations to ensure that awards and rostering were performing as per business
5.65
5.66

requirements340. The QHIC Scope Defnition stated that there were 300 defned business rules for QH and
that
341:
The system test approach will be to build a matrix that tests each Business rule against its assigned
Calculation Group. For example, the Daily Overtime Rule (351506) is confgured for part time and casual
Visiting Medical Offcers so this combination will need to be tested.
After the individual combinations are tested, combinations of scenarios will be tested where, for example a
Nurse has an RDO, some Overtime, is on-call etc. Rostering is also managed in Workbrain for this release.
333 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 146.
334 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), para 146.
335 T36-46, L12-19 (Mark Dymock).
336 T24-108, L28-L36 (Bill Doak).
337 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-24, para 7.1.5 (SOW 8, Version 1.2).
338 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 95-16-95-18, Deliverables 12 and 12A (SOW 8 Version 1.2); Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 77, para 2.5.6.
339 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 291-15; Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 170.
340 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 172.
341 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 172.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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5.67 The purpose of system integration testing is to verify “the integration of all applications, including
interfaces internal and external to the organisation, with their hardware, software and infrastructure
components in a production-like environment”
342. Its focus was the transfer of data between the systems,
SAP and Workbrain, and how successfully that data was sent and received
343.
5.68 The QHIC Scope Defnition identifed that the existing interfaces from the Department of Housing pilot
would be utilised for the Project and where possible test cases from the HRBS would be utilised
344. New
interfaces required for QHIC Project were identifed, which included an interface from SAP to Workbrain and
Workbrain to SAP.
5.69 The Master Test Plan prescribed the nature of the system and integration testing to be undertaken, along
with the entry and exit criteria for each test stream. The exit criteria were
345:
100% of High Priority test cases executed or exceptions signed off by QHEST.
1. All Severity 1 and 2 defects resolved.
2. All Severity 3 & 4 defects outstanding have documented workarounds (agreed with QHEST and
QHIC Project Team), and an agreement reached on when they will be corrected.
3. All deliverables are completed and approved
4. Business Stakeholders agree that any outstanding defects do not impact the production release.
5.70 It was a requirement also that a system test completion or interim system test summary report be produced
as a requirement for exiting system testing
346.
5.71 QH engaged KJ Ross & Associates (KJ Ross) to provide an assurance of the test phases and to recommend
any improvements to ensure that all testing verifed the production readiness of the new solution
347.
5.72 On 9 December 2008, KJ Ross conducted an audit and found that system testing was incomplete and
system test exit criteria had not been met. That frm reported a high number of outstanding Severity 1 and
2 defects; 90 test cases had not been executed, making it likely that further defects would be discovered
348.
5.73 The audit concluded that, based on the current trend, it was unlikely that “system testing will meet 100%
Severity 1 and Severity 2 defect removal within the available four week window”
349. It recommended
reviewing the schedule for UAT and other dependent activities including Go Live and “that compromises on
either quality or schedule were inevitable at this stage”
350. The audit further recommended moving out of
scope any further functional changes and freeing development resources to focus on defect resolution
351.
5.74 On 17 March 2009, KJ Ross conducted a further audit focusing on the issues found in the UAT execution
conducted in January 2009 and reviewing the readiness of the system to recommence UAT
352. The audit
concluded
353:
[T]here is insuffcient evidence from the vendor of successful and adequate completion of System
Testing and System Integration Testing. The low level of trust in the system is forcing excessive
coverage of System Testing and System Integration test cases within the UAT phase, which impacts the
schedule and distracts from the focus on validating the end-to-end business process.
5.75 On 24 April 2009, KJ Ross conducted an audit of the System Test and System Integration Test (SIT)
Completion Report to be delivered by IBM
354. The audit expressed concern that many business requirements
listed on the RTM were shown to have no test cases listed or that test cases were not linked to business
requirements
355. The audit recommended that an “urgent reconciliation should be conducted” noting
342 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 170.
343 Exhibit 102, paras 1.2, 3.1.2.
344 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 173.
345 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 291-36.
346 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 95-16-95-17; Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 291-35.
347 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 278.
348 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 278.
349 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 278.
350 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 279.
351 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 279.
352 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 275-284.
353 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 284.
354 Exhibit 108. It is unclear whether this document is the fnal audit, but KJ Ross provided this document to the Commission in response to a request to provide the “Audit of draft
QHIC System Test and SIT completion report content (24 April 2009)”.
355 Exhibit 108, at page 2, ID13.

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that “there is an unacceptable risk that some requirements may have had no testing” and this “should be
considered an unacceptable outcome for test exit”
356.
5.76 On or about 1 May 2009, the State accepted the System Test and SIT Completion Report stating that the
State “believed that IBM have been able to demonstrate satisfactory links between execution results and
the Requirement Traceability Matrix and believe that on evidence provided that test execution has matched
the requirements matrix”
357. This must have been false because it seems clear, as I have earlier explained,
that the RTM which IBM was using had never been accepted by the State as a full and accurate record of
QH’s business requirements
358.
5.77 On 5 May 2009, IBM delivered the fnal System Test and SIT Completion Report359. On 17 December 2009,
IBM delivered the Project Completion Report (A-G) Test Phase Completion Report (3.15), produced for the
purpose of verifying that IBM had executed the required test streams
360. The Test Phase Completion Report
documented that the System Test and SIT Completion Report accepted on 1 May 2009 was evidence of the
completion of those respective test streams.
5.78 Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report, as I have mentioned, identifed that there had been a “signifcant and
unplanned burden of requirements clarifcation and defect discovery and resolution placed onto UAT”
361. Both
of the options he identifed as being open to the State referred to likely inadequacies with system testing
362.
5.79 This report ought to have alerted the State to the real possibility that the system and system integration
tests had not been conducted properly and thoroughly.
5.80 A “Management Response” was prepared by QHEST to the Final UAT Report. It included also comments
from IBM
363. On the topic of the quality of system testing, IBM asserted364:
[T]he UAT Test Completion Report questions the quality of system testing simply by referencing the
number of UAT defects found. There is no other evidence for this assertion and no context around the
UAT defect numbers.
5.81 IBM considered that raw defect numbers to not provide “suffcient context for decision making, risk
assessments or any conclusions about systems testing”
365 and is recorded as having said that the system
test and SIT strategy and coverage have been reviewed externally numerous times during the course of the
project, including the “Test Completion Report (which was audited by KJ Ross)” and
366:
At no stage before, during or after system test and SIT, was the strategy and effectiveness of these
activities questioned. All testing was performed against a clear Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM)
and this coverage was confrmed by KJ Ross during their own audit.
5.82 There is no evidence before the Commission that KJ Ross ever approved or signed off on the System Test
and SIT Completion Report
367. Furthermore, there is no evidence that KJ Ross performed any further audits
on system and SIT testing after 24 April 2009, a year before the system went live and well before it could be
thought, by any reasonable participant, to have been in a state capable of being tested in such a way that the
results would be informative of how the system (as ultimately was to be delivered) would be likely to operate.
5.83 Requests were issued by the Commission to IBM compelling the production of the fnal instances of the
system testing and system integration testing for the period October 2009 to 14 December 2010
368. Other
than the reports identifed above, IBM produced no documents evidencing that further system testing or
system integration testing was conducted after 5 May 2009
369.
356 Exhibit 108, at pages 2-3.
357 Exhibit 102A.
358 T26-16, L10-28 (John Gower); T26-20, L43-44 (John Gower); T26-57, L49-52 (Paul Hickey); T24-56, L1-21 (Brett Cowan); T25-6, L17-54 (Bill Doak); Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page
322.
359 Exhibit 102.
360 Exhibit 86.
361 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 287.
362 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 287.
363 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at pages 384-391.
364 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 384.
365 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 384.
366 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 385.
367 Bill Doak accepted in his oral evidence that the KJ Ross Report of 17 March 2009 and the Final UAT Report do not constitute an approval by KJ Ross of system Testing: T25-108, L44
– 49 (Bill Doak); T25-109, L1-3 (Bill Doak).
368 Exhibit 126.
369 Exhibit 126, at page 8.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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5.84 Mr Cowan’s evidence was that UAT should only be conducted when system and system integration
testing has been completed
370. UAT is not, he said, a test that is designed to fnd defects371. The number
of functional defects he identifed in UAT in this case was evidence that this was “not a system ready for
UAT”
372 and gave rise to an “enormous risk” on Go Live373. He said, and I accept, that374:
UAT is all about confdence, it’s about instilling confdence in the end user of the system that the thing is
going to work, and that the precursors to the UAT 4 as well as the
227 defects according in these stats,
which I don’t see other ones, but let’s say the
227 functional defects is discovered and they’re sev 2
defects that are found in there are why it should have highlighted a complete lack of confdence in the
functionality of the system.
5.85 In particular, Mr Cowan raised concerns about the length of time between the commencement of UAT in
2008 and its conclusion, as well as the amount of “code churn” that occurred during that period
375:
[T]he amount of coding that’s being changed as a result of all of that testing and all of those defects brings
an enormous amount of risk. In my current role, when I see that someone has gone and made changes to
code, for a week I insist on re-system testing because that’s what system testing does, it fnds out these
things for you that you have actually truly delivered the functionality you expect. To have a year go past
where you haven’t re-executed a comprehensive system test on a system like this was astounding.
5.86 Mr Cowan advised that further system and system integration testing ought to have been conducted to test
the functionality of the solution. At every stage, he was advised by Mr Gower of IBM that “[s]ystem testing
has been signed off. We will not go back to that”
376.
5.87 Mr Doak377, Mr Gower378 and Mr Hickey379 rejected the assertion that the evidence of functional defects
discovered in UAT were evidence that system and system integration testing were not properly executed.
5.88 IBM sought to revisit the issue of the adequacy of system and system integration testing in the late
statements of Messrs Kwiatkowski and Dymock and in the oral evidence at the public hearings which resumed
on 18 June 2013. Mr Dymock, IBM’s testing manager with responsibility for that form of testing, referred in his
statement to the fact that the State had accepted the completion report for these forms of testing
380. There is
no dispute about that. His oral evidence, however, confrmed that a “full” system and systems integration test
was undertaken in the early part of 2009
381. It is that testing which KJ Ross audited. But there were changes to
the scope of the Project in, for example, June 2009 (by Change 184 for example). Further changes were made
as defects were identifed in UAT and assigned to, or accepted by, IBM. The making of these changes, while
not usual in Mr Dymock’s opinion
382, nevertheless necessitated, he said, system and system integration testing
to be revisited
383. That was not done in this case by reconducting a full system and system integration test, but
by testing those parts of the system which changed, as well as those parts expected to have been affected
by the changes
384. But doing so relies upon an accurate identifcation of those parts of the system that might
be affected by the changes, which involves some risk in having done so
385. KJ Ross never audited, Mr Dymock
accepted, this additional system and systems integration testing
386. The problem here, if there was a problem,
is likely to have arisen from:
a. IBM not having been suffciently accurate in its assessment of the parts of the system which were affected
by the changes occurring in UAT and as a result of the changes to the Project scope. There were very many
such changes and it therefore seems to me to be a very likely area from which this problem might have
stemmed. Mr Cowan’s concern was that he had “absolutely no faith that the number of these multiplier
effects of all the different risks that you buy into when you make a change wouldn’t have meant that there
were signifcant risks left in the system”
387;
370 Exhibit 101, para 15; T24-5, L51-56 (Brett Cowan).
371 Exhibit 101, para 15.
372 T24-7, L36 (Brett Cowan).
373 T24-14, L44 (Brett Cowan).
374 T24-66, L44–52 (Brett Cowan).
375 T24-31, L4-13 (Brett Cowan).
376 T24-14, L46-51 (Brett Cowan).
377 T25-63, L52-56 to T25-64, L1-12 (Bill Doak).
378 T26-41, L1-16 (John Gower).
379 T26-114, L15-26 (Paul Hickey).
380 Exhibit 163, para 40.
381 T36-82, L1-23 (Mark Dymock).
382 T36-80, L55-56 to T36-81, L1-2 (Mark Dymock).
383 T36-81, L4-26 (Mark Dymock).
384 T36-81, L20 (Mark Dymock).
385 T36-81, L23-26 (Mark Dymock); T36-82, L25-31 (Mark Dymock); T36-102, L40-50 (Brett Cowan).
386 T36-83, L3-5 (Mark Dymock).
387 T36-102, L49-53 (Brett Cowan).

Contract
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b. the fact that Mr Cowan’s UAT testing was, as it quite properly ought to have been, conducted on a sample
only of the system. It was likely that the kind and number of defects he identifed in the sample existed
also in the parts of the system which were not tested. It follows, and Mr Dymock in effect accepted, that
undetected problems would not have been the subject of this subsequent and targeted form of system and
system integration testing
388.
The evidence suggests a real possibility that, despite the State’s acceptance of the System
Test and SIT Completion Report, system and/or system integration testing were either not
completed to the threshold required by the Master Test Plan, or the changes made to the
system after early 2009 were not subjected to further such testing as they ought to have been.
5.89 IBM submitted that the software having passed system and system integration testing, and that report
having been accepted after independent audit, it should be the end of the matter
389. Were the matter as
simple as IBM would have it, I might have accepted that submission. IBM, however, has failed to face up
to the unexplained absence of documentation showing system and system integration testing after the
changes to the Project which occurred after March/April 2009, the strength of Mr Cowan’s evidence as to the
likely inadequacy of system and system integration testing and the limited assistance which Mr Parkinson’s
evidence offers (he having had no involvement whatsoever in the Project). IBM’s assertions that the “results of
the testing were audited” and that “further changes to the software were system tested individually”
390 leave
unanswered the absence of any audit showing the system to have passed system and system integration
testing and what were the results of the individual testing and why there is no audit of those aspects of it.
5.90 It is likely, and I put it no higher than that, that system and/or system integration testing had not been
properly performed, or performed on the system in the state in which it ultimately went live. Dr Manfeld’s
evidence supports this conclusion. Initially, he considered it “puzzling” that the system issues identifed in
the 9 December 2008 and 17 March 2009 KJ Ross audits were rectifed by 5 May 2009 as documented
by the System Test and SIT Completion Report in light of the evidence of Mr Cowan and the Final UAT
Report
391. The assumption he made was that these system issues had been rectifed by the time the
System Test and SIT Completion Report was delivered and that the report was an accurate representation
of the test results
392. Most importantly for present purposes, he did not consider the System Test and SIT
Completion Report to be inconsistent with the fndings of the Final UAT Report or Mr Cowan’s evidence on
the point. He held concerns as to the scope of the system and system integration testing performed by IBM.
He considered it likely that the scope of the testing had been uncertain
393.
5.91 The evidence suggests a real possibility that, despite the State’s acceptance of the System Test and SIT
Completion Report, system and/or system integration testing were either not completed to the threshold
required by the Master Test Plan, or the changes made to the system after early 2009 were not subjected to
further such testing as they ought to have been.
5.92 It is beyond doubt, however, that changes to the scope of the Project prejudiced proper testing, which was a
product, once again, of a rushed approach.
5.93 The evidence of Mr Cowan suggests that the system was not suffciently tested to verify that the individual
solution components functioned individually as well as together, given the functional defects which appeared
in UAT. IBM’s contention that these defects were not a product of the quality of system or system integration
testing performed by it is rejected. I found Mr Cowan to be a precise and honest witness. He was logical and
clear in his explanation of these matters and his evidence had the advantage of being of a person with some
independence from both IBM and the State.
5.94 The problems experienced after Go Live offer further evidence that functional problems existed in the
system, which system and system integration testing ought to have revealed.
388 T36-84, L8-50 (Mark Dymock).
389 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 136, 137.
390 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 141-143.
391 T30-54, L16 (Dr David Manfeld).
392 T30-56, L15-17 (Dr David Manfeld).
393 T30-56, L13-32 (Dr David Manfeld).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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payroll performance testing
5.95 It was a requirement of the QHIC Scope Defnition that payroll performance testing be conducted in the
test focus areas for that form of testing, although it was not an acceptance criterion in its own right
394. A
“Memorandum of Understanding” between IBM and QH dated 18 September 2008 set as a Go/No Go
gate the point in the target schedule when both the Award Interpretation Checkpoint and the Payroll
Performance Validation Checkpoint were completed. That Memorandum left to be defned “[c]lear and
objective performance criteria” for this gate as the “sole basis on which … [the parties would] decide
whether to continue the project or stop work”
395.
5.96 The ESC (Government Members), on 9 October 2008, noted an extension to what was described as the
“performance validation checkpoint”
396. Mr Doak is recorded as noting that acceptance criteria must also
be met at this time, and IBM must demonstrate payroll performance validation and Workbrain performance
in terms of handling awards
397.
Had the State invoked the condition precedent, it could have used that event to seek to reset
the Project and improved considerably its negotiating position with IBM. It was a grave error
of the State not to have invoked the condition precedent. IBM would not have hesitated, had
it been in the State’s position, to make full use of the default.
5.97 Change 129 (executed on 12 November 2008) introduced Payroll Performance Testing (in Enclosure 1) as
a condition precedent to the incorporation of that Change into the contract
398. The completion of payroll
processing performance testing also became a payment milestone
399.
5.98 The objective of Payroll Performance Test Criteria was to establish what the current performance of the
solution was at the time, and to assess whether the system could meet the QH performance targets of
400:
a. the 7th day (First Sunday) process completed within a window of 12 hours.
b. the
Pay Monday process completed within a window of 8 hours.
5.99 The Performance Validation test was scheduled to be completed on 31 October 2008. The tests sought to
measure the adequacy of the current performance of the Solution to ensure that the Daily and Final batch
runs (for payroll) would be completed within given timeframes: specifcally the Monday following the last
scheduled interface from Workbrain
401.
5.100 The “overall acceptance” of the payroll performance criteria was a matter for the State, based upon either402:
• current performance meets the performance targets for the production system altered to make an
allowance for the exclusion of retrospective pay adjustments which are:
• The
7th day (First Sunday) process can be completed within a window of 8 hours.
• The Pay Monday process can be completed within window of 6 hours;
or
• an agreed Performance Improvement Plan based on changes identified to address performance
bottlenecks found during the measurement of the performance of the current solution. This plan to
be implemented to allow performance to be tested and proven by end of November
2008.
5.101 The test was to be conducted on an estimated 70,000 employee migration population for one pay period,
with an average of 1,000,000 employee wage type calculations generated per pay run, with system
resources running at not greater than 80% capacity
403.
394 Exhibit 63, Volume 4, at page 175.
395 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 30.
396 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 266.
397 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 266.
398 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 29-34.
399 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 26.
400 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 29.
401 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 29.
402 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 30.
403 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 30.

Contract
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5.102 Changes 174, 177 and 179 reasserted and maintained these requirements, including their status as a
“condition precedent”
404.
5.103 IBM did not satisfy the Payroll Performance test requirements. Mr Hickey405 and Mr Doak406 accepted that.
The Payroll Performance Go / No Go test results of 28 November 2008 show that the elapsed time was 10
hours, 39 minutes and 52 seconds
407. That test was run on 59,193 employees and 757,675 records408. This,
however, was a slight improvement from the test results of 2 November 2008 (11 hours and 58 minutes)
409.
5.104 At the QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee meeting on 10 December 2008, it was agreed that
Performance Testing had passed “half” of the gate
410. By then, the Pay Sunday test was down to 8 hours 34
minutes, and although it may not have been the 8 hours that was “hoped for”, it was “enough to work with”.
Pay Monday remained a problem. It had taken over 10 hours. The threshold was reduced to 6 hours. It was
noted that the excess of hours for Pay Sunday had been brought down signifcantly. IBM was also expected
to ask for an extension of 2 weeks to correct Pay Monday, pushing the Go Live date to 4 May 2009
411.
5.105 At the Executive Steering Committee Meeting on 18 December 2008, Mr Doak reported that Payroll
Performance Validation testing had processed 750,000 records in under 8 hours using 7 Central
Processing Units
412. He proposed splitting the pay run to Saturday followed by a “skinnier” pay run
Monday to pick up variations. This was considered by the Committee to be a new proposal and one which
required further consideration
413.
5.106 The QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee, on 23 December 2008, recommended414:
QH allow IBM through the gate. They passed Pay Sunday but not Monday … CorpTech has a view that IBM
have not met the gate but they have introduced an action plan. Their advice would be the gate should
lapse and CorpTech work with IBM on a go forward … There is confdence in Workbrain and enough
information to get the time of Pay Monday down.
5.107 The State, despite these events, accepted the PPV Testing Phase Completion Report415.
5.108 The State, it can be seen, abandoned what the Payroll Performance Testing had required of IBM. IBM had
not passed the “Pay Monday” component of that test. That being so, the proper and diligent course was
to invoke the condition precedent, with the consequence that IBM would be in immediate breach of the
contract. Doing so was not only something which the State was entitled to do, but it was the obvious and
sensible thing to do.
5.109 IBM’s submissions on this issue were to the effect that, although the system did not pass this test, there
were comments by some State offcials to the effect that this might not be of signifcance
416, but it did not
suggest that the system had ever passed the test.
5.110 IBM had agreed to the test regime. There was good reason for the State to insist upon its satisfaction. Pay
runs, after all, ought to be completed reasonably expeditiously. The State had, no doubt, set the times which
the test imposed by reference to those it thought necessary. Had the State invoked the condition precedent,
it could have used that event to seek to reset the Project and improved considerably its negotiating position
with IBM. It was a grave error of the State not to have invoked the condition precedent. IBM would not
have hesitated, had it been in the State’s position, to make full use of the default. IBM, in its approach to
Changes, made clear from the outset that it would insist on its strict contractual rights. The State declined,
inexplicably in my view, to engage on the same basis.
404 Change Request 174, Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 190; Change Request 177, Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 266; Change Request 179, Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 285.
405 Exhibit 109, paras 150, 157, 158; T26-72, L9-10 (Paul Hickey).
406 Exhibit 103, paras 133, 136 (Bill Doak).
407 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 207.
408 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 207.
409 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 209.
410 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 280.
411 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 280.
412 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 325.
413 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 325.
414 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 332.
415 Exhibit 86, at page 4.
416 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 126-129.

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5.111 Responsibility for the failure of the State to invoke the condition precedent lies with the members of the
QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee
417.
5.112 An understanding of the State’s sacrifce of its rights in this respect is completed by a summary of the
events which occurred between the QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee meeting in late 2008 and
the agreement between the parties of Change 184.
5.113 As I mentioned earlier when considering the issue of Project scope, in mid-2009, the State and IBM agreed,
in Change 184, to “clarify” the scope of the Project. Between December 2008 and March 2009, serious
attempts were made by, principally, Mr Bird (a CorpTech contract manager) and Mr Campbell to take formal
action against IBM for what they suggested, having obtained advice from Mr Swinson, was a series of
breaches of the contract by IBM.
5.114 Mr Bird had concerns about the timeliness and quality of IBM’s contract deliverables. On 8 July 2008,
Mr Beeston as Program Director, SPO, signed a briefng note to the Director-General which Ms Perrott
endorsed. It recommended that CorpTech should
418:
1. [E]scalate to IBM’s senior management concerns about its performance …
4. [R]equest and require IBM to appoint an external partner to conduct a formal quality review of the
overall program …
On 8 August 2008, IBM delivered a Notice of Delay for the Go Live scheduled date of 17 November 2008
and gave an indicative date of March/April 2009 instead
419. In response Mr Campbell and others spoke
to Ms Perrott about their concerns with IBM’s performance. She instructed them to contact Mr Swinson
for advice on what options the State had as to the contract
420. On 25 August 2008, Ms Perrott emailed
Mr Grierson to brief him on recent events. She said
421:
Mal, while I fundamentally believe that we have to make this work, I believe that we are nearing the point
where we need to take more formal action with IBM. While Bill Doak has been a refreshing change to the
project, the content of the letters has a tone of absolving them from any responsibility and making light
of the fact that IBM’s performance to date has been less than impressive.
On 25 August 2008, Mr Swinson advised Ms Perrott422:
IBM … is unlikely to take matters seriously … unless a Notice of Breach is issued. Although this is a
serious step, it is not unusual … in circumstances such as this. This also increases the customer’s
leverage in any further discussions … . If the customer does not issue a Notice of Breach … then the
customer’s position downstream (if matters do not improve) will be much worse. It is always best to raise
issues in a timely and appropriate manner.
He recommended a review of IBM’s performance against the contract to determine whether there were
“genuine alternatives to having IBM complete the project”, and the issue of a Notice of Breach if the review
established there had been material breaches of contract by IBM. A decision whether to terminate the
contract could then be made
423.
Mr Bird asked Mr Swinson to draft a letter, to be sent by Ms Perrott to Mr Doak, to assert
inter alia that IBM
was in material breach of contract for failing to meet the Go Live date of 18 November 2008
424.
5.115 The draft notice of breach was shown to Mr James Brown for his review. He told Mr Campbell, Mr Bird and
Mr Beeston that the government did not wish to engage in a long legal battle with IBM, and the breach
notice was “volcanic”
425. He said that the Notice of Breach would not be sent. Mr James Brown could not
recall whether he made these remarks, but he stopped short of denying that he made them
426.
417 Members present at the QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee meeting on 23 December 2008 were Mr Peter Douglas, Mr Tony Price, Mr Russ Wilde, Mr Terry Burns, Ms Brigid
Bourke, Mr Paul Monaghan, Ms Janette Jones, Ms Sylvia Chapman, Ms Amanda Doughty, Mr Michael Kalimnios, Mr Philip Hood, Mr James Brown and Mr John Beeston: see Exhibit
63, Volume 7, at page 331.
418 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 108.
419 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 230.
420 Exhibit 68, paras 51, 52; Exhibit 28A, para 77.
421 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 287.
422 Exhibit 28A, Annexure 8.
423 Exhibit 28A, Annexure 8.
424 Exhibit 68, para 57.
425 T18-32, L12-39 (Malcolm Campbell); Exhibit 68, para 58.
426 T19-9, L1–18 (James Brown).

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5.116 Mr Brown may have been expressing his own opinion, or he may have been told, or sensed, that Mr Grierson
was opposed to the State relying upon its contractual rights with IBM. Ms Perrott advised the Executive
Steering Committee meeting of 11 September 2008 that Mr Grierson did “not agree” with Mallesons’ advice
that a breach notice should be served on IBM
427. Mr Grierson, according to Ms Perrott, had requested “that
alternative strategies be considered”. Ms Perrott observed
428 that Mr Grierson intended to raise his concerns
about IBM’s performance with its senior managers when he met them on a planned trip to America.
Mr Grierson said in evidence
429 that in about September 2008 he “didn’t want a breach notice … to drop
into a legal mode at that stage”; he wanted to “make sure scope (was) locked down” and then see “how IBM
performed”. He told Ms Perrott of his preference for that approach.
5.117 In January 2009, Mr Beeston drafted a briefng note for the Director-General. Its purpose was to brief
Mr Grierson on “developments and the current status of the … Lattice replacement project …” and was said
to be “relevant to informing the Director-General’s impending discussions with IBM and … directions he may
give to CorpTech regarding its management of the … Contract or … negotiations scheduled with IBM”
430. The
briefng note was critical of IBM and its performance of the contract. It noted a risk that CorpTech’s “failure …
to formally notify IBM that it is in breach … may give rise to the rebuttal that the customer has accepted the
delay and that time is no longer of the essence”
431. Mr Beeston did not sign the draft. In the ordinary course
of events it would have gone to Mr Brown for endorsement, then to Ms Berenyi and on to Ms MacDonald as
Associate Director-General before making its way to Mr Grierson. Mr Brown did not endorse it. He said he
had no recollection of the note but denies preventing the note progressing along the public service path.
5.118 In any event Mr Backhouse, Mr Bird and Mr Campbell met on 14 January 2009 to consider what, if any,
steps should be taken concerning the contract and IBM’s performance of it
432. Mr Swinson had advised that
CorpTech “should formalise its position by issuing Breach Notices to IBM in relation to … ongoing delays”.
That opinion was endorsed by those at the meeting and in March 2009, Mr Bird asked Mr Swinson to assist
with drafting a formal Notice
433. Mr Swinson provided a draft on 23 March 2009.
By early January 2009, the State had lost confdence in IBM and realised that the cost of
completing the Shared Services Initiative would be far greater than IBM had originally
estimated.
5.119 In the meantime on 29 January 2009, the parties met in Mr Swinson’s offces to discuss the status of the
contract
434. The State’s representatives were Mr Beeston, Mr Campbell and Mr Bird from CorpTech, Mr Burns
from QH, Mr Backhouse from the Department of Public Works and Mr Doak and Mr Paul Ray from IBM.
Mr Swinson and a solicitor, Ms Bowe, also attended. Mr Swinson’s recollection was that Mr Campbell was
quite aggressive towards IBM and accused it of a breach of contract in missing the Go Live date
435. Mr Doak
proposed a contract variation to set a new date. Mr Swinson took CorpTech’s side saying that the State
wished “to hold IBM to the contract”. Mr Swinson also remembered Mr Doak threatening to stop work if the
State commenced legal proceedings; IBM “would walk off the job”
436. According to Ms Bowe’s note of the
meeting, Mr Doak said
437:
If moving to ‘legal dispute’ then move to that phase now:
IBM stop project and focus on dispute issues.
5.120 When questioned on the point Mr Doak said that what he said, and intended, was that if the State were to
move to issue a Notice of Breach, IBM would contest the validity of the Notice on the basis that it was not in
breach of contract
438. The project had been delayed by events not of IBM’s making. If the State commenced
a legal dispute IBM would redeploy resources from the project to compiling evidence to support its case.
427 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 13.
428 Exhibit 53D, para 12; Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 12.
429 T28-108, L36-43 (Malcolm Grierson).
430 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 25.
431 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 27.
432 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 35-1.
433 Exhibit 28A, para 79.
434 Exhibit 28A, Annexure JVS9.
435 Exhibit 28A, para 87.
436 Exhibit 28A, para 90.
437 Exhibit 28A, Annexure JVS9.
438 T24-116, L18-34 (Bill Doak).

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Mr Swinson thought, and advised CorpTech, that it was unlikely that IBM would in fact “walk off the job”.
Mr Doak’s evidence appears to be that it would not, but that the project might be further delayed by the
need to respond to any Notice of Breach.
5.121 In March 2009, Mr Swinson sent Mr Bird a further draft Notice of Breach and a draft of a briefng note for
Mr Bird to give Mr Brown in support of the Notice of Breach. Mr Bird and Mr Campbell advised Mr Brown
that the Breach Notice would soon be ready for issue. Mr Brown, however, told them that the government
was “not going to go down that route, there has been too much water under the bridge”. They were told
instead to “continue negotiating an extension of time and … a new Change Request … ”
439. At a different
level CorpTech was negotiating with IBM for what became Change 184. Mr Brown (and those senior to
him) preferred that course to disputation. Mr Campbell concluded that his superiors in CorpTech wished
to avoid conflict with IBM and accordingly his ability to enforce the terms and conditions of the contract
was weakened. The approach taken on behalf of the State to its negotiations with IBM may be seen in
Ms Berenyi’s evidence. She had said in her statement
440 that she considered the original estimate “in the
order of $6M” for the payroll replacement “a gross underestimate”. She was asked if that assessment
influenced her consideration of Change 184 with its additional payment to IBM of $9M. She said
441:
Absolutely. … Mal Grierson … understood that this was a complex project and … IBM … was working to
deliver a solution … certainly Bill Doak … left nobody … misunderstanding that IBM believed this project
was costing them money and … we had to look at how we dealt with this going forward and … resolved
the delivery of the system in a timeframe … reasonable to meet the requirements of Queensland Health.
… We had to keep working with IBM and … we wanted a working relationship that would actually develop
… an end result.
5.122 Having given up its right to invoke the condition precedent, the State adopted the same loose approach
to Change 184. That Change, as Mr Bird said, “rewrites history”
442, in the sense that it attempted to set
the scope for the LATTICE replacement in mid-2009 when scope should have been set and agreed early in
2008. The real problem with it was, as I have found, that those who negotiated and agreed it did not give
it suffcient time or thought, and failed to give any proper attention to whether it would indeed achieve the
ends they required of it, principally, a functional payroll system. It did not achieve its objective.
the Rescoping
5.123 By early January 2009, the State had lost confdence in IBM and realised that the cost of completing the
Shared Services Initiative would be far greater than IBM had originally estimated. These factors led to a
decision, on about 27 January 2009, to restrict IBM’s involvement, at least until the Interim Solution was
completed, to that Project only.
5.124 This issue is of interest because it raises the question why, if the State had such a dim view of IBM’s
performance on the Interim Solution, it would continue to permit IBM to carry out work on it, bearing in mind
that QH was a large and complex agency which posed particular challenges in any system implementation.
5.125 The decision to “rescope” the contract in this manner was the culmination of events in 2008, a summary of
which is set out below.
5.126 IBM’s ITO response had recommended a two phase approach to the implementation of the whole-ofgovernment Shared Services Initiative443. The Interim Solution was to be undertaken frst, along with
preliminary work in DETA (as part of the Phase 1 roll out).
5.127 On 8 July 2008, CorpTech identifed “performance issues” with IBM including444:
a. weakness of its PDO (Program Delivery Offce) to develop and enforce systematic, program-wide
standards for methodologies, quality, reporting, management of streams and co-ordination of interstream dependencies;
b. an inconsistent quality of its deliverables;
c. an inability to meet many of the contracted delivery dates; and
d. a focus on its internal fnancial needs at the expense of timely or quality deliverables.
439 Exhibit 73, para 48.
440 Exhibit 113, para 214.
441 T27-80, L4-13 to T27-81, L1-10 (Margaret Berenyi).
442 T18-88, L19-21 (Christopher Bird).
443 Exhibit 4, Volume 14, Item 15, at page 34.
444 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 101.

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5.128 CorpTech recommended escalation of these issues to IBM’s senior management and requested an external
partner to perform quality reviews of the overall program
445.
5.129 By letter dated 15 August 2008, Mr Kalimnios of QH advised CorpTech that the whole-of-government
engagement of IBM should be questioned given the current delay of QHIC and DETA and the “QH position
is that we have limited confdence in IBM’s ability to deliver on the QHIC Project”
446.
5.130 On 19 August 2008 (and at the request of QH), Mallesons advised that CorpTech should determine whether
there were genuine alternatives to having IBM complete the project; and determine whether or not to
terminate, in whole or in part, the contract for material breach by IBM
447.
5.131 After this advice was given, Ms Perrott told Mr Grierson on 25 August 2008 that448:
All other HR releases be put on hold until these releases [DETA design and build and QH LATTICE
replacement] are substantially completed. This would mean that the WoG HR scope would be built as part
of the DETA project and the WorkBrain scope would be built as part of the QH project.
5.132 On 29 August 2008, a briefng note written by Mr Burns and cleared by Mr Price and Mr Kalimnios was
submitted to Mr Michael Reid
449. It noted that:
… There is an immediate need to replace the payroll solution, CorpTech or … IBM have so far neither been
able to deliver any workable solution to the payroll nor other ageing QH systems.
and recommended450:
QH separate itself from the CorpTech driven WOG program immediately and engage directly with contract
companies in order to evaluate alternatives expeditiously.
QH should examine alternatives to an IBM managed project.
If QH decides to continue the relationship with IBM it is recommended that QH engages with IBM directly
and negotiates new contractual terms and conditions.
5.133 Mr Kalimnios met Mr Reid, who had been Director-General for only about two months, on 3 September
2008 to discuss the briefng note. It was a “signifcant meeting” at which they discussed “some … dramatic
recommendations”
451. Mr Kalimnios raised the matter when he did because it was a “critical time in the
project”
452: IBM had delivered its Delay Notice; QH had concerns about the progress of the replacement
and there was “an opportunity to look at whether the project could be managed in a different way”
453.
Mr Kalimnios explained to Mr Reid the background to the note and his reasons for recommending the action
it proposed. Mr Reid thought it appropriate to discuss the proposed actions with the Director-General of
Public Works
454. That meeting occurred a few days later. The result of that meeting was unsatisfactory from
Mr Kalimnios’ point of view. Mr Grierson was “unpersuaded” that QH should or could detach itself from the
SS Initiative
455. Mr Grierson’s advice to his fellow Director-General and Mr Kalimnios was they should “get on
and make it work with both CorpTech and IBM”
456. The existing contractual arrangements would not change.
5.134 Mr Reid thought that the briefng note addressed complex issues which he did not fully understand having
recently become Director-General
457. He could not act upon the recommendations because the contract was
with CorpTech, not QH, and because the work was the subject of a whole-of-government program
458. For
that reason they met with Mr Grierson. Two points were discussed
459. The frst was QH’s fears that LATTICE
would fail, was unsupported and the replacement system was late. The second was whether the contract
with IBM could be terminated and the proposals recommended in Mr Burns’ briefng note be implemented.
Mr Grierson made it plain that QH could not be separated from the SS Initiative and was “not going it
445 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 108.
446 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 275.
447 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 283.
448 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 288.
449 Exhibit 65, Volume 5, at page 294.
450 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at page 295.
451 T21-115, L21-39 (Michael Kalimnios).
452 T21-114, L21-34 (Michael Kalimnios).
453 T21-114, L36-42 (Michael Kalimnios).
454 T21-115, L35-39 (Michael Kalimnios).
455 T21-100, L12-17 (Michael Kalimnios).
456 T21-100, L12-17 (Michael Kalimnios).
457 Exhibit 90, para 16.
458 Exhibit 90, para 16.
459 T22-55, L1-14 (Michael Reid).

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alone”460. Mr Reid understood the result of the meeting to be that CorpTech would better respond to QH’s
concerns about lack of progress with the replacement and would endeavour to resolve the diffculties in the
project with IBM
461.
5.135 Mr Grierson’s recollection of the meeting is that he pointed out the SS Initiative was government policy,
that the LATTICE replacement was part of the SS Initiative and that he, Director-General of Public Works,
could not tell a fellow Director-General what he could or could not do
462. If QH wished to detach itself from
the Initiative it was a matter for Cabinet and must be raised there by the Minister for Health.
5.136 There is no clear evidence that Mr Reid or Mr Grierson spoke about the briefng note’s recommendations
with their respective ministers. Mr Grierson’s account of the discussions with Mr Reid and Mr Kalimnios are
likely to be correct. Without a change of policy at Cabinet level the SS Initiative was to be implemented, and
the LATTICE replacement was part of it.
One of the material reasons for the rescoping decision was the prices which IBM had presented
under SOW 4 “Go Forward” as the likely fxed sum for completing the program as a whole.
5.137 On 18 September 2008, Mr Kalimnios sent a memorandum to Ms Perrott affrming QH’s desire to pursue its
own instance of Workbrain and SAP HR which would be converged with the whole-of-government solution
at a suitable time in the future
463. The memorandum expressed the view that “possessing a degree of
autonomy over the decisions required to meet tight timeframes is paramount”
464. Ms Perrott responded on
7 October 2008 indicating her support for “a separate instance subject to funding constraints”
465.
5.138 On 29 September 2008, Mr Kalimnios approved a second briefng note to Mr Reid466. Its purpose was
to advise his Director-General of developments relating to the whole-of-government SAP system’s
implementation. It recommended that certain “information be noted”, including:
• The contracted date for Queensland Health’s payroll system replacement is 17 November 2008. IBM has
advised its inability to meet this date.
• IBM has sought an extension of time to build the payroll solution and is proposing a new go live date
(still to be agreed) between March and June
2009.
• Queensland Health’s position is to progress under an “own instance” model for HR and payroll. This
position has been discussed with the Executive Director of CorpTech who was seeking assurance that
the approach would ensure as much reuse of design as possible for the whole-of-government. These
assurances have been given.
• This approach is more acceptable to Queensland Health as it allows a degree of autonomy over decisions
which directly affect business outcomes.
Mr Kalimnios considered the briefng note to be substantially the same as Mr Burns’ earlier note in that it
recommended that QH take a greater control of the interim solution
467. It was written on the basis that QH
had “been given a clear direction” from Mr Grierson that it was to remain part of the SS Initiative
468.
5.139 Mr Reid thought that the second briefng note was a “moderation” of the more distinct recommendation
made a month before
469. He discussed the second note with Mr Kalimnios who expressed concerns about
delays to the replacement and his general dissatisfaction with IBM’s performance
470. He did advise,
however, that problems were being progressively resolved. Mr Reid thought that the project was not one
with respect to which he “could make a useful contribution other than support the people who were there to
do the job”
471. It was not a matter which he would consider briefng the Minister for Health on in any detail.
460 L22-55, L25-27 (Michael Reid).
461 T23-18, L20-25 (Michael Reid).
462 T28-94, L21-40 (Malcolm Grierson).
463 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at pages 26-29.
464 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 26.
465 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 259.
466 Exhibit 63, Volume 6, at page 195.
467 Exhibit 89, para 27.
468 T21-116, L17-22 (Michael Kalimnios).
469 Exhibit 90, para 21.
470 Exhibit 90, para 26.
471 T22-58, L19-22 (Michael Reid).

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5.140 One of the material reasons472 for the rescoping decision was the prices which IBM had presented under
SOW 4 “Go Forward” as the likely fxed sum for completing the program as a whole. The sequence of events
was the subject of evidence from Mr James Brown. I touched upon this topic in considering the procurement
process in Part 1 of the report. It is necessary, however, to revisit those events, as I foreshadowed I would,
because of their particular relevance in the present context.
5.141 IBM made two presentations to the State (CorpTech) on about 15 August 2008473 and again on 31 October
2008
474. Both presentations were said to be the results of IBM’s work under SOW 4. Ms Sally O’Carroll
(Management Accountant, Shared Services, QSS) analysed the fgures which had been provided by IBM.
She had some familiarity with the cost of the Program because it was she who was responsible for the
internal accounting of the payments made by the State to IBM.
5.142 Ms O’Carroll compiled a spreadsheet which was Attachment 3 to Mr James Brown’s second statement475.
That document set out the commitments which the State then had to make payments to IBM. In some
instances, the amounts had already been paid, in others work had been contracted for and would attract
the obligation to pay for it upon fulflment by IBM of the relevant payment milestone.
5.143 Ms O’Carroll also added to the spreadsheet the fgures presented by IBM in the Go Forward strategy. This was
done for both the August and October 2008 assessments. She also included, for the purposes of comparison,
the fgures which IBM had stated in its ITO Response for the various components of the program.
5.144 Mr James Brown had some involvement (but not decision-making power) in the appraisal of the Program after
receipt of the Go Forward assessments. He received Ms O’Carroll’s fgures and used them to brief Mr Grierson
on “where we were in the program and some options for how we were to move forward with IBM”
476.
5.145 The fgures showed, in summary, that on the August 2008 Go Forward assessments, it was likely to cost the
State $133,029,749 to complete the Program
477. The 31 October 2008 fgures (making some assumptions
in order to maintain comparability) totalled $181,134,136
478. This fgure, the spreadsheet clearly showed,
was almost twice the amount estimated by IBM in its ITO Response, and which had been one of the most
important reasons for it winning the bid. This revised fgure approximated quite closely the price which
Accenture had estimated in its ITO Response for the Program as a whole
479. But from the State’s point of
view, the importance seems to have been that the estimated fxed price far exceeded the budgeted funds
which remained to complete the Program. It seems clear that the decision had been made that no further
funds would be applied to the roll out of the Shared Services Solution
480.
5.146 At the QHIC (QH only) Release Steering Committee meeting on 10 December 2008, Mr Kalimnios and
Mr Reid advised that Mr Grierson had told them (and QH) to stay with IBM and CorpTech
481. The decision
to “opt” out of the whole-of-government solution could only be made by Mr Grierson or Mr Bradley. It was
considered that it would be diffcult to convince another vendor that the current solution was workable
482.
5.147 In January 2009, CorpTech recommended to Mr Schwarten that the preferred option was to hold IBM to
account, have it complete the Interim Solution only, and not have it undertake any further Phase I program
activities
483. It was proposed that the balance of the funds which had been put aside for the whole-ofgovernment program be used to move two other departments to existing stable systems and consolidate
legacy systems. It was proposed that IBM be excluded from that work.
5.148 On 27 January 2009, the then Premier, Ms Anna Bligh, Mr Schwarten and Mr Grierson met to discuss IBM484.
Ms Bligh accepted that no fnal decision could be made by herself, the Minister and the Director-General
about the whole-of-government arrangement with IBM at that meeting, as it was a decision that would
472 Exhibit 75B, para 7.
473 Exhibit 75b, Attachment 1.
474 Exhibit 75b, Attachment 2.
475 Exhibit 75b, Attachment 3.
476 T19-33, L13-15 (James Brown).
477 Exhibit 75B, Attachment 3.
478 Exhibit 75B, Attachment 3.
479 Exhibit 4, Volume 18, Item 17, at page 656.
480 T32-11, L1-10 (Anna Bligh); T29-17, L22-30 (Malcolm Grierson); T19-33, L32-36 (James Brown).
481 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at pages 280-283.
482 Exhibit 63, Volume 7, at page 281.
483 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 65.
484 T32-9, L2-4 (Anna Bligh).

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require a Cabinet Budget Review Committee (CBRC) decision485. She also accepted that the preliminary
decision made on that day meant that no further SOWs would be entered into with IBM until IBM had
completed the Interim Solution
486.
5.149 On 29 January 2009, the Executive Steering Committee was advised by Ms Perrott487 that the Premier,
Mr Schwarten and Mr Grierson had met to discuss the proposed way forward. Mr Grierson had by then met
with Mr Tony [Peter] Munro and Mr Doak from IBM, and “instructed IBM to proceed with the delivery of the
QH LATTICE Interim Solution only. There may be some consideration of further engagement after this has
been completed”.
5.150 In one sense, there were reasons to treat SOW 8 and the Interim Solution differently from the wider
program: the replacement of LATTICE was, from the outset, considered to be necessary owing to its real or
perceived state of atrophy
488 and the work was already under way and partially completed489.
5.151 It is questionable, however, to what extent these features justifed IBM being permitted to continue with
the Interim Solution. The Interim Solution was, by January 2009, well behind schedule. There is no reason to
believe that the delays which it had experienced to that time would not continue. QH was the most complex
of the agencies, so the parties were faced with a greater range of problems than would have been the case
in a smaller agency and one without the complexity for which rostering in part was responsible.
5.152 While there existed reasons to continue with the Interim Solution, the reasons which presented themselves
to the State by late January 2009 were in my view overwhelming justifcations to “reset” the Interim
Solution or abandon it entirely. If the State could not unilaterally terminate the contract it could have
negotiated an exit from it.
5.153 In a briefng to Mr Grierson on about 25 February 2009, Mr James Brown and Ms Berenyi noted that, due
to budget constraints and diffculties with the prime contractor, the Government had approved IBM to
continue to be engaged for the Interim Solution
490.
5.154 On 21 September 2009, a CBRC paper was put forward proposing that IBM continue as the systems
integrator for the Interim Solution only
491. It was said that to make the most effective use of available
funds, and given the current fscal climate, a revised implementation approach had been developed by
CorpTech in consultation with the three shared service providers and Queensland Treasury. Key components
of the revised approach included
492:
a. IBM would complete the implementation of QH’s payroll system only;
b. in the interim, the DETA would remain on its existing human resources and payroll system;
c. existing agencies would be migrated and consolidated to a smaller number of supported human resources
and fnance systems.
5.155 It would seem that no thought, or at the very least inadequate thought, was given to revisiting IBM’s
involvement, the relationship between QH and IBM, or the terms of the contract, given that IBM had
produced, to that date, parts only of the Interim Solution. Mr Reid could not recall this being done at the
time but thought it something which “Mr Kalimnios and others” would have done
493.
5.156 Mr Grierson accepted knowing that both DETA, QH and “everybody” had lost faith in IBM494 and hearing of
this since April 2008
495. When asked about what he did in response, he said he took the best steps he could
to improve the relationship between IBM and the government agencies by
496:
… getting in a senior person in IBM, by changing governance structures, by ensuring that we were across
what was happening and hopefully locking the scope down.
485 T32-9, L6-11 (Anna Bligh).
486 T32-9, L13-21 (Anna Bligh).
487 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 98.
488 T29-38, L22-34 (Malcolm Grierson).
489 T32-92, L7-55 (Robert Schwarten).
490 Exhibit 63, Volume 8, at page 153.
491 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at pages 310-325, at specifcally 317.
492 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at page 316.
493 T22-70, L38-56 (Michael Reid).
494 T29-16, L23-27 (Malcolm Grierson).
495 T29-13, L30-31 (Malcolm Grierson).
496 T29-13, L33-36 (Malcolm Grierson).

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5.157 He drew a distinction between the Interim Solution and the roll out in DETA497. Education, he considered, had an
alternative. He seems not to have considered the DETA payroll system as being in urgent need of replacement. But
there was not, in his mind, that option for QH given that, to use his words “LATTICE was not a sustainable payroll
for the Health department”
498.
5.158 Mr Grierson was initially able to recall little of what was said at the 27 January 2009 meeting with
Mr Schwarten and Ms Bligh. He said, when pressed, that what is likely to have occurred is that Ms Bligh
would have been presented with the situation and that
499:
Where we wanted to go was not going to be achieved, which was a whole of government roll-out of all of
these wonderful Shared Services systems … just wasn’t working and … my belief was I didn’t need to tell
the premier that, she knew that from her own experience as treasurer, and that right now the biggest risk
was this LATTICE system running Health payroll and the way to get that … was to get IBM to focus totally
on that and get it delivered. And one way was, of course, to take Education out …
5.159 He was also able to recall that500:
I explained to them that … the government had made a decision that we were going to put Education on
hold. We weren’t saying Education wasn’t ever going to go there but Education was going to be put on
hold because we wanted Health delivered. That was the focus, that was the prime driver so we were going
to put Education on hold. I think there was also the consideration – sorry … I do recall that there was also
the consideration about the dollars that were left in the project budget and there was concern about the
Education exercise would also be chewing up the funds that were left in the Shared Services budget, and
the premier was concerned about that. But I explained to them that it was going to be put on hold and we
now expected IBM to get all their best resources on board, focused on Health and deliver Health.
5.160 Mr Grierson’s desire was to maintain a good working relationship between the State and IBM and by that
means to impress upon IBM the need to take all the steps it could to deliver the Interim Solution
501.
5.161 There were very serious defciencies in Mr Grierson’s approach. He was the most senior public servant with
responsibility for the Project. He had been made aware of serious concerns by government agencies with
the system and IBM’s performance. He knew of IBM’s contentions that QH had been lazy and incomplete
in the communication of its business requirements
502 and that scope would need to be locked down if
the Interim Solution were to be delivered and were to function as QH required it to. He prevented steps
being taken which might have put matters on a more formal footing and instead assumed for himself
the role of relationship manager. He believed he could manage the contract by escalating issues to senior
management within IBM
503. He met with IBM representatives in the USA on 19 September 2008504.
Mr Schwarten, Mr Bloomfeld and Mr Pagura, Regional Australia and New Zealand Executive Public Sector,
IBM, were in attendance
505. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of the government
building a new computer centre. Mr Grierson stated that he took the opportunity at this meeting to
ventilate the concerns held about the Project to senior IBM people
506.
5.162 Mr Grierson had frst met with Mr Doak shortly after he became Program Director in July 2008507. Mr Grierson
recalled expressing his disappointment that IBM had put its “‘B’ team on the project whereas I would
have expected the IBM I had known in the past to have had an ‘A’ team on a project such as this.”
508. He
recalled that Mr Doak more or less agreed, stating that he was now here and that the A team was on the
Project
509. Mr Doak requested Mr Grierson meet with him regularly in relation to the progress of the Project.
Mr Grierson’s understanding of the purpose of these meetings was that Mr Doak was keen to keep him
“informed of what he and IBM were doing to instil in me confdence that they did have an A team on there
and they were achieving what they should be achieving”
510. Meetings between Mr Grierson, Ms Robyn Turbit,
497 T29-13, L39-45 (Malcolm Grierson).
498 T29-13, L39-45 (Malcolm Grierson).
499 T29-16, L41-51 (Malcolm Grierson).
500 T29-17, L16-30 (Malcolm Grierson).
501 T29-13, L30-45 (Malcolm Grierson).
502 T28-86, L13-18 (Malcolm Grierson).
503 T28-72, L1-17 (Malcolm Grierson).
504 Exhibit 136, Volume 1, at pages 61-62.
505 T28-108, L45-54 (Malcolm Grierson); Exhibit 149A, para 4.
506 Exhibit 149A, para 4.
507 Exhibit 116, para 24.
508 Exhibit 116, para 24.
509 T28-78, L22-29 (Malcolm Grierson).
510 T28-79, L21-34 (Malcolm Grierson).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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Ms Perrott and Mr Doak were scheduled fortnightly511. Mr Grierson said that these meetings probably occurred
monthly and ceased in February 2009
512. Outside of these scheduled meetings, Mr Grierson did not recall
meeting with Mr Doak on his own
513, and denied Mr Doak’s evidence that these meetings occurred weekly514.
5.163 When questioned by Counsel Assisting, Mr Flanagan QC, as to whether he should have taken more direct
leadership and responsibility in resolving the recurring issues that arose with the contract, Mr Grierson said
515:
When I had CorpTech join my department, and I’ve heard the concerns about IBM … I had IBM put in a
better team and better management to control the contract, control their part of the contract. I changed
my management in CorpTech in December 2008 …. I put Margaret Berenyi, I put her in, who had good IT
experience, James Brown, who had experience with IBM and SAP in New South Wales, I moved Barbara
Perrott back to the Shared Services. … I escalated with everyone I could to IBM the people involved, the
concerns. I had a situation where IBM assigned a senior partner, Peter Munro, to deal personally with
me as I had concerns. We went – we looked at the overall program, we discussed with the Premier the fact
that we believe we should concentrate on Health because of the LATTICE situation, so I got that raised to
that level. We took education out of the equation so IBM could focus on the LATTICE replacement. We went
through and tried to freeze scope on so many times … I’m not sure what else you expected me to do.
5.164 The real problem with this approach was that Mr Grierson, while not defcient in confdence, appears to have
been no match for IBM’s negotiators. Although he might have had considerable experience as a senior public
servant, he lacked the toughness and shrewdness of the IBM negotiators. His urgings to them seem to have
been naïve. His constant attempts for them to “get their best resources” on board rather missed the point. He
failed to understand that the problem was not so much IBM resourcing as the highly unsatisfactory scoping
of the Interim Solution and the constant changes which QH was making to it in an
ad hoc fashion, yet without
increasing the certainty that the resultant system would be functional. And he was ineffective too in instilling
some discipline in the senior management of QH. Mr Grierson, being the most senior public servant with
responsibility for the Program, fell well short of what he ought to have done. He ought, at the very least, to have
sought to reset the Project in the sense in which Dr Manfeld used that term and, if he lacked the authority to
achieve that, to recommend that strongly to his own Minister and to the Premier as the proper course.
5.165 Mr Grierson, as others, failed to bring to the Project the skill and authority which his position demanded.
He is, in this respect, partly to blame for the price increasing and to the extent it did and for the resultant
system being seriously flawed from a functional point of view.
5.166 Ms Bligh was asked about the decision to rescope the contract. She recalled it being discussed at the 27
January 2009 meeting that IBM’s involvement would be limited to the Interim Solution and that that
decision was based upon concerns about both timing of delivery and cost of delivery
516.
5.167 The only option with which Ms Bligh was presented was the one which was selected: namely that IBM
remain working on the Interim Solution. When asked why this was the case, Mr Schwarten said that
Mr Grierson had advised him that IBM had the capacity to “do the job” and that
517:
[W]e weren’t left with a lot of options I would have thought at that stage to go and get somebody else to
carry out this job.
5.168 This failed to come to grips with the real problem, one which it was for these senior people to identify and
resolve. The problem may not so much have been IBM’s capacity to complete the Interim Solution but the
more fundamental problems which existed with the inadequate scoping which had been undertaken, the
persistent lack of clarity in scope, the constant changes to it and the need to ensure that the system would
be functional when it went live.
5.169 Yet this was the only option which Mr Schwarten discussed with Mr Grierson518. Mr Grierson knew by this
time that the problems were not limited to IBM’s capacity to complete the Interim Solution. Seen in this
way, the obvious decision was not to displace IBM from the Interim Solution because, as Mr Schwarten said,
511 See Exhibit 117.
512 T28-75 L1-4 (Malcolm Grierson); T28-82, L10-19 (Malcolm Grierson).
513 T28-81, L52-54 (Malcolm Grierson).
514 Exhibit 103, paras 104 –105; T28-82, L30-31 (Malcolm Grierson).
515 T29-24, L4-25 (Malcolm Grierson).
516 T32-10, L34-55 (Anna Bligh).
517 T32-57, L11-25 (Robert Schwarten).
518 T32-58, L1-25 (Robert Schwarten).

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139
it was not, by January 2009 at least, practicable to move in an alternative contractor to IBM519. Mr Grierson
had a similar view
520. The difference was, so far as Mr Grierson is concerned, that he was better placed to be
more fully informed about the real problems which were actually being experienced and therefore better
placed to know – and to advise upon – ways in which these problems could be resolved.
The real problem with this approach was that Mr Grierson, while not defcient in confdence,
appears to have been no match for IBM’s negotiators.
5.170 Another major oversight of the rescoping was the consequences of it for the Interim Solution. If IBM were
to be precluded from undertaking further works under the contract, what was to become of the “remainder”
portion of it? There seems never to have been any consideration given to this question, one which it was
essential to address, lest the Interim Solution be left, as indeed it was, in a partially completed state and with
functionality excluded from it. The question was put to Mr Kalimnios, Mr Reid, Ms Berenyi, Mr Grierson and
Mr Schwarten and, indeed, Ms Bligh. Their answers were uniform. None of them gave any thought to what the
decision to limit the work of the prime contractor to replacing the QH payroll system meant for the design and
functionality of the system which was no longer to be “interim”
521.
Mr price’s Memorandum of 6 July 2009
5.171 There is one other matter which I must consider before leaving the general topic of the opportunities
which the State had, and gave up, to reset the Project and the warnings it had of the inevitability that,
if the system proceeded to Go Live in the state in which it then was, it would be likely to be functionally
defcient. Into this second category falls a memorandum written by Mr Price (as Director of QHEST) with the
assistance of others who were junior to him. I will refer to this memorandum as “the Price Memorandum”.
5.172 The Price Memorandum was dated 6 July 2009 and took the form of a brief for noting to Mr Paul Lucas, the
Deputy Premier and Minister for Health. It recommended that the Minister
522:
[N]ote issues in relation to the IBM contract with CorpTech and that both CorpTech and Queensland
Health are working to obtain a solution to the issues.
5.173 The Price Memorandum outlined some of the history of the Project and identifed these three reasons for its
“failure”
523:
• Lack of recognised project management methodology had resulted in failure to manage development of
solution requirements through design and build process.
• Lack of adequate skill and resources provided by IBM.
• Critical features of governance to ensure Queensland Health business needs were met.
5.174 Mr Price highlighted a number of further factors, including524:
a. IBM having been in breach of the contract since August 2008 and CorpTech having been made aware of this
situation and failing to exercise its rights against IBM;
b. the tripartite arrangement between IBM, CorpTech and QH having weakened the governance of the Project;
c. there having been signifcant delay in delivering the Solution, resulting in increased project costs;
d. inadequate contract management having resulted in the fxed price contract evolving into a time and
materials engagement;
e. IBM having failed to apply a project methodology consistently throughout the Project, resulting in a number
of critical failures that have impacted the delivery of the Project, including:
• IBM failing to take Project accountability and produce a robust end to end Project schedule mapping all the
inter Project dependencies between themselves, CorpTech and QH;
• The Project schedule having underestimated the time and resources required to complete activities and
there being insufficient allowance for Project contingencies;
519 T32-92, L7-55 (Robert Schwarten).
520 T34-85, L12-52; T29-16, L1-8 (Malcolm Grierson).
521 T21-113, L16-38 (Michael Kalimnios); T22-70, L41-56 (Michael Reid); T27-70, L26 (Margaret Berenyi); T29-20, L37-51 (Malcolm Grierson); T32-58, L27-41 (Robert Schwarten); T32-
12, L31-56 to T32-13, L1-20 (Anna Bligh).
522 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 240.
523 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 241.
524 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at pages 240-250.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
140
• The Project schedule continually having been revised with the result that testing activities were compressed
and impacting on the quality of testing performed.
f. IBM not having instituted any formal internal quality assurance;
g. the process followed by IBM to identify QH’s business requirements having been inadequate. It was said
that a failure to identify business requirements had severely impacted the quality of the solution with a large
number of defciencies being identifed during UAT and a high number of manual business workarounds
being put in place.
h. defciencies in identifying business requirements having meant that there were ongoing debates on Project
scope and deliverables. As a result, Mr Price said, QH had agreed to “de-scope” a number of deliverables, such
as the HR/Finance integration requirements in order to meet a Go Live date in August 2009;
i. the quality of the Solution design not being high and there being a risk that both IBM and CorpTech may be
willing to compromise Solution quality in order to achieve a Go Live date, resulting in an unacceptable risk
profle for QH.
5.175 Mr Price was instructed to prepare the memorandum by Mr Shea or Mr Kalimnios due to the signifcant
issues being experienced with IBM and the implementation of the Project
525. On or around 6 July 2009,
Mr Kalimnios said that he received the Price Memorandum and considered it reflected the facts as he
understood them at the time and his concerns with the implementation of the project
526. Mr Shea also gave
evidence that the Price Memorandum generally reflected his view of the Project at the time
527.
5.176 Mr Price signed the memorandum and sent it to Mr Shea. It required clearance by both Mr Kalimnios and
Mr Shea and the endorsement and signature of Mr Reid before it could be sent to the Minister
528.
5.177 Mr Kalimnios, when asked what he had hoped the memorandum might achieve for the implementation of
the Project, said
529:
Answer: [S]ort of the last throw of the dice in terms of the project still had issues. We still had
problems in our perspective from the relationship between us, IBM and CorpTech and
how that was operating. The system wasn’t being delivered. We thought it would be more
effective if we were to take direct control of that and perhaps look at doing things differently.
So it was really just to try and sort of identify where we’re at, what we’re trying to – what our
challenges, issues were and perhaps trying to get a discussion at a senior level about how
we might move forward with that.

Question:
Answer:
But what did you hope the ministers would do?
Basically, make some decisions about whether we continue with IBM and whether we stop
the contract and, indeed, reform the contract as a Queensland Health contract with us as the
contractor and the client.
So in a sense to renegotiate the contract with IBM and Queensland Health?
Yes. …
Or bring the contract to an end …?
Correct.
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

5.178 Despite the concerns he held about the Project, Mr Kalimnios said that he did not provide the Price
Memorandum to Mr Reid nor to Mr Grierson
530. He gave the following reasons for not having done so531:
I decided not to send the brief to Mr Reid because, after consultation with Mr Shea, to the best of my
recollection, I thought that given the impact of the issues raised, and our desire to maintain and support
the whole of government position, it was more appropriate to address these issues directly with Mr Reid,
and for him to discuss these concerns directly with Mr Grierson with the objective of achieving a joint
Queensland Health and CorpTech position, before escalating the issue formally to Ministerial level.
5.179 Mr Shea’s evidence was that he regarded the Price Memorandum as being too long and emotive in
525 Exhibit 80, para 29; Exhibit 89, para 35.
526 Exhibit 89, para 35.
527 T22-27, L5-12 (Adrian Shea).
528 Exhibit 63, Volume 9, at page 250.
529 T21-100, L47-L56 to T21-101, L1-L25 (Michael Kalimnios).
530 Exhibit 89, para 37.
531 Exhibit 89, para 37; T21-86, L49-54 (Michael Kalimnios).

Contract
141
expression to be a suitable ministerial briefng note532. Mr Kalimnios had decided that it was more
appropriate to give an oral briefng due to the complexity of the issues.
5.180 Counsel for Mr Kalimnios submitted that he ought not be criticised for not sending the memorandum to
Mr Reid
533. That decision was, it was said, reasonable. Mr Kalimnios did raise the substance of the issues with
Mr Reid in meetings. What was communicated of the memorandum’s contents is the subject of a dispute
between Mr Kalimnios and Mr Reid. It does not appear that Mr Shea was in attendance at those meetings.
5.181 Mr Kalimnios’ evidence was that, shortly after 6 July 2009, he met with Mr Reid and discussed the contents
of the Price Memorandum. He did not recall whether Mr Shea was present
534. He did not, however, give
Mr Reid a copy of the document
535. Mr Kalimnios said that he used the Price Memorandum as a “checklist
of issues to address”
536. In a supplementary statement, Mr Kalimnios set out the matters from the
memorandum which he believed he had brought to Mr Reid’s notice in the meeting
537. It is clear from
that evidence that Mr Kalimnios did not descend into the detail in the Price Memorandum, but addressed
matters in broad terms. Mr Kalimnios stated that he made it clear to Mr Reid that
538:
[T]he quality of the solution build was not high and that unless all the defects are identifed and rectifed
prior to “Go-Live”, there was a risk that the payroll calculations may be incorrect, resulting in either under
or over payments to employees.
5.182 He recalled that Mr Reid said539 “the issues were fairly signifcant and we agreed that we should then
perhaps meet again with the Director-General of Public Works to address what we might do in moving that
forward”. Mr Reid, however, said that he frst became aware of the memorandum only in March or April
2010 when it was identifed as relevant to a Freedom of Information request
540. He recalled that some of
the issues in the Price Memorandum had been raised with him, but did not recall Mr Kalimnios having that
document in his hand or him discussing the detail of the issues it raised in one single meeting shortly after 6
July 2009
541. Mr Reid claimed he only became aware of issues in the Price Memorandum through the regular
meetings which he had attended with Mr Kalimnios and in which he was provided “high level” information
on the following
542:
a. LATTICE was an unsupported and ageing payroll system;
b. the QHIC Project was over time and budget and that costs had escalated;
c. QH was concerned about the control of project deliverables resting with CorpTech;
d. the Interim Solution was the pilot for the whole-of-government solution for Workbrain and SAP;
e. there had been a failure by IBM to deliver on time and budget;
f. the relationship between IBM, CorpTech and QH had not been strong;
g. a failure of the implemented solution to deliver a payroll solution would probably result in media attention;
and
h. CorpTech and IBM were members of the Project Directorate and Board which provides governance for the
QHIC Project.
5.183 Senior Counsel Assisting the Commission asked Mr Reid, in the course of his oral evidence, to mark on
a copy of the Price Memorandum those matters which were not raised with him by Mr Kalimnios
543.
This exercise suggested that Mr Reid recalled that the issues were discussed in broad terms and that
Mr Kalimnios had not discussed the detail of the memorandum. Despite this, Mr Reid said that, throughout
the course of 2009, he was “progressively reassured that the sources of Queensland Health’s dissatisfaction
… were being rectifed on an ongoing basis such that there was an increasing level of comfort that they
would be resolved to Queensland Health’s satisfaction”
544.
532 T22-11, L10-28 (Adrian Shea); T22-27, L15-21 (Adrian Shea).
533 Submissions on behalf of Mr Kalimnios, Mr Shea and Mr Ray Brown, dated 11 June 2013 (Contract), para 92.
534 T21-87, L1 (Michael Kalimnios).
535 T21-87, L12-13 (Michael Kalimnios).
536 T21-88, L1-5 (Michael Kalimnios).
537 Exhibit 145. See also Submissions on behalf of Mr Kalimnios, Mr Shea and Mr Brown, dated 11 June 2013 (Contract), para 94.
538 Exhibit 145, para 22.
539 T21-88, L7-12 (Michael Kalimnios).
540 Exhibit 90, para 34.
541 T22-64, L13-22 (Michael Reid).
542 Exhibit 90, para 34.
543 Exhibit 91.
544 Exhibit 90, para 34.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
142
5.184 Shortly after, Mr Kalimnios said he met Mr Grierson and Mr Reid and discussed broadly the contents of
the Price Memorandum
545. Mr Reid did not consider that the Price Memorandum, or his discussion with
Mr Kalimnios about it, was the reason for meeting Mr Grierson. His evidence of the meeting was
546:

Answer: The meeting with Mr Grierson, from recollection, was much more around the concerns
of the delay with IBM and the need to rectify that, as distinct from the earlier meeting in
2008 with Mr Grierson, which was more around, “Could we cop out of the contract?”
Can I just ask, what did you hope to achieve from this meeting with Mr Grierson, the
second meeting?
My recollection is that there was still a number of concerns that Michael was expressing
Question:
Answer:

to me, Commissioner, about the delays to go live and functionality of LATTICE and he
was trying to achieve, I understand, an arrangement whereby we could – now, I don’t
know where he drew the distinction, but he could gee up CorpTech and IBM to be more
responsive to the requirements of Health in getting the system live.
The Price Memorandum was a clear attempt by Mr Price to collate and bring to the attention
of the Minister the many problems which he had been informed were facing the system.
5.185 Mr Kalimnios thought that the second meeting was a repetition of the frst one, a year before547. Senior
Counsel for Mr Reid submitted
548 that the memorandum was not a recital of current issues, but was, at
most, a lengthy history of the matter and all of its problems through time as understood by Mr Price and his
team. He also submitted that a number of the concerns expressed were historical, not current and did not
evidence a need for urgent attention and therefore there was no reason for the contents to be discussed
by Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea in one meeting. Mr Reid’s recollection of events has, it was submitted,
“overwhelming support”
549:
a. Mr Reid’s evidence that no major issues were raised with him which warranted the involvement of the
Minister was supported by QH Position Papers which were distributed to the Project Board. These showed
some concern for contract management and governance in the period 15 July 2009 to 18 August 2009,
which coincided with the memorandum; however after this time these matters reported “green”
550;
b. if the issues raised in the Price Memorandum did in fact exist as at July 2009, one would have expected to
see evidence of them at QHIC Board level where these matters ought properly to have been addressed
551;
c. Mr Kalimnios did not want the matters raised in the Price Memorandum to be brought to the attention of
Mr Lucas. By July 2009, Mr Kalimnios was aware that Mr Lucas was conscious of the issues the project was
experiencing as Mr Price had briefed Mr Lucas on substantially similar issues for Estimates in June 2009
552;
d. in a meeting between Mr Kalimnios and Ms Berenyi on 17 August 2009, there was no record of complaint
about management or governance issues or about IBM providing inadequate resources or skills
553.
5.186 The Price Memorandum was a clear attempt by Mr Price to collate and bring to the attention of the
Minister the many problems which he had been informed were facing the system. That is not to say that
all the matters he identifed were in fact problems or had been suffciently evidenced or proved to him. But
what the Price Memorandum did correctly identify, in my view, was that there existed a divide between
QH’s requirements and the system which IBM was designing and building, with the consequence that the
solution quality was poor, something which, viewed from the perspective of the customer, was necessarily a
focus on the likelihood that the system would function properly as a payroll system ought.
5.187 These were, in the end, concerns. They were ones which both Mr Shea and Mr Kalimnios held. If that were
so, and I accept it to be the case, Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea ought to have ensured the Price Memorandum,
perhaps in a more focused and precise form, be sent up to Mr Reid and, ultimately, Mr Lucas. (Mr Shea
reported to Mr Kalimnios and could not directly inform or influence Mr Reid.). Had that occurred, it would
545 Exhibit 89, para 38; T21-120, L25 (Michael Kalimnios).
546 T22-65, L33-48 (Michael Reid).
547 T21-120, L26-27 (Michael Kalimnios).
548 Submissions on behalf of Mr Michael Reid, dated 4 June 2013 (Contract), para 25.
549 Submissions on behalf of Mr Michael Reid, dated 4 June 2013 (Contract), para 15.
550 Submissions on behalf of Mr Reid, dated 4 June 2013 (Contract), para 19.
551 Submissions on behalf of Mr Reid, dated 4 June 2013 (Contract), para 22.
552 Exhibit 151, Annexure PTL-3.
553 Exhibit 63, Volume 10, at page 44-45.

Contract
143
have resolved entirely the controversy which now exists between Mr Kalimnios and Mr Reid as to what
was said in oral briefngs. Both Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea, as I say elsewhere in this Report, suffered the
consequence of their failure by the termination of their contracts.
5.188 It is impossible to know whether Mr Reid was ever told the detail of the matters raised in the Price
Memorandum. But it is unnecessary to do so for present purposes. Mr Reid accepts that, at about the time
that memorandum was prepared, he was aware through conversations he had with Mr Kalimnios that
Mr Kalimnios believed there were serious problems with the quality of the product being delivered
554. That
in my view was suffcient to draw to his notice what I consider to be the most material point which Mr Price
sought to make, a point which stated accurately the principal problem then facing the system and the
problem of greatest concern to a Director-General, given its likely effect on the pay of his staff.
5.189 Having had that knowledge, whether in the formality of a brief or not, Mr Reid ought to have taken steps –
some steps – to ascertain the validity of the claim, or cause it to be further investigated by others.
5.190 IBM criticised Mr Price in its written submissions555. None of what is there submitted affects the fndings I
have made about the Price Memorandum he prepared or the attention it ought to have received.
6. the Decision to Go Live
6.1 The Interim Solution went live on 14 March 2010. The decision to do so was made by the Project Board. It
was a decision which was recommended by the Project Directorate.
6.2 There were, preceding those decisions, unambiguous warnings that the system possessed serious functional
defciencies, something which, as will be seen later, was confrmed when the system went live and failed to
pay a large number of staff and inaccurately paid an even larger number.
6.3 These decisions, because of these warnings, and because of the grave problems with the system after Go
Live, demand consideration as part of ascertaining the adequacy of the contract, project management,
governance and implementation processes.
6.4 The lead up to Go Live commenced on or about 22 January 2010, with the Project Board deciding that
the system, despite not having passed the pre-set criteria, ought to exit UAT4. Ms Jones summed up the
misguided but strong feeling which she felt given the number and nature of the problems which were then
emerging in UAT4
556:

Answer: [KJ Ross] were … as with all test teams, to raise a defect. I would not agree that it was
their responsibility to identify defects, quantify them or any such thing. We had a defect

management group and a working group that did that.

Question: But it was his [Brett Cowan’s] job, wasn’t it, to test and notify, and he did it on a daily basis,
those defects which he found as a result of doing his job?
I can’t comment on what his job was. He certainly did not report to me and I did not engage
him so I don’t know what brief he was given regarding his job, but UAT is about running
Answer:

agreed test case scenarios across it and reporting unexpected results or test case failures.
I don’t know that I can agree that it was his job or the purpose of UAT to fnd, identify or
quantify defects.
6.5 The decision to permit the system to exit UAT4 required, in order to be effective, having regard to the
Project documentation, a Change to the contract. This was effected, as explained above, by Change 208.
That Change both deemed the system have passed UAT and changed the exit criteria so that the existence
of Severity 2 defects would not be an impediment to it doing so, provided there was a comprehensive
management plan for them.
6.6 Once the system exited UAT, the system reached the stage of “cutover” in which IBM became responsible
for transitioning the data from LATTICE to the Interim Solution.
554 T23-31, L1-7 (Michael Reid).
555 Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 259-262.
556 T20-12, L14-44 (Janette Jones).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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6.7 Cutover occurred shortly after 1 February 2010. That was the day on which the Project Directorate
convened an “Extraordinary Meeting”, reviewed the “relevant criteria” and sent to the Project Board a
recommendation that cutover – technical phase commence
557. That recommendation was made by the
Chair of the Project Directorate (then Mr Shea) and cleared by Mr Price, as the Director of QHEST.
6.8 The criteria relevant to a decision whether to proceed with technical cutover are contained in what were
described as “traffc light” or “dashboard” reports
558, in which the criteria are listed and alongside each, a status
is attributed by a coloured disc which is green, amber or orange. Some of the items had an “amber” status.
6.9 The Project Board, when it also met on 1 February 2010, noted the recommendation from the Project
Directorate to proceed to cutover – technical phase and that a “full risk profle and subsequent mitigation
plan will be presented to the board for approval prior to Gate 2 on 01/03/2010”
559. The Board minutes record
that it “accepted the current risks and … approved entrance into Technical Cutover”.
6.10 At this time, there existed a real concern that the Defect Management Plan which had been developed would
prove impracticable. Against the criteria for “Additional Amended Criteria Via Deliverable 44”, it was said
560:
Process for the management of defects, (as detailed in the Defect and Solution Management plan), has
been endorsed by the PD [Project Directorate]. Final update of the Defect and Solution Management Plan
to be approved by Cutover Go/No Go Gate
2, 1st March 2010). Change control will be managed by the PD.
Note: Risk that the workload required to address defects in the Management Plan may not be achievable in
the available window.
6.11 The passage I have emphasised shows there to have existed (despite the “green” status allocated to this
issue) a real concern that matters which were, in effect, being deferred off into the Defect Management
Plan, and simply putting off to after Go Live, were matters which ought to have been dealt with beforehand,
and that those matters were of such a kind and number that it might prove impracticable to effect them all.
6.12 Ms Jones had expressed “great” concerns of a similar kind in an email of 12 January 2010 where she stated
she did not anticipate there being so many items on the Defect Management Plan before UAT had fnished,
stressed the need to agree that “each one of these are low impact or managed by an acceptable work around”
and expressed disagreement with items being listed on the Defect Management Plan before UAT and previous
commitments had been attempted to be met
561. These observations suggest that the Defect Management
Plan was being treated more as a convenient dumping ground than by reference to any measured assessment
of what could, realistically speaking, be dealt with after Go Live.
6.13 Ms Jones expanded upon the views that she had held at the time in her oral evidence562:
The management plan was not about everybody can put a defect on it and we’ll just work out how to deal
with it. The management plan was to be developed after careful deliberation on what could not be fxed
and whether it could be accommodated beyond go live. The circulation of this defect management plan
concerned me because it literally had a lot of defects on it. Some of them had not been analysed. Some
had not been discussed with IBM for our discussions about defect versus change and certainly the project
directorate had not had an opportunity to understand magnitude, impact, scale and volume of those
ones. It just got circulated to a large group, is my recollection.
My concern was that the UAT team was now circulating a defect management plan which they had no
responsibility over and were not asked to, in my understanding. The project directorate had asked IBM
to come up with a defect solution management plan. Once I had raised this with Pine and the project
manager on her return, it was deemed that we needed to have much more control about this because, in
effect, we now had two defect management plan terms being circulated. Considering that Queensland
Health was the one that would have to execute and be affected by the majority of the workarounds, I
wanted to make sure that the Queensland Health members of the board understood completely what was
on that plan. So it was just now very unhelpful that we had two defect management plans being circulated
and considering the level of goodwill within the project at that point, this was a very unhelpful event.
557 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 143.
558 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 152.
559 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 33.
560 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 155.
561 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 52.
562 T20-11, L7-37 (Janette Jones).

Contract
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6.14 Having proceeded through Gate 1, the system proceeded through Gate 2 “Business Cutover” and then,
fnally, Gate 3 (Simulation 2) in mid-February 2010
563.
6.15 At this point, the system was proceeding towards Go Live with only the fnal decision to be made whether
that ought to occur. There are, for the purposes of assessing the decision to Go Live, two critical documents.
The frst is the “Management Response” dated 19 February 2010 to Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report
564,
the other is a “QHIC Final Solution Risk Assessment Report” (“Risk Assessment Report”) by Mr Burns and
Mr Shah of 1 March 2010
565.
6.16 The Management Response, to which I have referred earlier, gave QH’s and IBM’s responses to the matters
Mr Cowan had identifed in his Final UAT Report
566. The Project Directorate assessed the options presented
by the Final UAT Report and concluded the risk of delay presented an equal or greater risk than the decision
to Go Live
567:
The Project Directorate agrees that there is a residual risk to continue into Production with the number of
severity two open defects. However Option
1 presents an equal or greater risk within the legacy system
environment to delay the Go Live, such as the contingency support nature for Lattice, limited priority
1 support for ESP and the need for additional infrastructure and technical sizing that would have to
be undertaken if the project was delayed. There is limited confguration opportunity in Lattice with an
increased number of workarounds into the future.
6.17 The Risk Assessment Report recommended568:
[T]hat Queensland Health enter the production cut over process in order to proceed to Go-Live, provided
all the critical milestones within this process are successfully executed according to the planned schedule
and that the risk mitigation plan for the key residual risks is actioned successfully.
But there is a residual risk that the cumulative effective of high levels of defects occurring in each
successive pay run, which by their nature create a further impact on the next pay run, could lead to an
unsustainable operational condition.
6.18 These recommendations were based in part on the following assertions made about the current LATTICE/
ESP system
569:
• There is a significant cost and effort required to manage the inherent error rate in the current payroll
system due to the significant number of manual processes involved in preparing the input data.
• The software in this system is no longer supported and there is
an extreme risk of system failure
occurring in the future.
• The costs to Queensland Health of providing a measure of skilled support for this technology is high.
• The complexity of the awards required by the Queensland Health payroll system are extremely difficult to build
into the current system.
• Some awards are too complex to be included in the system and require on going manual processes to
implement. In fact some of the new complex EBA’s cannot be built in the system.
• There are a significant number of detailed technical risks relating to the current software systems which
have been considered but not detailed in this report. [emphasis added]
6.19 The risks which Mr Burns and Mr Shah identifed are, for the most part, the same as those outlined in the
QHEST Risk Assessment of LATTICE which had been undertaken some two and a half years earlier, in
September 2007
570.
6.20 Despite the conclusion that the system built by IBM would have a lower operational risk than the existing
LATTICE system, the Risk Assessment Report indicated that there were risk indicators around the quality of
the solution that would be delivered. The Risk Assessment Report advised that these issues would have to
be managed by QH and CorpTech and early plans should be made for future improvements in quality and
functionality
571.
563 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at page 319.
564 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at pages 380-391.
565 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at pages 14-26.
566 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, at pages 380-391.
567 Exhibit 63, Volume 14, page 390.
568 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 19; Note the fnal version of the Report was distributed after the 1 March 2010 QHIC Pre-Board Meeting. The handwritten annotation on the copy of
the Report at Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 14 indicates the fnal version was dated 3 March 2010.
569 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 16.
570 Exhibit 131.
571 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 17.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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6.21 The Risk Assessment Report conveyed a sense of urgency in the decision to Go Live. In addition to the
operational and solution quality risk profles, that Report stated that QH “is faced with the need to assess
the new solution risks as acceptable or to face the potentially worse option of deferring the new solution
yet again”
572. In assessing QH’s strategic business decision, the Risk Assessment Report considered that QH
executive management would have to base their decision on the following factors
573:
1. There is a complex tripartite contractual arrangement with the prime contractor and CorpTech. There
would be signifcant contractual and commercial challenges if the project does not go live now.
2. The project staff from all parties who have been working on this project are fatigued and any attempt
to delay and restart the project phases at this stage will be detrimental to staff morale and cause a
loss of key skills and knowledge.
3. Rebuilding the project team again would be time consuming and expensive.
4. The fnancial cost and the time and morale impact on staff of developing the new solution to this
stage has been extremely high for Queensland Health. The business is now faced with a situation of
project exhaustion across the organisation.
6.22 These views echo the complaints which Mr Burns had made in his briefng note of 29 August 2008574
and there was an obvious desire for QH to be released from the arrangements with which it had been
discontented for so long, even if that meant having the system Go Live when it was unsafe to do so.
6.23 The Risk Assessment Report alluded to Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report.
6.24 The minutes of the Project Pre-Board Meeting on 1 March, which comprised its QH members only, recorded
the following
575:
The group agreed that all of the current project risks are manageable and nothing is preventing Go Live
at this stage.
The Project Directorate recommends that the defects can be managed through the defect and solution
management plan.
6.25 On 12 March 2010, Mr Burns presented a Program Assurance Position Paper to the Project Board which
confrmed that all critical milestones for Go Live were in an acceptable position
576. Ms Berenyi recalled that
participants at this meeting were asked to express their views of the readiness of the system to Go Live. She
could recall no dissenting views having been expressed
577.
6.26 On 14 March 2010, the Project Directorate presented a brief for decision to the Project Board which stated578:
The QHIC Project Directorate recommends to the Project Board that predefned criteria have been met
and that the business may go live with SAP and Workbrain.
6.27 The Project Directorate identifed that one issue was assessed as reporting “amber” however an appropriate
mitigation strategy was in place allowing the system to proceed to Go Live
579. Ms Berenyi said that the
advice provided to the Project Board by the Project Directorate was that this was a low risk and the Board
accepted this risk
580.
6.28 At 6.00am on 14 March 2010, the Project Directorate met and reviewed the criteria for Go Live581. At 7.00am
on 14 March 2010, the Project Board convened by telephone and decided, on the recommendation of the
Project Directorate
582, that the system would Go Live as all planned cutover activities had been completed
ahead of schedule
583. The minutes of the meeting record Mr Shea, Mr Doak, Ms Berenyi, Mr Ray Brown and
members of the Project Directorate as being present. Mr Kalimnios was not present at the meeting
584.
572 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 18.
573 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at pages 18-19.
574 Exhibit 63, Volume 5, at pages 294-296.
575 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 13.
576 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 143.
577 Exhibit 113, para 197.
578 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 168-169.
579 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 168.
580 Exhibit 113, paras 159, 195.
581 Exhibit 113, para 198.
582 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 166; Exhibit 80, para 69.
583 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 166.
584 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 166.

Contract
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6.29 It was not evident from the documents to what extent the decision to Go Live was properly and carefully
considered and competing risks were calmly assessed. Of particular importance is Mr Cowan’s clear warning
in his Final UAT Report that the system was in distress.
6.30 It became apparent in the oral evidence that the Project Directorate and the Project Board considered the
risk that LATTICE might fail to be the primary, if not the only, factor in the decision to Go Live. As well those
making the decisions had succumbed to a sense of inevitability that they had to go on with the project. The
belief that LATTICE would fail at any moment with catastrophic results gave rise to resignation that, come
what may, the Interim Solution had to be accepted and put into operation. Mr Kalimnios considered the risk
of LATTICE failing to have been unacceptable
585. He expressed the view that there were many factors that
were considered in recommending the system Go Live
586, however the primary one was the risk of LATTICE
failing
587:
[W]e … got to the point where, in my view, there was very little option, and particularly, and I need to keep
re-emphasising this with our view of what the potential option was with continuing with LATTICE, which,
from our perspective was an extremely high risk option. So in that context, we really, as I say, in my view,
had little option.
But to proceed?—Correct, yes. [emphasis added]
6.31 Mr Price held a similar view588:
To the best of my recollection, the Project Directorate had the view that the go-live decision was based on
that risk vs. risk assessment. By this time, Queensland Health has been corralled and pushed down this
track and had two choices – either stick on Lattice and risk that
70,000 people not be paid if Lattice failed
or accept the risk that had been identifed by KJ Ross & Associates and others, and Go-Live.
Mr Price admitted589 that there was:
… Undoubtedly a compromised situation occurring as pressure mounted around schedules, costs, the
ever present threat of LATTICE collapsing and … so our options had been cut off, we were virtually told to
make the best we can of this thing so that put us in a situation where compromise was the only way to go
… .
He identifed the imperative for having to accept a compromised project was that on two occasions, in
2008 and in 2009, he (and others) had told the Director-General “that we needed to get out … from the IBM
contract and (the) relationship with CorpTech … but that was effectively ignored
590”. The reference was to
Mr Burns’ memorandum of August 2008 and Mr Price’s own memorandum of July 2009.
Mr Price said in his statement
591 that by March 2010 “we had reached a point where we could not say
‘no’ any more. … We did not have a basis upon which we could say ‘no’ to going live by reference to the
established criteria because either (they) had been met or … any associated risk had been mitigated.”
The persons to whom Mr Price was referring when he said this were members of the Project Board and the
Project Directorate who “had the same view around the LATTICE risk and the situation we were in”
592.
6.32 The sense of being inexorably committed to the Interim Solution reached as high as the Associate DirectorGeneral. Ms MacDonald said593 that the State could not have acted upon the failure to meet UAT exit
criteria as a basis for bringing the project to an end. That was not “an option … off the back of the fear that
people had that LATTICE would not continue”. She said, on the same topic
594, by reference to the review
of the SS Initiative and the decision in January 2009 to restrict the prime contractor to delivering the QH
payroll system:
… If you were going to pull out of IBM, that would have been the point at which you’d (do) it … . Once we
got to that point it was so far in that you had to actually keep going almost because you didn’t have time
to rebuild something else.
585 Exhibit 89, paras 54, 55.
586 T21-90, L1-18 (Michael Kalimnios); T21-93, L14-32 (Michael Kalimnios).
587 T21-95, L33-43 (Michael Kalminios).
588 Exhibit 83, para 96.
589 T21-15, L1-15 (Anthony Price).
590 T21-15, L6-10 (Anthony Price).
591 Exhibit 83, para 100.
592 T21-18, L21-35 (Anthony Price).
593 T28-23, L5-10 (Natalie MacDonald).
594 T28-43, L45-55 (Natalie MacDonald).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
148
Ms MacDonald conceded that the State’s capacity to resist changes to the contract requested by IBM was
small because “there was certainly a desire to see this project completed” and “the history of the project,
the political dimension … really did make it much more likely that Change Requests would be acceded
to rather than opposed in a public way”
595. Ms MacDonald believed that IBM was aware of the State’s
commitment to the project with its consequential incapacity to refuse Change Requests
596. The “political
dimension” was the need to avoid public criticism arising from the way in which the project had been
managed by CorpTech.
6.33 Ms Jones considered the fact that LATTICE remained unsupported was a signifcant risk and no person
could guarantee the system would continue to perform. As to whether Ms Jones would have recommended
the system Go Live if someone had been able to demonstrate LATTICE could be reasonably relied upon for
six months, she said
597:
I had considered, “Could LATTICE go six more months?” and obviously I felt that it could have. Worst case
scenario, just hope it didn’t happen so six months, possibly. The problem as we progress was that I have
no confdence – we were talking about six months. By this point, more EBs were coming, the stacks were
there. The annual leave central scheme had come, Queensland Health reporting at a fnancial level was
coming. There were restructures within Queensland Health again, so my view was you weren’t talking six
months, you were talking six,
12 or 24. My real view was that you would have to start against and I don’t
mean from an empty box, I mean from where you were, we would have to start again and do two years …
6.34 When cross examined, Ms Jones gave the following evidence598:

Question: You understood of the system, could someone meaningfully guarantee to you that LATTICE
or the old system, I should say, would continue performing for another six months?
No. The assessment of the LATTICE risk was robust within government. The CorpTech
Answer:

support team under Phillip Hood did a fantastic job to provide the mitigation to LATTICE
being unsupported but at the end of the day, it was unsupported. Best efforts of government
were not going to cut it when it came to, “What would you do if you couldn’t pay people?”
and no-one could answer that, and the risk sat within government and as you can see by
the payroll Go Live, no matter whose – no matter leads to a payroll issue, it will be payroll
that is the focus and the blame or the perceived fault body, so Queensland Health not being
able to pay its employees, completely unacceptable and possible, so wherever it’s possible,
it’s unacceptable. We had people coming into payroll saying, “Are you sure that’s true?”
and we had consultants reviewing it, we had risk analysis’ being undertaken. This was not
my personal view, this was the view of people who took the time to understand what this
Queensland Health payroll system was like and how it was functioning, where it’s fail points
were and whether we had any room for mitigation left. [errors in original]
6.35 In his statement, Mr Hood was asked to consider what issues he believed would have arisen with supporting
LATTICE for a 3, 6 and 12 month period following Go Live
599. He said600:
… By necessity, CorpTech would have continued to support the Queensland Health instance of LATTICE
had the new solution not gone live in March
2010. There would have been no option but to continue that
support as LATTICE would have remained as the Queensland Health payroll solution.
My primary concern regarding continued operation of the Queensland Health payroll solution would have
remained – that CorpTech was operating a very complex and non-vendor supported payroll solution. While
CorpTech had signifcant capability to support LATTICE, it did not build the system and did not have the
same level of experience as the vendor. There was always a risk that a problem might arise that would
signifcantly impact LATTICE and that CorpTech might not be able to resolve the issue. Depending on the
type of issue, the impact could have impacted the employees of the agencies using LATTICE.
CorpTech has with Queensland Health’s agreement implemented a minimal change policy whereby only
critical changes could be made to the Queensland Health LATTICE solution. The rationale for this was that
the more changes that were introduced to the solution the greater the risk to the stability of the solution.

595 T28-41, L50-L54 to T28-42, L1-L10 (Natalie MacDonald).
596 T28-41, L52-54 (Natalie MacDonald).
597 T20-30, L7-19 (Janette Jones).
598 T20-38, L34-56 (Janette Jones).
599 Exhibit 66, para 33.
600 Exhibit 66, paras 34-37.

Contract
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The longer LATTICE was supported after the cessation of vendor support, the more diffcult it would
become to support, and the greater the risk to those agencies being paid from the LATTICE solutions.
6.36 Mr Shea (Chair of the Project Board), accepted that the decision to Go Live was the responsibility of the
Project Board
601. He described in detail the meeting between the Project Board on 14 March 2010 at which
members of the Project Directorate were also in attendance
602:
We did have a joint meeting between the directorate and the board and we went around every person
in the room to confrm that they were happy to go live. There were no dissenting views, there were
obviously – people had views that it was a potential risk or there were risks associated which we had the
risk document and the mitigation strategies but there was no dissenting view of the directorate that we
should not go live to my memory. Going over the whole room, we asked each individual person.
6.37 Members of the Project Board were anxious to make it clear that they relied heavily upon the briefng notes
and reports from the Project Directorate. Mr Shea, for example, said
603:
Not only did the QHIC Project Directorate comprise those with greater technical expertise and access to
experts than the QHIC Project Board, it also comprised representatives of the contracting parties who,
one might reasonably expect, would hold each other to adequate performance and who were best placed
to assess the status of the project.
6.38 Mr Shea stated he did not have any reservations at the time the decision was made to Go Live as he
believed the system was ready
604. He too saw a need to “push on” due to what he saw as the imminent risk
of LATTICE failing. This was a “signifcant reason” why the Project Board made the decision to Go Live
605.
When questioned, Mr Shea stated he based his belief that LATTICE was at risk of failing on telephone calls
he had received from Ms Jones, early briefngs he had been given and information he had received from
members of the Project Directorate
606. As to the risk assessment undertaken by the Project Board itself,
Mr Shea echoed the statements of Mr Kalimnios, in saying
607:
[W]hile at the time of the decision to ‘Go Live’ it was recognised that risks existed, the QHIC Project Board
believed and had been advised that the risks could be adequately managed. Moreover, because of the
position the project had developed to, the doubts around the reliability of LATTICE and the absence of any
alternative course to that point,
while the QHIC Project Board could always have decided not to ‘Go Live’
there was very little option for it but to do so.
[emphasis added]
6.39 Ms Berenyi, another member of the Project Board, also stated she was confdent the system was ready to
Go Live
608. She based her assessment on the discussions which had taken place at previous Board meetings,
Mr Burns’ views as Quality Assurance Advisor and the views of key CorpTech staff, namely Mr Hood,
Mr James Brown and Ms Stewart
609.
6.40 In addition to those factors, Ms Berenyi identifed a number of practical factors which she took into account
when participating in the Go Live decision
610:
there were only limited periods in 2010 at which it would be viable for the Solution to go-live;
the potential cost of $1 million per month of additional delay costs which would have been shouldered by
the State if QH had requested a delay;
the problems associated with a loss in expertise, needed for the Solution’s ongoing development, if the
March 2010 delivery date was not met;
concerns that the new EB [Enterprise Bargaining] determinations by the IR Commission – which would
need to be included in the LATTICE system were the go-live date delayed – would be incompatible with
the confgurability and fragility of LATTICE; and
the real risk of the LATTICE system and associated transactional processing by the QHSSP failing if no
replacement system was implemented at some point in near future. [emphasis added]
601 Exhibit 80, para 70.
602 T22-12, L3-12 (Adrian Shea).
603 Exhibit 80, para 70.
604 T22-12, L14-23 (Adrian Shea).
605 T22-13, L28-30 (Adrian Shea); T22-14, L15-21 (Adrian Shea); T22-20, L20-23 (Adrian Shea); Exhibit 80, para 67.
606 T22-13, L10-55 (Adrian Shea); T22-17, L21-25 (Adrian Shea).
607 Exhibit 80, para 70; T22-14, L30-37 (Adrian Shea).
608 Exhibit 113, para 201.
609 Exhibit 113, para 201.
610 Submissions on behalf of Ms Margaret Berenyi, dated 31 May 2013 (Contract), para 12(d); Exhibit 113, para 211.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
150
Submissions
6.41 Counsel for the State submitted that the Go Live decision ought to be viewed in the context of, among other
factors, “the real and imminent risk of LATTICE failure”
611. The State submitted this risk, on the balance of the
evidence, was not overstated, “[a]side from a lack of vendor support, other issues with LATTICE included an
inability to confgure upcoming enterprise bargaining changes and vital components reaching their end of
life”. It was submitted that the majority of witnesses acknowledged that LATTICE was failing and many said
there was a serious risk of it failing catastrophically which would have resulted in 78,000 employees not being
paid
612. The risk of LATTICE failing, it was said, was not on balance “illusory or overvalued”613:
The risk of LATTICE failure was a view held by the two people who had most experience with the payroll
system – Philip Hood and Janette Jones. However, it was not in their view alone that led to LATTICE being
considered a signifcant risk. Rather, their views were supported by a risk analysis undertaken in
2007 by
an external consultant [Exhibit
131], which identifed the LATTICE failure as being a high risk. The risk did
not lessen throughout the project.
The only witness who suggested that LATTICE was not such a serious risk was Mr Uhlmann. However, he
did not have the same knowledge and expertise as others who were directly involved with the LATTICE
system so it is submitted that the evidence of the other witnesses should be preferred in relation to this
issue.
6.42 I reject this submission. Even if the risk of LATTICE failing was a high risk, it did not displace the need to
take into account, and calmly to assess, other factors such as the warnings which Mr Cowan had issued.
Moreover, there ought to have been, and there was not, earlier and more serious consideration given to
what alternatives existed to upgrade or provide continuing support for LATTICE if the decision to Go Live
were postponed.
6.43 Counsel on behalf of Ms Berenyi submitted that it was reasonable for the Project Directorate to have
recommended the decision to Go Live and for the Project Board to have approved that recommendation
614.
That decision, even taken in isolation from all that had preceded it, was one which fundamentally miscarried.
For some considerable period beforehand, decisions had been made by both the Project Board and the Project
Directorate which had, as I have said, meant that the system when it went live would be sure to contain a
number of functional defciencies. When Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report confrmed what must by then have
been obvious anyway, that the system still possessed these problems, a Management Response was issued
with the obvious desire to neutralise it and explain away its conclusions.
6.44 The result was that, by mid-March 2010, the system, needing to be supported by a very large number of
workarounds and other devices, and possessing a large number of functional defciencies, some known and
others yet to emerge, was in a highly unsatisfactory state. Despite that being obvious, the system had taken
so long to implement that the condition of LATTICE became a growing concern, to the point by mid-March, it
seems, of near hysteria. These problems were exacerbated by extreme fatigue of many involved on the Project
615.
There had been a long period of very long days and under very diffcult circumstances. I discerned a strong sense
of utter helplessness and an overwhelming desire of these individuals for release from these pressing matters.
The release, however, could have come in the form of resetting the Project, and making alternative arrangements
for the ongoing support and maintenance of LATTICE rather than proceeding relentlessly towards Go Live. The
characterisation by Dr Manfeld of that attitude was “Plan A or die”
616. That expression sums up very accurately in
my view the mindset of both parties at this time and for some considerable time beforehand.
Even if the risk of LATTICE failing was a high risk, it did not displace the need to take into
account, and calmly to assess, other factors such as the warnings which Mr Cowan had issued.
6.45 Despite the reasoning of the Project Directorate and the Project Board for the decision to Go Live, there
appears to have been an absence of a true risk assessment surrounding the solution quality and the
“residual risk” in the system. This was an opinion which Dr Manfeld expressed
617:
611 Submissions on behalf of the State of Queensland, undated (Contract), para 130.
612 Submissions on behalf of the State of Queensland, undated (Contract), para 131.
613 Submissions on behalf of the State of Queensland, undated (Contract), paras 130–133.
614 Submissions on behalf of Ms Margaret Berenyi, dated 31 May 2013 (Contract), para 12.
615 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at page 18.
616 T30-49, L18 (Dr David Manfeld); T30-58, L29 (Dr David Manfeld).
617 Exhibit 123, at page 11, L22-46.

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The State’s risk assessments previous to the go-live were unsatisfactory and reflect more a desire to
go-live than to assess actual risk.
The risk assessment by the State focussed on Severity 1 and 2, defects
and on establishing work-arounds in mitigation, as established by the defects management plan. This
is reasonable behaviour for this aspect of risk management. However, there was a crucial absence in
the consideration of residual risk, so that an objective view of residual risk, post mitigation, was not
available. Issues include:
• UAT is not designed to detect all defects; there was no consideration of such risks.
• The number of software fixes done in response to defects left a residual risk of consequential defects left
undiscovered.
• The sheer number of work-around mitigations was an operational risk and there was no consideration of
residual risk.
• An initial project decision was made not to perform a full parallel payroll test against LATTICE … In the light
of the number of defects and work-arounds, initial assumptions were not revisited.
All unconsidered risks by defnition became risks accepted by the State. [emphasis added]
Findings and Conclusion
Any rational assessment would have deferred the Go Live, with some very determined
effort to reset the Project and make some alternative arrangements for the ongoing
support of LATTICE.
6.46 The decision to Go Live miscarried. What was regarded as an imminent failure of LATTICE overshadowed
any measured and analytical assessment and weighing of the relevant factors. By the time the Project
Directorate and the Project Board met to consider whether to Go Live, the members of those bodies had
made up their minds that the only option was to proceed.
6.47 To do so was to abrogate their responsibility to have proper regard to all options and to consider whether,
in all the circumstances, the best option was to proceed. The Project Board, as the superior body, must bear
primary responsibility for the decision which was made. It may have acted on advice, and been entitled to
do so, but that did not excuse its members from turning their own minds and making their own enquiries as
to the bases upon which this important decision was to be made.
6.48 The decision to Go Live ought not to have been made when it was. Any rational assessment would have
deferred the Go Live, with some very determined effort to reset the Project and make some alternative
arrangements for the ongoing support of LATTICE if, indeed, more support than Mr Hood’s team was
capable of providing was required.
6.49 I would agree with the view which Dr Manfeld expressed to the effect that it was reasonable to expect, as
required by Prince 2 project management methodology, that the Project Directorate “not only describe the
issues but describe options for the Board to consider”
618. There is no evidence that the Project Directorate
engaged in this analysis and presented in a considered way the options available to the Project Board. As
a result, when the Project Board came to make the decision to Go Live, the Board too felt that there was
“very little option for it” but to Go Live. Despite the general recognition of the residual risk in the system
in the Management Response to the Final UAT Report and the Risk Assessment Report, this risk was not
adequately assessed, such that the recommendation of the Project Directorate and decision of Project
Board to Go Live miscarried.
Consequences for Staff of the Go Live Decision

6.50 Shortly after the completion of the third pay run, and upon the problems with the system having
manifested themselves, Mr Reid caused the contracts of Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea to be terminated.
He did so after forming the view that the decision to Go Live had been “clearly erroneous and had been
made without suffcient rigour”
619, and Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea were directly involved in it. This decision,
6.51

618 T30-90, L31-35 (Dr David Manfeld).
619 Exhibit 90, para 49.

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he stated, was based on the information available to him, including the fundamental errors and problems
that manifested post-Go Live and the fndings of the Auditor-General’s Report
620. Mr Reid considered it
appropriate to terminate the contracts of Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea as they were senior executives with
the day-to-day knowledge of the replacement system and because “it ought to have been readily apparent
from any review or assessment of the replacement payroll system undertaken prior to its implementation
that it was not ready to ‘go live’ when it did”
621. Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea had not identifed and advised
him of the signifcant risk involved in going Live
622. He considered they and Mr Price had not adequately
discharged their duties as they “failed to identify these problems/errors and take steps to ensure they were
rectifed prior to the implementation of the payroll system”
623.
6.52 The contracts of Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea could be terminated without reasons having to be given. They
were contracted employees and thus liable to be terminated on this basis
624. The letters which were sent
to Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea, consistent with this position, offered no reasons for their termination
625. But
both men made clear in their evidence, and Mr Reid confrmed, that the reasons were indeed their role in
the Go Live decision
626.
6.53 Mr Reid would also have dismissed Mr Price had he been able to, under the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld)627.
But Mr Price was not a contracted employee. Mr Reid considered it appropriate to transfer Mr Price to a
position in which he would have no ongoing involvement in the replacement payroll system
628. Mr Reid
stated his decision was based on Mr Price’s responsibility for advising the QHIC Project Board in respect of
the replacement payroll system prior to Go Live
629. He did so notwithstanding that, at the time he made
that decision, he was aware of the Price Memorandum, but, strangely, its existence and his knowledge of it
had no impact on his decision
630.
6.54 Mr Reid considered that he took responsibility for the issues which arose post-Go Live as it was a part of
his duties as Director-General to ensure employees of QH were paid
631. Although nominally accepting
responsibility his acceptance was little more than lip service. He did not accept fault for the problems postGo Live, saying that he relied on the assurances he had received from the Project Board
632. When pressed in
cross examination by Mr Traves QC representing Mr Kalimnios, Mr Shea and Mr Ray Brown, Mr Reid said
633:
I accept the fault that I was not more vigorous in trying to fnd out what were the issues which would
occur in going live. I took the assurance of the board that the system was ready to go live, and the belief
that the board members who said there would not be detrimental consequences to Queensland Health
staff from doing that.
6.55 Mr Reid formed the view that less serious action should be taken against Mr Ray Brown as he had only been
appointed to the Project Board in October 2009
634. He had been invited to attend Board meetings as and
when he could, to discharge the limited role of ensuring that QH staff could access the payroll application,
which he did. As a result Mr Ray Brown was issued with a written warning
635. In addition, Mr Reid directed
Ms Jones be transferred to another position
636.
Errors, omissions and lassitude were plentiful. Public servants from Director-General down all
failed to act in the best interests of the public.
6.56 The initiative which Mr Reid showed in terminating the contracts of Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea, in transferring
620 Exhibit 90, paras 42-49, 56-58; T22-85, L20-40 (Michael Reid).
621 Exhibit 90, paras 49, 58.
622 T23-32, L50 (Michael Reid).
623 Exhibit 90, para 58.
624 Exhibit 90, para 50.
625 T22-85, L48-55 (Michael Reid); Exhibit 80, para 71.
626 T22-22, L8-10 (Adrian Shea); Exhibit 80, para 71; T21-121, L46-48 (Michael Kalimnios); Exhibit 89, para 65; T22-113, L48-55 to T22-114, L1-L2 (Michael Reid).
627 T22-86, L4-7 (Michael Reid); Exhibit 90, para 52.
628 Exhibit 90, para 52.
629 Exhibit 90, para 52.
630 Exhibit 90, para 53.
631 T22-114, L19-21 (Michael Reid).
632 T22-115, L19-23 (Michael Reid).
633 T22-115, L9-23 (Michael Reid).
634 Exhibit 90, para 54.
635 Exhibit 90, para 54.
636 T21-112, L35-55 (Michael Kalimnios); T22-85, L40-55 (Michael Reid).

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Ms Jones and Mr Price and in offcially warning Mr Ray Brown, is to be contrasted with his inaction in
responding to the concerns repeatedly raised with him about the Interim Solution and, in particular, the issues
raised in respect of IBM’s performance and whether QH ought to extricate itself from the contract. Mr Reid
accepted that a number of the matters raised with him by Mr Kalimnios in August 2008 were identifed by
the Auditor-General as reasons for the poor implementation of the system
637. Despite being aware of these
concerns, Mr Reid did not interest himself in the risks associated with the decision to Go Live, relying instead on
the assessment by the Project Board. He ought to have been more involved and active in trying to understand
and deal with the issues to which his attention was drawn, and, in particular, those which might affected the
accuracy and timeliness of the pays to be made to his staff after Go Live.
6.57 These events show that Mr Reid acted only when it was in his self-interest to do so. He was prompt and
decisive in punishing staff for their roles. But he was not hard on himself, despite giving lip service in his oral
evidence to accepting responsibility for the problems. He, in truth, took no responsibility and suffered no
consequence for the failings I have identifed.
6.58 After the Auditor-General’s Report was published, Mr Grierson received a letter from the Department of
Premier and Cabinet asking what steps he would take in respect of those CorpTech employees who had been
involved in the decision to Go Live
638. On receipt of it, Mr Grierson spoke with Ms MacDonald and Ms Berenyi
and asked each of them to explain why the decision had been made to Go Live
639. He concluded640:
So I looked at the documents, I looked at what she [Ms Berenyi] presented to me, I looked at the information
that she had received as a board member and my conclusion was: if I’d have been a board member
presented with information that said, “Hey, this area is responsible for data conversion and this area says
it’s done,” and the quality advisor to the Health department, Terry Burns is saying, “Yes, it is done, it is
green, ready to go live,” I would have probably said, “That’s fair enough, I would have gone live too.”
6.59 Counsel for Mr Kalimnios, Mr Shea and Mr Ray Brown submitted that the Project Board was misled as to the
state of readiness of the system and that Mr Grierson extended to Ms Berenyi a degree of empathy which
Mr Reid was not prepared to extend to Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea
641. It was submitted that642:
Whilst there were still general concerns within the … Board that there were risks around “going live”
it was felt that appropriate mitigation strategies had been implemented and its current project risks
were manageable. The imminent failure of LATTICE was also a signifcant driver to “going live”. …
Mr Kalimnios … was conscious that [QH] had received a poor quality product … . The position the Board
found itself in was the consequence of many of the issues he identifed in
2008. The circumstances were
not ideal but from the Board’s perspective there were limited options. The … Board took the decision to
go live believing it to be the best decision in all of the circumstances. The Board acted on reports and
recommendations from QHEST, IBM, CorpTech … KJ Ross & Associates and from independent contractors
Mr … Burns and Mr … Shah.
It should be apparent from what I have written that I do not accept the thrust of the submissions. I accept
that Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea must have felt themselves to be in an impossible position. The concerns they
expressed in 2008 and in 2009 had not been acted on. The Director-General had been less than energetic in
coming to grips with the problems they had brought to his attention. It is possible to feel considerable sympathy
for Mr Kalimnios, not only because he alone has accepted responsibility for what went wrong with the payroll
implementation. Over the course of 12 months he endeavoured to bring what he understood to be the problems
and signs of diffculty with the project to Mr Reid’s attention. He succeeded to the extent of having Mr Reid meet
with Mr Grierson on two occasions but at that level there was no interest in taking decisive action. Mr Kalimnios
was under pressure from those around him and below him to proceed with the LATTICE replacement and by
the intimation of those above him that they would not themselves take control. He succumbed to the pressure.
But leadership was required and the “signs of distress” should have been acted on. The Price Memorandum was
meant to bring the risk of the replacement solution failing forcefully to the attention of Mr Reid and the Minister.
Mr Kalimnios did not proceed with it. He had had “second thoughts” about giving the Memorandum to Mr Reid,
and thought it was probably too late to extricate QH from the project because “we were locked in to processing
with the current solution …”
643. He should have briefed Mr Reid with the memorandum, amended if necessary.
637 T23-23, L1-11 to T23-24, L1-53 (Michael Reid); see Submissions on behalf of Michael Kalimnios, Adrian Shea and Ray Brown, dated 11 June 2013 (Contract), para 110.
638 T29-26, L10-15 (Malcolm Grierson).
639 T29-26, L17-25 (Malcolm Grierson).
640 T29-26, L41-50 (Malcolm Grierson).
641 Submissions on behalf of Michael Kalimnios, Adrian Shea and Ray Brown, dated 11 June 2013 (Contract), para 65.
642 Submissions on behalf of Michael Kalimnios, Adrian Shea and Ray Brown, dated 11 June 2013 (Contract), paras 41, 56, 57.
643 T21-101, L10; T21-101, L30-40 (Michael Kalimnios).

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6.60 There was a marked difference in the way that Ms Berenyi was treated. She too was involved in the Go Live
decision and had, as Executive Director of CorpTech, more direct contact with IBM than did the QH senior
managers. The difference in the treatment she received, as compared with Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea,
would seem to be explained by Mr Grierson’s more robust character, which was more resistant to criticism
and felt less threatened (because of his robust attitude) by the decisions made by staff who reported to
him than was Mr Reid. As well Mr Grierson had the support and confdence of his Minister. There is, as
well, a point of distinction. Ms Berenyi had not prevented, as had Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea, the Price
Memorandum from progressing through the ordinary channels. There was a legitimate reason, therefore,
why Ms Berenyi might have been treated more favourably than Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea.
6.61 In the circumstances it is not possible to characterise Mr Kalimnios’ and Mr Shea’s terminations as
unjustifed, or to conclude that Ms Berenyi was treated with undue leniency. Mr Kalimnios and Mr Shea
cannot be regarded as the only public servants responsible for the series of bad decisions which led
ultimately to the decision to Go Live in March 2010. Errors, omissions and lassitude were plentiful. Public
servants from Director-General down all failed to act in the best interests of the public. That only two were
held accountable may be in a sense unfair, but looking at the particular cases their terminations were not
unjustifed. They do not become so because others could also have been justifably disciplined or dismissed.
7. System Inadequacies
Introduction
7.1 When the system went live, very many QH staff were not, for some considerable period, paid at all, or were
under- or overpaid. IBM could never have been in any doubt that, despite the system being an interim
one with minimal functionality, it was required to pay staff and to pay them accurately, even though the
system might require some manual adjustment to the pay roster and pay calculations. IBM had as good
as acknowledged that when, during the course of the implementation, it agreed to fx all defects which
affected pay (or net pay)
644. And Mr Gower accepted too, when questioned about the “issues” with the
system that affected net pay, that
645:
it was never my intent to deliver a solution that anyone would deem to be … suboptimal …

7.2 Mr Gower accepted on several occasions in his oral evidence that the system had, immediately before it
went live, problems that affected net pay
646. His evidence in particular made clear that the approach which
IBM had taken was not to turn its mind to what it would take to build a payroll system (albeit interim and
minimal) which paid people, but to rely wholly on what QH communicated to it as to its requirements
647:
Question: You’re saying if Queensland Health hasn’t told you of a requirement, the fact that it
nevertheless exists in reality in an award is beside the point, Queensland Health needs to
communicate the detail of the award to you as a requirement?
That’s correct.
So that if something existed in an award but wasn’t communicated to you by Queensland
Health, the system wouldn’t take what the award set into account?
That’s correct, nobody’s aware of that.
The requirements is the way you’re saying that it comes to IBM’s attention what it needs to do?
Correct, yes.
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
7.3 The problems which caused staff not to be paid, or to be paid inaccurately, were of three kinds: external
influences; what were described in evidence as business processes; and systems defects
648. The Terms of
Reference direct my attention to the “system”, which I take to mean the computer system. The causes in

the frst two categories are ones which are not, strictly speaking “system” defects, but they nevertheless
combined with system defects to cause pay failures and the inaccuracies in pay.
7.4 Although the problems which were experienced operated in combination, it is possible to identify the
system problems which contributed in a material sense to the pay problems. This is achieved by looking
to the defects which UAT had identifed before Go Live (a matter with which I have already dealt), the
644 See, for example, T36-62, L16-21 (Mark Dymock).
645 T26-13, L15-20 (John Gower).
646 See, for example, T26-14, L18-17 (John Gower). He said, in doing so, that many of these arose from what he said were “new requirements”.
647 T26-17, L5-18 (John Gower).
648 See, for example, generally Exhibit 79 and Exhibit 118.

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problems which were experienced immediately after Go Live, the steps which needed to be taken to rectify
those (and other) problems and certain of the events in the lead up to the State’s settlement with IBM in
September 2010 which included IBM agreeing to fx a number of defects in the system.
problems Identifed in UAt
7.5 I have already considered UAT and Mr Cowan’s execution of it. I would add only a brief reminder that
Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report made it clear that the system had serious functional defciencies
649. In addition
to the remarks in his Report, he noted that, during UAT
650:
… [R]ecommendations were made to the Project Board around the risks implicit in continuing the UAT
execution with the system in the state it was
and that:
The approach to UAT within the QHIC project has been very unusual with respect to normal business practice.
Best practice dictates that on discovery of signifcant defects within the UAT, the system should be returned to
the system developer as unacceptable.
7.6 Mr Cowan concluded that what he called the “residual risk in the system”651 was that a signifcant number
of functional defects remained in it
652. He noted that only 60 per cent of the production scenarios had been
exercised during UAT and if functional defects had been identifed in that portion, the untested 40 per cent
was also likely to contain as yet unidentifed defects
653. It was entirely to be expected, therefore, that after
Go Live the system would show up a number, and possibly a very large number, of defects which had not
previously been identifed and which prevented its proper functioning, in the sense it would not pay staff or
not do so accurately.

7.7 And that is precisely what occurred.
the First three pay Runs
7.8 The evidence of what occurred immediately after Go Live was, principally, from Ms Jones, Director of Payroll

and Establishment in the QH Shared Services Provider and Ms Stewart, Senior Director, Payroll Portfolio,
CorpTech. Ms Stewart had a longer involvement than Ms Jones with the system after Go Live (Mr Reid
transferred Ms Jones from payroll involvement on 18 May 2010
654), whereas Ms Stewart remains involved
to the present day. Ms Stewart’s involvement and expertise was of a more technical kind. She worked in
CorpTech so had an exposure to and knowledge of technical problems, which, she said, Ms Jones would
not
655. Moreover, Ms Jones was, in effect, removed from her position as I mentioned earlier, something
which coloured her evidence.
Another of the key issues which Ms Stewart experienced during the frst pay run was that it
took much longer than planned to send employee information from SAP to Workbrain. The
problem seemed to be with the importing process into Workbrain rather than its export
from SAP.
7.9 I found Ms Stewart’s evidence about the problems which were experienced in the system and its related
processes to be more informative and reliable than that of Ms Jones. Ms Stewart’s knowledge of the relevant
events was more balanced and she was able better to recall (and explain) the technical and other diffculties
which were experienced in the period after Go Live. She had the advantage also of having had a close
involvement with the system for a longer period post-Go Live than Ms Jones, and in particular by seeing and
being involved in how the defciencies with it and related processes were resolved. Ms Stewart had helped to
prepare the three post-Go Live updates of 19 March (Updates 1 and 2) and 9 April 2010 (Update 3)
656 and
649 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 287.
650 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 287.
651 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 306.
652 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 305.
653 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at page 306.
654 Exhibit 79, para 59.
655 T29-81, L17 (Jane Stewart); T29-110, L15-17; T29-110, L42-44 (Jane Stewart).
656 Exhibit 118, para 47.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
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knew which issues persisted beyond the frst three pay runs657. This gave her an insight into the nature of the
problems, their seriousness and the work which was required to correct them which Ms Jones did not have. This
makes her in my view a far superior witness to Ms Jones, and a witness whose evidence is supported by that of
Mr Michael Walsh, Executive Program Director, Payroll Stabilisation Project, and by Mr Cowan.
7.10 Ms Stewart also gave evidence that CorpTech experienced problems which were not seen by QH658.
7.11 For these reasons, I would prefer Ms Stewart’s evidence to that of Ms Jones to the extent there is any
conflict. As I show below, there does not seem to be any real conflict because Ms Jones accepted in her oral
examination that there were issues after Go Live of which she would have no knowledge and were within
CorpTech’s responsibility
659.
7.12 Ms Stewart gave a detailed account of what occurred in the period after Go Live660. I have relied on it below
in explaining the events which took place and the problems which were experienced by those with the
responsibility of ensuring the system functioned as best it could in the circumstances.
7.13 The frst pay run commenced at noon on Sunday 21 March 2010. The pay was delivered on Wednesday
24 March 2010
661. Ms Stewart considered that pay to have been a success662. But, as she pointed out,
it involved no element of “retrospective processing”
663 (ie dealing with changes to such things as roster
and staff position changes in prior pay periods
664). Some 151 “incidents” were logged with the CorpTech
service desk
665. In the frst pay run, performance and latency issues with the “Multi View Scheduler” (MVS)
in Workbrain were experienced
666. The MVS is used to maintain changes to rosters after they have been
loaded in Workbrain. This caused Workbrain to crash for a short time, and this had a flow-on material effect
for a longer period
667.
7.14 Another of the key issues which Ms Stewart experienced during the frst pay run was that it took much
longer than planned to send employee information from SAP to Workbrain
668. The problem seemed to be
with the importing process into Workbrain rather than its export from SAP. In any event, it meant that
pay reports which would ordinarily be fnished out of hours were still processing in the morning and in turn
causing the performance of SAP to be affected
669.
7.15 The second pay run commenced on Sunday, 4 April 2010670. It was less successful than the frst. This was
the frst time that retrospective processing occurred
671. During this pay run, Ms Stewart observed the
performance issue with the MVS getting worse, the general performance of Workbrain deteriorating and
requiring “urgent specialist attention”
672. That attention, she said, did not appear to be available on the
ground. CorpTech requested IBM to seek assistance of that kind on an urgent basis
673, because there was no
confdence that “IBM was … able to work through the issues in terms of getting resolution quick enough”
674.
7.16 The second pay run saw overnight batch process timings slow, due to the number of records being processed
and the fact that retrospective processing had commenced. Although this issue did not directly impact pay,
it created delays in processing and payroll staff productivity
675.
7.17 The second pay run revealed two main integration problems between SAP and Workbrain. The interface
programs between Workbrain and SAP were designed to produce error reports
676. The volume of the
integration errors increased faster than anticipated. The errors had to be addressed before the next
657 T29-96, L33-36 (Jane Stewart).
658 T29-110, L16-17 (Jane Stewart).
659 T20-76, L30-39 (Janette Jones).
660 See Exhibit 118, paras 47-101 and her evidence generally T29-81, L40-56 to T29-102, L1-47 (Jane Stewart).
661 Exhibit 118, para 48.
662 Exhibit 118, para 50.
663 Exhibit 118, para 49.
664 Exhibit 118, paras 14-18.
665 Exhibit 118, para 50.
666 Exhibit 118, para 50(a).
667 Exhibit 118, para 50(c).
668 Exhibit 118, para 50(b).
669 Exhibit 118, para 50(b).
670 Exhibit 118, para 54.
671 Exhibit 118, para 53.
672 Exhibit 118, para 51.
673 Exhibit 118, para 51.
674 T29-84, L34-35 (Jane Stewart).
675 Exhibit 118, para 52.
676 T29-86, L15-16 (Jane Stewart).

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integration load occurred, otherwise the data would be with loaded out of order, causing synchronisation
problems
677. Integration issues were dealt with by CorpTech and IBM and workarounds and emergent fxes
were applied to mitigate impacts upon pay
678.
7.18 The post-Go Live updates of 19 March and 9 April 2010679, which concern the frst and second pay runs
respectively, identify three major system defects, being the same defects as Ms Stewart identifed in her evidence:
a. the Workbrain MVS;
b. overnight processing overruns;
c. system unavailability and Workbrain to SAP integration issues, including causing Workbrain to crash.
7.19 Ms Stewart elaborated on each of these in her oral evidence.
7.20 She described the Workbrain latency and performance issues as “delays within the screen” and gave as an
example that when a user was in a screen and they hit a particular button or tried to do something, there
was a delay before they could see that take effect
680. Entering data took longer to process than had been
projected by IBM testing due to heavier than anticipated processing loads each day and inaccurate testing
scenarios
681. This had a flow-on effect of delaying the overnight interim pay run process so that it would still
be running in the morning
682. That in turn had an impact, as I have said, on the performance of SAP. The
Workbrain crash (Ms Stewart could not recall why it did so
683), created problems for longer than that short
period. Ms Stewart said that as a consequence of the crash, “transactions that were being processed but
had not been committed at the time may have been lost … Workbrain could not diagnose whether or not
data had in fact been lost …”
684.
The fact that IBM had to resort to assistance of this kind, despite it having designed and
built the system, and despite it having engaged Workbrain specialists in the course of doing
so, is damning.
7.21 The second issue (slow overnight processing runs) was caused by the heavy demand placed on the “offcycle
process”
685. Users were creating fles at exactly the same time. This was a problem as SAP used a unique
time code identifer to process the fles, but fles created at precisely the same second were given the
same time code. This meant only one fle with that time code would be processed, and the others were
left unprocessed and were not picked up in the offcycle process
686. The offcycle process was one which
permitted staff to be paid immediately on an ad hoc basis (ie without waiting until the next scheduled pay
cycle) because, for example, of a need to correct an error in their previous pay
687. That problem did not end
there. Once the time stamp naming issue was resolved, the Workbrain fle had incorrect data in it, and no
error message was being produced when that fle was transferred to SAP
688.
7.22 These issues were of grave concern to CorpTech. Ms Stewart said that some at least of these matters were
raised with IBM before Go Live and that IBM had assured CorpTech that errors of this kind would not occur
689.
7.23 All of the issues which occurred during the frst two pay runs continued into the third pay run690. It
commenced on 18 April 2010 and had been delayed by three hours (to 3pm) to allow for as many errors to
be corrected as possible
691.
677 For example: if the user intended to add, then delete then add data, and the load was out of order, the data could be added, added and then deleted which would produce a different
result, T29-86, L16-25 (Jane Stewart).
678 Exhibit 118, para 53.
679 Exhibit 63, Volume 15, at pages 233, 240-1, 288.
680 T29-82, L37-40 (Jane Stewart).
681 T29-83, L3-17 (Jane Stewart).
682 Exhibit 118, para 50b.
683 T29-83, L37-43 (Jane Stewart).
684 Exhibit 118, para 50c.
685 Exhibit 118, paras 87, 88.
686 Exhibit 118, para 87; T29-101, L15-42 (Jane Stewart).
687 T29-101, L45-48 (Jane Stewart).
688 Exhibit 118, para 89; T29-102, L4-11 (Jane Stewart).
689 Exhibit 118, para 90.
690 Exhibit 118, para 55.
691 Exhibit 118, para 58.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
158
7.24 The error correction processing for the QH Shared Services Provider took much longer than expected692. “Quite
large” errors were detected coming out of the pay run and the Shared Service Provider was requiring longer
to go through the error correction process than had been anticipated
693. The errors were generated from
uncontrolled or insuffcient data entry through human error, and from the content of data giving rise to other
problems with the pay run
694. Concurrent employment presented “challenges”, Ms Stewart said, as to how data
was captured, something which also produced error messages
695.
7.25 The third pay run revealed a new problem in Workbrain. It was described by Ms Stewart as a problem
transferring information from the MVS to the timesheet, which in turn caused inaccurate data to be
exported to SAP for payment
696. The problem arose because of inaccurate error messaging when the rosters
were published from MVS to the timesheet. The error message was not always correct. It would often say
that the timesheet had published successfully when it had not, or say it was not successful when in fact it
was. This could result in no timesheet information for those employees to be sent to SAP with an impact on
payments
697. Ms Stewart summarised the issue as follows698:
… [U]sers were left unsure about whether they were successful or not. Often it was successful, but
because it said it wasn’t they would then feel the need to submit again, and again, and again, which
added load to the system.
7.26 Ms Jones too observed the same problem699. She said rosters were corrupted when they were to be
published into the rostering software ready for export into SAP. She said that the publication suggested it
had been successfully published, but in effect it had not been treated by the software in a way that enabled
it to be exported out. This issue was not rectifed, to her knowledge, until the third pay period
700.
7.27 During the third pay run a “critical issue” was experienced which prevented CorpTech (initially) from
completing the pay run
701. Ms Stewart said702:
… There was an error coming up that would suggest that there was data missing from what would be
considered a mandatory requirement. We couldn’t work out how that could possibly have occurred, how
you could create such a record without that mandatory information being loaded. It was preventing us
from moving forward with the pay run, it was critical information to do with an employee’s pay that SAP
required that information flled in. It wasn’t a case of just going in and flling it in, it was locked into the
back end of the system where we couldn’t access it and we weren’t able to move on with the pay run.”
7.28 Ms Stewart and Mr Hood engaged two CorpTech SAP experts to complete the pay run. Had they not done
so, Ms Stewart said staff would not have been paid
703.
7.29 It took time for the problems with the system to manifest themselves. As I have explained, retrospective
processing did not commence until the second pay run. It may have been that staff took a pay or two to
realise that their pay was inaccurate, or they were patient about pay irregularities, being aware that the
system was new, no doubt thinking that whatever the problems with pay were that they would be corrected
in due course. Whatever the reasons, I accept Ms Stewart’s evidence, because she was in the position to
know, “there was a large number of issues that were surfacing that were not visible at the time of go live”
704,
and that “it was probably other issues surfacing on top of the defect management plan that started to
complicate the situation”
705. There is no doubt on the evidence that the Defect Management Plan could
never have been a complete record of the defects which existed at Go Live
706. Mr Cowan had warned it to
be likely that defects additional to those he had identifed during UAT existed, given that this was not the
function or purpose of UAT
707.
692 Exhibit 118, para 55.
693 T29-86, L40-50 (Jane Stewart).
694 T29-87, L23-42 (Jane Stewart).
695 T29-87, L44-47 to T29-88, L2-4 (Jane Stewart).
696 Exhibit 118, para 56.
697 Exhibit 118, paras 76, 77.
698 T29-88, L28-31 (Jane Stewart).
699 T20-63, L39-44 (Janette Jones).
700 T20-64 , L1-9 (Janette Jones).
701 Exhibit 188, para 58.
702 T29-89, L6-16 (Jane Stewart)
703 Exhibit 118, para 58.
704 T29-99, L13-15 (Jane Stewart).
705 T29-99, L25-27 (Jane Stewart).
706 See, for example, T20-11, L11-36 (Janette Jones).
707 Exhibit 63, Volume 13, at pages 305-306.

Contract
159
7.30 Integration quickly became a heavy workload for CorpTech to manage. New defects started to surface, the
Workbrain time and attendance data was not arriving in SAP or Workbrain was compiling incorrect data
to send to SAP. These issues eventually required two full time staff in CorpTech working to manage the
integration of Workbrain
708.
7.31 Workbrain continued to be problematic in the months following Go Live, and a range of system and
infrastructure changes were applied to address its performance. IBM engaged Infor specialists from
Canada to help with the changes
709. The fact that IBM had to resort to assistance of this kind, despite it
having designed and built the system, and despite it having engaged Workbrain specialists in the course of
doing so, is damning. Had the problems with Workbrain been of a kind which might be encountered as part
of teething problems in any system, the designer and builder, a large and sophisticated company such as
IBM, would have been able to fx the problems itself.
7.32 The problems which I have set out above are ones which did not end with the completion of the third pay
run. They persisted until about November 2011, which is the time at which CorpTech assumed responsibility
for support of the system. It is not until then that Ms Stewart considered the system to have stabilised
710. It
is to the period between completion of the third pay run and the time when CorpTech assumed control of
the system that I now briefly turn.
payroll Stabilisation and Improvement
7.33 The problems with the system post-Go Live led the State to establish, on about 19 April 2010, the Payroll
Stabilisation Project of which a senior offcial, Mr Walsh, was appointed Executive Program Director
711. The
work undertaken by that body included
712:
a. developing workflow and business requirements for current and future pay strategies, and, overseeing
support arrangements for district staff and processes;
b. processing pay cycles, fnalising adjustments for previous pays, and, fnalising adjustments for LATTICE;
c. resolving data issues and system defects and managing system issue logs including categorisation and
prioritisation.
7.34 The stabilisation project was brought to an end in July 2010, and the “Payroll Improvement Program”
instituted
713. By then, an issues register had been created to capture problems with the system and
associated payroll processes. As at 25 May 2010, there were some 2,800 issues with about 1,800 completed
and 1,000 remaining active
714.

7.35 The evidence which Mr Walsh included in his statement about the reasons for the problems after Go Live
were consistent with those which Ms Stewart had identifed
715.
In Mr Walsh’s time as head of the Payroll Stabilisation Project and the later Improvement Program, the
number of payroll staff increased from 650 full time employees to some 900
716. The extra staff were needed
7.36

to complete more transactions within each fortnightly pay cycle. The KPMG Review of the Queensland
Health Payroll system dated 31 May 2012 identifed there were 1,010 payroll staff, as at 31 May 2012
717.
other Factors Contributing to the pay problems

7.37 I have attempted to confne my survey of the matters above, so far as possible, to the problems which were
experienced in the system itself immediately after Go Live. Each of the relevant witnesses, however, made

clear that those problems were a consequence also of other factors, some external and some arising from
the business processes which QH had in place or implemented at or about the time of Go Live.

7.38 There is no doubt that that is so. Those factors are not, however, the focus of this Inquiry, but I say
something of them below so that the extent of them might be understood.

708 T29-100, L41-44 (Jane Stewart); T36-28, L1-34.
709 Exhibit 118, para 108.
710 T29-103, L21-24 (Jane Stewart).
711 Exhibit 121, para 4.
712 Exhibit 121, para 11.
713 Exhibit 121, para 13.
714 Exhibit 121, para 16.
715 Exhibit 121, para 25; Exhibit 118, paras 63-102.
716 Exhibit 121, paras 24, 26.
717 Exhibit 1, at page 2.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
160
7.39 First, the Business Reference Group within QH decided to centralise the processing of rosters718. The effect
of it was to withdraw from individual hospitals control of the payroll and to centralise it in hubs in major
regional areas and in Brisbane. The effect was that payroll offcers, who might previously have been
familiar with particular workers’ rosters or working arrangements, now lacked any such connection. Central
processing brought perhaps other benefts, but it also removed this customary arrangement
719.
7.40 Second, a direction was given by QH management720 to QH staff to raise any payroll questions directly with
payroll staff. Although some backlog of late forms, and forms unprocessed due to the downtime required
for cutover from the legacy system was expected
721, the direction was said to have meant that payroll staff
were inundated with requests, some of which were said to pre-date the Go Live of the new system and
referred to errors carried over from the legacy system
722.
7.41 The situation was exacerbated by, said Ms Jones, promises made by senior executives to the effect that
pay inaccuracies would be corrected in 24 hours
723. It was not clear on the evidence whether this promise
or one similar to it was ever made. There was some suggestion that the guarantee was to correct within
that timeframe inaccuracies which were 10 per cent or greater of the employee’s net pay with all other
inaccuracies to be dealt with on prioritised basis
724. Some employees lodged an amendment request
and, after not hearing back from payroll staff within 24 hours, relodged the same request, resulting in
unnecessary duplication
725.
7.42 The unexpectedly high number of payroll inquiries meant that payroll staff were distracted from their ordinary
duties because they had been directed to answer telephone enquiries. The task of answering telephone
inquiries was then outsourced to temporary contract staff
726. Ms Jones described the situation as follows727:
We now had people trying to contact payroll, contacting somebody who didn’t even work in Queensland
Health and didn’t know Queensland Health let alone payroll taking a message, telling the payroll offcer,
who, by this time is still trying to deal with other matters, and having to ring them back and them getting
abused because it took so long, or they couldn’t answer.
7.43 Third, there was also instituted what was called the “no roster no pay” rule. Ms Jones said that QH had
decided that “if you didn’t have a roster you would not be paid”
728. This was said to have come from senior
people within QH
729. It meant that ad hoc and cyclical rosters needed to be submitted by unit managers to
the payroll hub
730. This process was a fraught one. In some cases, there was no roster in proper form: some
were illegible; some payroll staff did not understand codes used by unit managers
731; and some rosters
and variations were not submitted
732. Ms Jones considered these issues to make up the majority of the
complaints she addressed in the post-Go Live period
733.
7.44 The new rule was said to have been instituted to coincide with Go Live734. It was said by Ms Jones (and
others) to be a new business requirement and was, as mentioned, responsible for most of the diffculties
and explained why many staff went unpaid. The consequence that omitted rosters, or those entered
late, would lead to no pay was said to have been accommodated under the LATTICE/ESP system which
generated a “default” roster for employees who had been paid in previous fortnights but for whom no roster
had been entered in the fortnight for which pay was being calculated
735. The default roster may not have
been entirely accurate with respect to hours and allowances worked in a particular period but it represented
the employee’s basic entitlements which would be paid. Adjustments, where necessary, were made in
subsequent fortnights.
718 Exhibit 122, Annexure E.
719 Exhibit 1, at page 4.
720 T20-27, L7-31; T20-70, L11-16 (Janette Jones).
721 Exhibit 118, para 61.
722 T20-36, L7-54 (Janette Jones).
723 T20-36, L20-21 (Janette Jones).
724 T20-36, L29-31 (Janette Jones).
725 T20-36, L40-50 (Janette Jones).
726 T20-27, L20-22 (Janette Jones).
727 T20-27, L23-34 (Janette Jones).
728 T20-26, L24-29 (Janette Jones).
729 T20-65, L1-16 (Janette Jones).
730 T20-66, L1-4 (Janette Jones).
731 For example the notation “ML” (Morning Late) would be entered on the roster by the unit manager which implied a “10am start” and the payroll offce would not understand the
notation: T20-66, L36-41 (Janette Jones).
732 T20-66, L31-41 to T20-67, L1-16 (Janette Jones).
733 T20-71, L36-37 (Janette Jones).
734 T20-65, L47-49 (Janette Jones).
735 T20-65, L30-45 (Janette Jones).

Contract
161
The new rule was said to mean what it said, so that employees whose rosters were missed went entirely unpaid736.
Mr Brendan Pollock’s statement makes it clear that the “no roster no pay” rule was not new and existed when
LATTICE was in use
737. The replacement system had been designed to operate similarly. Mr Pollock said738:
If a roster had not been entered for an employee … on a cyclic roster … time and attendance records are
created automatically … for payment without any manual intervention other than … adjustments to the …
roster … .
If a roster had not been entered for non-cyclic employees then … they would be paid an exception pay based
on their contracted hours.
There were processes in Workbrain to pick up if there was no roster or an employee’s roster did not match
their contracted hours. A report was able to be run on demand however they would have required the new
line managers’ input to validate (hours) … worked. Timeframes would have made this task challenging.
The problem which arose acutely (under both systems) concerned casual employees who by the nature
of their employment worked irregularly and might or might not work in a particular fortnight, and had no
basic roster which could be used as a basis for calculating pay. Casual employees did not submit rosters but
Attendance Variation and Allowance Claims (AVAC). If such a claim was not entered into the system the
employee would go unpaid.
The “no roster no pay” rule is a distraction.
7.45 Ms Stewart too was asked about the process and procedures which, although separate from a strict
defnition of “system”, contributed to the problems experienced after Go Live
739. She identifed business
processes in addition to those which Ms Jones had identifed that contributed to the issues with the frst
three pays, being the large volume of late LATTICE form submissions and the direction given to SSP to pay
staff what they believed they were owed without payroll evidence
740. But she made clear, and was asked
directly about this when examined, that there existed problems – independent of the business processes
and associated complications – with the computer system itself
741.
7.46 The external factor which was suggested in evidence as having had a material effect on the payroll
section’s capacity to pay staff was that an email was sent by a manager from Royal Brisbane Hospital to
the effect that if staff had not been paid properly, they ought to seek charity or consider doing so. Ms Jones
was the only witness who considered this to have been a factor
742. From that point, she said, and combined
with the media scrutiny of it, organisational control was lost and her section became the target of every
complaint, no matter how trivial, how old and how wrong
743.
7.47 Each of these matters no doubt affected in some way the process as a whole of paying staff and paying them
accurately. They seem to be matters, however, which, had the system itself been well designed and built (by which
I mean able to pay staff and pay them accurately), may not have arisen or were likely to have been manageable.
IBM’s Submissions
7.48 IBM sought to deflect any suggestion that the very considerable problems which were experienced when
the system went live were ones which, to use IBM’s terminology, concerned “coding” or “software”
744.
I am not certain that it is possible to confne so narrowly those parts of the system for which IBM was
responsible, but that issue need not be resolved because, as I have shown, both Ms Stewart and Mr Cowan
gave direct evidence, and evidence which I accept, of there being coding errors in the software.
But it remains that there were problems also with the computer system itself, problems which
concerned the way in which it had been designed and/or built and ones which, business
processes aside, caused staff not to be paid or to be paid inaccurately.
736 T20-67, L7-20 (Janette Jones).
737 Exhibit 169, para 45; see para 7.61 of this Part.
738 Exhibit 169, paras 46-49.
739 See, for example, T29-96, L45-46 (Jane Stewart); T29-90, L39-44 (Jane Stewart).
740 Exhibit 118, para 61.
741 T29-96, L41-46 (Jane Stewart).
742 Exhibit 79, paras 45-46; T20-25, L6-29 (Janette Jones).
743 Exhibit 79, para 46.
744 See, for example, Submissions on behalf of IBM Australia Ltd, dated 24 June 2013 (Contract), paras 5(b)(i) ,6(a) and 13(c).

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
162
A Defcient System
7.49 It is clear that many of the problems which were experienced after Go Live and which affected pay involved
Workbrain. Ms Stewart identifed Workbrain’s performance as the most signifcant system issue post-Go
Live
745. This exhibited itself in slowness of the MVS, diffculties viewing, updating and publishing rosters in
the MVS, individual users being unexpectedly locked out of Workbrain, and general slowness across the
Workbrain application
746.
7.50 Part of the problem was its sheer slowness in processing rosters. Payroll staff, as a result, Ms Jones
explained, simply did not have enough time to add all the data in to the roster environment to get the
rosters published
747. The problem may have been caused by a number of users in the same area using the
system at the same time, thereby creating too much of a load on the system so that it would lock them out
or freeze. Operators had to exit the system and re-enter it
748. The problem was something with which any
system, whether interim and minimal or not, ought to have been capable of dealing. Ms Jones estimated
that about 100 payroll staff across the state at any given time were affected by this problem
749.
7.51 Ms Stewart provided to the Commission a list of the problems which the system experienced after Go
Live. She gave a detailed statement about those matters, about which she was examined
750. Tellingly, she
said that, over the two and half year period since Go Live, 422 defect fxes, 180 enhancements and 172
maintenance updates have been effected
751. When asked about whether all the defect fxes were ones
which she considered necessary in order to bring the system to a position where it was functional, she
replied that they were to fx
752:
… something that’s not functioning as you would expect it to function.

7.52 She also noted that CorpTech would not be able753:
to produce the pay run today … with the way some of those programs were written in the frst place. We
just wouldn’t have enough time to complete the pay run.
Mr Doak, in his evidence, acknowledged few material defciencies in the computer system after Go Live. Those
7.53

he did recognise, he portrayed as temporary or minor. This position, in the face of so much evidence to the
contrary, did him no credit. He sought to portray the post-Go Live problems as ones which arose from the
business processes within CorpTech and QH. He sought to dismiss the problems of the kind of which Ms Stewart
gave evidence. He said, for example, of the slowness of Workbrain, that it was “minimal” and that it had
754:
[N]othing to do with this business as usual, fne tuning, tweaking, performance enhancement work that
we were doing on the computer system. It had everything to do with the fact that people never had to put
in a roster before all of a sudden had to put a roster in and overloaded the Shared Services provider, not
the fact that we were tweaking the computer system.
7.54 The MVS produced inaccurate error messages. It would advise the publication process had been successful
when it had failed or advised the process had failed when it had been successful. The inaccurate messages
occurred, seemingly, at random, so users were not certain when the error message was correct or false.
This in turn caused problems with users attempting to resubmit data
755. The unpublished roster report was
developed to address this issue. Mr Walsh identifed problems with data entry and error messages in the
MVS as main post-Go Live issues
756.
7.55 The Workbrain issues were serious enough to warrant the appointment of a Problem Manager by IBM to
work with CorpTech to diagnose the issues
757. They were serious enough to cause IBM to engage Workbrain
experts from Canada, frst to work remotely, and then for at least one of them to travel to Brisbane to
attend personally
758. The evidence which IBM provided late to the Commission, being the statements
745 Exhibit 118, para 67.
746 Exhibit 118, para 67.
747 T20-26, L9-12 (Janette Jones).
748 T20-26, L32-39 (Janette Jones).
749 T20-27, L1-2 (Janette Jones).
750 Exhibit 118; Exhibit 170.
751 Exhibit 118, para 121.
752 T29-94, L47-49 (Jane Stewart).
753 T29-97, L27-31 (Jane Stewart).
754 T25-50, L43-48 (Bill Doak).
755 Exhibit 118, paras 76-80.
756 Exhibit 121, para 25.
757 Exhibit 118, para 69.
758 T29-97, L39-47 (Jane Stewart).

Contract
163
of Mr Kwiatkowski759 and Mr Dymock760, addressed the issues which the system experienced after Go
Live. Their evidence was inconsistent with that of Mr Doak. They did not suggest that all of the problems
experienced after Go Live were a consequence of non-system problems.
7.56 Mr Kwiatkowski, for example, said there existed “unexpected performance issues” with the system following
the frst pay run
761. He described these as including there being “hung” sessions with Workbrain, requiring
users to have to log in again. He said that this issue resulted in IBM “Critical Situation Process” being
initiated. That involved bringing in a specialist to assess the situation, consulting with stakeholders and
managing the situation to resolution
762.
7.57 In addition to the critical situation management process, Mr Kwiatkowski referred to the need to obtain
assistance from Infor, leading to what he (euphemistically) described as “optimisations to the core
Workbrain product”
763.
7.58 Mr Kwiatkowski also said IBM engaged a database engineer who worked with CorpTech to analyse
problems, identify root causes and defne the actions to resolve the issues being seen in production
764. IBM
also, he said, engaged a “specialist Performance Architect” to assist
765.
7.59 Mr Kwiatkowski sought also to catalogue what I have described as the business process problems which
confronted the system on Go Live
766. They, as I have said, are accepted by Ms Jones and Ms Stewart to have
contributed to the problems which were experienced after Go Live. But it remains that there were problems
also with the computer system itself, problems which concerned the way in which it had been designed and/
or built and ones which, business processes aside, caused staff not to be paid or to be paid inaccurately.
7.60 The IBM witnesses have, necessarily, incomplete knowledge of exactly what was required to bring the
system to a state of reasonable functionality. Ms Stewart, who had responsibility for doing so, said that it
took some considerable time to achieve that, and that process to have involved many changes to it and
much work. She spoke, for example, of the need to rewrite “code”, that is the programming within the
system after IBM had left the Project. She used, to achieve that, staff who had worked for IBM on the
Project and who were quite capable of writing good code, code which more effciently achieved its intended
purpose than that which had been written under IBM’s supervision
767.
7.61 In order to better understand the problems experienced with the system at Go Live and subsequently I
requested information from Mr Pollock and Ms Stewart. They responded to the requirements to provide
information by furnishing statements on 17 June 2013 and 2 July 2013. The statements were made exhibits,
169 and 170 respectively, and posted on the Commission’s website on 3 July 2013. Commission staff notifed
all persons who had been given leave to appear that the statements had been made exhibits and were
available on the Commission’s website. No one requested Mr Pollock or Ms Stewart be made available for
cross-examination or sought to controvert the accuracy of the information each provided.
7.62 Mr Pollock commenced working on the SS Initiative as an Implementation Analyst in July 2006. In November
2006 he became a member of the Workbrain sub-team in the Initiative as a senior business analyst and
has remained in that role to the present time. He was at Go Live “embedded in the IBM team as a customer
supplied resource”. He has acquired an extensive level of understanding and knowledge of how Workbrain
worked and how it integrates with other products.
7.63 Mr Pollock provided two graphical representations of “All Workbrain and interface between SAP and
Workbrain defects at Go Live”
768. The graph “Reference 1” “summarises modules for the purpose of
providing information to the Commission but does not completely reflect actual modules”
769. The graph in
“Reference 2” shows the same grouping of a number of defects arranged by severity
770.
759 Exhibit 164.
760 Exhibit 163.
761 Exhibit 164, para 142.
762 Exhibit 164, para 143.
763 Exhibit 164, para 145(b).
764 Exhibit 164, para 145(c).
765 Exhibit 164, para 145(d).
766 Exhibit 164, para 166.
767 T29-93, L48-L54 to T29-94, L1-L17 (Jane Stewart).
768 Exhibit 169, Annexure A.
769 Exhibit 169, paras 8, 9.
770 Exhibit 169, para 11.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
164
Reference: 1
Workbrain Defects by System Category @ Go_Live

Total 1 1 1 17 3 6 15 9 5 2 13
8 6 4 2 0
10
12
14
16
Time &
attendance
Systems
support
Employee
data
management
Infrastructure Integration Leave Migration Reports Rostering Security Catch all for
workarounds

18
Reference: 2

8 6 4 2 0
10
12
14
Time &
attendance
Systems
support
Employee
data
management
Infrastructure Integration Leave Migration Reports Rostering Security Catch all for
workarounds
2–Major 1 2 1 5 1 2 4 1 2
3–High 1
3–Minor 1 8 2 1 14 4 1 1 11
4–Cosmetic 3

16
Workbrain Defects by System Category and Severity @ Go_Live

Contract
165
7.64 In Mr Pollock’s terminology, a module is a screen, or multiple screens within the software of “like type
processes”
771. They enable the system users to view it. All screens relating to employee management
constitute one module as do all screens relating to rostering.
The graph in Reference 1 depicts all defects at Go Live sourced from the Defects and Solution Management
Plan
772. Mr Pollock provided the following descriptions of the categories of defects depicted in the graphs.
“Catch all for work-arounds” refers to the time recorded for work done to perform a manual workaround
necessary because of defects in the system
773. “Employee Data Management” refers to the specifc
attributes of employees which can be managed in Workbrain
774. Typically, employee information is kept
and processed within SAP but some employee attributes are managed in Workbrain. Defects in Employee
Data Management may affect pay if the system does not properly recognise some attribute. Defects
in “Infrastructure Management” may affect the usability of the system but are unlikely to affect pay
775.
“Integration” obviously refers to the interfaces between SAP and Workbrain
776. Defects in this category
may affect pay. The graphs include all defects in Workbrain whether they initiated from SAP or Workbrain.
Defects in the “Leave” category may affect pay to the extent that leave is relevant to pay, “[f]or example if
leave was not accruing correctly then an employee may not be paid appropriately for sick leave”
777. Defects
relating to data migration could affect pay
778. The data within the Workbrain application resides within an
Oracle database. The data sets to load to Workbrain were prepared by a joint IBM/QH team. The data was
the combination of new data and data from LATTICE. The system provides about 30 reports to support
employee management such as rosters and details of leave. Defects in the category of reports have no
effect on pay
779. “Rostering” defects affect the system’s usability and may affect pay but typically do not780.
The category refers to such things as the creation of baseline rosters, entering rosters and the management
and publication of rosters. “Security” as a category is a reference to user access to functions within the
system
781. Defects of this type do not typically affect pay. “Systems Support” as the name suggests
refers to procedures which relate to supporting the system but not the system itself
782. An example is the
documentation of information. Such defects do not typically affect pay. “Time and Attendance” defects
may, however, affect pay
783. According to Mr Pollock there were two major defects in this category at Go
Live which did affect pay but he was unable to supply any details.
7.65 Ms Stewart’s response to the requirement that she provide information dealt with the number and type
of system issues encountered since Go Live and a similar description of the system issues which remain
outstanding as at July 2013. Ms Stewart provided two tables
784. The frst is of the 456 “system issues that
have been fxed … as at 1 July 2013”. These “system issues” did not relate to “new or changed business
requirements” in Ms Stewart’s opinion. The table is:
Category No. Brief Description
Deductions 3 A dollar amount withheld from an employees pay to allow Qld Health to pay
a vendor directly on behalf of them. Eg: Medibank Private. [Error in original]
Issues in this category may relate to the incorrect setup of the deduction
whereby the withheld amount may be calculated or disbursed wrongly or
there could simply be a display issue with the description of a deduction.
Manage Employee 19 The process of keeping employees’ data accurate such as their position
details, terms of employment, pay classifcation etc
Issues in this category may relate to user diffculties with the process to
perform updates to the data or may result in the data not being updated
correctly. This may or may not impact pay depending on the scenario.
771 Exhibit 169, para 7.
772 Exhibit 169, para 8.
773 Exhibit 169, paras 14-16.
774 Exhibit 169, paras 17-21.
775 Exhibit 169, paras 22-23.
776 Exhibit 169, paras 24-27.
777 Exhibit 169, para 29.
778 Exhibit 169, paras 30-32.
779 Exhibit 169, para 34.
780 Exhibit 169, para 35.
781 Exhibit 169, paras 39-40.
782 Exhibit 169, paras 41-42.
783 Exhibit 169, paras 43-44.
784 Exhibit 170.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
166
Category No. Brief Description
Finance 30 Ensuring that the dollar cost of an employee and is translated in accounting
terms for fnancial statements, reporting etc.
Issues in this category may relate to incorrect translation and posting of the
dollar amounts and associated cost centres into the fnance system. There
would be no impact on the employee’s pay but would impact fnancial
management and reporting.
Infrastructure 10 Relating to Information technology hardware or network.
Issues in this category may relate to the reliability of the system being
available or it’s performance. [Error in original]
Integration/Interfaces 88 The ability for different systems to exchange information or extract and
import data. Examples include imports and exports between SAP and
Workbrain, QSuper interface, EFT interface, ATO interface, Finance interface,
payslip interface
Issues in the category may relate to the accuracy of the content of the data
in the fles or the success of the transfer of the fle itself.
Leave 25 Relates to employee leave entitlement business rules, the management of
leave balances and the application and payment of leave.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of leave balances, the
usability of the leave function or display issues
Loans 3 Management of money advanced to an employee or overpaid to an
employee.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of the loan calculation due
to incorrect calculation logic or impact the loan reporting function or display
of loan information
Organisational
Management
1 The area that deals with the organisational structure, reporting structure,
positions and jobs but not the employees who work within it.
Issues in the category may relate to the user’s ability to accurately update
the organisational structure information but would not impact payment.
Pay rules/Time and
Attendance
65 The logic used to calculate award entitlements for employees based on their
hours worked.
Issues in this category would relate to the accuracy of pay calculations
for specifc scenarios based on a combination of award conditions with a
particular worked shift scenario.
Pay run Process 10 The processing mechanism that enables payroll calculation for a fortnightly
period to be done effciently and in a risk free manner.
Issues in this category may relate to the effciency of the pay run process, the
time to perform the pay run process and the amount of error and recovery
needed to complete the pay run.
Payslips 16 Reporting to an employee of their earnings and deductions for a fortnight.
This information is delivered by mail or available to the employee
electronically.
Issues in this category may relate to an employee’s ability to easily
understand their payslip and the accuracy of the information displayed.
Performance 13 To be able to improve the speed of the system.
Issues in this category would likely impact how quickly a user could process
their work or how quickly system batch jobs can be completed.
Reporting 54 Ability to report on employee, rostering and payroll information that is stored
in the systems.
Issues in this category may relate to poorly displayed data or missing or
inaccurately displayed data in a report

Contract
167
Category No. Brief Description
Rostering 23 Creation of baseline rosters and entering rosters in Workbrain.
Issues in this category may relate to diffculties with the process to enter the
rosters or publish the rosters or the accuracy of the data displayed
Security 16 The ability to restrict different users to access different parts of the
application based on their job requirements.
Issues in this category may relate to certain user security profles not
providing the correct security access to the data. This could be either too
much information or not enough information.
Superannuation 18 The calculation, management and reporting of both employee and employer
superannuation contributions.
Issues in this category may relate to the incorrect calculation of employee
super contributions thereby impacting the employee’s pay or the incorrect
calculation of employer super contributions thereby impacting the contribution
the employer is making to super for an employee. There could also be issues
with the reporting of the information to QSuper.
Systems Support 16 The ability to support and maintain the system
Issues in this category may relate to the ability to support the system in
accordance with service level obligations or ensure the integrity of the
system and be able to recover from system failures.
Taxation 19 Taxation related including PAYG withholding or Payroll Tax.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of taxation calculations
which may impact an employee’s pay.
Terminations 9 The process of fnalising an employee’s accounts/pay when they leave the
organisation.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of the termination
payment calculation, diffculties with the termination process or display
issues.
Wage types 16 Codes held in the SAP system that are assigned values of calculated amounts
which are used to calculate the fnal pay result.
Issues in this category could relate to incorrect values held against the wage
types or incorrect logic of how to apply the wage type to the calculation. This
could likely lead to issues with the accuracy of the pay calculation.
Uncategorised / Other 2 Fixes that did not align themselves to standard categories
7.66 With respect to issues still outstanding Ms Stewart described two types, those not related to the absence
of detailed business requirements and those which were dependent on, or arose from, missing business
requirements. There were as at 1 July 2013, 265 of the frst type. Ms Stewart provided a table of these also.
It should be noted that some issues may be duplicated but all low priority or cosmetic defects have been
excluded. The table is:
Category No. Brief Description

Deductions 3 A dollar amount withheld from an employee’s pay to allow Qld Health to pay
a vendor directly on behalf of them. Eg: Medibank Private.

Issues in this category may relate to the incorrect setup of the deduction
whereby the withheld amount may be calculated or disbursed wrongly or
there could simply be a display issue with the description of a deduction.
Manage Employee 39 The process of keeping employees’ data accurate such as their position
details, terms of employment, pay classifcation etc.
Issues in this category may relate to user diffculties with the process to
perform updates to the data or may result in the data not being updated
correctly. This may or may not impact pay depending on the scenario.

Queensland Health Payroll System Commission of Inquiry
168
Category No. Brief Description
Finance 16 Ensuring that the dollar cost of an employee is translated in accounting
terms for fnancial statements, reporting etc.
Issues in this category may relate to incorrect translation and posting of the
dollar amounts and associated cost centres into the fnance system. There
would be no impact on the employee’s pay but would impact fnancial
management and reporting.
Integration/Interfaces 4 The ability for different systems to exchange information or extract and
import data. Examples include imports and exports between SAP and
Workbrain, QSuper interface, EFT interface, ATO interface, Finance interface,
payslip interface.
Issues in the category may relate to the accuracy of the content of the data
in the fles or the success of the transfer of the fle itself.
Leave 24 Relates to employee leave entitlement business rules, the management of
leave balances and the application and payment of leave.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of leave balances, the
usability of the leave function or display issues.
Loans 6 Management of money advanced to an employee or overpaid to an
employee.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of the loan calculation due
to incorrect calculation logic or impact the loan reporting function or display
of loan information.
Organisational
Management
8 The area that deals with the organisational structure, reporting structure,
positions and jobs but not the employees who work within it.
Issues in the category may relate to the user’s ability to accurately update
the organisational structure information but would not impact payment.
Pay rules/Time and
Attendance
19 The logic used to calculate award entitlements for employees based on their
hours worked.
Issues in this category would relate to the accuracy of pay calculations
for specifc scenarios based on a combination of award conditions with a
particular worked shift scenario.
Pay run Process 6 The processing mechanism that enables payroll calculation for a fortnightly
period to be done effciently and in a risk free manner.
Issues in this category may relate to the effciency of the pay run process, the
time to perform the pay run process and the amount of error and recovery
needed to complete the pay run.
Payslips 11 Reporting to an employee of their earnings and deductions for a fortnight.
This information is delivered by mail or available to the employee
electronically.
Issues in this category may relate to an employee’s ability to easily
understand their payslip and the accuracy of the information displayed.
Performance 1 To be able to improve the speed of the system.
Issues in this category would likely impact how quickly a user could process
their work or how quickly system batch jobs can be completed.
Reporting 33 Ability to report on employee, rostering and payroll information that is stored
in the systems.
Issues in this category may relate to poorly displayed data or missing or
inaccurately displayed data in a report.
Rostering 22 Creation of baseline rosters and entering rosters in Workbrain.
Issues in this category may relate to diffculties with the process to enter the
rosters or publish the rosters or the accuracy of the data displayed.

Contract
169
Category No. Brief Description
Security 4 The ability to restrict different users to access different parts of the
application based on their job requirements.
Issues in this category may relate to certain user security profles not
providing the correct security access to the data. This could be either too
much information or not enough information.
Superannuation 20 The calculation, management and reporting of both employee and employer
superannuation contributions.
Issues in this category may relate to the incorrect calculation of employee
super contributions thereby impacting the employee’s pay or the incorrect
calculation of employer super contributions thereby impacting the contribution
the employer is making to super for an employee. There could also be issues
with the reporting of the information to QSuper.
Systems Support 2 The ability to support and maintain the system.
Issues in this category may relate to the ability to support the system in
accordance with service level obligations or ensure the integrity of the
system and be able to recover from system failures.
Taxation 4 Taxation related including PAYG withholding or Payroll Tax.
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of taxation calculations
which may impact an employee’s pay.
Terminations 16 The process of fnalising an employees accounts/pay when they leave the
organisation. [Error in original]
Issues in this category may relate to the accuracy of the termination
payment calculation, diffculties with the termination process or display
issues.
Wage types 8 Codes held in the SAP system that are assigned values of calculated amounts
which are used to calculate the fnal pay result.
Issues in this category could relate to incorrect values held against the wage
types or incorrect logic of how to apply the wage type to the calculation. This
could likely lead to issues with the accuracy of the pay calculation.
Uncategorised / Other 19 Further detailed analysis is required before these issues can be accurately
categorised.
7.67 I fnd that the system, when it went live, and for some considerable period afterwards, had serious functional
defciencies. Mr Burns and Mr Shah had warned of this as being a real possibility in the Risk Assessment
Report. Mr Cowan’s Final UAT Report had identifed it as likely and perhaps inevitable. It must have been
obvious, by the time the decision was made to Go Live, that the system, given these warnings, and the
problems with scope which had never properly been resolved, would experience those kinds of problems. The
Final UAT Report had made clear also that there were likely to exist in the system functional defciencies which
UAT had not discovered, having (quite properly) tested only part of the system.
7.68 It could come as no surprise then that the Defect Management Plan, impracticable anyway on its own, was
by no means an exhaustive list of the problems which the system possessed when it went live.
7.69 The fndings I have made are supported by the problems which I have summarised which were experienced
on and after Go Live, the work which was required to correct those problems (which both IBM and CorpTech
undertook) and the admissions made by IBM in the course of the settlement negotiations with the State
with which I deal in the following section of this Report.
… the system, when it went live, and for some considerable period afterwards, had serious
fun